

AMERICA'S DESTINY

The nether sky opens, and Europe is disclosed as a prone and emaciated figure, the Alps shaping like a backbone, and the branching mountain-chains like ribs, the peninsular plateau of Spain forming a head. Broad and lengthy lowlands stretch from the north of France across Russia like a grey-green garment hemmed by the Ural mountains and the glistening Arctic Ocean.

The point of view then sinks downwards through space, and draws near to the surface of the perturbed countries, where the peoples, distressed by events which they did not cause, are seen writhing, crawling, heaving, and vibrating in their various cities and nationalities.

—THOMAS HARDY, *The Dynasts*,
Part First, Fore Scene, stage direction



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
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TORONTO

AMERICA'S DESTINY

RECORDED

by

Herman Finer



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Preface

THE WORD "destiny" used in the title of this book is neither a preachment of duty nor the call to a crusade. It simply recognizes the fact that the jigsaw-puzzle fragments of civilization, shaped by thousands of years of history, have been tossed onto the world's table in such a way as to leave an empty space which can be filled by America alone.

It is vain to believe that the responsibilities thus conjured up can be satisfied by occasional gifts or loans of money, however generous. It is also vain to hope that imperative obligations can be met by a glorious and valiant rescue at the moments most threatening to an almost lost democratic cause. No! The Furies of obligation continue to call out, "For the peaceful there is no peace." Security, in short, is not to be had by paying tribute or by acting the knight errant in "the imminent deadly breach." Continuous effort and sense of obligation are the essence of peace because they are the essence of government.

Those who seek peace of mind will lose both peace and mind. For mind is life, and life is not peace when mind is surrendered; it is not peace that comes, but enslavement to the mind of another. If mind is valued, then it is best served by striving, striving which includes the persistent struggle for peace.

It is possible to have peace if life is extinguished or the mind is drugged. But while there is life there is power, for every individual is a mass of explosive energy, with physical power, spiritual value, and moral force. Power politics begins with the individual, and while he remains as he is, power politics must continue. It will be less of a moral struggle if he decides to abdicate rather than contribute his mind, conscience, and substance to the effort. It is of no use to blame the Secretary of State, the Foreign Secretary, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs for a harsh world! They merely transmit the power that emanates from the people. They would be broken if they failed to transmit it. As soon as the in-

dividuals that form the nations stop giving their secretaries of state and other representatives the impression that this is how they want the world conducted, these gentlemen will be able to satisfy their oft reiterated longing to retire from arduous and nasty duties. A continuing duty, then, lies with the people of whom the secretaries are merely the anxious agents. Some exception may be made for nations governed by despotic power.

Juvenal declared, "The motto, '*Know thyself!*' was sent down from Heaven." This observation was nothing but a Latin and Greek paraphrase of a later dictum: "Don't kid yourself that you are not to blame for contributory negligence!"

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CHAPTER I

No Time for Peace of Mind

FURY:

The good want power, but to weep barren tears.
The powerful goodness want: worse need for them.
The wise want love; and those who love want wisdom;
And all best things are thus confused to ill.
Many are strong and rich, and would be just,
But live among their suffering fellow-men
As if none felt: they know not what they do.

PROMETHEUS:

Thy words are like a cloud of winged snakes;
And yet I pity those they torture not.

—SHELLEY, *Prometheus Unbound*, Act I.

THE PEACE of the world is not in our time to be won by peace of mind. No moral narcotics will banish war. Just the contrary. For an unappeasable anxiety haunts the world. Men seem to question whether the First World War did or could possibly close the era of wars. It is held by some that the "war to end war" may actually have opened the way to more wars.

The world cries out for a constitution: mankind is convulsed in its quest of a livable constitution. The United Nations Organization is one attempt at such. On all sides, better ones are being invented. Indeed, the path to peace is strewn with the remnants of ineffective ingenuity. Yet, unmistakably those who draft world constitutions are tormented by their inability to agree, even though they have had the best education of our age, and even when they happen to be citizens of the same nation.

What torments them? This, that among friends a constitution is unnecessary; but where moral dissension prevails, the promise

of good behavior cannot be sincerely given, fully believed, unequivocally expressed, or faithfully observed. Where nations lack assurance, they are full of fear. Fear breeds preparation for self-defense; and self-defense dry-rots promises into deposits of suspicion. That, broadly, is the relationship between the nations today, though among some of them—for example, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway and Sweden—a sufficient like-mindedness exists to support the presumption of fair dealing and peace without even a verbal pledge.

Men are not the pilgrims of a single and uniform wish, but creatures of intense and contending appetites. They declare, most fervently, their desire for peace. The end of World War II was to see its advent. Yet, proceedings in the United Nations Security Council provide no full confidence. Indeed, world affairs are being conducted at two levels simultaneously by the same men. On the first, the assumption is that the United Nations alone can secure peace. This is the outward pose of all foreign departments. It is unavoidable, because otherwise immediate war preparations should be undertaken. But another attitude is also manifest. Some insist that real dangers to peace are involved in not forthrightly admitting the vanity of hopes in the United Nations. Without candor, the mind and spirit of men, they argue, will not be raised adequately to bear the burdens of a coming war, or the force required to deter aggression, or the sacrifices required to avert it. This approach, also, is unavoidable.

For the truth is that in spite of the defeat of the Nazis, the Fascists, and Japanese militarists, and in spite of so many sincerely contrived schemes of postwar reconstruction, numerous anxieties still bedevil the world.

CAUSES FOR ANXIETY

(1) The world is not divisible, physically, economically, or morally, into regions entirely separate from one another.

(2) The many nations are on extremely different levels of culture, government, and wealth, which provoke warlike tensions.

(3) Weapons of mass destruction exist and are being improved; and the atomic bomb, although chief, is only one of these.

(4) War has become total in its conduct.

(5) The United Nations is riven by hostility stemming from deep moral dissensions.

(6) After the experience of the League of Nations there no longer prevails a romantic confidence that peace is easy to secure.

(7) Finally, perhaps, the greatest power in the world, the United States of America, is not altogether ready for the task that falls to her to fulfill if the world is to be not only at peace, but contented. No one pines for the peace of the graveyard.

(8) Romantic belief in international institutions has declined. A brief explanation of these anxieties is proper here.

THE INSEPARABILITY OF NATIONS

If regions could be physically severed from one another, with so massive and impermeable a defense line or chasm as to be completely invasion-proof, then each region might peacefully bask in its own "way of life." However keen the pain its manners, morals, religion, color, or race might give to sensitive souls in the rest of the world, severance would mean peace. But this is impossible.

In the best attempt yet made to delimit regions, Walter Lippmann, in *U.S. War Aims*, sees three communities. Of these, the Atlantic Community includes the United States, Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Central and South America, and the various bases (Iceland, Greenland, etc.). In it, after a time, Germany would be included. A second community is the Russian Orbit; that is, Russia west to the German frontier, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Rumania, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria, and east to Vladivostok. The third community is the Chinese Orbit (presumably including Japan), southward to the borders of India, Burma, Thailand, Indo-China. In the course of time there would be other regions, for example, emergent Asia. Peace might be organized within each of these regions, and between them.

Mr. Lippmann, wisely, never forgets the physical contact of the regions. He very strongly stresses the moral interpenetration, and draws some firm conclusions regarding the Soviet Union's obligations to avert an intercommunity war.

Yet, the present anxiety is still the necessary continued strategic and economic interpenetration of these communities. (In the very long run, this may be salvation.) Each has "vital interests" in the areas of the others, especially so in a world where each nation is a law to itself, not beneath the rule of a common superior. For, so long as the communities are not physically disjoined and invulnerable, no one of them can deny its interest in extending its reach like a boxer, and getting under the guard of another community. This process of getting under one another's guard can be seen operating in the Middle East, in the struggle over Japan, northern China, and Manchuria, in the establishment of the Outer Mongolia People's Republic, in the conflict over Greece, in Bulgarian demands for a Mediterranean port, in American interests in Iceland, Greenland, and Spitzbergen and the Azores, in the tension between the western powers and the Soviet government over "the freedom of the Danube," the dispute over the status of the Dardanelles, and the ever poignant situation of the Kingdom of Iran, and the Soviet Union's veto of the otherwise overwhelming vote of the Security Council (March 25, 1947) that Albania must have had knowledge of the mining of Adriatic waters, causing the loss of two British destroyers and forty-four seamen.

Regions are not separable, because no wall is high enough to resist artillery, atomic bombs, airplanes, rocket weapons; no trench deep enough to prevent armies from moving in. Nor is the sea a barrier. D-Day in Europe decisively destroyed the vaunted immunity of areas hitherto protected by the sea. In the west, Germany threatens to step on the heart of France; in the east, the heart of Russia. For the Soviet government, Greece and Trieste are beach heads held by enemies, and the Dardanelles is a waterway leading to the very soft underbelly of Rumania and the Ukraine. The direct route to China from the United States is across Russia. And everywhere the connections are legion. The world cannot be torn apart: yet, the seventy nations are separate.

The common truth that the maximum economic welfare can be obtained only by the world-wide division of labor and skill and free exchange, is not the most significant sense of the dictum that nations are economically interdependent. Much graver is the truth that the "way of life" of nations, their culture and happi-

ness, have come to depend on, even in important respects to be, their economic well-being. Not one of them will lightly surrender a claim to some resource or commodity which happens to lie within or contiguous to the territory of another nation. Every addition to a nation's economic strength is a support of its "way of life." It has an interest in continued access to that commodity, and often in depriving others of approach thereto lest their strength for a possible war be increased.

Nations are not isolable as nations; nor, when they are grouped in communities, are the communities separable. Regionalism has no point if the regions are not different in culture and morality; if they are, conflict threatens. For they cannot leave the physical planet. Their fates are physically joined even at tangential points: a tangent is enough to cause war, for the point gets under the skin.

The moral or cultural factor prevents insulation. Many people in all countries, democratic or dictatorial, are politically deaf, dumb, and blind: perhaps they can smell. Their appetites, as Plato might have ventured, are so swinish that the interest of the community is of no concern to them, certainly of no sacrificial concern; their horizon is the pungent rim of the trough. Yet, a large and influential number respond with keen emotion to moral questions raised anywhere: Tsarist oppression and pogroms, Turkish atrocities against the Armenians, the invasion of Belgium in 1914, the Matteotti Affair, Hitler's infamies, lynchings in the United States, British internment camps in the Boer War, and Soviet oppression of the Russian people since 1918.

Democracies, in particular, cannot practice moral isolation: a democracy without the cultivation of charity, justice, and nobility in its citizens is a land of logrollers, and nothing more. These virtues are indispensable to the just solution of its problems at home, to self-control in the day of distress, and survival in war. A nation is not founded on material utility alone; it cannot flourish without the avowal of obligation. Hence, it cannot be indifferent to what occurs abroad; and so long as it is free at least some of its citizens will be passionate. But moral events and ideas, above all, are not divisible by national lines. Distance from the place of occurrence, so long as discovery and communication are possible, cannot abolish feeling and protest or approval. For some people, at all events, the moral law does not evaporate at

the frontier. Injustices in some countries could not and ought not be met by complacency elsewhere.

The most remarkable quality of mankind, from the dawn of history to our own time, is not what William James called "the rooted bellicosity of human nature." For men do not *fight* without purpose. Their most distinguishing propensity, at once terrible and sublime, is that they become excited, impassioned, inflamed, about *moral* questions, to a point where mere striving sharpens to fighting and killing for their solution. The moral attitude and emotions of men may range all the distance from the trivial values and exigencies of personal pride or jealousy or material goods, to the most elevated of ethical standards and the sublimest of religious creeds.

While any man lives he is a greater or a smaller power, but a power he is. For every man disposes in some measure of physical strength, brains, purpose, and passions, the four constituents of power. All "power politics" emanates in the end from the individual. For the individual is a nucleus of explosive force, of striving, bursting energies, whether he seeks to grow or merely to preserve, whether he is rampant to expand or concerned only to defend. He cannot abdicate power altogether: he ceases to be a force only when he is dead. That is one kind of peace. Only with death can politics cease or power evaporate: only with the satisfaction or decease of his moral spirit can the individual's struggle with and against others, and at the extreme, killing, be abated or ended.

Yet, dotted everywhere,
Ironic points of light
Flash out wherever the Just
Exchange their messages . . .

Neither physical, nor economic, nor moral isolation is possible. The world is laced together. Sooner or later it vomits forth, because it cannot help itself, any markedly foreign national body.

DIVERSITIES OF CULTURE

It would be less dangerous for peace if, the world being physically and morally one network, the nations were on the same or approximately similar levels of culture, government, and wealth. But after many centuries of nearly isolated growth they

incarnate vastly different levels of "civilization," however much they may have in common. Arriving on the world stage at the same point of time, with the most diverse loyalties, ideas, and strengths, they have become inextricably mixed up. All seek justice, in a world where their respective claims on one another are extremely divergent: territory, independence, immunity from subversive doctrines, protection, economic assistance, freedom and assurance of transit, respect for their ideas and government. To level the dissimilar mounds produced in four hundred years, in four, or in forty is to ask the impossible and wish the undesirable.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Weapons have become drastically fatal. The merciful will rejoice that in World War II some areas escaped violence. As a teacher of duty to a world community, equal and heavy direct damage would have been salutary. The veterans cannot tell all; if they did they would not be believed: tales are no substitute for suffering. But a reminder is always necessary. The old, relatively easy-going conduct of domestic and foreign policies, with the assumption of a risk of war, has suffered a dreadful shock. The new weapons intensify and bring fears to a frenzy, spur on the new weapons and defensive tactics, and so, paradoxically, provoke thoughts of war in order to avert its consequences if it came as a hazard. "Preventive war" is discussed more seriously than in 1936, when Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland. At the minimum, there is an end to tranquillity, or, as the United Nations Charter has it, "security." In concentrating on the atom bomb, the scourge of biological war is not ignored.¹

On August 5, 1946, an atomic bomb was dropped at Hiroshima, and two days later, another at Nagasaki—the first use of the *split nuclei* of uranium as a destructive force.

The destruction and loss of life were beyond the imagining of those who had hitherto used bombs from planes in warfare, even in the latter years of World War II. The devastation was so great that figures rather stupefy than vivify the imagination.

¹ Cf. survey of bacterial warfare by Theodore Roseburg and E. A. Kabat in *Journal of Immunology* (New York), May, 1947.

The atomic bomb will unite the world—whether by force or by persuasion, is as yet obscure.

At Hiroshima the dropping of one single atomic bomb by one airplane crew, on one mission alone, resulted in 70,000 to 120,000 killed or missing, and 75,000 to 200,000 injured; that is, in casualties to half the city. Almost everything within a radius of about one and one half miles was burned as well as blasted. Up to two miles from the detonation everything was blasted, with some damage from burning. In the third mile, everything was half destroyed. Beyond the three-mile radius, damage was minor. Twenty masonry and steel structures remained standing in the city's center, but they all were gutted and their windows blown out. Most bridges remained intact, except for the handrails and sidewalks. The area of total destruction was twelve square miles; the area of destruction and substantial damage, twenty-seven square miles.

This one bomb made 16,000 casualties among the 20,000 army personnel; and of the 9,000 at headquarters only 2,000 survived.

At Nagasaki a more powerful bomb was used; owing to the shape of the city, this one stroke brought only 40,000 to 50,000 dead and missing, and 40,000 injured. The industrial section was the target; the residential section, therefore, escaped lightly.

Great fires swept these cities. Radioactive dust caused hideous internal illnesses, sometimes leading to horrible death. Radium burns and blotches and exudations of blood through the skin afflicted many people. The blood-forming tissue in the bone marrow was affected by radiation, the white defensive corpuscles of the blood disappeared, and infections set in.

Up to two thousand feet away from the explosion in Nagasaki, nine-inch concrete walls were destroyed; and four thousand feet away, brick smokestacks with eight-inch walls were displaced, cracked, and overturned. The length of the burning area was three miles; its widest part, six thousand feet. Professor Oppenheimer asserts that if there had been ten miles to take out of Nagasaki, the bomb used there would have done it, and more.

Those who, in a lesser blow, might have assisted the wounded and fought the fires, could not do so at Hiroshima, and were only rather better off in Nagasaki: they or their apparatus and supplies were destroyed. At Hiroshima twenty-seven out of thirty-three fire stations were wrecked; three out of every four fire

fighters were killed or severely injured. Hospital staffs were killed or wounded, from the top men down. Of 298 doctors only 30 could be of help. Of 2,400 staff nurses only 600 could come to the rescue. The power stations, the railroads, the streetcars, telephone and telegraph exchanges, were destroyed. Only one hospital out of seven escaped severe damage. The people on the outskirts could not bring aid to the stricken, for their leaders, their equipment, their organization and buildings were destroyed.

No warning was given as there used to be, when whole flights of planes were needed to wreak any substantial damage on a city. The swiftness, the compactness, the size of the injury from one bomb, and one plane, are crushing.

A bomb can be vastly improved, and every effort continues to do better. Professor M. L. E. Oliphant, the British scientist, writes in *Nature* that, whereas the Hiroshima bomb was equal to 20,000 tons of TNT (the wickedest explosive till then invented), the future bomb may well be from fifty to a hundred times that force! Already a forty-pound atom bomb is as superior in explosive and destructive force to a forty-pound ordinary bomb, as a one-ton block buster is to gunpowder the size of a five-grain aspirin tablet.

Even with the bomb as it is, a city can be made almost to disappear in the fraction of a second, with anything up to ten bombs, according to the shape and size of the city. Its walls will dissolve into dust and smoke; human bodies, disintegrate. The heat that rages for a split second at the point of explosion is about 10,000,000° Centigrade; yet 100° Centigrade is enough to scald, and 800° to cremate. A hurricane of fire and air rushes upon and through the city.

All the cities of the greatest nation on earth can be wiped out in one single attack by, say, five hundred bombs (two hundred and fifty would be enough). Carried by five hundred planes with, let us say, a thousand others to decoy the defenders, they could kill some fifty million people, and put the rest out of any inclination or capacity to fight. All this in a few minutes. This is roughly the number Major General L. R. Groves calculates might be killed in the first surprise attack on the United States—a third of the population. *In crowded Britain, this number constitutes the whole population.*

One B-29 airplane, with one bomb, one crew only, on one

mission, can do as much destruction as hitherto required by five hundred bombers. If the atomic bomb, instead of the TNT, were used, all the wear and tear, the expense, and the loss of crews would be saved.

No more for Britain, after such an attack, the lion's roar, "We shall go on to the end . . . we shall never surrender." The time for such valor will never be past. But the atomic bomb allows no time for *growth* of confidence or power. It expunges "we shall" where "shall" is a verb of futurity: the beginning is the end.

The U.S.S.R.—as a state, not as a nation—could be destroyed, if attacked with 1,000 properly placed bombs, in spite of her vast spaces; for the centers of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kursk, Dneprostroy, Odessa, Baku, Batum, Magnitogorsk and the Ural mines and factories, Archangel, Petsamo, Tallinn, and more, would be dust.

A nation is subordinated not so much by the pulverization of its armed forces, as by the destruction of the state; that is, the organized will and integrating leadership of the community. That was the point of Hitler's blitz tactics. The new lightning not only lacerates but inflicts internal injuries on the state structure. For it can replace organized resolution by the panic and paralysis of overwhelming terror.

The atomic bomb is far cheaper than the most effective weapons now used. It cost the United States Government about ten dollars to deliver each pound of high explosive to the enemy target. Granted steady production, an atomic bomb costs \$1,000,000; the cost of the flight of the bombing plane and of weather and reconnaissance planes, \$240,000. For this total, an average (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) of 2.4 square miles is destroyed per bomb, or \$500,000 per square mile. This is one-sixth the cost of comparable bombing in World War II.

Another kind of comparison ought to be made.² To kill 305,000 and injure 780,000 in Germany, the American and British air forces dropped nearly 3,000,000 short tons of bombs in nearly 1,500,000 bomber sorties, together losing in action 160,000 men and 40,000 planes. The losses to Germany, including destruction or heavy damage to one-fifth of all dwelling units, utilities, and factories, took some four *years* to inflict. Such losses could be in-

² Figures from *U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey*, 1946.

flicted by *ten* atom bombs—let us say twenty; at the outside—in 10 to 20 sorties, instead of 1,500,000.

The range of a good modern plane, one way, is some 10,000 miles; that is, halfway round the world. The guessed twenty to sixty pounds of fissionable material, weighing with its mechanism and covering perhaps four to six tons, is an easy load for such bombers. From her home bases, the United States could bomb any place across the Atlantic from Ireland to the Urals, and the Black Sea and the Caucasus. From there, she too, could be bombed. Alaska is only 5,000 miles from Moscow. From the Kuriles, the Soviet Union could bomb the great Canadian cities and the American west coast. From Poland, from Austria, from Yugoslavia, if the Soviet Union were granted bases, or took them, she could bomb all American cities as far west as Chicago, and the intermediate countries. Flying over the North Pole via Canada, both the United States and the U.S.S.R. could inflict deadly injury from the bomb. I omit rockets, as weapons of comparatively short range—perhaps this is a danger which the United States, but not the British Isles and the jostling lands of Europe, or those in Latin America, could afford to ignore.

No feasible defense will save the defender. The bombs cannot be destroyed in their planes by being shot at: the plane itself must be shot down. But war demonstrates that when the attacker chooses his own time, some bombers always get through. One or several ordinary bombs are absorbable, but not atomic bombs. The maximum attainment of British defense against flying bombs was 97 shot down in one day out of 101 launched. But suppose the 4 that got through had been atomic bombs? They might have killed almost a million people. The other bombs that were exploded before getting to their bull's-eye, nevertheless, reached some target. Nothing could stop the V-2, the rocket bombs, shot from two hundred miles away some seventy miles into the air, except the seizure of the territory from which the rockets were launched, destroying their factories, and the transport facilities serving them—in other words, *becoming master of the enemy's territory at the earliest possible moment.*

It would be possible to go underground and rebuild cities in long linear formation, or in dispersed, though connected, centers. The estimated cost of this for the United States is around three hundred billion dollars; it includes moving people away from

some two hundred cities of 50,000 and over—a total of about 50,000,000 people. This may not include the dead loss of abandoning great urban centers, with all their amenities.

The other defenses are plenty of radar, planes to discover and combat attacks, *and the acquisition of bases* to deter the potential bomb thrower—hence, a constant maneuver for bases. (This may account for the Soviet Union's present possession of the world's largest combat air force.)³ Perpetual vigilance would be needed, for, even on a conservative basis, how could one prevent the sabotage that consists of sending merchant ships loaded with a bomb or two, as the Nazis sent merchantmen filled with disguised soldiers into the Norwegian harbors in 1940? So also with commercial planes. (Does this account for the Soviet Government's disinclination toward membership in the Civil Aviation Organization—disbelief in the right of *innocent* passage? Was the warning given in time by Marshal Tito, when United States planes were shot down in August, 1946?)

The fundamental science concerned in the manufacture of the bomb is widely known. The technological application and the building of the plants by other countries, is estimated variously from one or two to fifteen years: five years seems a favorite figure.

Several small nations, if they wished, could use their available scientists and technically trained men to produce the bomb. Small nations could embroil large ones by attack made without declaration and framed to cast suspicion on one or the other of several belligerents, or impartially to smash all.

Small nations have acquired a relative improvement in offensive and defensive status, because, even if they had only 100 bombs against a great power's 500, they would still have a power of practically mortal punishment at their disposal. When the margin goes to 500 for a small nation, or two or three allies among the small nations, against one or two thousand for a great power, the small aggressor would have a deadly club over the big powers.

Hence, supreme deadliness; cheapness, compactness, ease of delivery—range of delivery; power of irrecoverable surprise; indefensibility; and above all, *the pressure of time*, the short

³ Cf. *Aircraft Yearbook*, 1947, New York, Lanciair, Inc.

time, after which more than one nation will have atomic bombs.

This constitutes a pressure which may lead to hysterical cries for war against the closest thing to a potential aggressor, or offender; or to doing nothing through fatalism; or to maneuvering to get under the guard of an intended victim, for good reasons of defense; or to a common plan to control atomic power. Such being the danger to which all nations are exposed, what nation can henceforth trust any other nation fully, now that the fundamental knowledge is out and it is known, also, that the bomb can be manufactured?

The territories containing or suspected of containing uranium—Canada and the Belgian Congo and Oklahoma and Czechoslovakia, and very probably Siberia, which forms one geologic belt below the Arctic with Russian Turkestan and Canada—have become very desirable as sources for uranium and thorium: perhaps a ground for war. The cold of the Antarctic is matched by the heat of rivalry and suspicion in its exploration; even the U.S.S.R., mistress of the North, dispenses innuendoes regarding its strategic purpose.

It need not be supposed that destruction of the atomic bombs now in stock will lay the ghost. The gravest truth of all is that it is known that such bombs can be made, have been made, have been used, and promise self-defense or world mastery. Mankind cannot get back into the Garden of Eden now that it has eaten of the Tree of Knowledge.

“WORLD” WARS

Who will longer trust the pledged word of any nation when it involves the power to make and the will to use this absolute weapon?

As though the coming of weapons of mass destruction in a world of diverse, jostling national interests and outlooks were not cause enough for anxiety, wars have become bigger and bigger in fighting forces, number of casualties, number of countries involved, and proportion of combatants to total populations. Professor Lasswell has made a table to show this:⁴

⁴ Founded on Quincy Wright's *Study of War*, Vol. I, chap. ix, and Professor Pitirim Sorokin's *Index of War* ("Indices of the Movement of War"). Cf. for Lasswell, *World Politics Faces Economics* (1945), p. 7, and for Wright, *op. cit.*, pp. 641-665.

Century	12th	13th	14th	15th	16th	17th	18th	19th	1901-25
Index	18	24	60	100	180	500	370	120	3,080

A fair conclusion is, first, that in the centuries of small populations, remote from one another because even the most rudimentary communications and transport were lacking, wars were less frequent and intense; secondly, that in the age of the rise of the modern state—the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries—war was greatly intensified, and at the height of religious passions in the seventeenth century wars were more frequent than for nearly two hundred and fifty years; thirdly, that the nineteenth century was relatively peaceful. This is accounted for by the preoccupation of each nation with its own growing pains, constitutional and economic (ultimately contributing to strong nationalism); by the prevalent liberalism which tempered nationalism as it grew; by the influence of humanitarianism; and, finally, by the liberal and peaceful influence of the preponderant power, Britain, using her naval force for the balance of power and not for oppression. Positively stated, *in the absence of a preponderant power*, nations in proximity to each other have fought, intensively and extensively, in direct proportion to their differences of outlook and interests.

Finally, as regards the relationship of small and great powers in war, Professor Wright calculates that since 1648 in only three out of fourteen wars lasting over two years did any single great power remain at peace. These were the War of the Polish Succession (1733-1735), the American Revolution (1775-1783), and the Crimean War (1854-1856). Whatever the war's origin, the Great Powers were drawn in at some time. He asserts that the difficulty of remaining neutral has progressively increased. Thus, so linked are the nations, that the chances of remaining a neutral are not much better than one to five. The figures would be less favorable to neutrality, or isolation, if World War II were added. As for the smaller powers, they have been able to remain above the battle only when inconveniently located, or distant from the theater of operations, or when it has been to the interest of the belligerents to leave them alone—as Switzerland, and Portugal, and even Franco Spain in World War II.⁵

⁵ Cf. State Department, *Spanish Government and the Axis*, Item 1019, March, 1946.

TOTAL WAR

Nor is that all. War has become total. It has not merely spread to world-wide range, involving all occupations, resources, and all men, women, and children, but its *purpose* has become total. War aims are not limited as they were in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.⁶ Then, the particular dispute was settled by the victor's receipt of reparations, stores, cessions of territory. But World War I was the "war to end war," with more far-reaching aims which could properly be achieved only by long-term subjection of the losers, by the more general ordering of the whole of Europe for permanent results, even by the creation of a League of Nations based on permanent supremacy of certain principles of law and morals. At once, the effect of the very forms of government of separate nations on war and peace was involved. The aim was expressed as to "make the world safe for democracy," and Woodrow Wilson further elaborated it at Versailles. It was intended to refuse membership in the League to nations who could not satisfy this standard. The struggle received an ideological turn and vigor. This is what I imply mainly by the adjective "total." For when it is believed that the very principle of the enemy's political system is evil and dangerous, it is a temptation to consider the war not won until that principle has been eradicated. Eradication of the principle implies extirpation of its holders. It is not difficult in time of war or threat of war to arrive at the belief that all the inhabitants of the enemy country hold the doctrine or at any rate condone it.⁷ This leads to "genocide," or, in the terms of the United Nations, "a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups."⁸

⁶ Guglielmo Ferrero, *Peace and War* (1933).

⁷ See R. G. V. Vansittart's *Black Record* and other works.

⁸ Cf. United Nations General Assembly Resolution, condemning genocide and calling for an international convention for prevention and punishment of the "crime." December 13, 1946. *Journal* No. 58, p. 476.

The strongest resolution put forward, and not adopted, was that of Saudi Arabia. In part it ran:

"Any of the following acts may constitute the crime of genocide:

- a) Mass killing of all members of a group, people, or nation.
- b) Destruction of the essential potentialities of life of a group, people or nation or the intentional deprivation of elementary necessities for the preservation of health or existence.

Now, if that was the growing state of mind after 1916, and was developed further after the United States' entry into the war when Woodrow Wilson eloquently agitated democratic principles, then, the Bolshevik Revolution, the rise of Fascism and Hitler, the maneuvers of the Communist International, and Soviet propaganda and tactics made war more pervasively total in this sense. The doctrine of exclusive salvation was disseminated on a world scale: man could be saved, holy and happy, and live a worthy life, only in one special political way. Those not sharing this view were infidels properly damned, the permanent enemies of the elect who ought to occupy all the *Lebensraum*. Until the enemy of the one true way was suppressed a settled peace was impossible, just as it had been between Christians and Mohammedans in bygone centuries.

This ideological fury issued from the social struggles of each country. In the past, the separate countries alone might have been troubled. But the mass press, the picture papers and tabloids, the rapidity of news communication, the spread of ideas, the popularization of government in which the millions were urged as a duty to read, discuss, and vote, and the spread of mass education—all these marvelous twentieth-century assets furthered the permeation of the whole world with restlessness and warlike tensions. These tensions, strongly ideological, moving more millions of people during World War II than at any time since the Wars of Religion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, led to the

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- c) Planned disintegration of the political, social or economic structure of a group, people or nation.
 - d) Systematic moral debasement of a group, people, or nation.
 - e) Acts of terrorism committed for the purpose of creating a state of common danger and alarm in a group, people or nation with the intent of producing their political, social, economic or moral disintegration."

When the resolution on genocide was first proposed (November 5, 1946), the Soviet delegate, Mr. Gromyko opposed its placing on the agenda, claiming that the Soviet Government favors the explication of existing principles rather than the inclusion of others of a "general character." On November 22, 1946, another Russian delegate moved an amendment to the broad, original resolution, requiring study of the question "of the preparatory work to be done for a convention on crimes against any particular race." This was definitely limitative. The reader may draw his own conclusions regarding motivation. See United Nations Documents, General Assembly, 1946, A/Bur/50; A/C.6/83 and 86; A/231; and Journal, Tuesday, November 5; and Journal, No. 41, pp. 53-4.

Cf. also Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (N.Y., 1946).

grim recognition that war meant not just limited losses and gains but the possibility that a whole way of life would be wiped out. Mussolini and Abyssinia, Franco and Spain, Hitler and Germany (Himmler said, "Germany is the first country we must conquer!"), the Soviet rulers' treatment of their own Russian people as a piece of stone to be hewn into the shape desired by Lenin and Stalin, on Bukharin's plea, "The sword of history is in our hands," suggested what horrors might be expected. Fears and suspicions were intensified.

The recognition had already dawned and was written into the Covenant of the League: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League."

Not by any universal conscious choice, the nations had stumbled on the world's essential oneness, and sensed the depth in each country to which that oneness penetrated, to every soul, and the whole future. A war started anywhere could extend everywhere. An idea springing from one mind might disrupt the peace and the future of all souls. A system of government had foreign consequences, making its character the domestic concern of all other governments. The work of the League, the international struggles there conducted in public view, stimulated this extension of open conflict, as some who did not want the League had prophesied it would. (Yet the conversion of private revenge and indemnity into public trial and punishment of crimes in courts acting for the whole community, was a tremendously progressive step in the constitutional development, that is, the development of peace and unity, of each modern nation.)

Thus, the world happened on the wild surmise that the world is one. This can be a calamity, if the propensity to war is increased by conviction that war may mean the cancellation forever of separate national ways of life. One man's "thousand-year Reich" is another man's millennial subjugation. Yet nations can never retreat from the knowledge they have acquired. Their new world-sense may conduce to war without mental preparation for the efficient gathering of its fruits, or to a deliberately conducted diplomacy that will allow for armament and war if necessary; but it is highly doubtful that the nations will peacefully agree on a permanent peace-assuring constitution and international and national policy.

Total war has become one of mankind's mental habits. How easy it is now to talk of World War I, World War II, and World War III!⁹ Contrast this with the earlier peaceful life described by Hugh R. Wilson:

We were born in the Victorian era. When we reached manhood the Franco-Prussian War was long past, tales of the Civil War bored us to tears, and the Russo-Japanese and Boer wars were in such remote parts of the world as to be interesting only as episodes of history. Even the Spanish War was too easy and romantic—it inspired visions of world power but not of cataclysm. Change in the world was inconceivable; change in our social relations might come, but it would not be on a scale to shake our fundamental institutions. War between civilized Western powers was an absurdity; “it would cost too much”; “the international bankers would never permit it”; “the Socialist parties in Europe would call a general strike.” The world had become more or less democratic and surely, we argued, this trend toward democracy would become ever stronger, and peaceful democracies all over the world would avoid war. . . . We lacked wholly historical perspective. To us the Victorian era of stability was normal. We needed a lifetime to realize, and some of us have not yet realized, that it will be cited with the age of Augustus as one of the two great periods of peace and security in the history of Western civilization. We lived in the illusion of immutability, but we had unquestioning faith in the illusion.¹⁰

Once a challenge like Hitler's was issued, an answer was unavoidable: the only choice became whether it should be deliberate or fumbling. In the Proclamation to the German Forces on the eve of the assault on the Netherlands and France, Hitler said:

The hour has come for the decisive battle for the future of the German nation. In three hundred years the rulers of England and France have made it their aim to prevent any real consolidation of Europe and above all to keep Germany weak and helpless. With this your hour has come. The fight which begins today will decide the destiny of the German people for a thousand years. Now do your duty.

There is war for “total” stakes! Once so sweeping and evil a gamble is tried, can it be excluded from our quivering national

⁹ In the British House of Commons, Oct. 6, 1946, a member proposed that the use of the phrase “World War III” be forbidden!

¹⁰ *The Education of a Diplomat* (1938), pp. 2-3.

memories, so that it ceases to disturb national tranquillity? Hardly. Total war is so dangerous that its possibility cannot be lived with as a hazard: it must be replaced by rule.

THE UNITED NATIONS

With a world not divisible into severed regions; with weapons mortal; with war total; it would seem that the United Nations offers salvation. Indeed, if in 1919 the League had included both the United States and Russia, how happy mankind might have been! Today we have the blessing of universal membership. Yet it is coupled with the calamity of incomplete obligation, and one dark crevasse of moral dissension. We need not absolve small nations from their past-present sins. They were neither holier nor nobler than big nations in the League's twenty years. They were chiefly security consumers, and like all customers, wanted their goods cheap.¹¹ Yet small nations today are not likely to let their rancor or cupidity reach into wars, for they fear condign punishment by their big neighbors. Consider Czechoslovakia, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, in the orbit of Russia! Peace, then, is especially in the hands of the Big Five and certainly the Big Three. In the United Nations, veto power on decisions and even investigations that might produce conciliation among disputants is in the hands of the Big Five; but it is (politically speaking) especially in the hands of the Big Three. Peace depends upon the political relationship among themselves.

For the sake of peace and justice (justice cannot be omitted), they might agree. It happens, however, that they are riven by moral dissension; indeed, that fact *produced* the veto rule. Even so much international obligation was difficult to secure: it is more than doubtful whether the Soviet Government was enthusiastic about entering the United Nations.¹²

Each nation is unsure of the others. Whoever first provoked

¹¹ Cf. M. E. Burton, *The Assembly of the League of Nations* (Chicago, 1941); W. E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace Since the World War* (1940); A. E. Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935* (London, 1936).

¹² I refer to the news dispatches from Moscow between January and April, 1945. It will be recalled that the Soviet government sent Molotov, instead of the Ambassador to Washington, as head of the Russian delegation only after diplomatic appeals.

fears, each has surrounded itself with "friends" because it believes it is faced by enemies. A steady and deepening rift—except in small matters—afflicts and stultifies the United Nations.

Various votes have acknowledged the specter of total war and the need to intervene in international disputes (Iran), internal affairs (Spain, Argentina), and the admission of new states to the United Nations. Each party has, however, used the occasion to strengthen itself and weaken the others, and also to assimilate the rest of the world to itself. The United Nations should have been a forum; it has become an arena. Mr. Bevin's simple honest declaration of loyalty to the Organization (in December, 1946) as a paramount obligation was understood by Soviet diplomatists to mean unfriendliness for Russia! The nations feel deeply the inexorability of unity in a world to be based on a common morality; but each side clings to its own advocated morality. In the negotiations among the Allies over the peace treaties, the same features are visible. It was President Roosevelt's genius that secured the San Francisco Conference and, through it, the United Nations Charter before peace came. It is most doubtful whether, if left until afterwards, a United Nations including the U.S.S.R., would ever have been formed. Whether this will enable the world to avoid a tragic destiny is another question. The atom bomb at San Francisco would have made the Charter impossible. That is, perhaps, why Mr. Stettinius, who is said to have been briefed on the progress of the invention, was then silent about it.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

These are dreadful trials to the human spirit. Its help must come from the most powerful. It would be a happy thing if the most powerful were also the most virtuous. The U.S.S.R. has zealously offered itself as the leader of mankind; at least, it has implied that Communism could be. But the question is whether Communism, as the organizing principle of mankind, would be represented by the existing political system of Russia—the Soviet Government being the leader, ultimate arbiter, and continuous mentor and director of the activities of the governments of the seventy states—or would be subject to interpretation by each of the seventy states in its own government. The former would mean the despotic rule of a single party, whose policy down to minute

detail may be *forced* upon the people. The Soviet could hardly feel secure if the other sovereign Communist states were less dominated than Poland is today. This still leaves open the question whether such governments could be forced upon all other countries without war everywhere, for many, many years. Large majorities of dissentients, in some places vast majorities, if the results of free elections in all countries, even after the great catastrophe of 1939-1946, are taken as a guide,¹³ would require liquidation.

Another question must be asked: Is peace worth the price of complete deprivation of the free political practices and civil rights of the Western world? A Soviet world order cannot arise by popular acceptance; it could not succeed if imposed by force. Even the Russian people, if granted a free choice, would repudiate Soviet Government. The Soviet rulers know this; it accounts for their oscillations between desperation and geniality, as a permanent minority in the world. The men in the Kremlin must be intensely unhappy. They must reflect that if the whole world, even Germany alone, were as Communist as Russia is, the leadership of Communism would pass from Soviet hands. For other nations are far more competent administratively.¹⁴

The United States, then, becomes the chief salvation of mankind. When this is said, a howl of dissent and laughter will go up from many in the small lands of Europe, and from the politically conscious Middle East, Far East, and India. Some of these, educated in England and America, and by America's example—their liberties in World War I, World War II, preserved by America, which is *still* their pillar of hope—will alternately laugh and be afraid, because they will sneer at and despise various phases of American culture. These supercilious few have the peculiar arrogance of men who live holy lives in poverty: Brahmins and Mohammedans and Arabs of high caste and breeding, followers of Confucius, and various aristocracies and men of

¹³ On December 22, 1946, Mr. Bevin broadcast an account of the General Assembly session just ended in New York. He was at pains to emphasize that Britain was no exclusive friend of the United States, especially as a group of Labor party "rebels" had voiced the suspicion that there was a secret alliance between the two countries.

¹⁴ This fact, well known to all students of the history of administration, is abundantly supported by Stalin's frequent admonitions and such eyewitnesses as John R. Deane, in *The Strange Alliance*, 1946.

wealth and refinement, the "educated" parlor-philosophers of all social classes in Europe. The Lin Yu-t'angs and the Count Keyserlings have said their say. And European left-wing politicians who *failed* to stop Hitler and Mussolini now flash out in ideological pride against American strength, the strength which redeemed them!

They will not see the mote in their own eyes. They will not recognize the vocation of the United States to help them to peace. They can make some very powerful criticisms of America's spiritual and political right and capacity to use force on their behalf, and keep it ready in such measure that subsequent international solutions shall be American solutions. If I said that America should *replace* their governments and civilizations, they would be right, though not as right as they think. In any case, it is a tribute to the vast majority of Americans that they themselves do not believe it is their vocation to direct the world; and the first qualification for world leadership is, not to think so. Indeed, many Americans would join in the derision. That the Soviet rulers claim it is their right to "lead" the world, is their prime disqualification for the honor and authority.

Yet the trepidations tormenting the world cry out for resolution. They cannot be resolved except by throwing into the scales a preponderant force, imbued with order. For all nations, except Soviet Russia, would fear American-supported solutions less than Soviet ones. Many international disputes can be settled without the threat of force. Disputes become fewer and fewer. Keeping the peace depends upon the combination of the relatively best conscience and the strongest force, should force have to be invoked. The United States is most eligible on both grounds. Not that all Americans are virtuous, or innocent of self-seeking, while other claimants are corrupt. But, at every crisis in human affairs, the choice open to mankind is not between absolute good and absolute evil, but between imperfect alternatives. The only question mankind is permitted to answer is, Which is the better system now, and which promises more for the future with the maximum of reliability? The United States is called to leadership. If it were found wanting, that would be the crowning calamity, and mankind would dither along, inevitably stumbling into a war, and still not deriving from war any assurance of law, order, and peace.

The supreme qualification of the United States for responsible world leadership is that she is the most powerful living embodiment of democratic government. Her political system is founded on the final assumption of the evolutionary value of the individual human being; on the postulates of the freedom and equality of all men and women; and on the principle that governments may arise and adopt and enforce policies only if based upon the consent of the people. The shortcomings of democratic government in practice are not unknown.¹⁵ But, again, all choices of government are comparative choices. Mankind is in no position to make absolute choices whenever it wishes. It never begins with a clean slate. The oldest democracies are still in their infancy. What is one hundred and fifty years in the life of nations? It is the brevity of the blade of grass.

Hence, in that populous and powerful democracy, the United States, hardly out of the infancy of taming a wilderness and, it might be said, of cultivating some primitive people who flocked to her shores, we see the best instrument that history has yet provided.

America has a duty to assume the burdens of *arbiter mundi*. Arbiter, not ruler. She has the duty of supporting continuously with her wealth and man power (in association with those who will accept her lead, and against those who will not) peaceful solutions of the world's constitutional problems and disputes and situations which would lead to war, except for the timely use of a principled word and a muscular arm. She will ready herself to go to war for such purposes; or she will go to war in any case. For her intervention will be made necessary by the final strategic consequences of wars, wherever they originate. It is a terrible burden to bear, but she can have many good associates. Her power is so great that even repudiation of her responsibilities will be a kind of arbitration.

In the end, the responsibility lies on her. The recognition of historic destiny by those who acknowledge America's place ought again to be accepted without irreverence and meanness. For it cannot be a day of jubilee for patriots of Churchill's or De Gaulle's type to confess the passing of the glory of their nations,

¹⁵ Cf. my *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* (New York, 1932—2 vols., 1,500 pp.)

and their submission to the un pitying sweep of titanic terrestrial forces.

Many acute apprehensions in the world at this moment could be calmed, if it were assured that the United States would give to the nations in the twentieth century at least the liberal, if not perfect, leadership that Britain gave to Europe in the nineteenth century, and that the United States Senate can surpass the House of Commons in wisdom and constancy. America is today morally and institutionally unready to take out the marshal's baton from her knapsack where it has lain since 1776. But she could be ready tomorrow. Is it true that

The only fault's with time;
All men become good creatures, but so slow?

DECLINE OF INTERNATIONAL ROMANTICISM

In 1914, the nations entered the war in a romantic frame of mind. The League of Nations was set up with an equal dash of the glorious and the easy. Twenty years of bitter experience have taught that nationalism was an extremely tough, tensile, corporate force, flexible but resistant, and when cast out by one clause of the Covenant returned through another, or through "interpretations." The peoples entered World War II in a notably sober mood, as a nuisance. It was a duty like cleaning dirty streets. As the French concluded: "Il faut en finir"—"We must end this once for all." The war was an affront to the human spirit of good sense and prudence. Yet it was not appreciated that men's own faults of omission had produced it, that their innocence was not enough. Those who were being taken away from their girls and their ice-cream sodas and beers, complained, "Why were we not told about all this earlier, when there was still time?" There was a revulsion from twenty years of moral tension, of being kept on edge, and always without tranquillity. For the war did not and could not end for Europe in 1918. A more fateful question altogether burst from the hearts of men, called from the factories, the harvests, and the beaches: How were they to finish thoroughly with their own burden of responsibility for the bitter sorrows that had fallen upon them?

Nor was the spirit creating the United Nations at Dumbarton Oaks or San Francisco romantic. The powers were not sanguine

that a constitution made will necessarily work—it had been tried. To expect less, but to be more self-controlled, was the moral. Yet nationalism was not mollified. The war immensely increased it; the victors swelled with pride; the vanquished were not abashed. The “undergrounds” were determined to keep splendidly what they had rescued so valiantly. The force of nationalism is more formidable than ever. But there is, I think, an increase in sober resolution to keep the peace justly. Nor will the idea of world unity and order ever be entirely snuffed out, since the psychological miracle wrought by the mere existence of the League of Nations for twenty years.

One aspect of this heightened nationalism is the claim to preponderating influence on the peace treaties and the settlement of disputes, based on the magnitude of losses suffered in the War. This demand is made by all belligerents, but especially by the Soviet rulers. Mr. Molotov argued thus at the Paris Conference on August 9, 1946:

When we had to fight against our common enemy, the Soviet Union did not stand in the rear ranks among the Allies. The Soviet Union is proud to have saved the civilization of Europe from the Fascist barbarism. The Soviet Union is proud to have liberated not a few European states from beneath the Fascist heel, to have freed several capitals where only yesterday the Hitlerite flunkies were parading, and to help them on the road to democratic development, to raise the banner of freedom, to sound the clarion call of national renaissance in all Europe.

The Soviet Union made unheard-of sacrifices in this struggle. Seven million of our men are dead. Seven million men gave their lives to the fatherland. Incalculable losses were inflicted on our national wealth. This gives us the right to recall that the voice of the Soviet Union, the voice of all other democratic countries, the voice of all those who appeal for as complete a unanimity as possible, deserve to be heard.

Now that we have won the victory, we must work together to create as solid a peace as possible. *And all attempts to set a majority against a minority will do no good.* The attempts will simply have a deplorable effect on public opinion in democratic countries and will contribute to the destruction of the prestige of the conference, which must be kept as high as possible.

Molotov was opposing the principle of majority vote (advocated with reservations by the United States, knowing well that the

two-thirds rule would benefit the Soviet Union since a long and careful campaign had prepared for Russia an adequate number of associates with the ability to block any settlement unsatisfactory to her). Mr. Byrnes answered the Soviet war-sacrifice plea with a similar plea, especially adducing services to the Soviet Union herself.¹⁶

What is dismaying in such a contention, from whatever source, is that war services and losses justify a laying down of the law of peace. The argument is irrelevant to the principles of peace, and the choice of its organizers. The truth must be faced. The Soviet Union accepted the burden of war only when her *own* survival was at stake. In August, 1939, she concluded a pact with the Devil himself, Hitler, making as certain as anything in the world could be that Hitler would wage war on the West. She damned the consequences for the rest of the world, and she damned by callous calculation. Russia did not enter the war for ideals, or justice, or mercy, or charity, or the liberation of enslaved countries. It is true that her sacrifices did contribute tremendously to the overthrow of Hitler; but she took no risks regarding Japan, another Fascist state. And furthermore, she carefully waged her campaign, when strong enough to choose, to safeguard her political gains from the war—the Baltic states, the Balkans, Austria, Germany, the Kuriles, Sakhalin, Manchuria. Rivers of Polish blood were spilled on behalf of the Soviet rulers' selfish political purposes.

We should still mourn the Soviet Union's shocking bereavements, and pay everlasting homage to the bearing of her rulers and her masses. But sacrifice gives title only to a prayer for justice, not to seizure of what belongs to someone else.

Similarly of the other belligerents except the Axis, which deliberately made war. Great Britain entered at the last possible moment for her own survival. France fulfilled her pledge to Poland only after insistent pressure from London. The neutrals, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, tried to remain snug and chaste above the battle, until they were overborne. The United States made some contributions, but little in proportion to neces-

¹⁶ It must be remembered that the Soviet rulers have had several times to be strongly prompted to admit to the Russian people the size of American and British war effort and losses.

sities until Pearl Harbor and Hitler's and Mussolini's declaration of war.

The only proper relationship between contributions and the weight of influence in peacemaking is the strength, constancy, and justice pledged and assured, to support the peace of the future.

World War II was not fought for a principle, but against a common enemy, by a number of nations with different, not harmonious, principles and reasons for fighting. Above all, in the United States, the true job of informing the nation and its fighters about "what they fought each other for" did not take the form of preparing America for the fulfillment of this global phase of its "manifest destiny." An explanation is needed.

Once the nations entered the war, and acknowledged Hitler's guilt, admitted the "crimes against humanity" they had long known but had preferred to ignore for the sake of a quiet life, it was their leaders' duty to see that their populations were thoroughly informed and convinced of the tasks of future peace, and their consequences for the individual life of each man and woman. If the underlying *reason* for war were reputable, then that reason deserved and required its continued implementing *after* the war also. For the instability of nations today is largely a product of the fact that more people than ever before are more conscious of political duty, but as yet not enough people are sufficiently conscious. We already know too much for war, but as yet too little for peace. We are too civilized to want to use force, but not civilized enough to be persuaded and persuade.

Was the necessary task of information fulfilled? Emphatically no, despite the fact that the Office of War Information had at its disposal more considerable opportunities of mass education than had ever been in the hands of a single organization, except the ministries of propaganda in the Italian, Nazi, Japanese, and Soviet governments. Failure was due not to lack of money, or of technical means like the radio and the film. The missing factor was the will to teach democracy and the international task of democracy to its final consequence. It never occurred to the leaders that the name "War of Democratic Deliverance" expressed its spirit. A time of war is the most hopeful occasion for the education of vast masses. For then the habits and routines of men and women are abruptly and extraordinarily changed, and, having more anxieties, they ask more questions. Peace breeds habits; it

may even be said that peace *is* habit; and habit asks no questions. In war, the mind is excited, the feelings are aroused, and the relations between nations are incessantly thrust on the attention. Men will listen out of desperation. Millions upon millions of Americans never learned in school where America ended and where the rest of the world began! Other nations shared these shortcomings. The Four Freedoms ran:

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms . . . "freedom of speech; freedom of worship; freedom from fear; and freedom from want"—which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants.

To this may be added the international version, that is, Paragraph Six of the Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941):

After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Inculcation during war of all these objectives in governmental and social reform at home lacked the foundation of a long peacetime education. And, again, the "freedoms" have very diverse meanings for different people. Nor is that all. Their international implications, the national duties and sacrifices involved in the establishment and fulfillment of such a standard would have far-reaching consequences for domestic and Allied differences. The President's burden of carrying the Congress, even his own party, in the immediately essential matters let alone the Republican opposition, was almost insupportable.¹⁷ Vast numbers of people in America, as in other countries, wanted to fight the war making the smallest concessions in their own future liberty and property. Hence, it was impossible for the agencies of public information to press a democratic doctrine to its full measure. Words and ideas lost step with events. But events do not teach understanding,

¹⁷ Charles A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940*, Yale, 1946, shows this vividly, though unintentionally.

system, comprehensiveness, or balance. They awake the spirit and inflame curiosity. They produce hunger, appetite, and a vacuum. The true task in America is yet to be done. Even Henry Wallace could learn some history, for policy is askew without it. For obvious reasons, greater success was had in Great Britain.¹⁸ The Soviet Union had the supreme success, for there a single, clear dogma without reservations was taught by a convinced government which meant it, to a people *forced* to accept. Neither democratic shortcoming nor Soviet success is cause for rejoicing. If the victors did not fully comprehend the democratic import of the War, how could they teach the Germans?

World War II ends, then, in bewilderment, fumbling, and, above all, fear. Why should anyone worry about the eight anxieties? Because considerable numbers experience shock after shock to their confidence in the arrival of a peaceful world. Hitler's prophecy that the Soviet and the West must come to war sometimes seems to be coming true. The time of troubles into which the world has slipped is an outcome of its own nature, not of Hitler's nor of Stalin's: it derives from the historically acquired position of all of the nations. Hitler was a product as much as a producer. The masses are right in being concerned. But the proper way out of a time of troubles is to cease self-deceptive talk, to know oneself, and not to ignore or abandon one's responsibilities. Either men and women do all that is necessary for peace—*all*—or they make ready for dreadful wars in uncertain intervals of fat living and genial cynicism. It is no longer permissible in democratically governed countries for the common man to carp and at the same time indulge in innocence about the fundamentals of his nation's power and duty. He connives at and shares in its enjoyment of riches and strength. He becomes guilty, accessory to the fact, as soon as he can read. General Marshall's disappointed report of October 29, 1945,¹⁹ is true. He said: "For the moment, in a widespread emotional crisis of the American people, demobilization has become, in effect, disintegration, not only of the armed forces, but apparently of all conception of world responsibility and what it demands of us." This is not the state of emotion or

¹⁸ Cf. my article "Postwar Reconstruction in Great Britain," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Politics*, Sept., 1942.

¹⁹ *New York Herald Tribune Forum*.

mind which will make the world safe for peace and justice.

The obsessions that darken our time are, it will have been noticed, the product of the physical, economic, technological and moral interpenetration of all nations. Yet the international law (and government) that rules contemporary nations in their relationship with each other, as it has developed from the seventeenth century, is chiefly a texture of acknowledged custom, the quintessence of which is, that states shall practice a mutual non-interference with each other. It is a duty of all to treat each other as independent, self-governing, self-contained units, unassailable in territory or any phase of the domestic life of any of them. It rests, it may be surmised, on the severance of nations by distance, and it omits the will and opinion of the masses. If complete non-intercourse as well as the absence of mutual influence could be practiced, the world would have peace. But it has been seen that the conditions do not admit of this possibility. The Covenant of the League attempted to bridge the gap of the centuries, but inadequately. The Charter of the United Nations does better, but not much better. What can improve it? What principles? What procedures? And by what route is improvement to be sought? What measures will exorcise the anxieties?

Fate has overtaken us, as it overtook America in the Civil War and as, in particular, it overtook a great and noble man, Lincoln. It is sad indeed that this generation and the next have come into so damnable a heritage; but that heritage is alive, it is not a package of still life. Like Laocoön's coiling serpents, it attacks. The only question is, will man let his slack appetites relax, or will his mind dominate the situation?

Peace, Justice, and Security

Men would rather have their fill of sleep, love, singing
and dancing, than of war.

—HOMER, *The Iliad*

THE SIXTY-SEVEN sovereign nations never cease protesting their wish for peace.¹ Yet they have no sure sense of security. What defeats their will, save their own will? So grave a paradox must be explained.

If men pray for peace so fervently without achieving it, something must override their desire for peace. If it takes two to make a quarrel, it takes only one to submit to peace. But such a peace springs from fear of the consequences, no matter how unjust the intimidator. If peace, and peace alone, were the paramount demand of mankind, mankind could have it, though it might have less of other desirable things.

¹ A trio among thousands of examples:

President Truman, at the San Francisco Conference, Apr. 25, 1945: "We hold a powerful mandate from the people. They believe we fulfill this obligation. We must prevent, if human mind, heart, and hope can prevent it, the repetition of the disaster from which the entire world will suffer for years to come. . . . If we do not want to die together in war, we must learn to live together in peace."

From Stalin's Order of the Day, May 1, 1946: "The peoples of the world do not wish a repetition of the calamities of war. They fight persistently for the strengthening of peace and security. In the vanguard of the struggle for peace and security marches the Soviet Union."

Finally, the Preamble of the United Nations Charter opens, "We, the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind . . ." and includes at the head of the list of Purposes: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

The Chinese could have been spared much bloodshed and anguish if they had, as a clergyman once suggested to me in a perfectly Christian spirit, permitted the Japanese to occupy all China. Even if this involved molding by Japanese culture, the final blend might have been predominantly Chinese. Yet the Chinese could not see the merits of this course. They found this easy way to peace repugnant. The same repugnance is expressed by the Moslem League in India against the submergence of the Mohammedans in a unified India, with the Hindus in a vast majority. It is of the very highest significance that the clash between the two cultures will be *peacefully* solved, because both live under a common superior (resting on force), the British Government, which has developed something of a common morality, a common language, and common notions of law and justice.

In fact, none of the official declarations are pure or unqualified claims for peace. The terms "security," "justice," and "international law" make their appearance. Two examples are illuminating.

Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Foreign Minister, declared at the Second Plenary Session of San Francisco Conference, April 27, 1945:

Let the great powers be our freely accepted leaders. We have confidence in their strength and in their experience. Let them not forget that, less inclined to rely on a strength that fails us, we consider respect for justice and law as the supreme guarantee of our existence. This sentiment leads us to express the wish with other delegations that the juridical and moral principles on which the new organization is to be based should be more precise. The will to maintain peace is undoubtedly a very laudable aim. But recent history has shown us that in order to achieve it, it is imperative that we should be faithful to rules of justice. In our minds and in our souls, we may not separate the idea of justice from the idea of peace. We should not let ourselves be forced to the painful choice between justice and peace.

The Memorandum of the Netherlands Government to the conference reads:

The maintenance of international peace and security is a most desirable goal. But, if speaking *ex hypothesi*, a case arose of peace being bought at the price of what would be widely felt as injustice,

that price might well seem unreasonable to many; such a settlement could not be expected to command respect and therefore to endure. . . . The Netherlands Government do not claim to have found the ultimate solution, but they have asked themselves whether a reference to those feelings of right and wrong, those moral principles which live in every normal human heart, would not be enough.

Under the pressure of the small nations, especially the Latin American, the word "justice" was not infrequently inserted into the Charter. They rejected peace at the price of Munich. Marshal Tito put it in a nutshell, "Yes, we want peace, the most just peace, but not peace at any price."²

Senator Vandenberg told an American Legion convention: "American people cannot be driven, coerced, or pressured into positions which we decline voluntarily to assume, and we will not bargain in American rights and fundamental liberties anywhere on earth."³

The nations will be peaceful *if* they obtain justice—that is, admission that their claims are right and the practical concessions to fulfill them. Here, then, is the crux: the inability to define "justice"—that is, the rightness of the claims made by each and all—satisfactorily to all nations creates the international quicksands of our time. In default of a formula of justice universally satisfactory, the sovereign nations have arrogated to themselves, and have been endowed by international law (made by themselves) with, the independent right to decide what justice is. This, then, authorizes each to take such action as his own discretion, and the power at his disposal or obtainable from allies to compel the rendering of this justice, allow. In peace, the nations are fearful of any shift of power likely to cause the prevalent practical definition of "justice" to change to their detriment. In war, they consort with nations most likely to support their ideas of justice. In the making of a world constitution, like the Charter of the United Nations, they hedge the powers of the collective organization and the making of a common will by limitations designed to leave each party still a judge in its own cause, or of what justice is to be to it and therefore to all others—for justice is a relationship.

² Speech, Aug. 21, 1946, during the tension with the United States that followed the shooting down of American planes over Yugoslavia.

³ Aug. 17, 1946.

Only a tiny minority anywhere wants war for its own sake. The vast majority of people everywhere desire peace, though they may crave activity, being energetic. War has no purpose if the desires of man may be obtained by other means. But the contemporary desires they condense in the word "justice" happen to be extremely ardent, and some collide heavily.

Hence tremendous boulders lie in the road to peace. Who shall define "justice"? The nations for themselves. Who shall alter the existing situation? The nations for themselves. But this implies that national existence and national independence of mind must be safeguarded. They are, indeed, so protected in the constitutions of the League and of the United Nations, as they have been protected since the rise of modern states over three centuries ago, by various principles of international law.

Peace then is hardly the paramount and absolute object of all nations. They seek something that is called "justice" (and from time to time "dignity" or "honor"). As yet no objective standard of justice to measure the reciprocal claims of each on the others has been either imposed on the world, or unmistakably and irresistibly revealed to all equally with equal persuasiveness.

All nations have been at various times prepared to yield something, if war against them were otherwise certain. For example, in World Wars I and II neutral nations were subjected to what they regarded as "indignities," but were unable to resist except by war. The most striking illustration is the search of American vessels during World War I, and the imposition by the British upon neutrals during World War II of a system of certifying their cargoes before they left port ("navicerts") on pain of search at sea. In World War I, Woodrow Wilson was at one stage sufficiently incensed against the British Government to dim his perception of a moral difference between Britain and Germany.⁴ Under "intolerable pressure," as President Benes complained, Czechoslovakia yielded at Munich. Her cause was certainly just. Finland in 1939 was prepared to yield *something* to Russia. Turkey can be adamant against the Soviet demands for a dominant position on the Dardanelles, because she has powerful friends. The peace is kept by surrender only where war has been

⁴ Cf. *Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice: A Record*, ed. by Stephen Gwynn (2 vols., London, 1929).

certain or very likely, or where friendship and alliance later are very likely. Where the risks of war are possible but remote, nothing will be conceded. The Japanese would not yield Manchuria; nor the Italians, Abyssinia; nor the British, Egypt, the Middle East, or Hongkong; nor America, Porto Rico—still less the Panama Canal Zone; nor the Russians, the Baltic States, the Balkans, or Poland. That is to say, in the absence of punishment by a common superior, "peace" is maintained by the imposition of one idea of justice over another which is either intimidated or altogether suppressed.

All are prepared for peace at their own price; all have different prices in the same transaction. The mind and heart must never forget the awful question, Are some kinds of peace worth keeping? Some kinds of peace will outrage the self-respect of some men, even in nations not immediately affected by a dispute. Physical contiguity causes one man's sense of justice—Hitler's, for example, or Soekarno's—very easily to involve distant third and thirty-third parties in war, whether these make a willing, conscious choice or not.⁵

The criterion of a "just" war proved to be indeterminable for international lawyers in an era of sovereign states, and they finally capitulated, declaring all wars must be regarded as just.⁶ A radical change in that situation, long overdue, could be effected only by establishment of a principle of justice. As this has not yet been invented, the alternative so far has been to provide (a) for its ultimate emergence, by writing into the Charter of the United Nations a series of general principles, and (b) simultaneously placing therein a prohibition on the use of force or its threat in the course of international disputes, unless the disputants observe a prescribed procedure. The corollary is that the disputant

⁵ Note Mr. Byrnes's acknowledgement of this in Paris, Oct. 4, 1946: "The people of the United States have discovered that, when a European war starts, our own peace and security inevitably becomes involved before the finish. They have concluded that, if they must help finish every European war, it would be better for them to do their part to prevent the starting of a European war. Twice in our generation doubt as to American foreign policy has led other nations to miscalculate the consequences of their actions. Twice in our generation that doubt as to American foreign policy has not brought peace, but war."

⁶ For a survey, cf. von Elbe, "Evolution of the Just War in International Law." *Amer. Journal of International Law*, 1939, pp. 666 ff.; and R. Regout, *Doctrine de la Guerre Juste* (Paris, 1935).

who does *not* follow the procedure is an aggressor, or that he is "unjustly" waging war, or waging an "unjust" war. But this device is not a perfect substitute for the first—that is, the establishment of justice.⁷

Each nation, and each group of declared or undeclared allies, is usually soberly prepared to approve some other nation's sacrifice for the sake of the general peace not excluding their own. Thus, both Great Britain and the United States have by accepting the internationalization of the city of Trieste, instead of awarding it wholly to Italy, looked to the general interest in peace, which very much included their own. On that theme, Senator Connally made a moving plea to the commission on the Italian treaty, begging the Yugoslavs not to obstruct peace "for a little territory."

Again, millions upon millions were content to turn their backs on Hitler's atrocities against the Jews between 1933 and 1939, and some even until 1941, before taking action; and even then the action taken was hardly that of a good Samaritan. Or again, the United States was not prepared to assume the burden of a mandate (Armenia) or the obligations of the League of Nations, or even to take measures against the aggressors between 1931 and 1941. Within the last few months she has been content to let Britain carry alone the military weight of a settlement between Jews and Arabs in Palestine, though offering some dollars as a contribution. In spite of the President's plea for a lowering of American immigration barriers, the opposition is overwhelming. The Arabs, with plenty of land, are peaceably disposed toward the Jews, so long as the Jews bear the full burden of their pitiful fate. These not unfairly accuse the rest of the world, especially the richest nations, of contributing little to ease Jewish misfortunes. Each nation tends to adjudge justice as that condition which is easiest for it to bear.

Indeed, the Nuremberg indictment of the Nazis is in an unmistakable sense an indictment of the prosecuting nations, who always had it in their power to stop—in the language of Justice Jackson's charge—

crimes against peace; namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international

⁷ This point is not quite fairly dealt with by Brierly in his *Law of Nations and Outlook for International Law* (London, 1945), though I can see his philanthropic intention.

treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.⁸ A passage from this Report to the President of the United States on June 7, 1945, is very significant in the present context :

Early in the Nazi regime, people of this country came to look upon the Nazi government as not constituting a legitimate state pursuing the legitimate objectives of a member of the international community. They came to view the Nazis as a band of brigands, set on subverting within Germany every vestige of a rule of law which would entitle an aggregation of people to be looked upon collectively as a member of the family of nations. Our people were outraged by the oppressions, the cruellest forms of torture, the large-scale murder, and the wholesale confiscation of property which initiated the Nazi regime within Germany. They witnessed persecution of the greatest enormity on religious, political and racial grounds, the breakdown of trade unions, and the liquidation of all religious and moral influences. This was not the legitimate activity of a state within its own boundaries, but was preparatory to the launching of an international course of aggression and was with the evil intention, openly expressed by the Nazis, of capturing the form of the German State as the instrumentality for spreading their rule to other countries. Our people felt that these were the deepest offenses against that International Law described in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 as including the "laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience."

If the acts were as early and public as the Justice alleges, and if it was so widely appreciated that international law was being destroyed, for the clear purpose of aggression, why did not the other members of the "international community" intervene? ⁹ "Our people," were even ignorant of the existence of the Hague Convention, let alone of their personal obligation to see that their complaisant statesmen did right to all men. But for this they needed to cast aside peace of mind and to fill the vacuum with civic education.

Nations are grossly unwilling to assume the continual burdens that are obligatory *if* peace is to be assured. The French delegation at San Francisco proposed that a qualification for admission into

⁸ Department of State Publication, Trial of War Criminals, 1945, No. 2420.

⁹ The documents in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1946-7) shows how early the developing crime was recognized.

the United Nations should be the abjuring of neutrality.¹⁰ Why should that not have been admitted? It was argued, with some justification, that other, more general clauses expressed banishment of isolation. The inclusion, however, would have made the obligation more precise. Nations become uncomfortable when they smell obligation. They are not sure *they* will get "justice" in return. Again, when the League of Nations Covenant was being drafted, Baron Makino, the Japanese representative on the commission, pleaded for the inclusion in the preamble of a simple endorsement "of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals." He was intent upon the formal acknowledgment of an equal standard of treatment for all men. It took the tragic interval between the establishment of the Covenant and the writing of the United Nations Charter to demonstrate the overriding need for such an avowal. For Woodrow Wilson and the British, influenced by the Commonwealth (noble word!) of Australia, rejected the plea, afraid, they said, of stirring the racial prejudice of their populations at home—but not afraid of the humiliation which might create a Japanese determination not to live permanently in a world order where it was their fate to be treated as inferior by nature.

The contention is that peace without justice is not peace to the dissatisfied; that most nations are smugly satisfied with inaction while others suffer injustice.

Ralph Ingersoll's *Top Secret* contains a very relevant lesson on the same theme. He chides the British Government for its slowness to set up the Second Front by invading France, and for its preference on political grounds to invade the alleged "soft underbelly" of Europe, that is to get into the Balkans. The intent was to be as far east as possible when the Russian armies arrived, in order to deprive the Soviet Government of the power to dictate the peace arrangements in the Balkans by *fait accompli*. Mr. Ingersoll observes that he and his friends wished to win the war as quickly as possible, while the British wished to conduct campaigns for political ends—even though it prolonged the war.¹¹

Events, alas! have shown that Mr. Ingersoll was wrong, from

¹⁰ L. M. Goodrich and E. Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (Boston, 1946).

¹¹ Cf. also Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York, 1946), p. 186.

the *American* and British point of view;¹² perhaps also from the point of view of the Balkan peoples. And the Russian people? Mr. Churchill may well have been wrong about the softness of the underbelly: it has, I personally know, a thousand Cassinos. But paramount in our interest in the conduct of a war, is the kind of world it helps to create for peace; and, of unfought wars, the shape of the world which should call them forth. One of the most serious basic threats to peace is that nations and their nationals are excessively ready to buy their own peace at the expense of somebody else. While this propensity prevails, there can be no assurance against war.

The sin of buying peace at other peoples' expense, and the unwillingness to pay the price of peace while we cry out that peace is our one conscientious and supreme demand, has riddled the United Nations Charter with reservations that imperil it. Unsure inside the United Nations, the small nations will seek to shift the balance of power among the great. Their petition in November, 1946, that the veto power be modified—sponsored by Australia, Cuba, and the Netherlands—evoked the most vehement and angry denunciation from the Soviet spokesman, Mr. Vishinsky, on this very ground.

Men covet more things than peace; and these can be summed up in the word "justice," whether it be economic satisfaction, or civic freedom, or the right to carve out nations and great spaces dominated by their ideology. If peace is desired, and if the risk of war is to be reduced to the lowest point, then there must be a much more broadly accepted standard of justice. As it is, the nations confront a race between the development of such a standard, and war. A series of wars might produce the necessary pattern of justice in peace charters or treaties, by sheer accident of victory. The price would be terrible, if purchasable only by atomic and other weapons of mass destruction now ready and yet to come.

Many men will not surrender their ideas of the good life even under the vilest torture, let alone dying in the heat of battle. Elmer Davis exclaimed, in answer to the slogan "One world, or none," "No world, if necessary!"¹³ "Has it occurred to them,"

¹² Deane, among others, with ample experience of the Soviet Government, suggests this in his *Strange Alliance*.

¹³ *Saturday Review of Literature*, Mar. 30, 1946.

he asked of those who warned against atomic disaster, "that if their one world turned out to be totalitarian and obscurantist, we might better have no world at all?" Men *will not* surrender certain ideas and ways of life for the sake of peace; and in this they are right. We have quoted Mr. Jackson on the Nazis to the effect that it is sometimes a duty to make war. We must be objective about ourselves; but only so objective that we cease to be an immoral, not a moral, power. Some truths are so self-evident that we should fight for them at home and abroad against aggressors, and side by side with those who suffer assault though far distant from our own land.

The supreme trouble of our own time is that the nations realize that peace without justice is unacceptable, but lack a common notion of justice. In fact, are not peace and justice identical? We cannot drown our fears for ourselves, nor our recognition of responsibilities to others. We are transfixed at a point where the old international and national concepts we inherited (tested even then in the fires of criticism and revolt) are giving way, and where the world has become so inseparable into sharply outlined nations or regions, that new realities are insistently pushing their way to the front.¹⁴

There is, then, a flexible but firm connection between security, justice, and peace.

The strict dependence of peace upon a conception of justice has rarely been expressed so clearly, if so lamentably, as by Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Union's representative at the Security Council of the United Nations. Speaking on the subject of control of atomic warfare to the American-Russian Institute in New York (May 19, 1947), he declared, in rejecting international inspection and ownership as interfering with Russia's domestic economy:

The Soviet Union cannot agree that its national economy be made dependent on the will even of a majority in the control organ, being aware that such majority may take one-sided decisions. The Soviet Union cannot subject the fate of its national economy to dependence on the will of the majority in such an international organ, because it realizes that *there may be decisions dictated not only by interests of justice.*

¹⁴ Spinoza said, "Peace does not merely mean the absence of war, but the kind of goodness which is born of a strong spirit." Then what is our duty in an age when the strong espouse inimical kinds of goodness?

The establishment of an international atomic energy control system might promise the world peace, and produce an abatement of fear—the Soviet Union will not rely on justice as established by majority decision, but insists on the use of her veto to make her notion of justice prevail—rather this, than the chance of peace. And in the same speech Mr. Gromyko charged that it was not only the Soviet Union that held that position.

Peace is largely produced by security—that is, the assurance either that one will not be attacked, or that successful defense will be possible—by one's own strength, or with the help of allies, or perhaps with the help of a world organization.

Allies—even more, a world organization—will lend aid only where the justice of the cause is recognized. This may of course, in the opinion of critics, amount to doing a wrong to the attacker; but it has already been acknowledged that in such contests the advocates of each cause consider their own to be just.

Security consists, we have said, in the assurance of not being attacked, or of the ability to make a successful defense against attack. Freedom from attack depends on the absence or relative weakness of enemies. A nation can make them by its pretensions or threats. This involves justice between nations. Among the conditions which can create a threat are the form and spirit of a nation's government, and not the least important factor is the *temper* of that government—its moderation or extremism, the degree of its belligerency and coerciveness, the intensity of its despotism or amiability. Friends will come to the aid of either, according to their valuation of the just or unjust tendencies of the regime, for they themselves must reckon on the future reciprocal rights and obligations between them. If a nation has taken territory, or trade, or prestige from another, without just title, then it must suffer some insecurity, and so far have lost its peace. A potential attacker may exercise self-restraint, and will do so if it decides that the game is not worth the candle, or may be swayed by moral considerations, believing that the other nation's policy is decent, and that a nation, generally speaking, has the right to be left unmolested.

Ability in self-defense is in large part dependent on popular belief in the justice of the cause. It depends also on good repute with allies and even, as in the case of Athens defeated by Persia, repute with the victorious enemy.

Hence, the relationship between justice, security, and peace is extremely close. It can be admitted that only omnipotence can be entirely sinful. To wit, Hitler. All others must be just, if they wish to be secure. But the strong can be unjust to the degree of their ability to withstand coalitions. Justice strengthens the security of the weak so far as their cause is credited by strong friends, and unopposed by strong enemies.

The nations, states as they are, and even as they have ensconced themselves in the United Nations, cannot solve the problem of peace and justice together. They have not surrendered enough independence, or conceded enough obligation, to give and enjoy the assurance of peace.

CHAPTER III

World Government and War's Causes

And forasmuch as sovereign power is a necessary but a formidable creature, not unlike the powder which (as you are soldiers) is at once your safety and your danger, being subject to take fire against you as well as for you, how well and securely is she by your galaxies so collected as to be in full force and vigour, and yet so distributed that it is impossible you should be blown up by your own magazine?

—HARRINGTON, *Oceana*

THE REQUISITES OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

IS WORLD GOVERNMENT A FEASIBLE WAY TOWARD PEACE?

ANY SERIOUS increase in the power possessed by some individuals in a society compels the immediate search for an increase in social authority to control it.

The use of the atom bomb after the voting of the Charter sharpened men's fears of war and increased their doubts whether the United Nations could guarantee them against it. "World government" was soon offered as a panacea.

A conference at Rollins College, Florida, issues an Appeal to the Peoples of the World. Examination of the manifesto shows the impossibility of its way of arriving at world government, and indicates the nature of the grim task that still lies before mankind.

The proposals, verbatim, are:

1. That the United Nations be transformed from a league of sovereign states into a government deriving its specific powers from the peoples of the world.
2. That the General Assembly be reconstituted as the legislative branch of the world government, in which the citizens of the member states are represented on an equitable basis.

3. That the General Assembly, in addition to its present functions, shall have the power:
 - a. To make laws prohibiting or otherwise controlling weapons of mass destruction and, so far as necessary for that purpose, regulating the uses of atomic energy.
 - b. To make laws providing such inspection as is necessary or appropriate to the execution of the foregoing powers.
 - c. To provide for appropriate civil and criminal sanctions for the laws enacted pursuant to the foregoing powers.
 - d. To provide and maintain such police forces as are necessary for law enforcement.
4. That independent judicial tribunals be created with jurisdiction over cases and controversies arising under laws enacted by the General Assembly or involving questions concerning the interpretation of the Charter of the United Nations.
5. That a Bill of Rights be designed for the protection of persons affected by laws enacted by the General Assembly.
6. That the Security Council be reconstituted as the executive branch of the world government with the power (a) to administer and insure the enforcement of the laws, and (b) under the direction of the General Assembly, to perform the present function as defined in the Charter.
7. That the powers not delegated to the General Assembly be reserved to the member states.

We believe these to be the minimum requirements necessary for the creation of a world government capable of averting the catastrophe of another war in the atomic era. The present "United Nations Charter" does not meet these minimum requirements.

Two points should be noticed: first that the conference assumed that *within a short time* more countries than one would have atomic destructive energy; and second that the operation of world government would require a broad program of mass education. But they do not warn that this will take *a long time*.

How can a league of sovereign states (that is, the United Nations) be transformed into "a government deriving its specific powers from the peoples of the world"? The peoples cannot convene in a world mass meeting to conduct an election transcending national boundaries. They will surely act through their governments? Or, is a world-wide referendum seriously proposed? Yet, if direct action is not taken by the peoples, how will the new government differ in constituent authority and legitimation from the United Nations? A referendum could not be organized except in

national units by their political parties, using the languages of the respective units. In other words, the solidarity of nationalism cannot be exorcised by such mumbo-jumbo as "specific powers from the peoples of the world."

The famous Peace Ballot on British support of collective security and disarmament (1934) demonstrates how illusory is the attempt to discover by referendum¹ genuine and intelligent opinion as an immediate basis of policy. It may also be learned from the various public opinion polls taken in the United States. No one can tell how durable the opinion is, or how serious; and, above all, one is entirely in the dark as to what sacrifices the opinion givers would be prepared to make continuously for the realization of their policy.

Thus, Mr. Roper reports (*New York Herald Tribune*, August 1, 1946) that 62.8 per cent voted "Yes," 19.8 per cent "No," and 17.8 per cent "Do not know" to the question:

If every other country in the world would elect representatives to a world congress and let all problems between countries be decided by this congress, with a strict provision that all countries have to abide by the decisions whether they like them or not, would you be willing to have the United States go along in this?

But when it was asked,

If every other country in the world would turn over to a world organization all their military information and secrets, and allow continuous inspection, would you be willing for the United States to go along on this?

the answers were: "Yes," only 47.3 per cent; "No," 37.7 per cent; "Do not know," 15 per cent. *The affirmative sharply dropped.* And the vote was only 52.2 per cent in favor of universal disarmament, with armed contingents for an international force. Doubtless, if all the implications of a world state had been revealed to those who voted, *all* the affirmatives would have dropped sharply; for the scope of power of the world government, its administrative machinery, its penetration into each country, whether majority vote or veto power would prevail, and above all, the weight of representation of each country, were not made clear to

¹ Cf. *The Peace Ballot*, The Official History (London, 1935).

those interrogated. Therefore, it is vain to expect a world government to emerge from a *levée en masse* of opinion; the choice is bound to be exercised through governments. If so, governments cannot act otherwise than as representatives of sovereign nations. Sovereignty cannot be banished through the action of sovereign states; something prior to the sovereign nation must operate. It might be the peoples if they were not already nationally organized, especially if the tenacious self-preservative body of nationality had had a shorter history. But that is not all. Some governments do not even admit the genuine participation of their peoples in political decision, while in others the participation is as yet minimal. Of the first group the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Balkan countries are examples; of the second, such large agglomerations as China under Chiang Kai-shek, and India under Nehru.

If *time* is of the essence of the proposal (and the peace-war argument is powerfully influenced by *time*), then the idea of securing a grant of authority from the "peoples of the world" is a vain delusion. World government enthusiasts, whose policy is based on honor, should not play the innocent about this error.

By a queer inconsistency, the Appeal proposes that a general conference of the United Nations be called (as provided in Article 109 of the Charter) to draft amendments accomplishing "the objectives as stated above." Now amendments require a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and then ratification by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, *including all the permanent members of the Security Council*. That is, the veto power applies to amendments. The Soviet Union's stern defensive outlook on all questions, conserving at once her veto, her sovereignty, and the power of the strong nations over the small, had already been emphatically asserted. Since the Appeal the Soviet Union has shown, through her use of the veto in the Iranian and Spanish situations, that she means the Charter to be strictly limited to her interpretation. Further, her unambiguous and even ferocious opposition to the proposals by Mr. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs, for modification of the veto power and for the grant of larger power to the General Assembly to discuss disputes, has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt that she and her local friends intend to seek sanctuary within the veto. Crowning all, she has sharply rejected the control of the uses and develop-

ment of atomic energy with final sanction for violations to be resolved by *majority* decision, not subject to the veto. No possible hope exists that the procedure proposed by the World Government Conference could be effective.

The Conference omits advice on how many votes will be required to "make laws prohibiting or otherwise controlling weapons of mass destruction." We may presume that the two-thirds majority required by the General Assembly of the United Nations for "important matters" would prevail. But the Soviet Government is opposed. It is also entirely doubtful whether the United States would accept such an Assembly vote on, say, the destruction of atom-bomb stocks, and even much less important matters.

The World-Government signatories are, then, overly trusting. For they have ascribed to the General Assembly the status of "legislative branch of world government." Do they mean "government," and do they mean "legislative"? They attribute to the Assembly the specific powers of controlling weapons of mass destruction and "ancillary powers strictly necessary thereto." They leave obscure whether the legislative authority extends further, for they specify these powers "in addition to its present functions." But study of the United Nations Charter reveals clearly that the General Assembly is not a "legislative" body: its resolutions are not *obligatory* on the constituent nations or their citizens.

If world-government advocates intend that all these permissions shall be converted into *commanding* powers, their hopes are vain. If they do not mean that, they have not secured world government by their method. For they still rely upon a contractual arrangement between states, whatever they may say about "a government deriving its specific powers from the peoples of the world." Nor would any government in the world, nor any people left to its own devices in some curiously planned interregnum, assign to the Assembly *commanding legislative power* over its present range of functions. Even the best-willed government of all at San Francisco, the United States, demurred regarding the powers exercised by the Assembly merely to "promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development," lest the obligation should interfere with American "domestic jurisdiction." Reassurance came only when it was correctly observed that the self-determina-

tion of the United States in this respect was already amply safeguarded by Article 2 (7) :

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter ; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

It is unnecessary to pursue this exposure of world-government proposals any further than to reveal its most vulnerable spot : the basis of representation in the Assembly. The more significant the obligations of the members of a collective organization, the more careful, cautious, and avaricious are they about their representative weight in the making of decisions. This is demonstrated by the battle over the voting power in the United Nations, and particularly over the weight of representation in the Security Council. The Big Five received permanent seats and a veto power, while the other nations are represented by six nonpermanent members elected by all. Where there is *small* power—namely, in the General Assembly—to bind the members, there member-states can be and are accorded equality of representation : one state, one vote. Or, conversely, where there is equality of representation between Luxemburg (280,000), Panama (630,000), and the United States (140,000,000), and the rest, the powers of the Assembly are deliberately slight.

This dependent relationship between obligations and voting power pertains also in the various international public unions or organizations like the International Labor Organization. The weightier the obligation, the greater the dependence of the obligation on unanimity of ratification to become effective. For example, in the International Monetary Fund a special majority is required in cases affecting the fixing of par value, and the state concerned can itself reject the par value assigned to its currency.

Now the Rollins College Conference, without offering a precise list of its General Assembly's powers to commit its members (except atomic energy), declares that in the "legislative branch of the world government" the citizens of the member states are represented on an equitable basis. What is "equitable"? If the formula were disclosed, it would be rejected. "Equitable" is a refuge,

not a solution. Many ingenious schemes of representing states for the general and special purposes of a world legislative body have been propounded. None has ever been accepted where it required a differential representation (queerly conceived at that!) except in minor cases.²

Whenever the inroad on national independence of judgment and will is appreciable, the states insist on the principle of equal representation. The larger states, and indeed the small states expected to shoulder a large part of the burdens created by the legislation, will not, if they are to count only for one among equals, submit to a superior with substantial powers of obligatory legislation. Consider the anxious protests of the small nations in the San Francisco Conference at the extent to which they had already committed themselves in the Assembly (two-thirds vote on important matters), even though the Assembly had *no* power to enforce obligations; their position of inferiority in the Security Council, whose decisions, by seven to four, oblige them in the settlement of disputes and the contribution of military and economic forces to restore peace and punish the aggressor. Especially pertinent and distasteful is the obligation to be bound by a two-thirds vote for amendment of the Charter.

Indeed, the voting arrangements became tolerable ultimately to the smaller powers (and, we may say, to the Big Powers) only on official admission of the *right to withdraw from membership* on a simple statement of justification and without any stipulated procedure of holding, questioning, or reprimanding.

This liberal escape clause supplies other material features for the refutation of world government. The interpretative statement permitting withdrawal (approved by the San Francisco Conference) runs:

The Charter should not make express provision either to permit or to prohibit withdrawal from the Organization. The Committee deems that the highest duty of the nations which will become Members is to continue their cooperation within the Organization for the preservation of international peace and security. If, however, a Mem-

² C. A. Riches, *Majority Rule in International Organisation*, Baltimore, 1940, especially Chap. X. The International Fund, the Bank, the Office of Public Health, the Central Commission for the Rhine, the Sugar Marketing Council, in the Governing Body but not the Conference of the I.L.O., and the like.

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ber because of exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.

The San Francisco Conference accepted this resolution on the right of withdrawal in order to meet the unwillingness of member states to be bound by the voting procedure on amendments, and enable a state not willing to accept an amendment to leave. But the right of withdrawal was recognized as inevitable if, "*deceiving the hopes of humanity, the Organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so at the expense of law and justice.*"

Two features of this escape clause attract notice. First, some delegations strongly supporting the right to withdraw, argued that their nations would not ratify the Charter if membership were regarded as permanent; or if they were bound by amendments they had refused to ratify. They could not accept unlimited and unknown obligations. Denial of the right to withdraw would violate the principle of *voluntary association* which was the foundation stone of the Organization! These arguments clearly reveal the state of mind of the nations, and their sensitiveness to their independence. Secondly, the Soviet Union even proposed (though unsuccessfully) that the phrase "and leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security on the other Members," be omitted altogether, because it would in effect be a prior condemnation of the grounds on which any state might seek to withdraw, whereas that right "is an expression of state sovereignty."⁸ Lest it be thought that only the small state and the Soviet Union were insistent on that right of unhindered withdrawal, it is most pertinent that, on ratification of the Charter, Senators Connally and Vandenberg in the Foreign Affairs Committee extracted from Leo Pasvolksky the assurance of state sovereignty. Senator Vandenberg asked the crucial question:

"Is not this an accurate statement of the American position in the event that the United States wishes to withdraw?"

"First, the United States can withdraw at its own unrestricted opinion. Its only obligation is to state the reasons.

⁸ For reference see Goodrich and Hambro, *Charter of the United Nations*, p. 88.

“Second, the only penalty is in the adverse public opinion, if our reasons do not satisfy the conscience of the world, and the action of the San Francisco Conference simply suggests certain criteria upon this score.

“Third, when we withdraw, we are simply in the same position as if we had never joined; namely, we are subject to the Organization if we threaten the peace and security of the world.”

Mr. Pasvolsky's reply settles the issue:

“I think that is precisely the situation, Senator.”⁴

This excursion on the subject of withdrawal was necessary simply to demonstrate that nations will not easily accept the burdens of world peace; that they still wish to retain the right of private judgment; and that, where the objects of common legislature are important in limiting their private judgment, they insist on a way out. One way out is withdrawal.

Another protection of a nation's independence is such a weight of representation in the legislative assembly that it cannot be outvoted. (This was the subject of the “Great Compromise” in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 to establish the United States Constitution: equality of representation in the Senate, and representation proportionate to population in the House. The Compromise did not finally settle the issue: it took the Civil War to settle it, for representation was bound up with the institution of slavery in the South.)

It is not possible to devise differential representation acceptable to all the states whose collaboration is necessary to a peaceful world. Like individual men in each state, they are barely willing to descend to equality, they obstinately refuse to accept inequality. Those with much to contribute will not be outvoted; those from whom much might be expected will not freely accept a minority status. When Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin threw out the faintest suggestion in the House of Commons⁵ of a “world assembly elected directly from the people of the world as a whole,” *Pravda* immediately replied that the proposal was “reactionary.”⁶ If the areas of large population, like China and India, are given low representation, they will not accept: what of their future? If they

⁴ Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945, pp. 59-68.

⁵ House of Commons Debates, Nov. 23, 1945, pp. 7 ff.

⁶ Dec. 2, 1945, quoted in *New York Times*, Dec. 3, 1945.

have a representation equal to their population (and why should they not have it? are not all souls equal?) then one may easily imagine the result of the votes. The United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union could all three together be outvoted. Suppose the matters subjected to vote directly or indirectly concerned the standard of living of the various nations: immigration, movement of capital, the industrialization of raw-material economies. There is little doubt to whose advantage and to whose disadvantage the vote would go. The wealthy countries would be voted out of their wealth in one way or another. The control of war seeps inward to the control of industry and even the national mind.

From time to time, some new simpleton seeks to promote world government by the seduction of ingenious representation. Thus Fremont Rider rejects "wealth," proposed by others as a weight on population,⁷ because definition is difficult—it is real estate, goods, bank deposits, or undeveloped resources—and so is valuation. But he is confident that *he* has the key: "educational accomplishment"! "Exactness" and "accuracy" in the case of *his* enthusiasm become always "relative terms." Facing the problem of estimating Ethiopia's educational status, he is bold enough to say (in relation to setting up world government): "There appear to be no published educational statistics whatever for it. But that does not mean that we know absolutely nothing about the educational status of Ethiopia. We have such things as consular reports from Ethiopia and the letters of missionaries; we have the records of travelers and the reports of war correspondents and newspaper men . . . and from that impression we can venture, and venture with fair assurance, at least this opinion: that Ethiopia ranks so low in national 'educational accomplishment' that it comes within what 'Table C' terms the 'minimum' class."⁸ *Sancta simplicitas!*

Does he, or do the men (Einstein among them) who endorse his book, imagine that the nations of low "educational accomplishment," as calculated in the Library of the Wesleyan University at Middletown, Connecticut, will accept their assigned position as political underlings, short of compulsion? Nations do not regard

⁷ It is used mainly by Louis Sohn in "Weighing of Votes in an International Assembly," *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, Dec., 1944.

⁸ Fremont Rider, *The Great Dilemma of World Organization* (New York, 1946), pp. 51, 53.

"education"—that is, according to him, "number of literate adults (twenty-one years and over) who have completed x years of education stated"—as an index of *political right*. He correctly points to the high place Germany and Japan would occupy in his table; but he is not disconcerted by their recent dubious services to humanity. Each nation values its *own* civilization, and will not be put low except by force. Why should an illiterate but saintly Hindu, or a Mohammedan or Chinese or Soviet citizen—especially, say, a member of the Communist party who has read his manuals, though with only four years' literacy—yield to a twelve-year educational product of Scottsboro, Tennessee, or a farmer's boy from Cornwall, or gentry at Eton, or Groton, in the *pressure* (not the mere counting of votes) his people might exert on the fortunes of the world?

Such schemes cannot be instituted voluntarily. They may come in a far distant future. And the first stages thereto are *not*, alas, based on the voluntary contract of states as states. The signatories of the Appeal to the Peoples of the World virtually admit this when we add together two of their observations:

Such objectives cannot, we know, be reached overnight. The difficulty of building support within each nation for a world government is multiplied by the diversity of cultures, governments, and institutions among the nations.

The establishment of a world government representative of the peoples of the world must be accompanied by a broad program of mass education and the free exchange of knowledge among them.

But this is discrepant with the statements which are the groundwork of their objectives: that atomic secrets cannot be kept for more than a few years by any nation or small group of nations; that there is no adequate military defense against a surprise annihilatory attack. Thus, the further objectives of a Bill of Rights, and an international police force to protect the guardians of the world against atomic warfare, fall to the ground. Professor Einstein, who began by a plea for world government, has arrived at the conclusion, "Science has brought forth this danger, but the real problem is in the hearts and minds of men."⁹ True.

I have insinuated that world government, to be effective, would

⁹ *New York Times Magazine*, June 23, 1946.

need to be government penetrating far deeper into the lives of nations than the mere control of armaments, let alone the atomic bomb. It is forgotten how much destruction and death may be caused by other weapons. This is a subject highly material to the argument of this book.

BEYOND ARMS TO THE MIND

In the interwar years from 1932 to 1939, preceded by years of preliminary "technical" discussion, the Disarmament Conference attempted to limit the armaments and armed forces maintainable by members of the League of Nations. It is not possible to retail here the long and tortuous chicanery, or the genuine want of assurance,¹⁰ which caused the Conference to fail, indicating that no one felt safe enough to disarm in a world where, even with the League, war was still possible and legal. Attention need be drawn merely to the fact that arms and the men in existence do not constitute the only problem: the war potentiality of the various nations must be reckoned with. Their productive capacity, their advanced industrialization, their technology, and their possession of raw materials were the source of major anxieties. These could not be regulated. It became the ambition of the economically backward nations to reach the point where their arms might at least give some pause to would-be attackers. And behind industrial potential loomed the problem summed up in a slogan which Mussolini repeated *ad nauseam*, "the disarmament of the mind."

Nations anxious about their security scan their neighbors' potential and the speed with which it can be converted into successful offense or defense. At this very moment, the speculative balance of power that is and must always be revolving in the minds of those primarily concerned for each nation's strength and vulnerability is focused less on arms instantly available, than upon the strength of the Soviet Union when the three Five Year Plans, reaching to 1961, have been fulfilled. In the discussion on atomic energy before the Senate (McMahon) committee, various witnesses speculated not only on the basis of knowledge possessed by the Soviet Union, but on how long the Soviet Union would take

¹⁰ Cf. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *The Pipe Dream of Peace* (1935), and the same author's previous works; and W. E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace Since the World War* (1940).

to reach America's standard of education, and on the number of her scientists, and the industrial plant from which these could be drawn. Major General Groves testified that in making bombs the United States Government had used the services of about 200,000 people;¹¹ that these came from the most diverse skills; that they were drawn from private industry, which, over decades, had independently developed various processes and so stimulated the provision of specialist education which was adapted to the new problems. Behind all this stood American industry, and the vast intricate background of schools and colleges and research serving it. Could the United States maintain its lead? Those who believed that the Soviet Union could never overtake America's accumulated achievement and demonstrated genius tended to minimize the need to share the secrets of the bomb with the Soviet Union, thus allaying the Soviet rulers' suspicions and conciliating them against the day when their own side should invent such a bomb.

The point becomes even clearer in discussions of the future of Germany. The issue is not simply her immediate military armament, but her industrial strength. The choice is whether to destroy her industry and force her to a mainly agricultural economy, or to trust her with a highly developed industrial system. The latter has been recommended out of merciful consideration to her seventy million people (whose standard of living some consider to be a humane obligation), and out of fear that the loss of her work and ability will seriously lower the standard of living of the other nations with which she exchanged goods and technical knowledge. The severer policy involves the occupation of Germany for many years, and a continuous and close supervision and inspection of German industry. It requires socializing heavy industry in order that the responsibility for its conduct may be unmistakable, and so controlled by Allied supervisors.

Even such controls are, however, not regarded as completely satisfactory preventives of rearmament. Whether Germany shall be split into federal or independent states is a question. General de Gaulle, speaking for France, said July 28, 1946:

"In the lifetime of a single man we have been invaded three times by our neighbors across the Rhine. . . . [We oppose]

¹¹ Senate Hearings on S. Res. 179, Pt. I, p. 44. The total is made up of 120,000 maximum direct employment, and about 50,000 operational forces.

the possibility that Germany should again become a unified and centralized state or, in short, the Reich whose structure and power have always resulted in warlike enterprise. . . . France's solution for an accord on Germany that would be sincere, practical, and human is a simple solution that everyone knows. It would allow these differing and traditional Germanic units—Prussia, Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, the Palatinate, the Rhine provinces and the provinces of the northwest—to regroup themselves and administer themselves . . . [each in] its own way. It would place under an international authority the immense arsenal of the Ruhr, not to deprive German population of what they need but to divide among them and the neighboring nations the coal that is required for the economic life of all."

Germany herself pursuant to Hitler's New Order, with the Germans on top, was to base a thousand years' peace upon a complete reordering of agricultural and industrial life of Europe, extirpating unsuitable populations and increasing the appropriate type. And Rosenberg provided the pagan gospel to match.¹²

It is of the very highest importance to observe, also, that the German problem is clearly recognized to be "reeducation"—that is, to produce *democratic* citizens, because it is believed that these will not tolerate an aggressive government. The mind and the form of government are behind all questions of arms.¹³

¹² Cf. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, Government Printing Office), Vol. I.

¹³ The Committee of American Educators on the Reeducation of Germany has accordingly reported to the State Department, Aug. 21, 1946, as follows:

"(5) The primary principles of justice basic to the program of reeducation are:

"(a) That men and nations owe obligations to each other; and that these responsibilities are not, as Nazism maintained, limited to a single race, nation or group.

"(b) That the dignity and integrity of the individual must be respected by society and other individuals; and that the individual is not, as Nazism maintained, merely a tool of the State.

"(c) That citizens bear their share of responsibility for public policy; and that they have the right and duty to participate in Government resting on the consent of the governed.

"(d) That the untrammelled pursuit of truth is a prerequisite for the maintenance of justice; and that free communication between individuals, groups and nations is a necessary condition for national and international understanding. Experience with Nazism proves what evil consequences flow from the suppression and corruption of the truth.

"(e) That toleration between diverse cultural and racial groups is the

It is fully manifest, then, that world government designed to secure tranquillity and peace must go much further. As the Rollins College Appeal says: "Peace is not merely the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order—in short, of government." To be sure of itself, world government would inevitably need to reach deep down beyond weapons into the structure and spirit of their economy and so, deeply, of their lives and ambitions. And peace lies in assurance, not a long chance that war will not come. *But world government, giving complete assurance, cannot come by voluntary contract of the nations, which would suffer a stupendous transformation if peace were really to be guaranteed.*

Behind the economic structure man's mind is involved: Guilty? or Not guilty? A warlike mind without weapons or their promise cannot produce war. A great industry and inventiveness without a warlike mind cannot produce war. But those who have purposes which require war for their fulfillment can create disturbances—for example, the various Balkan Wars, and the abortive war between Greece and Bulgaria of 1925 stopped by the Council of the League of Nations. Even disarmed and impoverished Germany was armed by one small man born in a small town of Austria, a small country. The devil can spring from anywhere. As Hitler continually stressed, "Those who have the will can find the weapons." Now, the extinction, even the weakening, of one of the nations involves a shift in the balance of forces, and arouses apprehensions and emotions elsewhere. Hence world government, to do its work thoroughly, would have to be watchful over mentality, even as the most liberal of democracies are obliged to be vigilant for sedition. It would be responsible for doing justice, in order that nations should not set out to do justice for themselves.

basis of national and international tranquillity; and that coerced unity of culture, after the manner of Nazism, is the source of tyranny and anarchy.

"(6) The program of German reeducation will make maximum use of those German resources which offer promise of developing ideals and institutions in harmony with the above-stated universally valid principles of justice. The reconstruction of the cultural life of Germany must be in large measure the work of the Germans themselves and must be fostered not only on a regional but also on a national scale.

"(7) The Nazi heritage of Germany's spiritual isolation must be overcome by restoring as rapidly as possible those cultural contacts which will foster the assimilation of the German people into the society of peaceful nations."

Here then is the dilemma: to expect such world government to arise by voluntary agreement, freely undertaken among the nations, is futile; to expect wars to cease without some measure of world government is also futile.

THE DISINTEGRATION OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

A further step is needed to complete this part of the argument: some speculation on what might happen if, by chance, world government came into existence.

Suppose that by some chance a world government sprang into existence? The moment the supposition is put, it looks too unreal for argument. But suppose it came into existence. Our first thoughts would be concerned with its range and depth of powers. Suppose they were of the order exercised by the Federal Government of the United States in relationship to its continental territory (since the Civil War, it must be added). What would be likely to happen to that government? It could not avoid certain serious anxieties. The first would be, How long before the government and the new world state were disintegrated by its various regions unless their languages were assimilated and the memory of their different cultures and, perhaps, differences of religious worship expunged? Living together on one spot, with a high degree of immobility due to the necessity of earning their living, and obtaining the advantages that come from common operation of their economic environment and their social utilities (cities, transport, housing, schools, places of entertainment, etc.), citizens would make the common best of their local vicissitudes. Their specific geographic location and climate would give them certain advantages and certain problems to solve, different from those pertaining to other areas. They cannot be expected to be eternal wanderers, to become global nomads, and so their clustering of common localized interests would develop differences of outlook, tending therefore to pull them away from the common standards of the common government for the whole world. The prospects of the world government, and defiance of center-escaping tendencies, could be improved only if the world distribution of population were thoroughly reordered without regard to existing claims of the peoples on territory.

Secondly, far from the center of government, neighboring

peoples would form friendships or develop warlike sentiments for reasons of simple human comity, or as the result of disputes which made some groups of people fearful of others. The central government could not always rely on the loyalty to its commands of the peoples afflicted with fear. It must be suspicious of special friendships that tended to develop among its peoples, especially if they became big and powerful in relationship to the total forces of the world commonwealth.

Thirdly, the various localities could not tolerate the determination of all things, or many things, by the central government. Decisions made at the center might be considered dilatory. The center could not be cognizant of the real character and inwardness of local troubles. The world government would lose credit. The familiar argument would arise that those in the localities who bear the burden of expenditures should both locally (and at the centers) have their *own* government. It would be represented that, if local responsibility for the free development of the local economy and social activities is taken away, then the vital stimulus to inventiveness and joy in self-government would be lost. Cultural diversity might be reduced.

Fourthly, a world government would necessarily be beset with the possibility that somewhere in its broad terrestrial domain, sanguine men with original and subversive theories of the value of life would arise—dreamers, prophets, saints, preaching a loyalty to some god that was not the world god. A queer loquacious debater in Athens might preach an alternative world state based on a different principle of justice. From Tibet might descend a dogma denying that there should be a state at all. From Valhalla a song might sound that war was humanity's highest purpose. A local Napoleon might be a fanatical worshiper of his locality and of the supreme virtues of its people.¹⁴ From a foundling hospital a thwarted saint might send out persuasive pamphlets that locusts and honey represented standard of living enough. From somewhere in California, a seven-foot Yogi might emerge, so wise, so magnetic, that the loyalties to the world government might be undermined by widespread human passivity. However saintly it might be, or diabolical—and one man's god is another man's devil—the world government must watch for subversive

¹⁴ Cf. G. K. Chesterton, *The Napoleon of Notting Hill* (London, 1904).

men and dangerous thoughts. The wider the scope of its authority, the more the anxieties, and so the more stringent its rule; and so the more subject it would be to challenge. As Rousseau said, the wider the area of the state, the thinner the authority—and the greater the temptation to make it crushing for trouble-makers. (Hence the secular cruelty in Russian history.)

If such a view of a flight from the center seems strained, it may be noticed that this dispersion has been rather the course of the British Empire since 1776. British dominion over palm and pine was not cruel, but relatively liberal and intelligent. Yet the American colonies fought for independence. Canada might have been fully lost, if a lesson had not been learned from the American failure. The lesson was the imperative of self-government: fully developed as Dominion status. In peacetime, this means free kindnesses among the Dominions and Mother Country; in war, the high possibility that all will aid one another—but not the perfect certainty. In peace, it means the full economic, social, and political self-government of the Dominions even to one another's disadvantage, and the disadvantage of the Mother Country. It means free and, therefore, often opposed voting on the international bodies on which all are separately represented. It means also, even in view of the common dangers of war, a resolute determination not to be brought together into common policy by a formal constitution. When in January, 1944, Lord Halifax declared it to be "both desirable and necessary . . . that in all the fields of interest common to every part of the Commonwealth—in foreign policy, in defense, in economic affairs, in colonial questions, and in communications—we should leave nothing undone to bring our people into closer unity of thought and action," Prime Minister King of Canada rejected the suggestion. "Behind the conception expressed by Lord Halifax and Field Marshal Smuts there lurks the idea of inevitable rivalry between the great powers. Could Canada, situated as she is geographically between the United States and the Soviet Union, and at the same time a member of the British Commonwealth, for one moment give support to such an idea? . . . In meeting world issues of security, employment, and social standards we must join not only with Commonwealth countries but with all like-minded states. . . . Our commitments in these great issues must be part of a general scheme, whether they be on a world basis or regional in nature."

Mr. King even rejected rather simple machinery for permanent joint consultation.

Australia and New Zealand about the same date concluded an agreement for conducting closely cooperative foreign policies and defense and welfare programs in the Southwest Pacific.

In this Commonwealth system, the Irish Free State, Roman Catholic in tradition and contemporary worship, obsessed with a memory of oppression, acted very differently from the other Dominions, and was the only one to insist on its neutral rights should Hitler or his associates in war crime call for asylum. While Britain in 1936 favored entrance of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations, Mr. de Valera was extremely dubious.

This fissiparous tendency, it must be emphasized, operates where strong blood ties between the Mother Country and the Dominions still exist.

Complete world government, taut and comprehensive, is not to be sought. Even among British people of the same tongue and former nationality, time, distance, and sundered space pulls them apart. Nevertheless, they can remain at peace, in spite of disputes, because they have sprung from the same loins, and share *basic common convictions about the worth of life, the destiny and religion of man, and the political institutions and demeanor on which these rest* or to which they give everyday effect.

What, for the whole world, can replace this British system's acceptance of the authority of certain ideals, not the authority of a single member?

What can replace for the whole world such adherence to a common superior morality—here established by the accident of time, the gradual, piecemeal development over two centuries, but nourished by a common religious and political history and tradition going back two centuries? It would seem that the accidents of a very long past have given the communities the peace of the present. Yet, in truth, it was no accident, except in its uneven stumbling paces, but the offspring of the democratic idea. To this we return later. If fortune has not offered the whole world this possibility of a peace without deeply penetrative world government, a peace which allows as much diversity without the serious risk of quarrels leading to war, what alternative has the whole world? Thus far, the voluntary contractual relations among the nations have not proved adequate.

WAR'S CAUSES

Now, if the origin of war could be reduced to the simplicity of one primal source, the prescription for peace would be as simple; it would itself define the machinery required to control it. Some writers do believe in single causes. One school insists on economic causes, meaning that men fight for material advantages in a number of forms. Another has refined this to economic creeds—that is, beliefs regarding the way each nation should regulate its productive activities and the justice of the distribution of the product. Still another school is exclusively insistent on nationalism, or the sovereignty of areas lying side by side, eventuating in group conflict. But thorough analysis reveals much more complexity than this superficial and attractive simplicity suggests. Simplicity in diagnosis leads to simplicity in provision against the evils of war. But the very problem of preventing war and securing the reign of enduring peace lies precisely in the complex nature of the causes of war. War arises from a combination of causes; every war results from a combination of several causes; though any war when compared with any other may be caused more predominantly by one or several causes. If the causes of war are many, and if they are likely to arise at any time in any place, then the assurance that war will be stopped before it ever breaks out, or be soon quashed, can only be provided by an organization capable of covering any eventuality anywhere. That begins to look like world government; but the question still remains whether mere considerations of prudence can bring nations together in a *voluntary* contract which will meet the needs of such a situation.

Let us then look at the causes of war as study has revealed them over a long span of human history. The reader will remember the difference between “causes” and “occasions,” the “conscious” and the “profounder” motivations.

Economic

Economic causes vary with the stage of culture and technique of a society. Wars have been fought to get more to eat, to wear; to reduce work and fatigue; to obtain possessions which may lead to all kinds of advantages for which property is necessary. Wars

have been fought among primitive peoples for cattle, or to acquire slaves. The Turks regarded the European peoples they conquered as *rayah*, cattle.¹⁵ Wars have been fought for trade routes, that is, access to and from Great Britain by her peculiar geographic position has been involved notably in these; so have Spain, Holland, and Portugal, and so also the United States in the form of the "freedom of the seas." Men have struggled for places of migration: Mussolini practically threatened this. The Japanese invasion of China was partly attributed to the American policy of not permitting immigrants into *her* borders. Thus, Hideki Tojo, Premier of Japan in World War II, declared to the Associated Press (*Boston Traveler*, June 17, 1946) that "the suppression of the Japanese Empire's trade development by the objection of a certain big power against the East Asiatic immigration, adoption of a high tariff policy, and formation of an economic bloc," forced Japan to attack.

Tensions between nations have been caused by financiers and manufacturers and exporters competing for outlets for their enterprises abroad, and supported by their governments. This is the special view of Hilferding,¹⁶ Hobson,¹⁷ and Lenin,¹⁸ and it has again been most recently enunciated by Stalin,¹⁹ though decisively refuted by Staley and Robbins.²⁰ Further attention will be given to it later.

Reflection on economic motivation as a cause of war leads to two conclusions. First, it is more likely to be conducted in the earliest stages of civilization where the possibility of starvation and the highest degree of insecurity prevail.

This introduces the question of *standard*. It is readily arguable that in most parts of the world today men are not so poor that they are forced to make war on others as a pure and dire economic necessity. Yet if standards of living are set high by modern peoples—that is to say, if peoples are taught to be greedy for a high level of material possessions—they could contribute to war.

¹⁵ Cf. A. J. Toynbee's remarkable description in *A Study of History*, Vol. III, p. 22 ff.

¹⁶ *Das Finanzkapital* (Vienna, 1910).

¹⁷ *Imperialism* (London, 1902).

¹⁸ *Imperialism*, 1st ed. 1916.

¹⁹ See below, p. 119.

²⁰ Cf. E. Staley, *War and the Private Investor*; and L. C. Robbins, *The Economic Causes of War* (London, 1940).

But the standard at which people aim is not a direct and independent economic matter. The economic target always lies within a spiritual framework. A morality teaches values—to be temperate or intemperate about wealth. The economic is not autonomous. It is a choice in the consciousness, deliberate or customary, implicit or explicit, in all the individual homes and the great societies called nations, between chiefly economic satisfactions and other satisfactions. One may mean pressures on other peoples which might lead to wars; the other, contentment with less, and even acts of generosity—Santa Claus, or the Good Samaritan, or the Golden Mean—which might mollify enemies and win friends.

The second point is, that it is wrong to attribute, in our time, wars to economic imperialism when that imperialism is ascribed to a minority of people within each country, called "capitalists." To this point we shall return, saying now only that in dictatorial countries the despots can pursue an acquisitive policy of the kind referred to without popular check upon their activities, while in democratic countries the *masses* may more or less consciously seek economic satisfactions which oppress other peoples. The allocation of responsibilities is the first step to peace. It will be noticed, also, that what may seem to be a simple economic drive may be in the interests of the increased *power* of a nation or a group in it.

Finally, when modern communities—nurtured to believe that they have title to a high standard of living which, in fact, is the supreme good—suffer depressions involving hardships that cannot be met by puny individual adjustments, because the integrated economic apparatus is too vast, men may, in desperation, gamble on leaders who offer them a salvation in a disreputable regime with militarist purposes. Millions followed Hitler for this reason. Yet many other nations, as economically stricken as Germany, behaved better.

This leads to the conclusion that other factors of mind and character were involved in the consequences of economic distress on the fate of Germany, and the whole world.

Territory

Wars have been fought for *territory*; they continue. Sometimes economic expansion is sought; sometimes racial or national supremacy; or political prestige in a world which sets high value on

largeness, or strategic advantage—that is, for the better ability for defense and for offense. Thus, the acquisition of Gibraltar, Malta, the Suez Canal by Great Britain; the acquisition of Texas, Louisiana, Porto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, Guam, and so on, by the United States; thus the continual extension of Russian dominion unslackened through eight hundred years, and still moving westward, eastward, and southward, wherever there is an outlet or a potential enemy.

Though modern agriculture and industry have reduced the amount of space needed for abundance, land is still a valuable economic possession, as it was in ancient days when the only machine of production was land. Hitler coveted the rich Ukraine; the Poles now pour into East Prussia. Even in an age of atomic warfare and air-borne armies, the problems of occupying for permanent control territories won as a result of destruction from the air make a wide and deep belt a very important asset of defense, and areas of retreat and maneuver invaluable for renewal of resistance. Russia in 1941–1942 escaped the fate of France largely by this territorial factor. The conflict among the nations in post-war negotiations renders illustration excessive except that attention may be called to the Yugoslav claim for Carinthia, a portion of Austria supported by no other member of the United Nations than the U.S.S.R.! One of the last remaining values of colonies in an era of economic “open door” is as bases for defense or attack, for they get under the potential enemy’s guard. Originally, colonies were sought as a source of wealth to the mother country, other nations being excluded from their resources; the rising power of states forbade the policy of “open door,” free trade, and migration.

The contemporary quest for uranium and the exploration of the Arctic Circle, revive the interest in land as a cause of war.

Adventure

Some wars have been fought for *adventure*. The cases of Alexander, Philip of Macedon, Cortez, Raleigh, even Columbus,²¹ may lead us to believe that such motivation no longer exists; but such a belief could be a very costly error. A cogent argument can be advanced that adventure led Mussolini and Hitler into war.

²¹ Cf. William Bolitho, *Twelve Against the Gods* (New York, 1929).

The question arises, Did the doctrine or the man come first—or the man with the doctrine? We cannot ignore the pugnacity of Mussolini from his earliest days, and his intention to become somebody.²² In Hitler, it is even less mistakable. *Mein Kampf* begins with a sneer at his father's profession as an honest, hard-working, petty customs official. Not for Hitler the life of a public servant, or a bureaucrat—let the reader choose his word. Hitler preferred to read the history that would lead him to glory, and to discard, as he confesses, all other histories. Many Germans followed him in this.²³ It was easy to persuade them since their own country had suffered an abysmal defeat in 1914–1918, and the other spiritual and economic troubles of the time cast them outside the common peaceful avocations and pleasures of society. They went out hunting! If this seems farfetched, let the reader turn to Hauser's *A German Talks Back*. Is Peron, also, such an adventurer?

Self-Preservation and National Independence

These twins have been frequent causes of war. Even the United Nations Charter, Article 51, leaves them a loophole: "Nothing in the present Charter shall imperil the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the organization, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

Some of these wars of self-preservation may be mentioned for concreteness' sake. Persia and Athens; Athens and Sparta; Spain and the Moors; the Thirty Years' War ending in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648; the Netherlands and Spain, and Britain and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; Britain and Ireland over the centuries; the American colonies and Britain; Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia against Napoleonic France; the American Civil War, 1861–1865 and even a little beyond, perhaps; Latin America and Spain from 1810; the Balkan countries assisted especially by Great Britain against the Turkish Empire; the Arabs against the Turkish Empire in 1915–1918; the

²² See Megaro, *Mussolini in the Making* (London, 1938).

²³ On Goebbels and Göring, cf. K. Heiden, *History of National Socialism* (London, 1934).

Italian states and Austria-Hungary during the nineteenth century; the North American Indians and the European immigrants from the seventeenth century onward; the Maoris of New Zealand against the British immigrants; the wars of the African tribes against their European and British colonizers; Mexico and the United States. Why such wars were undertaken, we shall discuss more fully in Chapter V.

Domination

Wars of *domination* were fought for individual or class or general social advantage by Caesar, Henry VIII, Elizabeth, William the Conqueror, Frederick the Great and his predecessors, Wilhelm II and his Pilot Bismarck. Wars may be stimulated by a ruling class afraid of its own people—this is a sweet Marxian theory. I can find no clear example of it, though two are usually adduced. One was Secretary Seward's advice to Lincoln to prevent the incipient Civil War by embroiling the United States with Great Britain or France. But Lincoln did not do this. Secondly, the American Minister at Madrid reported to the State Department in April, 1898, that the dynasty would risk a war to avoid overthrow.²⁴ General wars of domination were undertaken by Napoleonic France against Europe; between Tsarist Russia and Japan (so far from being undertaken to put down class revolt against the Tsar, the war actually produced it, though the effect was hardly intended); the United States against Mexico, Bolivia, Colombia, Nicaragua, Spain, and Texas; Britain in China and India; and Germany between 1906 and 1918; Bismarck's Germany against the France of Napoleon III, partly to unify the German states under Prussia in the heat of war.

It is feasible, and not unwise, to penetrate through the main purpose of such wars to the background, which teems with larger or lesser motivations, some individual, some collective. The surface is imperialism or patriotism: acting for the "vital interests" of the national group, or alleged interests and glory and honor. The purpose is domination. A spiritual justification may be offered: to bring culture and civilization to an inferior.

²⁴ Cf. C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 106-107.

Ideological: Soviet Communism and Western Democracy

The discussion has led to the *ideological*, the *religious*, the *cultural*. We may think of Islam and her cruel conversions of Christians in Europe, through the Arabian Peninsula, to the North African seaboard, or to Morocco and Spain. "There is no God but the one God, and Mohammed is his Prophet!" From 1095 to 1270 the Crusades set Europe and the Middle East in an intermittent state of war. These wars against the Mohammedans originated in the clergy's appeal to make the way safe for pilgrimages to the Holy Sepulcher and to secure the rule of the Christian Church in the Holy Land. The masses were attracted by the spiritual merit to be obtained in an era when the Church taught (without rival doctrines of destiny) as the goal in life accumulation of merit for the Day of Judgment: penance could cancel out sins. Other motivations mingled with these: the ambition of the Norman princes; adventure; excitement for the masses—migration to plenty, perhaps, away from the famine and pestilence of their own lands. The Italian cities cooperated for cheap products from the East and the establishment of their bazaars; the Norsemen were avid for territory; the Church was anxious to divert the hardier spirits in its area from their private wars. From 1520 to 1648, Europe and the New World were riven by the Wars of Religion between Protestants and Catholics. Economic motives, and motives of territory and power cannot be excluded; but religious differences—some believing that salvation lay in a man's right to worship as he pleased while others thought that salvation lay only in the Catholic Church—set men against each other across national boundaries or within them.

Of ideological wars, examples are abundant; and here, again, the causes are mixed. The American War of Independence was suffused with an ideology best summed up in Thomas Paine's libertarian rationalism, being antitraditional, and defending the authority of the people against the authority of kings, aristocracies, and established churches. The French Revolutionary Wars, until their perversion by Napoleon and even under him to a point, were wars for Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity against the feudal

monarchies of Europe. The Holy Alliance was an ideological pact to suppress these ideas in post-Napoleonic Europe.²⁵

The ideological clash of our time is of Russian or Soviet Communism, Fascism, and the democratic idea.

An ideology is not merely a system of ideas about human values, purpose, and duty—that is, something merely uttered but inert. Its particular character lies in its being or becoming the index to a program of social action carried to its logical consequences from a sharply defined, single, all-inclusive generalization about human nature and destiny. Purporting to include all, an ideology is one-sided; it is sick with bias. Edmund Burke expressed the flavor of ideologies in his castigation of the English friends of the French Revolution:

I think I envy liberty as little as they do, to any other nations. But I cannot stand forward, and give praise or blame to anything which relates to human actions, and human concerns, on a *simple view of the object, as it stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of metaphysical abstraction*. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass for nothing) give in reality to every principle its distinguishing colour and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind.

An ideology is not merely comprehension of political truth, but a recommendation for action and a call to obedience. Karl Marx, the world's most recent ideologist of classic quality, sought (in his own words) "not to understand the world, but to reform it." That is to say, ideologists have a purpose, the fulfillment of the commandments that produced and are implicit in their ideology. Ideologies do not evolve from the long and ever modified wisdom of several generations; they are not tentative, but are the product of one thinker or one sect. Since no one mind, however fertile and sagacious, can prescribe for all men, seeing that none can ever understand all men, the history and valuation of human nature, of which an ideology is compounded, are limited.

Ideologies are like religions in their passion, their exclusiveness of reference to the faithful, and their supreme significance and sway over believers. They are like religions also in the un-

²⁵ Cf. pp. 339-340 below.

provability of their final tenets, and, certainly, as fountains of the righteousness of command and the duty of obedience.

They resemble philosophy in their attempt to comprehend all answers to the final questions of existence, and in the rigorous consistency with which their stages follow from the answers given to the elemental problems. They are like an evangel in the missionary spirit with which they become endowed; like morality, in their peremptory formulas prescribing the way to attain the supreme good, to which no other holds a candle. And they are like ideals, in their attraction, their warmth, and loyalty-building incandescence, except that they are all knit together in a one-sided view of human capacities and aims. Ideologies are ideals carried to an extreme, in a pattern excluding alternatives, with a temper quite intolerant of even the possibility of any second way toward happiness or virtue, and especially the latter, to the point of exclusive perfection. The most finished and effective of living ideologies is the Marxist, on which the polity of the Soviet Union is based. It admits no other perfection, for man or society. It considers the others as inevitably and eternally deadly to itself.

Now ideologies differ in their present-day significance according to two factors: their process of development, and their content. At the basis of the Western democratic way of life—that is, the *truly* democratic government—is an ideology. In its time, it had all the fervor and one-sidedness and fanaticism of any ideology. It was revolutionary and subversive, and intolerant to the point of tyrannicide and war. Over three centuries of experience have molded its contours and given it mollifying reservations. The bed has been fitted to humanity, for humanity in operation. As the degree of tolerability of democracy has been evidenced by the responses of many generations thereto, rulers and thinkers have desisted from the punitive attempt to carve mankind to the length and shape of Procrustes' bed.

The more recently fabricated ideology, in the hands of the first generation of revolutionary bigots and practitioners, has still the faults of its incomplete reading of human nature, its subversive purpose (even though subversiveness to re-create), and the temper of the original fanatics. And it required considerable fanaticism to sit in the British Museum Reading Room for ten years and live the life that Karl Marx or his persecuted disciples, Lenin and Stalin, lived.

Next is the decisive question of content, which, it may be added, is also a function of time, for time reveals the truth about man under government.

The Marxist-communist ideology is a sanguine and transcendent doctrine *over and above* men. It invokes the revelation of "all history" to indicate what human nature is, chiefly moved by considerations of material possession. It has selected one aspect alone of human nature, and, at that, has not related it to other aspects, the unseverable combination of factors which make up the wholeness of man. Even so it has not stated the *degree* to which the economic element is paramount in the motivation of human activity. The strength and weakness of Marx-Leninism lie in its simplicity. It mixes the truth and error. The truth inspired and produced the Russian Revolution of February–October, 1917; the error is ruining Russia and may ruin the rest of the world.

The democratic ideology is not only smoothed down, has not only ceased to be madly heroic, that is, prepared for self-sacrifice and the sacrifice of cowards or infidels inferior to the creed; but, above all, it is an ideology based on the view that *no ideology is valid for human nature and activity in society that does not emerge from the equal participation of all men rightly endowed with the maximum freedom to participate in this process*. Democracy is, therefore, the ideology of toleration, because it is the ideology which believes that truth cannot have been once and for all discovered to be bequeathed in perpetuity. It holds instead that all truth—that is, the conviction of good and evil—is to be learned only by continuing an endless and open experiment, with conscious and frequent opportunity to refute and repair error and declare newly surmised truths.

A Serious Warning

If the analysis of the nature of prevalent ideologies seems to pit them against each other in inevitable collision, because they are in rigid and exclusive contrast, some crucial questions must be continually asked before final and drastic conclusions are drawn at any stage of policy making.

These questions are: Do the practical exponents really believe all of the ideology? How seriously do they believe whatever part they do believe? What rewards, outside the ideology, would

they accept, to diminish the temperature and impetus of their belief? What punishments would deter them from the attempt to realize their beliefs? How much *fight* are they likely to put up for their ideology: defensively, to stop the area of its prevalence from contracting; and offensively, to expand the area of its dominance? What specific provocations will produce offensive or defensive reactions?

Some hope *may* be found in the answers to one or all of these questions. For example, on challenge, it might be found that the rulers (whether despots or masses) for a time, or for all time, prefer the assurance of their own continued power to the propagation of their faith: that may be their primary, even their only, real belief. Or, postponements of action, instead of immediate conflict, may follow from the actual state of belief.

A very grave international threat lies in the fact that it is hard to answer these questions accurately until some disputes have revealed, by guesswork and inference, the states of mind; and one or another of those disputes might be the final one. Furthermore, a system of government may be by nature so secretive as to offer no hints to guide confident peaceful behavior.

Until a later phase of the argument is reached,²⁶ it is wise to be tentative regarding the consequences of ideology.

Whatever its seed and root, every ideology has blossoms called justice. This conception of justice is the bedrock of its constitution at home; it is the root of the principles on which peace or war will be sought. This informs the character of participation in international relations. Ideology and justice have many diverse fruits, and among them in Iran, for example, are barrels of gasoline. For with the gasoline the tractors on the collective farms will run; or you may take the family into the fresh air.

Have nations gone to war for ideology's sake? It might almost be declared that nations have never gone to war for anything else! We have mentioned the Holy Alliance, preceded by the coalition against Napoleon. (Was not the self-preservation of Britain the vindication of an ideology—let Burke prevail?) Were not the nascent nationalism and independence of Prussia, the will to live of Tsar Alexander I, the signatories of the Declaration of Independence examples of the supremacy of ideology? Or—to descend

²⁶ As from Chapter VIII below onwards.

to our own day, the *conscious* leaders of the alliance against Hitler; Hitler's onslaught on the Soviet; the Soviet's incursion into eastern and southeastern Europe, and her protective inroads by tolerated infiltration into as many countries of the world as she can reach? The Soviet protects in a peculiar way her conviction of justice among men. The democracies act protectively and aggressively for the purposes of that ideology which has, as yet, seemed to the voting majority of their peoples to be preferable. The strength of their attachment will determine the strength of their responses to any event, however trivial, irrational, and unintended, that threatens the life of the society commended by their ideology.

Thus, the causes of war are many; they are mixed; their combination varies from war to war. From any quarter a voice may call which makes a nation spring to arms; and even if it is a small nation it is part of the unseverable land and sea formations that encircle the globe. "Chain reactions" were not first caused by the atom bomb, but by the mental bomb, man's mind. *If* world government is to be effective in supplying an absolute guarantee of peace, then it is government which must cover the maximum number of the aspects of national life, including the form of government and opinion in its early stages. Its maxim might need to be Cicero's on Caesar: to preserve the Republic, kill him at twenty-six not fifty-six!

So wide and deep a government cannot be achieved by voluntary social contracts, if the ideologists are inflexibly resolved on their own existence, to the exclusion of ways of life chosen by other communities. For their self-solicitude is the heart of their belligerence. They cannot be expected to surrender the right of defense. They may, in the temperature of their self-confidence, be ready to proceed by the sword to make the world safe for themselves. No one of them can be happy about the conversions made by the other's ideology in neutral territories.

Therefore, seeking peace we are thrown back upon (1) the spontaneous, simultaneous action of states in harmony with one another; or (2) unity which proceeds from acceptance of a common morality or ideology; or (3) agreement to differ, and trust that such differences will not mean war; or (4) world government. Of these alternatives, the first, second, and third are

possibly ruled out for reasons not of divergent but of *hostile* ideologies, as we have mentioned and will demonstrate more fully; and we have seen that the fourth can hardly be expected to come about by voluntary contract. Further examination of this view is undertaken presently. Let it, however, be emphasized at once, that the more alike the ideologies are in general character, the less the need for common organization, to say nothing of the need for the whole apparatus of world government. Politics abhors unnecessary machinery for a function performable without it. Conversely, the wider apart the ideologies are, especially in their temper, the more necessary for tranquillity and security is the integrating force outside, even coercion. The resemblant ideology may be trusted to keep its own house in tolerant order, and to overthrow any domestic Caesar, who might also be a Caesar to other nations.

In the absence of these assurances, self-defense is continuously necessary, with provision for assistance to one's friends.

Wars for Government

One other frequent cause of war has been relegated to this last paragraph, because treatment of it properly belongs to a later stage of the argument. Many wars have been fought to establish government over a wide area previously held by other peoples, tribes, cities, or social groupings, living near by in actual or potential hostility. All our modern states, not to mention those with an origin and history in a more distant past, emerged wholly or partly out of acts of force and involuntary submission, leading to a common superior, then common law and order, and finally peace. The theme is resumed later. They may be called "wars for government."

CHAPTER IV

Promises Must be Kept Between Nations

Trust none ;

For oaths are straw, men's faiths are wafer-cakes,

And hold-fast is the only dog, my duck.

—SHAKESPEARE, *King Henry V*, II, iii, 53

THE WEAKNESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

SUCH PEACEFULNESS as the world has enjoyed since the Napoleonic Wars has proceeded from a disposition to be peaceful, because the exertions of war became too considerable for any gains it might secure. Distance still separates countries; its abridgment is costly. In many places a poised threat produces the peace of submission to injustice: what cannot be cured is peacefully endured. Germany could have had Alsace-Lorraine if she had not grasped for more. Out of sight, out of mind: distance reduces fear. In various areas of the world mutual fears have been banished by descent from a common history, development of a philosophy of living; and where, in fact, conquest though not expected would not be regarded as a completely insupportable calamity if it came.¹ Simultaneously, and as a result, in part, of this conditional oneness, peace is brought to the world by fulfillment of the principles of international law. Peace here must be construed not only as absence of war, but also as the conditions under which war is legitimate and must normally be expected.

¹ For example, the American-Canadian frontier of three thousand miles and the two countries' common defense philosophy, manifested by the absence of fortifications on the frontier, and the Canadian lukewarmness after the League of Nations once the United States Government repudiated membership. Cf. Corbett, *The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes* (New Haven, 1937), and Britain: *Partner for Peace* (New York, 1946) on common defense policy since 1939.

International law is not the product of legislatures like those which make statutes in the various nations,² because an international legislature does not exist.

International law consists of two elements. One is *customary* principles of intercourse between nations; the other is *treaties* between them, called by such names as treaty, pact, declaration, convention, agreements, yet all broadly the same in origin, authority, and kind of obligation force.

The major *customary* principles may be indicated thus :

1. All states are sovereign.
2. All states are equal.
3. All states have control over every aspect of their own domestic life—on the land, in the sea around to the three-mile limit, in the air above—except as they voluntarily or after defeat in war surrender it, and except in respect of the person and property of aliens, to whom they are required to render justice as, roughly, their own land may set the standard in some respects, putting aliens at no disadvantage in comparison with citizens of their land of residence.
4. All states have the right to give or withhold recognition to other states.
5. All states have the right to certain immunities and precedence for their diplomatic representatives.
6. All states have the right to receive or decline to receive the representatives of other states.
7. All states have the right to ceremonial respect.
8. All states have the right to establish and manage armed forces as they will, and also their economy and form of government.
9. All states have the right to remain neutral in a war.
10. All states have the right to go to war at their own discretion, certainly in self-defense, and to use force in reprisal for hostile actions, and various forms of unpleasant retort for hostile activities, for example, hostile propaganda, or actions against its citizens, person or property, or atrocities, or tariff discriminations, or insults to their flag, honor, and so forth, and, if they succeed in such exertions of force, to impose their will on the vanquished by a treaty which shall be honored.
11. How much force may be used; its forms.
12. Crimes of war.

² See pp. 297-300, below, for further analysis of this point.

13. Who are belligerents.
14. What belligerents may do to neutrals and neutrals to them.
15. All states have the right to acquire territories by discovery, conquest, cession.
16. No state shall be forced against its own will into any common action desired by one or more other states.

These principles constitute the guarantees of independent state or national³ existence, spiritual and material, with the right to use force in defense. It is the preservation of the unhindered will of any nation provided it does not interfere with the rights of other nations. This right to go to war is unrestricted. The international lawyers take it so much for granted that it is often wrapped up casually in a sentence about something else. It is taken for granted; thus (only one among many examples):

In the last resort almost the whole of the duties of states are subordinated to the right of self-preservation. Where law affords inadequate protection to the individual he must be permitted, if his existence is in question, to protect himself by whatever means may be necessary.⁴

Something evidently is defective in this arrangement for the peace of the world. The defect is that the right to make war is at the pure discretion or caprice of any nation, if it should feel its rights threatened, or its existence in jeopardy (which means roughly, its territory, or resources, or its political independence, or its own efforts at expansion, or its position in the regional or world balance of power as it desires to make or preserve it). Such a system is perfect for nations at one with one another, or contented not to expand, or unafraid of the expansion or adventures of their neighbors. For a quiet world of live and let live these maxims are adequate. But, as Brierly justly says:

A system professing to be one of Law, which yet is incapable of making the most elementary of all legal distinctions, that between the lawful and the unlawful use of physical force, is entitled to very little respect and hardly deserves to be described as legal at all. To hold

³ There is a difference between the two terms—but it is an almost vanished one.

⁴ W. E. Hall, *Treatise on International Law*, 7th ed., ed. by A. P. Higgins (New York, 1917), p. 278.

at one and the same time that states are legally bound to respect each other's independence and other rights, and yet are free to attack each other at will, is a logical impossibility. Yet that is what the accepted international legal theory today requires us to do.⁵

What is the use of giving a state a right which it may never be able successfully to enforce for itself, and which is not enforced by a superior for its benefit?

In this system there is no common superior, in the form of an arbiter or judge or court continuously in session with a jurisdiction at once compulsory, authoritative, and enforceable. The right of private judgment is exercised by the executive and judicial authorities of each separate state, interpreting international law as they deem just. From this process, in the highest matters of self-defense, war-making, and the terms of "peace" settlement, the domestic courts are excluded, the executive and the legislature having the last word. What is justice is their own individual business. The great authority, Oppenheim, confesses that "an equilibrium between the members of the Family of Nations is an indispensable condition of the very existence of International Law!"⁶ It is dismaying to reflect that the *force* behind justice makes law—but it clears the mind.

TREATIES MUST BE KEPT

Now, of the very essence of this customary law—yet sometimes set down in the form of agreements⁷—is the law relating to treaties, that is, contractual obligations assumed between the sovereign independent nations. These can, by agreement, do what they like with their independence: amend it or end it altogether. And a vast amount of specific regulation of the relationships between states within the lines of the main customary law, as indicated above, is so ordered. The power to make or not to make treaties is an offshoot of the power of independence. This can limit the right to make war—thus, in the League of Nations Covenant, or treaties of friendship or nonaggression or the many

⁵ *The Outlook for International Law* (1945), p. 21.

⁶ L. F. L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 4th ed., ed. by A. D. McNair, Vol. I (London, 1928), p. 99.

⁷ For an example in Pan American agreements, cf. the Act of Chapultepec, 1945.

arbitration treaties. It can regulate the conduct of war—thus, in the Hague conventions to limit the use of certain weapons, or to respect nonbelligerent life and property. It can regulate the position of neutrals, as in the Declaration of Paris, 1856, regarding contraband. It can and does regulate the position of the vanquished in war, putting territorial, reparations, minority protection, disarmament obligations on them. It regulates freedom of commerce, immigration, labor standards, communications, transport, customs formalities. It can regulate armaments, as in the Treaty of Washington of 1921, setting a naval ratio between the United States, Japan, and Great Britain. It regulates the very treaty relationship itself by the terms in which the specific treaties were drawn, for their interpretation for the settlement of disputes, their denunciation.

Some of these treaties were bilateral; for example, the United States Reciprocal Trade Treaties. Others were multilateral, including a number of states—the great powers chiefly—and making vast territorial settlements,⁸ or were of an almost constituent nature, viz., the Hague conventions of 1899 and 1909 establishing the Permanent Court of International Arbitration, Versailles with the League Covenant, or the United Nations Charter. The latter established incipient and limited, but far-reaching, world government, and set procedures regarding, or banned except for collective application, the threat or use of force, in situations or disputes between nations.

Next to the right to make war, the right to enter into or stay out of an agreement on a treaty basis with other nations is the most important right established by international law. It is a frail instrument of international organization. This must be said, although gratification and reverence are due to the efforts of treaty makers and international-law theorists, who through three centuries have devoted their learning, acumen, and ingenuity to establishing peace and justice by this means. Yet a treaty is nothing but a contract between independent parties who give up only so much of their independence as, in their own private judgment, they find the agreement valuable and just to them. However much they may allow for the good of others (and many nations

⁸ For example: Westphalia, 1648; Utrecht, 1713; Paris, 1815 and 1856; Vienna, 1815; Berlin, 1885; Versailles, 1919.

have done this from time to time) it is still they who judge of that good; and they act only to the extent of their self-determined interest. Beyond this process, no authority stands above the individual parties with authority to decide and command the assumption of obligations.

The essence of the treaty arrangement is that *it must be fulfilled*. That pacts are to be observed, or promises fulfilled, is the last residue, the final precious distillation of duty among nations, laboriously preserved since the fall of the unity that (it is alleged) once bound Europe together in the silken filaments of the Christian morality. The doctrine, *pacta sunt servanda*, was well expressed by the Council of the League of Nations on April 17, 1935, in a resolution condemning the German Government for violating the Treaty of Versailles disarmament stipulations:

- (1) That the scrupulous respect of all treaty obligations is a fundamental principle of international life and an essential condition of the maintenance of peace;
- (2) That it is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty nor modify the stipulations thereof unless with the consent of the other contracting parties.⁹

STATES ARE NOT LIKE MEN—NOR ARE MEN

The first classic exponent of this doctrine for the international law of modern states, having their origin in the late sixteenth and seventeenth century, was Hugo Grotius. His argument was based on the supposition that states in the world were bound together by ties like the compacts or contracts which bind citizens together in any state. This analogy would not be tenable even if his reasoning about individuals were correct historically; and it is not.

The argument proceeded that man needs society, for communication and tranquil association. His intellect requires this. He is not an animal, seeking such association only for the sake of advantage, though even when the advantage is present his own good is tempered by regard for his offspring and for others of his species. Adults have an exceptional craving for society, and can

⁹ Cf. G. H. Hackworth, *Digest of International Law* (1943), Vol. V, pp. 164 ff.

know and act on general principles. Man has a concern for society; *this is the nature of his intellect*. His intellect and his concern for society (and I suppose for himself) are the source of law: they counsel abstention from the property of other people; restitution thereof; reparation for wrongful damage; the retribution of punishments. Man can overcome fear, or the enticement of present pleasures, or action on heedless impulse. The human nature to act in association with others on the terms noted, and to act according to *judgment* rather than impulse, directly produces natural law:

It is conformable to natural law to observe compacts (for some mode of obliging themselves was necessary among men, and no other natural mode can be imagined); civil rights were derived from that very source. For those who joined any community, or put themselves in subjection to any man or men, either expressly promised, or from the nature of the case must have been understood to promise tacitly, that they would conform to that which either the majority of the community, or those to whom power was assigned, should determine.

For the mother of natural law is human nature itself, which would lead us to desire mutual society even though we were not driven thereto by other wants. The mother of civil law is obligation by compact; and since compacts derive their force from natural law, nature may be said to be the great-grandmother of civil law. But utility supplements natural law. For the Author of nature ordained that we, as individuals, should be weak and in need of things for living well, in order that we might be the more impelled to cherish society. But utility furnished the occasion for civil law: for that association or subjection of which we have spoken, was at the first instituted for the sake of some utility. . . . But just as the laws of each state regard the utility of that state, so also between all states, or, at least, between most of them, certain laws could be established by consent—and it appears that laws have been established—which regard the utility, not of particular communities but of the great aggregate of communities.

Great states, wealthy in themselves, would not appear to have need of that virtue which regards extraneous parties and calls it justice.

. . . But—not to repeat what I have said already, that law is not established for the sake of utility alone—there is no state so strong that it may not at some time need the aid of others external to itself,

either in the way of commerce or in order to repel the force of many nations combined against it.

A people which violates the laws of nature and of nations breaks down the bulwark of its own tranquillity for future time.

Thus, Grotius has assimilated states to individual human beings. That postulate has held good in international law down to our time. He has assumed a state of nature in which they are independent, until they make compacts for each other. His human nature requires him to make compacts, partly out of concern for others, partly for his own utility. That utility is particular and present, or distant and general: it gives tranquillity and peace. All this is applicable to states in relations with each other. But it is still *compact* which creates obligation.

The virtue of contracts therefore depends on whether *all* are imbued with the same view of and faith in the dictates of natural law. But Grotius himself had to search long and in many places for his fortieth natural law: "*the testimonies of philosophers, historians, poets, and finally orators.*" Then comes a rather sharp dismaying admission: "Not that these are to be trusted indiscriminately; *for they are ordinarily writing to serve their sect, their argument, or their cause.*" Thus the lovable Grotius (lovable because he admits his own weakness) must discriminate, as all political scientists and international jurists do and must. "But," he concludes, "when many writing in different times and places affirm the same thing is true, their *unanimity* must be referred to some universal cause, which in questions with which we are here concerned, can be no other than either a right deduction proceeding from principles of nature, or some common agreement."

The disservice of Grotius is fourfold. The analogy of the entrance into a compact in any one society is misleading in regard to the compacts between nations. He assumes the compacts of individuals in single societies were voluntary. At any rate, he omits to record how the states did actually come into being (though the Thirty Years' War was doing the work in front of his prison bars): whether over a long period, or all at once; whether by persuasion suddenly, or over a long series of stages in many generations; or at some one stage by an act of force, which thereafter may have been liberalized into the practices of a free or at least freer commonwealth.

The second difficulty is that Grotius has placed no weight whatever on the differences among individual men, but seems to assume an amiable and congenial sameness among them—and so apparently of states?

Thirdly, he assumes a kind of equal strength in the international compact as in the domestic compact. But such a conclusion cannot be drawn. The integers which make the international compact are conspicuously different in character among themselves: in Vattels' picturesque phrase, dwarf and giant nations are counted equal in sovereign independence.

Finally, he ignores that men may seriously differ at any one time in their ideas of the law of nature, which proceeds from human nature, or of the human nature that God put into humanity (for Grotius makes that perfunctory obeisance), and so be impelled not to make compacts with each other even though they may have a common interest in doing so. Or, having made compacts with each other, men may be impelled to interpret differently, and even with intent to obtain a corrupt advantage by violating promises, or give them no sanctity, because they attribute no sanctity to the state with which they are making the alliance. Men may be inebriated by their respective ideologies of such hostility that they would say, as Hitler said of treaties to Hermann Rauschning:

Every pact sworn to was broken or became out of date sooner or later. Anyone who was so fussy that he had to consult his own conscience about whether he could keep a pact, whatever the pact and whatever the situation, was a fool. He could conclude any pact and yet be ready to break it the next day in cold blood if that was in the interests of the future Germany.

Differences in ideology or the national myth, though not attaining these sinister proportions, nevertheless often make the negotiation and fulfillment of treaties too unsure a basis of peace for men to rely on, in an age of weapons of ferocious mass destruction.

Now, generally speaking, treaties will be interpreted and fulfilled in conformity with the spirit of their original intention if the parties share the same state of mind about the substance of the treaty, and above all about the sanctity of the promises.

What, then, worried Grotius enough to cause him to write? He

wrote in travail of spirit, for though in his view the natural law should have made states as they then existed—especially in the sovereign persons of their kings and princes—enter into peaceful accords, the Thirty Years' War, begun for religious reasons, was destroying north central Europe with the most unmercifully cruel massacres and rapine. Something deeper than the alleged lost unifying force of Christianity was needed to support the sanctity of contracts: human nature itself.

Since, for the reasons which I have stated, I hold it to be completely proved that there is between nations a common law which is of force with respect to war and in war, I have had many and grave reasons why I should work on that subject. For I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license in making of war of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed, recourse being had to arms for slight reasons and for no reasons; and when arms were once taken up, all reverence for divine and human law was lost. Just as if man were henceforth authorized to commit all crimes without restraint.

COMMON MORALITY LOST TO THE WORLD

This, then, the obligation to fulfill promises, is the last and minimum obligation which can keep the world—by now grown to seventy sovereign nations—linked in peace. It is an obligation founded in philosophy or ideology, to replace one that is alleged to have prevailed during some part of the epoch of the dominance of Christianity.

An oft told tale need not be repeated in detail again. It is enough to say that, it is held that after the Greek city states sank under their own blows in the Peloponnesian War, because their common culture and commercial interests and defensive alliances against the East were inadequate to override their separate city gods, they were overwhelmed by the empire of Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. Then Rome by "force, force to the utmost," founded her empire, with a dictated and enforced *pax Romana* stretching northward past the Alps to the Danube and the Rhine and to Scotland, westward and southward through Spain and northern Africa, and eastward through Greece and Asia Minor to the Black Sea and Persia and Egypt. About a hundred million people dwelt in these territories at Rome's apogee

about A.D. 110. Its dominion had begun to wax about 100 B.C.; it fell in A.D. 476; its span was about six hundred years.

The Roman Empire brought peace, order, Roman Law, another law inspired thereby for the various peoples called the *jus gentium* giving them an approach to equal justice among themselves. It produced roads for communication and authority; able administration. Its fall provoked the gifted historian of political ideas A. J. Carlyle to exclaim to Clarence Streit: "Ours is not the first modern world state—there was Rome." Had it persisted, and its rule "broadened down from precedent to precedent," Europe might have been one.

Above all, it established Christianity as the official, authoritative religion of the West.

The barbarians from the north and east and center of Europe, pushed forward by Mongolian pressures, destroyed the Empire and were themselves subdued by the Christian faith in the course of time. The unity of Western Europe was carried forward by two institutions, the Holy Roman Empire and the "Christian Republic," centering in St. Peter's, Rome.

The first was supposed to comprise secular authority over the territories of the Empire that had been destroyed, but in fact comprised those which pretenders (blessed by the Pope) could gain and hold. Established first over the lands from northern Spain to the Baltic and from the Atlantic to the Oder, by the might of Charles the Great of the Franks, who received the imperial crown on Christmas Day, A.D. 800, at the hands of the Pope himself, it disintegrated on his death, and fell victim to Saracens, Germans, Vikings, and all manner of internal dissensions.¹⁰ A multiplicity of kingdoms, principalities, and town rulerships arose on a feudal or burgher basis, subject to no concrete unification or peace. The legacy finally went to the German kings, comprising their lands and Lombardy.

The Christian Republic covered the area proselytized by the Church. Hildebrand, the brilliant son of a humble family of Tuscany, after his ascent in 1073 to the seat of Pontifex Maximus as Gregory VII, superb in mind, courage, ability, and doctrine, pressed forward the unifying influence of Christianity. He con-

¹⁰ Cf. E. L. Woodward, *Christianity and Nationalism in the Later Roman Empire* (London, 1916).

firmed the high clerical appointments, archbishops and bishops in all lands; claimed the power to hallow kings and so make or unmake their authority; and through his bishops anointed rulers. He held lands as states or feudal holdings, rendering duties above and exacting them below. The most intimate domestic felicities and responsibilities were regulated by Papal decrees and interpreted and enforced by the clergy—baptism, confirmation, extreme unction, marriage, penance, ordination, and mass. The Church entered the bodies of men, and men into its body, for the sake of Christ, their one father.

Rulers made obeisance to the Holy See because, as in Hungary and Poland, they received in return for their quasi-allegiance the compensation of Papal intervention to secure them from their predatory neighbors. The Church expressed the Christian ethic; purified the always relaxing local clergy; protected local worship from temporal brutalities, and gave sanctuary to fugitives; encouraged learning and established virile and merciful religious orders. It was everywhere with its legates and advisers; and the courts of the rulers were frequently dominated by counselors who were in clerical orders and whose education, in a day when there was hardly any other, was given by the Church. It arbitrated among kings and princes and overlords, often forcing its judgment and advice upon its children. It overthrew great rulers like Emperor Henry IV by anathema—which, rendering him infamous, petrified the root of the loyalty of his subjects and his princely neighbors. They were afraid of losing their spiritual prizes; afraid of damnation.

It established a Truce of God—banning war on Sundays and holy days, until men had not the right to fight more than eighty days in the years.

In Toynbee's words: "The gossamer filaments of the Papal spider's web, as it was originally woven, drew mediaeval Western Christendom together into an unconstrained unity which was equally beneficial to the parts and to the whole."¹¹

Yet, the "gossamer filaments" did not remain so spiritual and subtle for more than a few decades; and the web was soon broken. The spiritual could not triumph without recourse to the sword—at any rate not so soon, though it had the tremendous and unparalleled

¹¹ A. J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. IV (1939), p. 526.

advantage of having no rival mind to offer alternatives in salvation such as had existed in earlier ages, or that came afterward with the Renaissance and Reformation. It was bound to look for secure support from the very princes whom it sought to control in order that it might by their assistance overrule other princes who were challenging its work in their domains. It was particularly avaricious of taxes for the Papal uses. Its armed forces—those of its friends, no loyal friends to it but planning usurpation of its authority—were in very frequent use throughout Christendom. War followed war, in spite of the *pax Christiana*. The Golden Age of the Christian Peace was a fiction. The Papacy became a pawn, sometimes a willing one, in the power maneuvers of the princes. Some two hundred fifty years after Hildebrand's taming of Emperor Henry IV, the Papacy was for nine Papal terms forced to sit in Avignon, France. Foreign kings were not won to the idea of Christian unity, or of paying their subjects' good money to those held in this Babylonian Captivity. Between 1378 and 1417 there were sometimes two or three Popes, recognized by different parties. The Popes intrigued with rulers, and fostered subversion in their lands. These rulers developed their own royal pride, even "national" pride, and their own special interpretation of Christianity. The Popes used an atrociously cruel sword against hostile interpretations of Christianity by heretical sects. They authorized the Inquisition.

The eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries are full of large and small wars: some engendered by the Popes; some instigated to assert Papal authority in disputes between princes; many without benefit of clergy between the terrestrial rulers themselves; many between 1095 and 1300 against the Turkish rulers of Islam for the assistance of the Oriental Christians, stimulated sometimes to drain off martial exuberance from the West to the East. The statistics of wars (see page 14) point to considerable wars in the time of the unity of Christendom, and the age when the "just" war was defined by the Fathers of the Church as one which was molded by and upon the principles of the Christian ethic.

In its contest with the Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, the Holy See conquered; but it substituted no other unity. It denied its own spirit by the use of force, yet had no secular administration which could subordinate parochialisms to a single

authority. Through its refusal to be guided by representative councils, or its failure to make them operate, a chance of a European council was lost. The best that can be said about the legend of a *pax Christiana* is that its conception was noble, and the spirit of its claim is one of the paths to peace. For it rested on the conviction that only where men are pervaded by a sense of obligation and of the rights of others can there be trust and justice, that is, peace.

The Church failed under the impact of a number of factors: lust of power and avarice for the revenues the clergy were exacting and sending to Rome; the great distances from the Holy See which, even if it had legates everywhere could not everywhere overcome the disobedient by its own armies. The princes and peoples drew apart out of proud unwillingness to abide by the Church tenets and obey its commands; out of a perception that the clergy were not as holy as their office required them to be, being lecherous and greedy; out of the sheer growth at a distance of independent social aggregates of human beings, rooted to the spot because communications were bad, and because local protection by the overlords was what mattered to men and their families.

Strong men created kingdoms, and claimed sovereignty against the Holy Roman Empire and Rome—that is, the supreme and unchallengeable and unappeasable right to make laws, render justice, execute laws, and impose taxes. Each had his personal version of the Christian religion which caused him to reject in whole or in part the authority of the Pope. The more this was resisted by the Church, the more the arrogant princes reinterpreted Christianity for themselves. The Church was ever under assault from heretics, and they were too distant to be subject to daily preachings and persuasions. The heresies mounted to tremendous proportions after the rediscovery of the ancient learning. The Renaissance and its secularizing effect, its human resilience and audacity, fostered the sanguine belief in man as a pagan rather than a Christian. The Reformation introduced the interpretation of the Gospel by individual conscience. Thereafter, the religion of the princes became their own largely uninfluenced version of Christianity, Catholic or Protestant, and there were a number of sectarian versions among Protestants. From the first quarter of the sixteenth century to the last quarter of the seventeenth century, nearly one hundred fifty years, Europe and its embryo overseas possessions were swept

by constant and ferocious wars of religion. At length, disillusionment about the hopes of total victory, or weariness, or mercantile instead of spiritual ambition, brought toleration in place of zeal. And that toleration was made possible and guaranteed by sovereignty accorded to the kings or other rulers. If the sovereign were tolerant the sovereign could be peaceful; the sovereign, in order to enforce tolerance, must be powerful, that is, sovereign. This was in the mind of thinkers like Jean Bodin and Hugo Grotius: the religions could live together *under a common superior*, powerful enough not to fear subversion by either or both, and by force giving guarantees of freedom of worship sufficient to make forceful uprisings unnecessary.

Christianity itself lost effect on human motivation and activities, and some states even prohibited the establishment of any church, Christian or otherwise. These had no official—that is, state—standing. The Western world came into relationship with governments in the Middle and Far East which did not accept Christianity at all. The evolution of these states for nearly four centuries without a common Christianity has produced a most extraordinary array of corporate beliefs in the nations of today. The Christian religion forms only a part of their existent ideology, or no part at all. Or it has been deliberately extinguished to make an ideology more potent, as by the Soviet rulers. The Greek Orthodox Church, once declared by the Soviet rulers to be the embodiment of a religion which was opium to the people, is dominated by a state religion formulated in terms of the 1936 Constitution, and the propaganda of the Kremlin.

THE MINIMUM BOND: SECULAR GOOD FAITH

What remains of the bond: the minimum obligation? It is the bond of expediency. Some nations may, and do, make treaties in good faith. Some keep a treaty because they foresee immediate and eventual punishment by the bilked power, permitted for unilateral scrapping of the treaty. They may draw down on themselves collective rebukes, like in 1871 when Russia rearmed the Black Sea, contrary to the Treaty of Paris of 1856; or like Germany, as previously illustrated. Nations have at least this grace: they are ashamed to break a treaty without a reputable excuse. The doctrine of the fulfillment of treaties is that they must be

kept even by the vanquished signatory as faithfully as though he had voluntarily and cheerfully accepted the terms.

Thus a very strained doctrine was invented and implemented, because without it war could hardly have ended without the total annihilation of the vanquished party. Without such a complete crushing, the original wrong could have been reenacted; and it is assumed that the original wrong displeased the victor sufficiently for him to go to war. Hence there would have been no termination of war. Yet the doctrine is still hard. It could only be sound if the victor imposed just terms—just, not on the basis of his own interests but on some common ethic, and eschewing revenge or exemplary reparations. Without a common superior, a morality or a power, the victor's chance of a quiet life is founded on subjection of the vanquished in the degree of his own conception of justice; while the vanquished, having his own ideas of justice, is bound to feel that, though he has signed, yet if he finds the strength it should be used forcefully to reassert his own idea of justice.

The treaty is the acme of the social contract theory, which, first applied to individuals, was transposed to states. It was misleadingly taught for individuals in the state, by some writers, especially Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. A truer doctrine, if a more frightening one, of the relationship of individuals to the state, and perhaps, therefore, of the relationship between state and state, is now built on more accurate and profounder historical studies of the constitutional evolution of states. We draw the conclusions later.

Wars have accomplished the work of international change which treaties were not able to do. But no distinction is now made in international law between just and unjust wars. In the first centuries of Christianity, what the Church declared to be just and unjust regarding war might be of some moment in determining the duties of rulers and subjects. The Fathers of the Church wrote an elaborate doctrine of war, for, once Christianity had become the religion of Rome, it could no longer commend an absolute pacifism as the doctrine of the New Testament. Rome's defense was the Church's salvation: it had to arm its faithful against the barbarians, infidels, heretics. Its doctrine was a standard; its ethic was supposed to limit the sovereignty of princes. But soon disunity befell its doctrine among and within peoples.

Christianity was what the prince thought it was, if he thought anything. Each prince produced his own idea of justice. Hence all wars, in the eyes of the princes, were just.

After a struggle by Grotius,¹² failure by Suárez in the Spanish dominions by another theoretical route than that of Grotius, and a sophistical effort by the authoritative Vattel, "justice" was surrendered to the seventy sovereign states as the separate possession of each, to make, fake, or forsake, as they wished, found useful, or had the power.

Yet redemption by the Christian doctrine may still be won, as will shortly be shown; but not certainly by peaceful means alone. What was lost by the sword, may have to be redeemed by it.

Thus, the basis on which men of a past age relied beyond common interests was a common morality. The minimum international obligation is the fulfillment of promises. For that to be safely assumed, especially in an age of mighty destructive power, requires the existence of a common credibility, not credulousness or gullibility. For common credibility, a foundation of a single general standard of morality, applicable to all peoples, is essential. The question then becomes: How can this be developed? How long will it take? Is it at all feasible? Can it be attained before more wars come? Will it be attained only as the rueful result of a series of wars which, beginning with the casual and irrational unwillingness to face the inner realities, and ending without the triumph and reign of principle, still force men to reflect on their bitter experience? Out of this experience, little by little, will they set up a common standard, much as did the several nations when, emerging in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries from religious, property, and family wars, they invented the theory of a sovereignty for each society which would be above all local contenders, suppressing private judgment and fighting, but eventually guaranteeing toleration for all?

Now, it must not be overlooked that many treaties are kept, and honestly kept, even under the strain of changing circumstances which might lead a nation to wish to ignore or denounce them. Some are violated not because of bad faith, but from difficulties

¹² Books I and III, *Law of War and Peace*. Cf. especially the injunctions against war for any reason but self-defense and redress of injury, and the admonition to practice forgiveness, and the appeal to doubt of one's self-righteousness.

of language and confused intentions of the parties. Difficulties, for example, cropped up out of the Potsdam Agreement relating to the words "preparatory" and "democracy." Another is the word "procedure" used in Article 27 of the United Nations Charter on the Security Council's voting procedure, where the veto need not be used; and another, the word "discuss" in the Charter; and again "situation" and "disputes." Further, treaties suffer, as written constitutions do, from the effects of time. Circumstances forecast, but not necessarily well understood or defined, require interpretation. Differences of opinion arise between nations as they do between statesmen of the same nation, and even between nine judges, long sitting together on the same supreme bench, after a highly assimilated education in their law schools. But that is not all, the circumstances of the parties change at a different intensity of hardship on each.

Many treaties are nevertheless kept, and the breach of a treaty is not always a deliberate act of private judgment with a self-seeking advantage. However, we are thinking of the maintenance of peace by treaty—a very serious matter to the masses of mankind. We can hardly afford to throw on treaties a strain which experience, and contemporary immediate vicissitudes, show they have no capacity to bear. The treaties which in our era have been best kept, apart from those imposed as a war settlement, have been those of an economic and social sort. Giving substantial material advantages to the signatories, even if they have required unequal contributions of these, they have scarcely reduced their independence of policy. For if the monetary or other economic contributions of the signatories have been small compared with their national incomes and the advantage obtained, so also the inroads on their domestic jurisdiction have been small. But above all, the surrender of liberty of judgment and action has been trivial compared with the reserve of it still remaining to the states, the essence of whose independence has never been allowed to be touched. I refer to such treaties as those establishing the international specialized agencies already referred to.

But the treaties which are *not* kept are of the type of the Nine Power Treaty (in spite of which Japan attacked China), Locarno (in spite of which Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland), Nonaggression Treaties of Russia with Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, the guarantees to Czechoslovakia and Austria by France,

the Gentlemen's Agreement on the Mediterranean between Mussolini and Britain. The Kellogg Pact was entirely ignored by Japan, Germany, and Italy. These treaties affected the territory or armaments of the powers, or an established concert and balance of influence among them, and therefore affected their strength to do as they liked in future: their self-preservation.

International anxieties do not merely arise out of the history of the violation of treaties; what poisons the atmosphere of tranquillity is the *contingency* that treaties may not be kept. Spies are therefore a help.

It is in a kind of despair that statesmen clutch at treaties. Consider Mr. Chamberlain's piece of paper signed by Hitler which he declared to be peace with honor! Yet such reliance is today paramount. Thus, when the San Francisco Conference considered the clauses relating to the General Assembly's power to take cognizance of situations which might eventually lead to war, the proposal was introduced that provision be made for the revision of treaties. Article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant was recalled. Various delegations, including, strongly, Senator Vandenberg, proposed the *inclusion* of treaties. This was resisted, and finally defeated, and the reasonableness of the omission acknowledged by the Senator. Instead the Article was to read:

. . . The General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The comment of Secretary of State Stettinius in his Report to the President on the Conference (page 58) should be well noted:

The United States Delegation took the position that explicit reference to the revision of treaties would throw the weight of the Organization too heavily on the side of revision and encourage change beyond the needs of situations requiring it. It was argued that it is not possible to launch an international organization based on international integrity and at the same time intimate any lack of respect for treaties, *which are the principal instruments through which international integrity functions*. Indeed, a consideration of the general welfare and friendly relations might call for a recommendation that

a treaty should be respected by its signatories rather than that it should be revised. The thousands of treaties in operation as the bond of orderly relations among the nations of the world, *should not be weakened by raising doubts about their VALUE OR PERMANENCE.*

This view was asserted by the Soviet Union also: she professes strongly the sanctity of treaties. It was realized that the vanquished in World War II would have too much encouragement for restlessness if the revision of treaties was specifically provided for. *Moreover, the United Nations Charter is itself a treaty.* Indeed, this is why the first great contest in the Security Council—namely, the Soviet Government's violation of the Russo-British-Iranian Treaty to evacuate Iran six months after the end of World War II hostilities—aroused so much dismay and uproar: back on the quicksands so soon!

The attachment to treaties is an attachment to peace: it is also an attachment of despair. To throw itself on the sea of periodical change of treaties, a nation would subject itself continually to the necessity of redefining "justice"; for nations will require revisions when the existing situation is in their opinion unjust. The revisability of treaties would act in much the same psychological way as a clause in a constitution permitting the right of revolution: to stimulate the dissatisfied to press claims.

The international constitution as it has operated in the past through the revision (as we have described it) of treaties is defective because it has no amending clause. At least its amending clause is one that requires unanimity for a new arrangement, while an old one can be upset by the unwillingness of any party to fulfill its obligations—a kind of *veto*. Nations have been unwilling, when in a position of advantage in the international balance, to throw themselves on the sea of redefining "justice." If "justice" could be established satisfactorily to all, the problem of peace would be settled. In the absence of a common superior, buttressed by naked force or sustained by a morality, the definitions of justice are made by each for himself. They are embodied in the treaties prevailing at any moment. Their change would impose intolerable strain on suppliants, as well as those in happy possession of the field. *Peaceful* change is hardly possible in a world which has no unifying concept of justice, and the hopes of

this, sincere and ingenious as they have been, have been vain, sad as that is.

Thus the analogy between the entrance of individuals into society, their submission to government, order, and peace, and the surrender of the right to make war on their own judgment, by a voluntary contract, is not applicable to states in their interrelationships. It does not work; it has not worked. Can it be made to work? Even for individuals in the historic or existent states, the contract is an untrue account of how men became law-abiding and peaceful under their governments: force entered in at some stage and in some measure, and even in the most cultivated and peaceful societies now extant, it is still a brooding and sometimes a roughly intruding presence.

Nationalism, Not Sovereignty, the Enemy

It is therefore our business carefully to cultivate in our minds, to rear to the most perfect vigour and maturity, every sort of generous and honest feeling that belongs to our nature. To bring the dispositions that are lovely in private life into the service and conduct of the commonwealth; so to be patriots as not to forget we are gentlemen. To cultivate friendships, and to incur enmities. To have both strong, but both selected: in the one, to be placable; in the other, immovable.

—EDMUND BURKE, *Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents*, 1770

SOVEREIGNTY, THE CHILD OF NATIONALISM

MEN ARE NOT born free: they are born national. The handicap is heavy.

The world's will to peace or war is not created by a global aggregate of individuals. Between the individual and the world community operate those peculiar tenacious dominating corporate bodies called nations. Nations are the integers which at once fashion the world's will and the individual's spirit and duties. Has the individual no part in all this? Yes: a powerful part already in *democratic* states, more than he usually knows. But it is important that he know much more in order better to comprehend that peace is in *his* keeping, and war is of *his* making.

Any one of the seventy states of the world is a potential disturber of the peace. Its maximum obligation is international law. But this, as though it were entirely natural and completely unqualified, admits the right to make war. The nations are sovereign.

Sovereignty is unchallengeable independence of will, to do whatever pleases the state, in relationship to other states.

Now one of the most seriously confusing habits is the common talk of sovereignty as if it were a very simple, tangible commodity, one small consignment of which, if shipped to some world agency, would produce peace. When the Soviet Union refused to accept inspection for atomic energy control, on the ground, overt and implied, that this infringed sovereignty, a *New York Times* reporter at the United Nations Security Council minimized the loss of sovereignty—because precedents existed in the international control of narcotics, and in the work of the Red Cross in wartime!

Mr. Willkie once made the very creditable remark, "Sovereignty is to be used, not hoarded." Emery Reves, in his well-meaning but excessively fervent book *The Anatomy of Peace*, consistently overuses the term "sovereignty"—as though sovereignty were marketable in retail, a thing separable from the inracinated selfhood of peoples.

The true measure of the problem of peace is to be taken only by realizing that sovereignty has no independent existence: today it is the offspring of nationalism, though long ago it assisted at the birth of nationalism. Sovereignty is no waif or stray that can be ordered to go off by itself to an orphanage. The stern and possessive mother of sovereignty is nationalism, and the problem of peace is nationalism, not sovereignty. Not seventy sovereignties, not seventy states, but seventy *communities* of which the states are largely the products—these are the bodies in international life which make war or peace. It is with the nature of nationalism that seekers of peace are compelled above all to contend.

THE NATIONALIST COMMUNITY

A nation is a peculiar grouping of people, as a separate, corporate, cohesive, and exclusive congregation, with a loyalty normally confined to the interests (not merely material) of that group; any extension of this loyalty to other nations, results only from the exercise of its own judgment and discretion. It is bound together by patriotism—which conveys the sense of the members' common acceptance of the fatherhood of the society and therefore of their common fraternity in it, but emphatically does not postulate a father *outside* itself, to whom reverence is due.

It is not here intended to review the innumerable definitions of nationality as the group-fact, and nationalism as the self-righteous

pride, but to interrogate them for their relevance to peace. The phenomenon is plain to see, but harder to explain. A number of groups of people, many centuries ago, settled in certain separate localities. Each made its own areas as large as could be in face of counter-pressure from the other groups similarly expanding, and of geographical obstacles which the early means of communication, transport, and food conservation could not surmount. No world authority ever fixed the frontiers in every case once for all. In some cases kindred people, Germans or Slavs, were outside the area which by war, cession, or marriage of the ruling families, was acknowledged as belonging to them in the intercourse with other such groups. In some cases nonkindred groups, Poles, Ukrainians, Germans, Rumanians, Bulgarians, have been left in other nations as minorities. Not until very recent centuries, in many cases recent decades, have the states, the authoritative governmental framework organizations of these peoples for internal and external purposes, been made hard and fast by treaty or custom. For centuries, especially after the fall of the Roman Empire, men wandered hither and thither. Even with the rise of organized living on a large territorial scale under a single ruler, called the modern state, men could and did migrate freely on their continents.

Yet the great cores of people were practically immobile. Let it be remembered that even in 1790 it took ten to fourteen days in good weather to journey from Boston to New York, a mere 220 miles. In the course of three or four centuries the likeness in customs and language is bound to grow very recognizable and acceptable, because they are continuously adapted to the heart's desire of each people. In various places, men's minds and forms of expression develop differently in response to the problems of environment and climate and accidental occurrences. For example, the birth and religious education of Luther in Germany; or the ravaging of Russian lands by a Mongolian horde which descended on the original Russian tribes in the thirteenth century and imposed its barbarous autocracy for two hundred years; or the adoption of the Cyrillic alphabet in Eastern Europe, the Latin alphabet in Western Europe, and picture writing in China and Japan. The less peoples know of each other, the more they remain themselves; and they are pleased with themselves, since it is a propensity of man to believe he is virtuous, and to worship at the altar of his own vanity, unless he is faced with the striking contradiction of

some other culture *continually* forced on his attention. As Calderon's comedy expresses it: "A man who has never seen the sun cannot be blamed for thinking that no glory can exceed that of the moon. A man who has seen neither moon nor sun cannot be blamed for talking of the unrivalled brightness of a morning star." It is widely believed in the United States and Britain that their weapons in World War II were marvelous—and, of course, superior to those of the Nazis. General Marshall's Report on the European Theater proves that the Germans were just as clever, and often cleverer.

Nationality, the exclusive grouphood of those who belong to our *nation*—the little congregation of kindred born of us, or born so near that we can understand them without troublesome explanations, as harmless enough because they are like ourselves—developed from such origins. Suppose (which is true) that for five hundred years in Europe, and longer in the Middle East and the Far East, in Britain and Ireland, in Greece and around Rome, that differentiating process, the life of the self-contained, self-maturing group goes on—the end results must be cumulatively different. What is different, is not so much the structure of positive laws to handle the problems of a society now openly conscious of them; but that deep, many-layered, closely knit, dense pattern of culture, the recesses of which Johnson has in mind:

How small of all that human hearts endure,
That part which laws or kings can cause or cure!
Still to ourselves in every place consigned,
Our own felicity we make or find.

THE CURSE OF DIFFERENCE

Theorists of nationality explain it by *common* features shared by all of that nation who have grown together and, in the main, been born in its location. They refer to a common territory, a common language, a common literature, a common history (that is, a memory supplied for the society as a whole), often a single, common religion, common descent, a common government.¹ In our own day, they could add a common economy—that is, instruments

¹ Not all *states* have all these characteristics; not all *nationals* are in the one-nation state; not all *nations* have all these elements fully.

of production which, to whomsoever they may privately belong, produce wealth for the whole of the community. They would also add a common social consciousness, bringing charity or social security to the masses. All these produce cohesion, a sense of belonging together. But Renan, though a luminous and noble genius, overemphasizes that the nation is a unit because it expresses daily the will to live together, "a referendum of every day." No! Not easily for the adult: for he lives under the spiritual and psychological effect of referenda taken tacitly over the centuries. His part in *today's* ballot is small compared with the massive heritage, and biased by his infant years of submission to it while still incapable of independent thought and loyalty.

It is the *differences* between the peculiar groupings with their common characteristics that count the heaviest. Those differences are embodied for each in Burke's immortal thought:

. . . the state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico and tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place.

The nations are blessed, but cursed, with different languages, different religions, different literatures, different histories, different locations, different climates, different resources, different sports, different clothes, different gestures, different attitudes in the relationship between men and women, different forms of family affection and discipline, different forms of government and political manners, and different economies. They are tough, resistant, corporate cultural unities. They may even be likened to the separate identity of persons, who have notoriously fought with

ferocity for life, prosperity, and liberty. What is highly relevant, individuals would fight more fiercely and murderously in their own nations if society, organized as government, had not at some time by force and by assent taken over from them the hardest and most disagreeable tasks, the imprisonment and execution of criminals. *Difference* must be emphasized if the problem of peace is rightly to be understood. Not that there are *no* common approaches or interests or values at all; but the resolute, self-preservative, implacable self-defensiveness to the utmost of these corporate forms of life must be confronted above all. Time will still go on even if the telltale clock is ignored.

How different they are, may be realized if we, for a moment, dwell on the differences in fate which have befallen some of these groupings in the past. Consider then the "accidents" of geography, of timing, of invasion and conquest, location of frontiers, of advent of religious ideas or philosophies, of proximity to the Holy See at Rome, of mind and character—for example, Luther, or Elizabeth, or Peter the Great, or the Romanov dynasty, or the Hohenzollerns of Prussia—of access to the sea, of constitutional battle. Consider the influence of Greek and Roman learning in the West; the commerce of the seas beyond the Mediterranean and the Atlantic; the outlet to the oceans; the discovery of the Americas, where no authority preceded the navigators, the pioneers, the missionaries, and the emigrants, nor followed them, so that they could carry free worship and the idea of the social compact of individual consciences throughout both continents.

Think of the centuries with practically no communication between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia and Britain and the Americas, the Middle and Far East, nor any means to disseminate among the masses the news that was obtained from other lands. Calculate the cumulative consequences of a turn of accident in any one of these countries: that you are Protestant and urbanized and commercial; or that, being Russian, you have been terrorized by an alien and barbarous conqueror, and then have taken over the Byzantine despotism and Greek Church allied with it! One begins to acquire the suspicion of an appreciation of many original differences, overlaid by the cumulative and progressively sprouting effects of successive graftings of difference. How striking is what we may call the "multiplier" of history, which allows no single differentiating cause between nations to remain its

simple self, but multiplies its weight by all the others existent and to come!

A STATE OF MIND IS TOUGH

The *New Yorker*, admirable and humane in its concern for peace, said recently:

Neither the Russian people nor the American people nor any people have as yet seen the essentially fictitious character of a nation. The nation still persists in people's minds as a tangible, solid, living and breathing thing, capable of doing and thinking, feeling and believing, having and enjoying. But the nation is not that at all. *A nation is a state of mind.* (For "state" read "state of mind," and you will understand the day's news better.)

Yes, the nation is a state of mind; but that does not blow it away or convert four or five centuries' growth into a thistledown. Some individual states of mind, indeed, are so natural, so ingrained, that to cope with them, corrective treatment, detention, even cruel force has to be applied—and even then the delinquent, or the merely peculiar or eccentric, the hearer of voices, is often given up as hopeless.

Nationality and nationalism are not "fictitious." Would that they were: the answers would be simplified. They are natural to man; they are deep-rooted in his character; they are corporate devotions of very long and deep growth. They are even ready to defy the atomic bomb, as we shall see. *We* are different, and the *other* peoples are different. Men have given their communities values, and the communities provide values for men.

All men crave consecration and blessing. They yearn that their short lives be valuable. They thirst to be right. From the first they have never ceased to crave that some authority give them the faith that life is worth living and they will never die. Since the decline of the power of organized Roman Christianity, the local society in which one habitually lives has furnished this assurance of grace. It is in their nation that men have sought salvation and immortality. Its standards are theirs; its rewards and punishments, its honors and disgraces inevitably (since men cannot be always on the move) must be theirs to seek. I talk of the mass of men: and among the mass are many great and good men. As much of

religion as was absorbed or invented in that community molds social standards. Whether it was Christianity or something else, it is modeled by the long-enduring, gradually developing, acquiescing, and selective community. This is the *mysterium tremendum*! Grace is found in a local place.

These things are not fictitious; they were made by man for his needs and out of his natural spirit and body. As Hobbes said, the State is the "artificial Man."

The national community has an advantage over smaller communities within it and the wider world outside. It is able to give material advantages and wipe them out and still keep loyalties, so great are the benefits of a larger territory over which all men and women may travel and be received in peace. But, as regards the world beyond itself, the nation has the practically insurmountable advantage that it is there in the beginning, from the first hours of a child's life. Men are not born free, they are born national. Up to this present point in history they are born on land, or a river or canal, or a ship on the high seas or an airplane of registered nationality, in a place, and usually to nationals of that place, who already speak and understand its language and nothing else and are completely enveloped in its culture. From the moment a child utters its first thin wail, there is no such thing as human nature by itself. He sees a particular kind of light; is wrapped in fabrics special to that area; suffers its seasons' warmth and cold; is fed differently when taken from the breast (even that practice is diverse); experiences different kinds of parental treatment; hears his own parents' native lullabies.

Two things are critical in this development. First, the culture of the place has priority from the beginning, and in most cases no alternative is ever taught. It heals him from the anxiety of being separated from mother and father, from protectors, and comforters. It supplies his craving for the holy and divine. It is God's best.² Secondly, that culture as it is being made and modified, as it grows even in his lifetime, plays upon him incessantly, all the days of his life, through the senses of sight, feeling, smell, hearing, taste, and two other senses: the apprehension of relationships between people, and the apprehension of values. Their

² Cf. for example, Ian Suttie, *Origins of Love and Hate* (1937); Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (New York, 1939).

impact is continuous; they are pungent with all the power of first-hand, immediate insistence; they monopolize the consciousness; they are inescapable; they are accepted; they are normal; they are "the best," for they have been hard-won. They are *lived*. The nation is the reservoir of man's emotional sensations. Nothing yet invented has molded mankind in the same dense envelopment.

The growth of communications and graphic arts in the past century, a promise of the future, gives speed of news and a certain continuity of impressions from abroad.³ But, compared with the priority and the continuing inescapable cultural air that is drawn into the lungs on pain of social meaninglessness, these relayed impressions do not begin to compare with the difference-making consequences. Let it not be overlooked: the differences are enormous, and they are toughly rooted.

The advent of printing assisted the unification of language and education in national areas; good roads and police furthered the building of the national community. In spite of the shrinkage of space in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the distances between nationals, whether leaders or masses, are still difficult to bridge: acceptance and submission are two different matters. The spiritual cohesiveness of nationalism has been expressed by Giuseppe Mazzini, to whom nationalism was a duty of man, while Beardsley Ruml explains the psychological roots in nostalgia, or "homefulness." They demonstrate the tensile durability of this in-grouping of human beings.

Mazzini regarded nationalism as a *duty* of man, and said:

Our Country is our home, the home which God has given us, placing therein a numerous family which we love and are loved by, and with which we have a more intimate and quicker communion of feeling and thought than with others; a family which by its concentration upon a given spot, and by the homogeneous nature of its elements, is destined for a special kind of activity. Our country is our field of labour; the products of our activity must go forth from it for the benefit of the whole earth; but . . . in labouring according to true principles for our Country we are labouring for Humanity; our Country is the fulcrum of the lever which we have to wield for the common good. If we give up this fulcrum we run the risk of becoming useless to our Country and to Humanity.

³ Cf. Robert D. Leigh and L. White, *Peoples Speaking to Peoples* (Chicago, 1946).

Before *associating* ourselves with the Nations which compose Humanity we must exist as a Nation.

Beardsley Ruml has very nicely analyzed the significance of "homefulness," the common experience of being at home in a situation or surroundings:

This extremely complex set of relations of things and of people stemming from the past into the present, and projecting, if ever so briefly, into the future, has for each individual a unitary character. In its diversity he finds himself placed in its center and in it he moves with both a sense of certainty and a sense of adventure. It is constantly changing and yet, in a strange but real sense, through continuity, it always remains the same. . . . Within the framework there is sympathy, understanding and peace; but there is also rivalry, conflict and the unexpected.⁴

How inveterate the differences are is aptly illustrated by a reflection of Vincent Sheean's on the trial of the twenty-five Negroes at Lawrenceburg, Tennessee—a part of the United States:

For however deeply and painfully the visitor from the North may feel the situation of the Negroes—up to and including the bitterest sorrow for them and with them—the fact remains that the white people of the South, too, have been born into a society of which the determining elements were established long, long ago.⁵

This in-grouping is immensely strengthened because the national group, born *in war*, has rendered an unforgettable service to almost all of its members by its championship of independence, or expansion, or sheer self-preservation. Individual men and their families are weak, fearful, and lonely. The continued threat of force from outside is a stimulus to the continued and enhanced expression and perfection of cohesiveness. Nationalism thrives especially on war. Since war sunders the nations, produces arrogance on one side and humility on the other, revenge and fear, the internal cohesion increases, the sense of difference is heightened, and is consciously stimulated as a warlike mental armament. It hardens the heart of the nation, the corporate personality.

⁴ *Government, Business and Values* (New York, 1943), p. 39.

⁵ *Chicago Sun*, Sept. 30, 1946.

No established nation, or group which feels itself possessed of a clearly differentiated culture, dares rely on the good graces of another nation for its continued free development. It seeks statehood; for statehood in international law means its own armed forces in the measure that it can support them, its own flag and other public symbols, such governmental forms of its own as it wills, the right to expel undesirable aliens, to deny entrance to immigrants and discriminate among them. It means the right freely to determine, without submission to the judgment of any external agency, whether or not it shall enter into international arrangements with other willing states, and the right of interpretation thereafter.

These are the safeguards of nationality, of a nation's permanent right to be different from others, to determine its own internal destiny and defend itself against foreigners. Therefore some Jews are Zionists: persecution under the kindly graces of other nations has forced them to plead for a state of their own: if they resisted law, killing would be murder; if as soldiers of their own state, killing would be patriotic heroism, that is, war. The Czechs, who had received minority rights of a large kind within the Austro-Hungarian Empire before 1914, worked under Thomas Masaryk and Eduard Benes for full statehood to ensure the preservation of their own culture, and freedom from the whim of overlords. This is why the various European countries occupied by the Nazis built their "underground" resistance. This is why, to take another example, the French-Canadians resist the strong temptation to become a part of the United States. Within the Dominion of Canada they enjoy certain treaty and constitutional rights as a community, in the Province of Quebec; as one of the states of the United States, or especially scattered throughout the United States, their own culture would have no greater status and protection than that of any other minority. They would go into the "melting pot." This is why, also, the national minorities in the various states of Europe set up by treaty after the World War I were still discontented with their status. Neither the promises of their hosts, nor the protections afforded them by the League of Nations could assure them of all the defenses of their own identity, their personality, which they thought indispensable. They were right, although the treaty was unprecedented in

scope and machinery, and world-wide public opinion had become intensely favorable to the protection of minorities.

WHY FEAR EXTINCTION OF CULTURE?

The essence of the matter is that nations fear the extinction of their separate, peculiar cultures, their unique larger persona. "Guarantees" dependent on the promises of other states do not satisfy their fears. They were even suspicious of the efficacy of those afforded by the League of Nations, as they are still of the Charter. Why is this? It is because they have been saturated with conviction that their culture is the highest good. This process occurred while they were unconscious of the original influences. Human nature by itself does not exist. The proverb goes that habit is second nature. This has been properly amended by a wit to the effect that habit is *first* nature—indeed, there is nothing *but* habit. I could not bear the extinction of Britain. Why not? Nor the extinction of the Jews. Why not? My little daughter will soon not be able to bear the extinction of the United States. Five years after the Blitz which brought her to the United States, I am admonished by her when I suggest in the mildest form that President Truman's policies are occasionally inappropriate to the situation; for a President is the symbol of the national group to her. And she would dearly like to believe that I am a direct descendant of George Washington!

Some men and women have minds and interests that transcend the survival of their own land. It is for the world to learn how to maintain national cultures and yet increase the number of people owning a loyalty beyond the nation.

What would diminish the force of nationalism?

1. The early opportunity of seeing and choosing alternatives. The experience of the children who came from Britain to the United States during the Blitz proves this. But to be really effective the migration would have to be at an early age, and on a mass scale. Some substantial effect might result from the interchange of several thousand young people from each country. *Thousands* must be exchanged; and the persons would need to be those who by character would later become leaders of opinion at home.

2. The protection of national cultures by some common supe-

rior who would be impartial among all, combined with a large freedom to move to and fro anywhere in the world.

3. The multiplication of communications to such a point that they could rival the inculcation of love of one's nation from the cradle onward.

4. Education that would deliberately open up the books of the world, (a) making the obstacles of nationalism to peace known, (b) giving an appreciation of the value of other cultures, and (c) encouraging the growth of a common culture for the whole world.

5. The effective operation of conspicuous international institutions which capture the attention and are continuously suggesting better ways of life.

These goals are immensely distant, and some notable gains in free movement and information are lost, as in the Soviet rulers' deliberate action to prohibit international influences. The issues involved in peace are issues of which *time is the essence*. Differences are still regarded as stigmata.

So strong is nationalism that it is no use regarding it, like Lord Acton, as a froward sin, an infant's caprice, which a little thought would cause to be discarded.⁶ Nationality contains very precious values. Every nationality has something of value for the whole world, regarded by itself as marking its superiority to other peoples: art, or government, religious prophets, poets, philosophers, novelists, or heroes. It does not wish to lose connection with these values, or ascent to historic significance through them, or the potentiality to continue producing such values in the aura of its own genius.

The development of local culture—that is, nationalism—the elements of which are as complicated and braided as the causes of war, is accompanied by something that looks, but is *not*, rather like race. When a people lives for centuries on one territory with very little immigration, the individuals of whom it is formed, intermarrying, develop considerable general physical resemblance. This in no way implies that the race is pure, or that a nationality, even in centuries, can become so different physically that it is inexorably set in character and reactions. I imply only that the

⁶ Uncle Sam and his Eagle, John Bull and his Lion, Joan of Arc and her Gallic Cock, Great Russia and the Bear, the God-Emperor of Japan, and many other such apparently primitive or childish symbols, symbolize—they cannot be *laughed* out of existence.

homogeneity of physical type, not complete or detailed, but marked, adds to the differentiating obstructions among peoples.

It is necessary to dwell briefly on what nationalism is not:

1. It is not race. It is not indelible. Migration at an early age, and even well into youth, allows ready assimilation of other cultures.

2. It is not the simple result of the duping of a people by its rulers or, in later terminology, the bourgeoisie or capitalists. Now it is true that some governing classes have for their own purposes at some times encouraged and misapplied the affections for the nation, especially by nurturing resentments and even hatreds against other countries, ridiculing their vulgarity, expressing horror at their diplomatic iniquities, and deriding their institutions. Again, some people regard the state as an economic instrument for the production and protection of their standards of profits in competition with entrepreneurs from other states. This truth is one facet of Lenin's and J. A. Hobson's famous essays on Imperialism. But it has been demonstrated that these accounts of nationalism are vastly exaggerated. Terrible mistakes in policy would follow if these were acknowledged to be the only animating forces of nationalism. The wrong causes would be attacked, and the true ones neglected. Too simple a diagnosis must lead to too simple remedies.

CULTURE INCLUDES BARRELS OF GASOLINE

It is necessary to go a little further in the analysis of nationalism in our own time. We will begin with a brief glance at history, saying first a word about oil.

I have already used the aphorism, "A barrel of gasoline is part of ideology." It is designed to show the relevance to nationalism of a multiplicity of interrelated factors, economic as well as spiritual, and their blending. The dispute between the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the United States in the Security Council regarding fuel oil in Iran offers an insight into this. Now it is difficult to tell whether oil was the principal object of contention, or Soviet defenses against attack from the Persian Gulf, or the domination of the routes across the Middle East. Certainly the problem of oil was among the chief issues. Why should what looks like a simple business proposition be the subject of such bitter dispute? Because the acquisition of oil supplies for each, the denial of them to others,

and the proximity of potential enemies to the points of supply, vitally affect the power and the standard of living of the disputant nations. Each nation has developed an economy dependent on mechanical power and wheels, passenger and commercial vehicles and farm tractors. But the standard of living served by these is essential to a national culture. The Soviet rulers are engaged in transforming Russian popular state of mind deliberately and overwhelmingly by changing the traditional methods of earning a living and by raising the returns. Industrialization and agricultural revolution depend upon mechanical power, which depends upon fuel oil. Furthermore, industrial power and agricultural wealth are important factors in the ability of the Soviet rulers to protect the independent nationality of Russia, and to *alter the national cultural heritage in the way that they hold to be right*. The Soviet Government has to justify itself to its people if it wishes to minimize coercion in its attempt to develop a classless society; and permanent economic misery and harsh servitude are not likely to be an attraction to mass obedience.

In the United States similar propositions apply: except that a high standard of economic consumption is the predominant ethic of the public, and within this, ownership of a car and the ability to drive about at will are part of American nationalism. While Russia and the United States have much fuel oil in their own soil, Britain has none. She depends on a bridge of ships to link her with her friends, to maintain her industries, connect her with raw materials of which she has few at home, defend herself at sea and in the air, and maintain a standard of living without which her population is doomed to dwindle. Her ability to defend herself against the onslaughts of more populous peoples is dependent on fuel oil. The wish not to see a decline in the population produced by a fall in the standard of living is also part of nationalism. Walter Lippmann has acutely observed that the idea of "the open door," the right to travel and trade everywhere on fair and equal terms with others is a strong and self-justified motive force in American nationalism. If the standards that are nourished by oil were repudiated or moderated, the international tension would slacken. The responsibility of the individual is obvious.

Here, then, is a link between nationalism and economic satisfactions. If the economic standard desired is part (it might be all) of an ideology, it is not to be attributed simply to a handful of

profit-making capitalists. Almost all men and women participate in a corporate gentlemen's agreement to raise their standard of living. This, also, is manifest from the history of nationalism.

THE AGES OF NATIONALISM

The general consensus of the historians of nationalism, with some marked differences of interpretation, is broadly as follows: Nationality developed in three great stages, attaining to the force of nationalism in the last two: (1) from medieval times to the French Revolution; (2) thenceforward to World War I, with crucial changes beginning around 1870; and (3) between World War I and World War II.

In the first period, nations were born, the customary rules of traditional law and divisions of the people into estates were overcome by a single prince, a sovereign, who remained somewhat under the restraint of the Christian ethic, chivalry, and custom. Yet the state was a kind of dynastic estate. The dynasty made the nation by giving it its cohesions of settled and firm central government: thus the Hohenstaufens, the Habsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, the Bourbons. Sovereign rulers were in "international" relationship. The fate of the ruler and his armies and that of the people in general were kept in different compartments. International law originated as the rules of the game between individual rulers; *their* conduct of foreign policy; the acceptance and attribution of obligations and rights to *them*. War was limited to the military forces, the armies of the rulers. The diplomatic practices of the Italian cities followed the internal government in its secretarial and negotiator's competence and stark cynicism for "reasons of state." The rapacious wars for territory and power, exemplified by Peter the Great and Frederick the Great in Europe, and by Britain, Spain, and France overseas, drew large masses of the population into their vendettas and corruptly mocked the niceties of diplomatic language. Frederick the Great was ultimately adored not only by Prussians but by the English mobs. Walpole was forced into the war with Spain by popular clamor. "Today they are ringing the bells: soon they will be wringing their hands!"

It is no use urging that Machiavelli was indulging in mere *post-mortem* analysis. Mercenary armies gave way to standing armies. The policy of mercantilism, or cameralism, or Colbertism

sought to develop the economic strength of the nation less for the welfare of the people than for their defensive or offensive power. The solidarity of such interests in the nation was fostered, and they fostered a more widely conscious nationalism. But they sundered the peoples by making nations as units deadly rivals for possession of the world, especially the Far East and the Americas, exercising every form of violence and rapacity. They were very turbulent, bloody centuries, though the people as a whole had not come into their democratic heritage.

The century 1815-1914 was surprisingly peaceful. The dissemination of democratic theory, and violent resistance to misgovernment by autocrats or aristocracies caused widespread democratization of nations. Theorists like Rousseau, and later Mazzini, identified the whole people with the nation. Lands overrun by Napoleon, especially Prussia, not only responded with passionate, lyric nationalism but, in an age of political consciousness and the Hegelian vocation of philosophy, made an ideology of it. Russia produced Pan-Slavism. The British, with decades of pale Cobdenism rejecting colonies and empire, nevertheless were affected by Disraeli and Joseph Chamberlain, and Jingoism was not the property of a sect. The United States saw its "manifest destiny" and the masses were stirred by "54-40 or Fight" and the Spanish War.⁷ The sovereign ruler or aristocratic group was replaced by "democracy"—but everywhere as yet a limited democracy, as the French said, limited to the "legal nation," the *pays légal*. A middle-class, propertied nation now shared the burden of peace and war. This would have made for more wars if the economic element led to wars; but it did not, it led to peaceful treaty relations. Karl Marx acknowledged the peacefulness of bourgeois commerce in the *Communist Manifesto*. But the fervor of attachment to the nation was growing, especially as the rationalism of the century steadily disintegrated inhibitions on the pursuit of wealth. Deep respect for the growth of nationality was accorded to other peoples as well as one's own. The century was an age of swelling nationhood, more nations with growing territories: Germany; Italy; Russia; the United States with its acquisition of Louisiana, Texas, California, Alaska, the Philippines, and Porto Rico; the flores-

⁷ Cf. A. K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny* (Baltimore, 1935), an excellent historical analysis.

cence of free Latin America; the British Dominions, including Canada with the stabilization of its constitution; the Balkan nations, relieved of Turkish oppression and suzerainty; the further development of the British Empire; the multinational struggle for Africa.

Respect for the rights of man then meant respect for the rights of nations. A time of abundance and free migration, it was a time of hope. Still existent distance, and the romance of liberalism, lent enchantment to the view, and yet kept nations from clashing. National governments were not yet deeply involved in managing the economy of their countries, or regarding that economy as an essential part of their defense. Defense was, therefore, less necessary, and economy was the affair of employers and workers. Moreover, the fairly unhampered international movement of goods was facilitated and accompanied by an almost free movement of gold—and there were banking houses, like the Rothschilds, which in placing their loans were careful to contrive that their debtor governments did not pursue warlike courses.⁸

One great armed force above all others could have done or tried to do damage to the rest of the world. It could have suppressed the blossoming of other people's nationalism and taken or attempted to take substantial territorial hostages for its own future safety. This armed force was the British Navy. However, it was the ideology of the British Government, as well as the interest of the British nation, that independent nationalities should exist. In the order it supported, neutrality and isolation flourished. The benefactor of Europe, voluntarily or of necessity, was Great Britain; her fleet and her open honorable money market in the City, her own liberal political institutions, and her brilliant and unforgettable championship of liberal causes on the Continent were pacifying, stabilizing, and optimism-making. Above all, the peoples enjoyed hope, engendered by peace, free migration, the growth of population, and the rise of their per-capita standard of living. Distance, separation, has its advantages, even as among relatives. (Yet there were wars.)

The rising might of Germany was the first and chief cause and symptom of change. Germany under Bismarck was an activated powerful bloc. It had not the internal divisions and

⁸ Cf. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (New York, 1944).

opposition of other countries—for example, France or Great Britain or the United States. Its traditions solidified it, traditions of three hundred years' rule from above, with only a momentary relaxation caused by the French Revolution. Its Reichstag was not sovereign. Its military successes made it confident and vain-glorious. Even so sober a person as the philosopher of group liberties, Otto von Gierke, relates how deeply he felt himself at one with the nation, merged in it, as the victorious troops paraded in Unter den Linden on return from France in 1871. Germany's recent federal unification filled it with pride. Its philosophy, particularly, emphasized the nation, the *Volk*; for its principal philosophers, Fichte and Hegel, had glorified the nation-state as the supreme association of humanity, above all law: God's especial embodiment or Reason's. The admiration of genius and will, pronounced in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, encouraged adventurers.

A partnership between nascent industry, agriculture, and government, was firmly cemented, these being born in an age when *laissez faire* in any case was dying in a land that had always rejected it, solid, because it was geographically fixed between a France it had defeated and despoiled, a Russia titanic and autocratic, and Austria, cast down in 1866. Even the German Catholic party voted military funds to Bismarck!

All who had something to lose were set into a furore by Bismarck's activism,⁹ and then by Wilhelm II's constantly exhibited "shining armor." Nationalism, chauvinism, jingoism were everywhere engendered, or encouraged, or infuriated, and this in turn gave rise to the myth of German encirclement.¹⁰ Above all, the German Reich meant to have a Navy, and "a place in the sun": there were still colonial prizes in Africa and the Middle East, unappropriated or in the hands of inferior peoples. It was a German Kaiser who went beyond existent ideas of nationality to that embodied in his jihad against the "Yellow Peril." It was in Germany that theories of racial purity and supremacy were nurtured.

The third period of nationalism, that to which we are heirs, emerges from World War I. Attention has already been drawn to the effect of that war on nationalism. Wilson's Fourteen Points

⁹ Cf. Croce, *History of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1933).

¹⁰ Cf. H. Kantorowicz, *The Spirit of British Policy and the Myth of the Encirclement of Germany* (London, 1931).

and various principles were responses to contemporary feelings. Through German miscalculations of lightning victory the burden of total war was imposed on all. The severity of carrying war to the whole population by air attack, the exploitation of occupied lands, the conscription of the population for industry as well as combat—all this, in an age of industrialism in which the whole strength of the nation needed to be exerted to parry a threat to its very existence, changed the nature of war and intensified national cohesion.

New nations arose out of the war, and the recognition of the idea of "self-determination." Between 1871 and 1914 there were fourteen nations in Europe; by 1924, there were twenty-six. More possibilities of conflict than ever arose, there being more independent parties to commence disputes. The clear domination of a few great powers—France, Britain, Germany (earlier, Prussia), Russia, and Austria-Hungary, which has formed a more or less steady and peace-making concert in Europe—was shaken. The maintenance of a balance of power was more subtle and yet more exigent.

Certain conditions conspired and still conspire to intensify nationalism and its warlike consequences. The present is the first generation of full popular sovereignty. The masses who are the new rulers, governing through representatives, are as yet unschooled to the degree required for choosing and steadily supporting representatives who will express their considered and cultivated sense of relationship with other nations. I cannot see in this more than a temporary deficiency, which may well be succeeded by a more stable international life than has yet been known, a kind of Augustan age in which Demos will be Imperator. To that I shall return later. It is possible that we may witness a spate of precipitate and passionate egoistic actions by the mass democracies; but this I doubt, for reasons displayed presently.

Other factors threaten trouble. Totalitarian ideas of government have introduced the venom of total ideology into war. This must make nationalism more ferocious, throughout its defensive diplomacy. Further, the nineteenth century's severance of political and economic activities has ended. In one country, Soviet Russia, everything, and therefore everybody, is owned by the state, and all production, all plans therefore, all choices between civilian consumption and war, are made by one united and unchallengeable

authority. Other countries are far from this, and will remain so—but the separation has collapsed. All countries must provide for the social welfare and security of the masses. Full employment and social security, planned and administered by the nation, are the special peace aims of the belligerents over and above the Fourteen Points of 1918. The state has become the social-service state. The daily fate of the worker and his family is intertwined with the fate of his nation. Hence, in war, more ferocity in fighting, because defeat means reduction of the standard of living; hence, in peace, a taut solidarity within nations prevents the attainment of superior advantages in the world-wide division of labor and markets and raw materials and investment opportunities by other nations.

This situation owes much to two phases of economic history between the first two world wars. First, were the years after 1919, when a return to "normalcy" was attempted: disputes regarding reparations, debts, tariffs, war controls, shipping. Before the return was fully accomplished, the Great Depression supervened in 1929, made more severe by the earlier war dislocations. During the depression the economic interconnection between the egocentric economic policy of one country, the United States, and the welfare of most others was seen with clarity for the first time by a large proportion of the masses. Each country, by a policy of tariffs, quotas, foreign exchange manipulation, and bilateral trading and accounting agreements, tried to export its welfare difficulties. Numerical full employment became more important than productive employment. Men wanted jobs and, as they were the rulers of their nation, intended to have them, even if productivity was thereby reduced. There is much, morally, to be said in favor of this desire.¹¹ The binding of men to their nation, because they wish and it provides economic security, makes nations more than ever separate units—at any rate, units. Socialism is not yet international: the socialized economy of one state pits a solid set of interests against those of other states: it is hard to adjust those interests in good temper. The tendency to increase dislikes between men and women, or aliens and nationals, in time of unemployment, is paralleled in the relationship between nations and their respective nationals when times are hard.

¹¹ E. W. Bakke, in *The Unemployed Man* (New York, 1934).

Now, these developments render obsolescent the already mistaken theory that nationalism is a product of "capitalists." The workers combined with their employers in antiforeign measures. Mr. Bevin urged that the trade unions should study, *and not reject on principle*, the Ottawa Agreements of 1932.¹² It was Australia, a workers' republic if any nation in the world is, that declared with the loudest voice its rejection of free immigration, and its loyalty to tariffs. In the depression, labor unions did not oppose the policy of their employers in restricting entry into their own trades, restricting imports of competitive goods or admission of aliens, even of persecuted refugees, to work.

STALIN'S ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

Even if we were at all inclined to the belief that nationalism in the past had been a creation of the "bourgeoisie" or "capitalists," that time has gone. The developments of the last thirty years make altogether empty Marshal Stalin's latest jeremiad against the Western nations, that fly-blown mess, the "monopoly-capitalist" theory of wars. If he intends to rebuke those whose interests may make for war, the rebuke must be addressed to those in America and other nations, *the masses*, who tolerate a more or less capitalist method of production, for they could change it any time they thought it to be in their interest. The American Federation of Labor and John L. Lewis have loudly declared that they do not mean to do so: they are content, so long as the workers get their cut! Why should Stalin throw doubt on the proletariat, unless he believes that only the Russian proletariat is holy, and that only when forced to be so by the Communist regime?

Stalin's thesis is material at this point because it is part of *his* present nationalism, which he might defend if necessary by war. It is permissible to express surprise that he pretends he has not learned better in the course of twenty-two years of highest office. Other men, with a better academic opportunity than his of observing the activity and aspirations of free workers, are even more blameworthy in continuing the shibboleth that war is the product of "capitalism." Stalin said on February 9, 1946:

It would be incorrect to think that the war rose accidentally as the

¹² Cf. Report, *Trade Union Congress* (1933).

result of the fault of some of the statesmen. Although these faults did exist, the war arose in reality as the *inevitable result* of the development of the world economic and political forces on the basis of monopoly capitalism.

Our Marxists declare that the capitalist system of world economy conceals elements of crisis and war, that the development of world capitalism does not follow a steady and even course forward, but proceeds through crises and catastrophes. The uneven development of the capitalist countries leads in time to sharp disturbances in their relations, and the group of countries which consider themselves inadequately provided with raw materials and export markets try usually to change this position and to change the position in their favor by means of armed force.

As a result of these factors, the capitalist world is rent into two hostile camps and war follows.

Perhaps the catastrophe of war could have been avoided if the possibility of the periodic redistribution of raw materials and markets between the countries existed in accordance with their economic needs, in the way coordinated and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist development of world economy.

Thus, as a result of the first crisis in the development of the capitalist world economy, arose the First World War. The Second World War arose as a result of the second crisis.

This does not mean, of course, that the Second World War was a copy of the first. On the contrary, the Second World War is radically different from the first in character. It must be kept in mind that the main Fascist States—Germany, Japan, and Italy—before attacking the Allied countries had abolished at home the last remnants of the bourgeois democratic liberties, had established a cruel terrorist regime, had trampled underfoot the principles of sovereignty and freedom of the small nations, declared the policy of seizure of other peoples' lands as their own policy, declared for the whole world to hear for world domination and spread of the Fascist regime throughout the world . . . as distinct from the First World War, assumed from the very beginning an Anti-Fascist liberating character, having also as one of its aims the re-establishment of democratic liberties . . . the war turned into a war of peoples ["freedom-loving peoples," he says a little earlier] for their existence.

I will not do Stalin the dishonor of believing that his speech was for home consumption only.¹³ The important thing is

¹³ Harold E. Stassen's questions to Stalin on April 10, 1947, were remarkable for their tact in ignoring the speech of February 9, 1946.

that it is muddled; and no one knows in the end where Stalin places the emphasis. It seems, at first, as though there is an inevitability about the course of crises and booms and depressions, and that this is disturbing and must cause war. If it was inevitable before World War II (which is untrue), then it is *still* inevitable. This is a point of which the rest of the world must take note. But then Stalin slips into another key altogether: the cause of war becomes the tension between those who have raw materials and markets and those who have not. He should admit that Russia is to some extent responsible: indeed, he here furnishes another Hitler with an excellent argument for once more inevitably attempting the invasion and colonization of part of Russia; namely, the impossibility of a peaceful redistribution. For Russia is high in potential riches, and its population is of a very low density, compared to that of Germany.¹⁴ During the first twenty years of the Soviet Government's existence its heads showed no readiness to help the proletarians of the rest of the world to relieve their domestic pressure by immigration opportunities.

The First World War came from manifold reasons, some of which I have suggested, Lenin's theories, written *ex post facto* in 1915,¹⁵ were bosh, have been thoroughly exposed as such.¹⁶ Why, with an inevitable law of war for the two reasons which Stalin has given (instead of one), World War II should have been a total or partial exception, can only be explained by the desire to elevate the Soviet Union to a position of international heroism as a rescuer of small countries, and to awaken and maintain in the Russian people a feeling of patriotism and gratitude.

To be true to the facts, Stalin would be obliged to despise the proletariat of other nations for not choosing the path of Soviet communism, and so for causing wars. According to his papa, Lenin, he ought to take this position; for Lenin had much contempt for the trade-union type of workers, perceiving that they did not want revolution, which was his own objective. But if Stalin were to denounce the proletariat in other lands he would lose any potential friends he might have among them; and to berate the "capitalist" has great benefits for him—he keeps his potential friends or at

¹⁴ Cf. Hitler's speech on the day of the assault on Russia.

¹⁵ Developed fully in *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (New York, 1933).

¹⁶ Cf. among others, W. Sulzbach, *Capitalistic Warmongers* (Chicago, 1942).

least does not antagonize them outright, and at the same time contributes to division among social forces in the lands he alleges are inevitable war-makers.

Nationalism has captured the citadel of each national economy, largely for self-defense in an era of national animosities. One of the strongest inducements to the capture has come from the perception that nations with the type of government of Soviet Russia—that is, both dictatorial and highly planned—possess a potential economic strength, and power of rapid and secret mobilization, that other lands must organize highly, in order to meet. For in a world of nationalism the strength of one nation is always a threat to the existence of the rest.

GREED, A COMPONENT OF NATIONALISM

What is decisive for its hostile impact upon other nations is not the economic organization of a nation, but the *spirit* of its economy—that is, whether or not it is acquisitive. Greed had its effects in primitive, in tribal, in feudal as well as capitalistic times. What all of Marx's works mainly proved was that *all* men are greedy, not that the possession of the machinery of production forced them into class war. The masses can be as greedy as the capitalists; or they would not be interested in Karl Marx. Dictatorial governments like the Soviet rulers, can be just as grasping on behalf of their people (and their own despotic power) as the masses in democratic states can be for themselves. The high standard of living is the dynamic and inimical factor, for small and large nations alike. Capitalist organization operates by extreme decentralization. When it was able to work internationally, unobstructed by the barriers of nationalism, it seemed to offer a way to peace, because it was expected that across the frontiers and the seas international connections would be firmly woven between merchants, manufacturers, and producers of raw and finished materials, providers of funds and technical knowledge. These hopes were realized only for a short period; then the consciousness of nationhood and the fears engendered by strong, virile, and pushing nations made continued freedom impossible. Yet capitalist enterprise had a drawback as a peace builder: it could undertake business ventures which ultimately drew in the support of the respective governments and troubled the peace of

the world or threatened the independence of other peoples, as in China, Egypt, Mexico, and other Latin American republics.

The argument ascribing to socialized states a stronger tendency toward wars because the masses are then economic antagonists *en bloc* has some merit: how much merit depends on the strength of the masses' inclination toward profit making. Hitherto socialists, and especially Marxists, have ascribed such motivations to capitalists. But we have yet to see whether the workers are cast in the same mold. *This constitutes one of the most crucial and splendid problems the world has yet to solve.* No one as yet can give a practical and unexceptionable answer. But those who have advanced the argument are under some suspicion of ulterior motives, for they are men who have striven to discover every possible argument against the socialized state. The answer will depend upon whether the spirit of democracy which has brought the masses to sovereignty, now unrestrained by anything except their own appetites, wisdom, and morals, is adequately practiced for all peoples. The word "adequately" is explained later in a discussion of democracy and the single standard.¹⁷

It is evident, then, that effectively, all the loyalties and devotions alive in modern societies are enveloped in the national loyalty. If it is desired to abate this, a change must occur in devotions and loyalties, and the burden of this would fall on the individual citizens. If they are greedy they will produce a greedy nation, and that greed as a corporate emanation will set them in opposition to other such entities. If each is proud, or enough of the individuals are, there will be a conflict of the proud. Nationalism is as wayward as an individual, as concrete, as virile, as unquellable. Writers like Emery Reves give the impression that there is something totally unnatural about nationalism. There is nothing, alas, unnatural about it. It is the only begotten faith of a collective person.

THE STRENGTH OF SELF-DETERMINATION

So strong is nationalism that neither World War I nor World War II could exorcise it; on the contrary, as we have suggested, it has substantially increased. Woodrow Wilson, no less than Lloyd George and Clemenceau, was obliged to couch his promise that

¹⁷ See pp. 327 ff.

the world should be "safe for democracy" in terms of nationalism. In his speech of July 4, 1918, he declared as one of the ends of the war

the settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

His link between the nationalities was by "open covenants of peace, openly arrived at." The enthusiasm of Europe for Wilson, apart from the succor which meant for it victory and the promise of perpetual peace, came from his doctrine of "self-determination." In the autumn of 1916, a Foreign Office Memorandum declared:

His Majesty's Government has announced that one of their chief objects in the present war is to insure that all the states of Europe, great and small, shall in the future be in a position to achieve their national development in freedom and security. It is clear, moreover, that no peace can be satisfactory to this country unless it promises to be durable, and an essential condition of such peace is that it should give full scope to national aspirations as far as practicable. The principle of nationalism should therefore be one of the governing factors in the consideration of territorial arrangements after the war.¹⁸

More than anyone else Wilson was responsible for the injection of the phrase "self-determination" into the world-wide debate on the world's future. It was a principle that could be misused, for the smaller the areas of self-determination, the greater the number of units to be reconciled; it could enhance every diversity in the cultures of mankind, the arrogance of separatism. The men who made it had in mind reservations that were economic and strategic, and Wilson, at least, saw it subject to the reign of law fulfilled through permanent international organization designed to reduce hostilities or at least make them innocuous. There were men who could apply the principle not for self-maintenance, but for development at the expense of their neighbors' reasonable

¹⁸ D. Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), Vol. I, pp. 31-32.

claims and the peace itself. Hitler on May 21, 1935, denied any wish to annex or be federated with Austria or to interfere in her affairs:

The German people and the German Government have, however, the very comprehensible desire, arising out of a simple feeling of solidarity due to a common national descent, namely, that the right to self-determination should be guaranteed not only to foreign nations but to the German people *everywhere*.

And so again and again, especially after the rape of Austria, even to the use of the term "*racial* self-determination."

It is urgent to realize that the encouragement of resistance in World War I exacted the promise of national self-determination, and that it led to an increase in the number of independent nationalities. What is more important, if that principle were a basic tenet of the victorious powers who had the making of the peace in their hands, the League of Nations could only be one more treaty, however passionate the expressions and momentary earnestness to be loyal to the League and to settle disputes only by peaceful methods.

The house built on sand, then, has been replaced by another house built on sand, except that dreadful tribulations have fused together the futures of some of the nations. But, once again to sustain the Allies in their efforts, to avert defections, to encourage resistance, the principle of self-determination had to be reaffirmed, this time in new language. This occurred in the Atlantic Charter; its chief contribution is:

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

For the "assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want," they looked to disarmament, "pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security."

This declaration was subscribed to in various forms by all the powers at war with the Axis, including the Soviet Union.¹⁹

¹⁹ Treaty of Alliance between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain, July 4, 1942, Fourth Paragraph. It appears again in the Declaration of Moscow, repeating the Joint Declaration of the Allies of Jan. 1, 1942.

The Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943, made by the Big Four goes even further: it bases its hoped-for general international organization on "the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states." The United Nations is "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members" (Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 1), and safeguards are established for the preservation of this sovereign equality. In the Act of Chapultepec (the "Declarations on Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity") of March 3, 1945, the rights of nationalism and its supremacy are reaffirmed and redeclared, with precision. Only one of the "principles" stated and two of the declarations need be quoted:

The recognition that respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of each American State constitutes the essence of international order sustained by continental solidarity . . .

1. That all sovereign States are juridically equal among themselves.
2. That every State has the right to the respect of its individuality and independence, on the part of the other members of the international community.

THE STAMINA OF NATIONALISM

We are back at the beginning: the nationalism of nations and its offspring, sovereignty. The prescription for peace is the cure of sovereignty, but the cure of sovereignty is the cure of nationalism. This is no fictitious, artificial, wayward behavior. It is deep-rooted, this group passion. Moreover, it is so deep as to be unconscious—love is blind—and goes unquestioned in ourselves, even if questioned by similar groups. It produces the stigmatizing of differences in others, and the arrogation of superiority in ourselves. When pervaded with a raw and energetic ideology, it is as much nationalism as if it were the product of ancient custom and manners. The Soviet nationalism of today, in which, as in all nationalisms, the vital elements are feared for and therefore defended, is the Marxist ideology. It is the possibly sincere belief that the Russian people's glory and salvation lie in the fruition of their system of government and economy, founded on this particular theory of human nature and destiny, and bright social consequences which will some day blossom therefrom.

All this is no accident of perversion, as Mr. Reves would sug-

gest:²⁰ nor is it even a "heresy," as the great historian Acton declares. It is not just a few jingoists, a handful of Fascists, that are saturated with it—but all nations, including the United States, Great Britain, and by no means least, the U.S.S.R. Moreover, the workers everywhere are nationalists; nationalism is not a plant by a few capitalists. Even if it were, millions of workers are capitalists, owning land, stock in the industry that employs them, and savings-bank deposits. And, where, as in the Soviet Union, the masses are permitted to own but little private property, they are the more obliged to defend the supreme and only proprietor of all on their behalf, the State. Even through the grievous trials of our time, even beyond bereavements such as men never expected to suffer at the hands of men or themselves be guilty of inflicting, even beyond the pledges upon pledges of submission to the authority of the United Nations, the spirit of nationalism rears its head almost untamed—so far untamed, at least, as to give us no assurance of peace. Even the men who made that Charter search in it for loopholes that will permit the exercise of their private judgment for the good of their country, and Senator Connally, United States Delegate at the birth of the Charter, was able to get attached to the resolution by which the nation accepted the jurisdiction of the World Court, the limitation, "except essentially domestic issues, as these are interpreted by the United States of America."²¹

The Soviet rulers, verbal champions above all men and nations of the union of the masses everywhere, still prefer their own masses and own preservation at the cost of the proletariat of Germany, Italy, Austria, Japan and the other countries, from whom they are exacting heavy reparations. The exaction of reparations by the Soviet rulers is a denial of loyalty to their own proletarian global embrace, shaking also the sincerity of their belief that war is made by capitalists and Fascists only. This is the direct product of their kind of nationalism, their theories of the cultural rights of the Soviet Republics notwithstanding.

Marx regarded nationalism as a trick played by the capitalists to blind the proletariat to its own interests. It was degrading, like religion. Lenin accepted and expanded this theory. Stalin be-

²⁰ Pp. 133-134.

²¹ Cf. *Congressional Record*, Senate, Vol. 92, p. 10850, Aug. 2, 1946, and *Bulletin State Department*, Sept. 8, 1946.

came the Russian Communist party's expert on "the national question." In 1913 he wrote a rather confused essay, in which, however, it is clear that he had no objection to the continuation of differences in national "culture," but urged that the socialist movements of Central Europe ought to regard Communism as above national loyalties, and not divide and form separate organizations. One who played a leading part in the Central European socialist movement, Julius Braunthal, shows vividly²² that it was quite impossible to persuade leaders and masses not to form national groupings. In 1917, Stalin, Commissar for Nationalities, introduced the Bolshevik policy of *cultural* independence for the various Russian nationalities,²³ a notable achievement in direct contradiction to Tsarist imperialism and Russification.

Yet the Ukraine and Georgia were not allowed to become nationally independent. They were *forced* into the Union. The Constitution of 1936, when they had been thoroughly quelled, gave the various republics wide rights of self-government and the enjoyment of their own languages and folkways. But, though they were given the right to secede, none of the republics has ever tried it. The constitutional and extralegal dominance of the Communist party everywhere, backed by the N.K.V.D. and the Armed Forces, and the drawing of all the economic strings to Moscow, with the ownership of all productive instruments by the state, effectively keeps the nationalities in check. They are *not* nationalities, because their loyalties, willy-nilly, are penetrated and dominated by the supreme loyalty to Soviet Communism. As regards the rest of the world these inner groupings mean nothing, in spite of the gift to the Ukraine and White Russia of their own armed forces and foreign policy,²⁴ except that these republics have qualified for separate representation in the Assembly of the United Nations. To the rest of the world, the U.S.S.R. acts as one nationality, with Soviet Communism, or Marxism, or Leninism, or Stalinism, as its nationalism. During World War II passionate and effective appeal was made to the other nationalism—love and defense and

²² *In Search of the Millennium* (London, 1945).

²³ Cf. *Declaration of Rights of Peoples of Russia*, Nov. 2, 1917, paragraphs 10 ff.

²⁴ Cf. *Soviet Autonomy Decrees* of Feb. 1, 1944. *International Conciliation*, No. 398; March 1944, pp. 234 ff.

self-preservation of Mother Russia. Communism was not yet enough.

Fascism was almost nothing but a commingling of Mussolini's vainglory and pugnacity with nationalism. It pretended to be unifying, patriotically, in Mazzini's sense. It certainly was expansionist and imperialist, harping on the theme of the "have" and "have-not" nations. Its deep sense of the national community as a final superior above men was shown in the Fascist Charter:

The Italian Nation is an organism endowed with purposes, a life, and means of action transcending in power and duration those of individuals, singly or grouped, which compose it. It is a moral, political, and economic unity, which realizes itself in the Fascist State.

If Fascist nationalism wanted only a share, Nazism called for the inclusion of all Germans in one state, and then proceeded to argue for domination, especially of Europe and areas of Russia. Hitler's racial theories were important for the impulse of domination they produced and served, and for the eternal yoke of war they fastened upon man, whose duty it was to discover by this cruel means who on this earth was fittest to survive and therefore was "noblest"!

Nationalism is as tough as a long-lived and perpetually renewed giant. People are good individually, but murderous in the mass; whatever citizens may be individually, they are something else as members of a nation. Since they cannot live apart from other men, and their nation is closer to them than any other association, circumambient, surrounding them, pervading them, these are units which act like men in a state of nature.²⁵

To these nations applies all the force of "the state of nature" as imagined by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan*. This classic political philosopher is closest to the present-day realities of the relationship between states in the nascent, imperfect, perhaps imperfectable, world community:

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition (where all of fairly equal ability compete for the same ends): Secondly, Diffidence (meaning lack of confidence in the peaceful intentions of others): Thirdly, Glory (desire to be

²⁵ Cf. C. J. Hambro's powerful plea for the independence of small nations in *How to Win the Peace* (Philadelphia, 1942).

valued highly by others). The first maketh men invade for Gain; the second, for Safety; and the third, for Reputation. The first use Violence to make themselves Masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattell; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflexion in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name.

Hereby it is manifest, that *during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe*, they are in that condition which is called War; and such a War, is of every man, against every man. For War consisteth not in Battle only, or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by battle is sufficiently known.

The cause of clarity may be served by reflection on who feel least strongly the claim of their own national group-passion. These are some poet expatriates—some can be of no country, some attach themselves to others. They are few. Poets so precious are not usually popular. Then there are men like Bernard Shaw and H. G. Wells, of special sensitivity and responsiveness to the claims of humanity everywhere, but above all of a duty to serve the noblest and highest potentialities of man in art, science, and beauty, and hence, the conditions to cultivate these everywhere. Some are scientists, men who have remained in or close to pure scientific research, to whom progress and the distribution of the benefits to all are the summit of lives. Some reject social injustices in their own country and abnormally despise the nationalism which permits them: it may be the form of government; it may be the economic system; it may be the general morality. Some churchmen are not national-minded. Some capitalists regard nationalism as an obstruction to business and therefore were vilified by Hitler. The nation is not a perfect corporation. Even as, in a classic phrase, it is a worm in the intestines of the world community, so is it also afflicted with its own internal dissentients; but their number is not yet legion. There is fearful power in the corporate encirclement of the individual. Is it appeasable? Can it be overawed? Or, must it be disciplined by a force standing above?

THE EXPLOSIVE POWER OF NATIONALISM

The dangerous effects of nationalism depend on the intensity of its temper. But there is no way of stating this arithmetically, like

temperature. The lack of such a measure makes it impossible to count with optimistic plausibility on certain mitigations of nationalism—humanity, understanding, and economic cooperation.

Indirectly, we have already surveyed the mitigation of humanity, when the failure of Christian brotherhood, its disintegration into the fraternity of nationalism, was discussed. Universal kindness and charity, and the acceptance of a single ethical standard as binding for all, have been only of small effect. The subject is taken up again later.

As for “understanding,” when the facts are known it might mean repudiation and hostility, not harmony. This, also, is discussed later.

MORE WELFARE, LITTLE HELP

Economic cooperation is more promising, though still not enough. Enormous common advantages are obtainable by all nations if they behave economically, in trade and industry, as though the world were not divided. Indeed, in spite of national boundaries and passions, the nineteenth and twentieth centuries saw the gradual but powerful weaving together of the whole world into one economic unity, by means of free trade, or commercial treaties, the free movement of gold, and exchanges of manufactured and raw materials, and world-wide investment. Indeed, in a sense, there is no such thing as “foreign” trade; for the economies—that is, the occupations, standard of living, and size of population of many nations of the world, and particularly of those of north-western Europe and North America and the British Dominions—came to depend on the world-wide division of labor and the reciprocal benefits of the resources, climatic endowments, and acquired skills of all countries. Each economy came to be dependent on all the others, in a network of industry and trade, though some, those named, obtained the special advantage of early comers over the now “backward areas” or “raw-material economies,” without much protest from the working class of the wealthier nations.

Additional benefits were rendered by agencies like the International Labor Organization, in the improvement of labor standards by convention and by the economic and health and social welfare agencies of the League.

However, these benefits did not mitigate nationalism to the point of stopping war, or come anywhere near such a consummation. This was to some extent because the causes and conditions of the common welfare were never adequately taught to the public. The foundations of their welfare in international cooperation can be seen only by economic education, but they are there. Above this, the economic benefits were not allowed to be as great and conspicuous as they could be because they were reduced by national *fears* prevalent in various countries. The American colonies, hardly out of their teens, embarked on a tariff policy, for strength, for independence (denied them by the British mercantile laws), for a fleet, and self-protection. All the values of economic interdependence were small in the scales against the preservation of national independence.

Now, wealth coming from international cooperation, either in the form of freedom of trade and migration, or by deliberately planned contractual agreements between nations, is not to be ignored or despised as a mitigation of nationalism, and as an aid to peace. It is to be prized and promoted. As the nation-state itself was created, in part, because it could give benefits which smaller communities could not provide, and as it would be unmade if it ceased to give them, so the marked unmistakable benefits of world organization may aid the cause of a wider loyalty. "Where my good is, there is my fatherland." But the benefits would have to be *overwhelming* in their magnitude. If not—and that is the case at present—the fears for independence conquer attempts at economic friendship. In any case it must take a very long time, with the capital and knowledge now at the disposal of mankind, to secure the benefits proposed, even if the slate were clean of nationalistic scribble.

This brings us back to an ancient question, decidedly relevant at this point: whether mere utility can produce allegiance to a community. The answer of the political philosophers has been almost invariably "No." And those who have answered "Yes," as Bentham did in his *Principles of the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number*, could answer "Yes" only by not defining the nature of happiness. Duty, obligation, acceptance—these are something other than the receipt of utilities, of goods and services. Men desire *values*; standards; appreciation; recognition of their value by the community. Moreover, international economic co-

operation gives only *some* utilities, not all of them; and it cannot give the promise of *all* of them, still less of their permanent duration. It is not comprehensively creative of benefits and has not the authority to be, in its own right.

This answer to the plea that economic and social cooperation will promote the decline of nationalism is an answer to those who are convinced that a series of international agencies, like the I.L.O., the Monetary Fund, a Bank of Development, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the Health Organization, transport unions, a World Trade and Cartel Authority, and so forth, will, by transcending national areas for the fulfillment of purposes to the benefit of all, reduce the diversities, and accentuate the similarities of nations. They will—if they are allowed to work by all nations. But they still do not get into the heart of nationalism, and are upset by its destructive palpitations. If they succeed it will be because nationalism has been mitigated by its own reasoning self. To place faith in the so-called “functional”²⁶ system of creating peace is to trust a poultice where an operation or psychiatry is required. I have myself in my *United Nations Economic and Social Council* and *An International TVA*, among other works, written and thought too much about this aspect of international relations to place great weight on its ameliorating effects on nationalism, or to be accused of unduly minimizing them.

* * * * *

Nationalism, hardly bridled, and of spirited temper, looks for its independence and its security and domination of other nationalities (if that would serve its purpose) to its own power or that of its friends. It practices what is called power politics: which can have meaning only when the word *power* is emphasized, because all politics involves the conflict of power against power. “Power” is doubly stressed to denote that the maintenance or acquisition or increase of power is pursued, and that ethical limitations on the use or threat of force, that self-restraint by loyalty to fraternal principle, are at their minimum. Will, not virtue, is supreme.

From this springs the policy of the Balance of Power. The question then is, whether in an age of weapons of mass destruc-

²⁶ Cf. D. Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London, 1943).

tion, especially the atomic bomb, that balance of power, with its calculated risks, can save the world from wars of annihilation. On this two wise things were said in the wise eighteenth century. Alexander Pope said:

Now Europe balanced, neither side prevails;
For *nothing's left* in either of the scales.

Dean Swift said:

The balance of power was so even that a sparrow lighting in either of the scales would overturn it.

The implications are ruinous. For nationalism is itself force, since force is nothing other than power moved by spirit. Peace must then be dependent on the reduction of power or the conversion of spirit, or both. So long as this is not feasible, force still remains, and it is only to be stopped in its tracks by opposite and equal or superior force.

CHAPTER VI

The Atom Bomb: No Will, No Way

The face of war is the face of death.

—HENRY STIMSON, formerly Secretary of War

THE LURID PROSPECT

THE ATOMIC genie has been torn and released from the innermost recesses of Nature: the knowledge is out, and nothing can push it back or sweep it from the mind of man. Horrible temptations and fears dwell in this knowledge, for knowledge is power. Already the publication of the Smyth Report, which described four ways of successfully separating U-235, in the first flush of triumph and innocent generosity, is bitterly regretted. "I still say that it, in some respects, has made our chore of shaping this security system a really terribly hard one."¹ This, that the knowledge is out and can be found, and that bombs of devastating power can and have been made, dominates the situation.

The obsession is not with the destruction of stocks, or the cessation of manufacture: it is that they are henceforth always potentially existent in the lands which have already made them and, some day to come, in any land possessing scientists and industrial technology, moderate wealth and the will to manufacture them. As former Secretary of War Stimson has said: "The face of war is the face of death." The security of nations has already come to be dependent on this kind of speculation: whether the Russian scientist Kapitzka has been imprisoned in the Urals or sent there to make bombs (thus Brien McMahon, United States Senate, January 22, 1947) or whether planes will carry bombs over the North Pole to the Soviet Union.

¹ D. E. Lilienthal, U.S. Senate Hearings, Jan. 7, 1947.

The destructiveness of the bomb and the abject defenselessness against it have already been described.² Several confident predictions of imminent stupendous multiplications of their annihilating force have recently been made by scientists. Atom bombs are still being made by the United States Government, and not by accident. Nationalism and its consequences, power politics and the balance of power, with the aggravated risks and fears of atomic warfare, would seem to lead to the threat of wars of annihilation. Is that the prospect?

HARSH CHOICES

An atom-bomb policy directed toward peace must, if founded simply on complaisance and easy good nature, cause an explosion in the hands of its makers. For all countries—but especially for those of its invention, which are most likely to improve it—atomic energy is the greatest single object of responsible trusteeship with which Nature has ever endowed, plagued, and tried humanity. It may be divine; it may be diabolic.

The weight of tremendous anxieties might, in ancient days, have been removed at a stroke through the crushing of all immediately hostile governments by the present possessors of the bomb. Considerations of capacity to succeed and, at least as serious and genuine, of democratic humanitarianism rule this policy out of court. The alternative is agreement among the nations; that is, a treaty. The question then is, What ought the contents of such a treaty to be, and what derivative practical problems must be solved in implement, beyond the shadow of a doubt, the principles of such a treaty?

The degree of security has been here put at "beyond the shadow of a doubt." It could be pitched lower; but to do this, in view of the destructiveness of the bomb, makes its worth dubious. If complete assurance is not aimed at, because the international devices for control leave loopholes which ingenuity and good will cannot fill, then the target policy itself, at least, must be to secure complete assurance.

For this, the first and transcendent principle is that as many as possible of the loopholes, errors, defalcations shall be imagined

² Chap. I.

and discovered *beforehand*, and administrative provision in the maximum conceivable and foreseeable detail shall be made *beforehand*. To this pattern must be added, penetrating every fiber of the system of control, full authority of every kind including penalties; and all the barriers of nationalism, including such corporate state sovereignty as might frustrate enforcement, must be laid low. This is to rely on the *administrative* method of international government, not the judicial or diplomatic; for its essence is anticipation, a continuous operating authority in charge, and finality of enforcement by that authority—state unity and sovereignty notwithstanding—in the measure deemed appropriate to the objective. To trust states as separate, corporate entities, to interpret and execute the terms of a treaty in so grave a matter, is to invite murder.

PROBLEMS AND ACTION

The discussion now follows this course:

- A. The process of official action: agreement and disagreement
- B. The nature of the attendant problems to be solved
- C. The state of affairs remaining in view of disagreement
- D. The net situation, and certain ancillary matters

The initiative was naturally taken by the three inventing partners, the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, in their declaration of November 15, 1945. But before the bomb was dropped some American scientists had sought to persuade their government not to use it. They foresaw the possibility that no international control would be possible; foresaw the horror that would be aroused—and believed it right that such horror should be expressed; foresaw the suspicion that would be engendered in Russia, that such a weapon should have been so long in the making without her being brought into the secret. They felt pangs of conscience that they had participated in its manufacture. They held that perhaps the military advantages of the bomb could be obtained without use on Japan by a demonstration “before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or a barren island.”⁸ The United States Government

⁸ See “A Report to the Secretary of War,” in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May 1, 1946, p. 3.

took enormous and sensitive care in deciding whether to use this abhorrent means of ending the war. The saving of American and Allied lives, to the number of perhaps a million, and the relatively lesser loss of Japanese lives by use of the bomb, the shortening of the war by over a year—these responsibilities decided the issue. The U.S.S.R. had not been apprised of the dreadful secret: henceforth, she could reflect on the appalling power at the disposal of her Allies, created in a long-term plan, never disclosed to her until the dreadful event. What a memory! And what a frightful prospect!

"This revelation of the secrets of nature," said Winston Churchill, "long mercifully withheld from man should arouse the most solemn reflections in the mind and conscience of every human being capable of comprehension."

There have since followed (1) the Truman-Attlee-King Declaration; (2) submission of the problem of control to the General Assembly of the United Nations in January, 1946, after discussion with the U.S.S.R. at the Moscow Conference of December, 1945; (3) publication of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report; (4) the United States Proposals presented by Bernard Baruch to the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, June, 1946; (5) submission of proposals by the U.S.S.R. directly afterward; (6) many debates in the Commission; (7) reports by the Commission's Working Committee founded on the findings of its subcommittees—of special importance, its Scientific and Technical Committee; (8) the *First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council*, accepted by all the members, U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining.

All these stages cannot be traversed here, but cardinal developments of principle require analysis.

American policy on atomic energy control may be said to include the policies of Great Britain and Canada also. Both are said to possess the secret technological information, while Canada has been the chief source of supply of uranium ore, of which she has substantial deposits.

The Truman-Attlee-King Declaration recognized that there was no adequate military defense against the bomb, and that no single nation could keep the monopoly of the energy. The heads of the three nations desired international action to prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes and promote the

development of this energy for peaceful and humanitarian ends. They thought it impossible to protect the world *entirely* from the destructive use of scientific knowledge, *except by preventing war*. Aggressor nations could not be altogether prevented from producing atomic weapons. They were, however, ready to share the fundamental scientific information with other nations willing to reciprocate. They had already published that which could be of peaceful use and trusted that others would do the same, "thereby creating an atmosphere of reciprocal confidence in which political agreement and cooperation will flourish." However, no disclosure was made of "detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of atomic energy. The military exploitation of atomic energy depends, in large part, upon the same methods and processes as would be required for industrial uses."

They believed that a constructive solution of the problems of the atomic bomb would not be furthered by publication of this specialized information "*before it is possible to devise effective, reciprocal and enforceable safeguards acceptable to all nations.*" It might have the opposite effect. They would share on a reciprocal basis "just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes can be devised." To this end, they were prepared to submit the matter to the United Nations Organization and to prepare recommendations for exchanging basic scientific information; for controlling atomic energy, its use for peaceful purposes only; for eliminating from "*national*" armaments atomic weapons and "*all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction*"; for effective safeguards by inspection and other means to protect complying nations against the hazards of violation and evasion. The work of the Commission would proceed stage by stage; each of the stages would develop the "necessary confidence of the world before the next stage is undertaken." The Commission would start with attention to the wide exchange of scientists and scientific information, and the development of full knowledge concerning natural resources of raw materials.

The peroration may be cited:

Faced with the terrible realities of the application of science to destruction, every nation will realize more urgently than before the overwhelming need to maintain the rule of law among nations and to banish the scourge of war from the earth. This can only be brought

about by giving wholehearted support to the United Nations Organization, and by consolidating and extending its authority, thus creating conditions of mutual trust in which all peoples will be free to devote themselves to the arts of peace. It is our firm resolve to work without reservation to achieve these ends.

Reflection on these proposals reveals that the period before divulgence of the crucial facts (namely, the "specialized information regarding the practical application of atomic energy") must be long, indeed extremely long. For it is dependent on all nations' being satisfied "with the effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards" against destructive use, and this is further linked to *other* weapons of mass destruction. One stage is, manifestly, abundant information from other countries regarding their military, industrial, and scientific strength. The Soviet rulers could not have contemplated the delays, and therefore their exposure to dangers during that period, without considerable dismay.

Moreover, the signatories' appeal for the rule of law and the consolidation and extension of the authority of the United Nations could hardly be palatable to the Soviet Union which is a minority therein, very small and indubitably permanent. This, also, is nobody's fault. It issues from the uneven development of civilization, which at the precise instant when a broad unity of moral outlook among the nations was more than ever imperative, perhaps even was the only barrier to civilization's destruction, had, in the dealing of the gigantic pack of world cards, come out in a most ominous raggedness. The three signatories and their friends were comfortable, but the Soviet rulers, men of imperious spirit, used to moving with irresistible force, had collided with the immovable object.

THE ISSUES

This crowning, matchless debate is conducted chiefly between the United States (Great Britain and Canada are at hand) and the U.S.S.R. The rest of the nations are perhaps content to have it that way. If the peace of the world depends on these great powers, then the peace depends on their view of atomic control. They have been at odds from the first; and in spite of some rapprochement since November, 1946, the gap is still wide and hideous.

The American Proposals were founded on the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, published March 16, 1946. The public mind was then at the end of its tether, and especially serious tension between the Western powers and Russia prevailed. It was popularly not thought possible to devise a satisfactory scheme of control. The people had grasped the truth that salvation lay not so much in ingenuity of mechanism and procedure as in will. Now a plan was put forward which suggested ways and means the United States believed feasible, embodying its will. The contrivances were supplied by the Report: the answer to the problem of will was given in the Baruch Proposals. Yet some confusion cannot but prevail throughout the world on American policy, for no one can say whether the Senate would ratify the Baruch plan if it were accepted by other nations!

ACHESON-LILIENTHAL REPORT

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report urged that the United States has a special interest in control by an international agency, because her political institutions "and the reluctance of the United States to take the initiative in aggressive warfare" would put the United States at a disadvantage in a surprise attack.⁴

The Committee on Atomic Energy, issuing the report, asserts that the United Nations Organization must be "supplemented by a specific control of an instrument of war so terrible that its uncontrolled development would not only intensify the ferocity of warfare, but might directly contribute to the outbreak of war" (page 3). Later, the Soviet Government's position was that it could see no reason why a supplementary organization outside the United Nations should be established. This awkward point is not to be ignored. For it asks why the United Nations, itself, does not inspire confidence.

The Committee is satisfied that it has answered the questions it poses. These are: to what extent its proposals afford security against atomic warfare; to what extent they tend to remove the possibility of atomic weapons being a cause of war; to what

⁴ This may be an echo of the case for the defense in the Pearl Harbor investigation, where it was emphasized that, because the constitutional power to declare war was lodged in Congress, the American armed forces and Commander-in-Chief were careful not to strike the first blow.

extent they establish patterns of cooperation which may form a useful precedent for wider application.

The early common proposal of "outlawing" the use of atomic weapons is rejected. For, dependent on "the pledged word and the good faith" of each nation party to the outlawing declaration, it "puts an enormous pressure upon national good faith." A general lack of confidence would follow.

Nor could a mere system of combined outlawry and inspection succeed. The political, social, and organizational problems involved in enforcing agreement between nations each free to develop atomic energy, but pledged not to use it for bombs, would be insoluble. National rivalries must result from the continuance of the national right to develop energy which could be used for destructive purposes. Successful control by way of inspection was impossible so long as the production of fissionable materials by national governments was permitted. The same, of course, applies to private organizations within nations.

Inspection is a vital component of control—but only a component. The Committee makes the sound point that, technically, to rely upon inspection of a merely police nature would defeat full reliability because the inspectors, though at first scientifically qualified to recognize dangerous activities, would soon fall behind if not themselves continuously engaged in the process of advancing the technology. Therefore, the controlling agency itself must be active in research and development, and "well informed on what is an essentially living art." As a "persistent challenge to the good faith of the nations inspected," many acutely irritating incidents would follow inspection—particularly where industrial secrets of a non-atomic nature were involved. So long as control is confined to the bomb alone, and industrial development is permitted, there could be no assurance in the good faith of nations that the industrial would not be transformed into military purposes. The conclusion is inescapable: international control, to be fully assured, must be control which applies to *all* activities with atomic energy. No part of the process can be exempt from the controls, from property in the ore to the last uses of it by the various nations. This is the more important because knowledge is in the process of development: it is not known where the next danger may break out; and therefore, once again, all-around control is essential.

Therefore, an Atomic Development Authority must be created to conduct *all* intrinsically dangerous operations in the nuclear field. Under it, individual nations and their citizens would be free to conduct, on license and with a minimum of inspection, all non-dangerous operations.

It would require authority to *own* and lease property—in particular, all the ores which could be made into fissionable material—and to carry on mining, manufacturing, and research, licensing, inspecting, selling, and any other necessary operations. There is little point in dwelling on the Committee's observations on the agency's constitutional form: the Committee itself recognizes that form is secondary to powers.

The international agency would have *exclusive jurisdiction to conduct all intrinsically dangerous operations in the field*: construction and operation of plants and conduct of research in explosives. The large field of non-dangerous and relatively non-dangerous activities would be left in national hands. *The drawing of this line would be continuously in the hands of the international agency.* The separate nations would be permitted to accumulate and use stocks of atomic material that could produce non-dangerous power. Their activities would be subject to license by the international agency, subject to the rules and regulations made by it, including collaboration on design. Furthermore, the agency would have its inspectorate to assure against illicit operations, primarily in the exploitation of raw materials.

Safeguards are available if a nation, nevertheless, breaks faith and misuses the supplies available to it under license by the international agency. It is believed to be possible to denature uranium and thorium so as to render them useless for explosive purposes, though keeping it valuable for all other uses.⁵ *Any activity in the raw-material field would be a sign of illicit activity, for such activities should not be going on at all.*

Inspection would be carried out. Apparatus and factories would be licensed only if unable to produce explosive material. Such factories could not be hidden from the expert inspectors, as their physical layout would have been licensed if detectable. The power of the agency to license development and to audit, would further enable it to defeat evasions.

⁵ This has been declared more recently not to be so certain.

Such controls, it is believed, would make it impossible for a nation to conduct all the processes from mining to the production of the bomb on a dangerous scale without discovery.

The Committee rightly endeavored to avoid controlling or inspecting for *motive*. The international agency would control by specifying the efforts *permissible*; all others would be patently *impermissible*. Then, in a sense, atomic activities would be automatically self-inspecting, because of the distinctive and physical designation of permitted activities. The need for personal inspection would vary with the activity permitted.

Persisting suspicions regarding the activities carried on in mines or installations could be satisfied if the agency having a *prima facie* case could get permission from the World Court to inspect. "The procedure seems sufficiently limited in its effect upon national sovereignty to be practical" (page 43).

The agency would be under the surveillance of the Security Council, or some other integral organ of the United Nations, to assure the necessary degree of accountability to the nations and peoples whose instrument it will be.

MR. BARUCH

The Baruch Proposals include the International Atomic Development Authority, and its ownership of material and functions. In addition *when*, and only when

an adequate system for control of atomic energy, including the renunciation of the bomb as a weapon, has been agreed upon *and put into effective operation, and condign punishments set up for violations of the rules of control which are to be stigmatized as international crimes*, [the United States Government proposes] that—

1. Manufacture of atomic bombs shall stop;
2. Existing bombs shall be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the treaty; and
3. The Authority shall be in possession of full information as to the know-how for the production of atomic energy.

Mr. Baruch warned that the disclosure was subject to a fully effective system of control. He listed as violations:

1. Illegal possession or use of an atomic bomb;
2. Illegal possession, or separation, of atomic material suitable for use in an atomic bomb;

3. Seizure of any plant or other property belonging to or licensed by the Authority;
4. Wilful interference with the activities of the Authority;
5. Creation or operation of dangerous projects in a manner contrary to, or in the absence of, a license granted by the international control body.

For these violations, penalties as serious as the nations were prepared to fix, and as immediate in execution as possible, should be fixed.

. . . the matter of punishment lies at the very heart of our present security system. It might as well be admitted, here and now, that the subject goes straight to the veto power contained in the Charter of the United Nations so far as it relates to the field of atomic energy. The Charter permits penalization only by the concurrence of each of the five great powers. . . .

I want to make very plain that I am concerned here with the veto power only as it affects this particular problem. *There must be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for destructive purposes.*

Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British delegate, underlined the need for "condign, immediate and effective penalties against violation," and raised an issue, bound to cause great difficulty: With what actual weapons would penalties be enforced?

THE SOVIET COUNTER PROPOSALS: SOVEREIGNTY AND PROMISES

The Soviet Union offered an alternative based on a radically different conception. Observing that the continued use of atomic energy for weapons of mass destruction might intensify mistrust between states and keep the peoples of the world in continual anxiety, it proposed a treaty to forbid the production and use of atomic weapons, require *the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons*, and impose penalties for all activities violating such agreements. This would be the first and primordial stage of proceeding. Later would follow arrangements for supervision of plant and activities, and sanctions against unlawful use of atomic energy.

The Soviet delegate philanthropically stressed the interest of the world in the use of atomic energy for raising standards of wel-

fare and living conditions, and that the results of the use of the weapons "are incompatible with the generally accepted rules and the ideas reinforced by the common sense of humanity . . . regarding rules for the conduct of war . . . that innocent civilian population should not be destroyed." An exchange of information for the purpose of advancing the science was necessary, and this could be explored.

The *first* thing was the treaty; the Soviet draft was ready:

(a) An atomic weapon was not to be used, in any circumstance.

(b) The production and keeping of a weapon based upon the use of atomic energy was forbidden.

(c) *Within a period of three months from the entry into force of this agreement, all stocks of atomic energy weapons*, whether in a finished or semi-finished condition, were to be destroyed.

(d) Violation of these three engagements was declared to constitute a serious "crime against humanity."

(e) The signatories within six months of the entry into force of the agreement were to pass laws providing severe punishment for violation of the terms of the agreement.

(f) The agreement would come into force after approval by the Security Council (that is, subject to the veto of any of the Big Five) and ratification by half the signatory states, including all states members of the United Nations, as under Article 23 of the Charter.

The features of this first Soviet proposal were: (1) it depended on a treaty outside the United Nations Charter; (2) it depended for enforcement in the first place upon the several nations signatory to the treaty; (3) it did *not provide for international enforcement*, since it attached no sanction to the stigmatizing article, that violation constitutes a serious crime against humanity, and relied on outlawry; and (4) it insisted on very early destruction of stocks of bombs and cessation of production.

In other words, the Soviet Union put its trust in treaties, and proposed swift action. The United States on the other hand, was not prepared to act so fast; it wished to keep its bombs and continue to manufacture until, stage by stage, the controls internationally executed should prove effective. The Soviet proposal was a treaty based on nationally enforced penalties and inevitably put the heaviest strain on national good faith and provided for inspection only at a much later stage. As for international ownership

of the ores, it recommended a committee of the Assembly to study the measures, systems, and organizations of control to insure the observance of the international agreement and also of sanctions.

Without any waste of time, the Soviet delegate warned against any attempt to "undermine the activity" of the Security Council. He stated that "such attempts should be resisted." This was ominous.

Except the Soviet and the Polish delegates, all expressed hearty approval of the United States scheme. Some attempted to keep the veto power out of the discussion, hoping thus to arrive at a maximum agreement which might carry the issue; but the Soviet delegate was adamant.

In the face of all proposals and pleading, through many days of debate and negotiation, he insisted that the Soviet Union would retain the veto power in any agency at least to the stage of punishment of derelictions by the several countries.

The American scheme envisaged the International Atomic Development Authority in a subordinate relationship to the Security Council and in connection with the other organs of the United Nations. The suggestions by some delegates, particularly Mr. Evatt of Australia, that the Authority would possibly not be subject to the veto power seemed to make the Soviet delegate more inflexible than ever. Mr. Evatt said: ⁶

If in the end an international convention establishes a world atomic authority, the day-to-day administrative decisions of that body may or *may not* be subject to the veto system of voting.

Now, in national government, distinctions between "administrative" and "political" are made but are difficult to sustain absolutely. Such a separation is more usual and possible in democratic than in Soviet governmental practice. The Soviet rulers would be acutely aware of Soviet intermixture of the two. They may regard any item in the Authority's jurisdiction as having the highest political (that is, punitive) implications. This may be in their minds, in the same way as the problem of where "procedure" ends and questions of "substance" begin; or whether "investigations" which go beyond mere "discussion and consideration" may lead to

⁶ June 25, 1946.

action, and therefore are in a sense "acts" and subject to veto in the Security Council.

Indeed, in Memorandum No. 2, submitted by the United States Government to the Commission, the suspicions of the Soviet on this score might be further accentuated, for Part 7 reads:

The exercise by the Authority of the controls referred to above will call for a wide variety of administrative decisions based on fair, sound and responsible judgments. In suggesting the conferring of these powers upon the Authority, it is not intended that their exercise by the Authority should be absolute, unlimited and free from review. Obviously, as to certain specific fields and functions to be defined in the treaty, the Authority's decisions would be final. In others they would not. . . .

But this "administrative" activity concerns inspection, enforcement, and such serious matters; special investigations by the Authority; revocation or denial of licenses; "reference of serious violations to the Security Council of the United Nations."

The United States Memorandum No. 2 recognized the need for a due relationship between the Authority and the organs of the Charter; but also claimed it needed its own authority and powers. Finally, it required a "degree of autonomy":

Having in mind the essentially non-political character of the Authority, the presumably high caliber of its personnel, and the necessity for wide discretion on its part in order to achieve its purposes of control and development, great weight and *a considerable degree of finality* should be given to its determinations, orders, and practices. Where their consideration is required by another organ, they should be accepted unless clearly erroneous or beyond the scope of the Authority's powers.

The trouble is that neither Stalin nor Molotov, nor Vishinsky, nor any of their colleagues of the Politbureau, has had the inestimable education of working as an administrative student in the TVA, or ever taken a university course in public administration and the quasi-public corporation.

We arrive at the reckoning. American Memorandum No. 3 emphasizes the need for sanctions without veto:

The controls established by the treaty would be wholly ineffectual if, in any such situations, the enforcement of security provisions could

be prevented by the vote of a state which has signed the treaty. Any other conception would render the whole principle of veto ridiculous. It is intended to be an instrument for the protection of nations, not a shield behind which deception and criminal acts can be performed with impunity. This in no way impairs the doctrine of unanimity. No state need be an unwilling party to the treaty.⁷ But *such undertakings would become illusory if the guarantee against their breach resided solely in the conscience of the one who commits the breach.*

All parties to the treaty and all peoples of the world must have protection of a final and dependable character against the terrible consequences of the destructive use of atomic energy. Such protection requires international machinery which can and will function quickly—machinery which does not permit the offender to be protected by his own or another's [*satellite's!*] negation of the exercise of joint power essential to the security of all.

Subject to this principle, the Security Council would have full jurisdiction over "serious" violations. In all other situations, assigned to the Authority, the Security Council would still function as the Charter originally intended.

"Voluntary" and "agreement" seem to me to be tortured words where one nation possesses the bomb and the secret of production, and another is without it, and where vastly different views of what constitutes man's highest social good divide the contestants. Mr. Evatt's General Report⁸ underlines this need for operations outside the reach of the veto power.

The earliest Soviet argument held that the Atomic Development Authority needed no enforcement powers, "because any necessary enforcement action could be undertaken by the Security Council." The Soviet delegate declared that to place sanctioning power in the hands of the Authority was "directed to undermining the unanimity of the Members of the Security Council upon questions of substance and is incompatible with the interests of the United Nations."

Mr. Gromyko refused to budge. He believed that the control of atomic power could be handled by the existing organs of the United Nations, that they were empowered to deal with the sub-

⁷ This proposition is sound formally; but the United States *has* the atomic bombs. The United States delegate is virtually saying, "Make a treaty on this basis; for if not, we can do what we like with the bomb."

⁸ Cf. *International Control of Atomic Energy*, State Department, App. 202-209 (1946).

ject. (This is, in fact, quite feasible, *administratively* considered; as easy as the method proposed by the Acheson-Lilienthal Report. The issue at stake is not schemes: it is enforcement, and acceptance of enforcement.) Mr. Gromyko lumped together the American categories of administrative matters, procedural matters, and serious offenses, from the point of view of their practical impact. He thought that in these matters the Authority would be in reality independent of the Security Council—and this could not be reconciled with the Charter. Moreover, he urged the United States to realize that control and inspection by the Authority were difficult to reconcile with the provisions of the Charter relating to the sovereignty of the member states. To meet this argument the United States proposed⁹ that all matters related to atomic energy should be considered not as matters of national importance and “essentially domestic jurisdiction,” but as “international,” so that Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter (which saves the essentially domestic jurisdiction of the member states) should be inapplicable to atomic energy. Mr. Gromyko objected:

The principle of sovereignty is one of the cornerstones on which the United Nations structure is built: if this were touched the whole existence and future of the United Nations would be threatened.

(Incidentally, it must be remembered that it is a right of any member state to withdraw from the United Nations.)

“Any proposals undermining the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in the maintenance of peace and security” were not acceptable to the Soviet Union. “The Security Council’s rights cannot be diminished. The United States proposals, as in Memorandum No. 3, are either as a whole or in separate parts unacceptable to the Soviet Union.”

The Soviet delegate returned to the treaty he proposed—“not so complicated if we really desire to prevent the use of atomic energy as a weapon.” He implied that production was still going on. “It is impossible to reconcile production of atomic weapons with the task of using atomic energy for peaceful purposes only and with the spirit and the principles of the United States.” In this, also, he was being as ingenuous as the United States Memorandum in talking of “voluntary agreement,” and “unanimity.”

⁹ Memorandum No. 3.

THE PROBLEMS

Though some rapprochement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has occurred, some of the problems have proved intractable and others involve serious difficulties. It is highly probable that they are insoluble by agreement among all the principal powers.

The problems need analysis. Seven stand out as crucial: (1) the definition of "dangerous" and "non-dangerous" atomic activity; (2) the location of plants, and strategic balance of power; (3) personnel; (4) inspection; (5) the veto power and punishment; (6) ownership of mines, and information regarding resources; (7) timing of stages of control.

(1) The distinction between the *dangerous and non-dangerous uses* of nuclear energy is vital to the scheme of control, because the dangerous must not be in the hands of the several nations, while the non-dangerous may be there so that it may be beneficially developed. But, if any nation can deny the line of differentiation set by an international authority, the authority may be frustrated in its business of detection and control, and dangerous activities may be exploited by the separate nations. In either case, uncertainty will prevail, and the "condign penalties" will have to be enforced at some time, by law or in fact. But this again would put a strain on the principle of majority voting for such penalties as are proposed by the United States: it would not be acceptable. The right of veto would be demanded, whether under the Charter or under a treaty, as suggested by the Soviet and endorsed by Henry Wallace. Difficulties in making the differentiation might, as has frequently happened in the practice of national government, need to be overcome by devolving *all* the activities upon the Atomic Development Authority. If other things were satisfactory, this would actually be a valuable international advance: the benefits of productive atomic power might be an attraction to international loyalty for citizens of all countries. Why not? The *First Report* of the Atomic Energy Commission underlines the fact that the production processes of nuclear fuel, whether for peaceful or destructive use, are identical and inseparable up to a very advanced stage of manufacture. This makes stronger than

ever, as in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, the need for international control.¹⁰

Now, when the control of atomic energy by the United States' Government was being discussed in the McMahon Committee, a disturbing thought took shape. Perhaps, to avoid atomic war, the only sure path was to stop further scientific advancement altogether? Indeed, at least since World War I, students of the human situation have often suggested that man's knowledge of natural sciences, and therefore of destruction, has by far outstripped his ability to exercise social controls to avert dissension and war. It is not surprising that the idea of a moratorium on the development of industrial uses of atomic power should again be broached. This is mitigated by the view that if this were done for, say, twenty years, then laboratory science with small piles of uranium could progress, while international tension would diminish. Yet, surely, this proposal is too late. For the essential bone of international contention is that the basic knowledge is out, and there can be no rest for any great nation in its search for the weapon and the industrial power together. It is not for a higher standard of living alone, not merely as an economic temptation, that atomic power has come to stay, but as a defense of national ways of life. The conclusion is ineluctable: let it advance; let it be brought out into the open; but let it be internationally controlled.

(2) Next is the problem of *location*. The Authority cannot function above the planet astride a cloud. The uranium and thorium are in the ground, and factories are on it. Where will they operate? To guard against the advent of war, attempts at aggression, the collapse or ineffectiveness of the United Nations or the Atomic Development Authority itself, and to give all nations a sense of security against subjugation by atomic surprise, protection must be afforded "against the eventuality of sudden seizure by any one nation of the stock piles, reduction, refining, and separation plants, and reactors of all types belonging to the Authority."¹¹ This means that concentration of operations in individual countries, as in the United States hitherto, must give way to strategic international distribution and balance of forces—very reminiscent of Ely Culbertson's peace plans by strategic balance of

¹⁰ Cf. State Department, *International Control*, etc., p. 261 ff.

¹¹ *Report*, p. 47.

forces.¹² The Authority must function on some territory: in the known state of mind of the nations it must disperse the power plants.¹³ This would reduce the need for policing of the plants by the Authority or by United Nations military forces, and therefore would diminish the severest conceivable inspection. For if any one nation seized the plant or stock piles in its territory, other nations could appropriate those in their own areas. They would fall back on some other weapons, if any. The minimum stocks of a dangerous character would be workable and increasable as weapons in all countries, each with an equal start. Such seizures would be a dramatic danger signal, and a coalition against the aggressor could be organized. It might take a year or more to produce atomic weapons in quantities sufficient to have an important influence on the outcome of war. The exact time is yet to be calculated: the longer it turns out to be, the less the pressure for punishments and the less the strain on the veto power.

The *Report* raises the question (emphasized by Australia) of the right to priority in securing non-dangerous atomic power plants: a most delicate one, involving collective assent to territorial distribution of "dangerous" activities of the Atomic Development Authority. Will a small nation receive anything at all? If it is allowed plant and material, will this be on terms of residing within the sphere of influence or becoming a satellite of one of the Big Five or Big Three? Such terms may not be stipulated in the atomic treaty, but the treaty may never be drawn and signed unless it is understood that such a balance of power is accepted and durable. It might even be found necessary to impose such a status on the smaller powers; and, reluctant as they may be, diplomacy or force may press them. How can any of the Big Three possibly consent to location in the area of a known satellite of a presumed or potential enemy? Location, quotas, balances—they stagger the imagination! Yet unless they are soluble not one country, but *many* will vote against it—if they are free to do so.¹⁴ The Australian delegation has already raised the problem of the dis-

¹² Cf. *Total Peace* (1943).

¹³ This subject was not considered by the Atomic Energy Commission's Working Committee.

¹⁴ I must omit some other difficult questions raised by the *Report*, such as the priority in establishment of non-dangerous plants in the countries needing power, and the selling price of the raw material (TVA power-rate ghost!).

tribution of non-dangerous power plants: who is to come first? Some students of the problem are disturbed by another anxiety: how tragic to disperse *all over the world* atomic plants now confined to one or two countries only! What a risk!

(3) The *personnel* of the Authority would be responsible for research; geological survey; designation of dangerous and non-dangerous activities; plant design and layout; licenses; and inspection. Not everything would depend on them, for we have seen that the reinsurance of a strategic distribution of the plant has been proposed. But much would still depend on them. The *Report* (pages 34, 45) states:

The development agency itself would be truly international in character. Its staff would be recruited on an international basis. Its functions would be such as to attract a calibre of personnel comparable to our own activities in raw materials during the war and our own primary production. . . .

One of the key problems of course will be the question of personnel. It will be of the essence to recruit that personnel on a truly international basis, giving much weight to geographical and national distribution. It does not seem to us an unreasonable hope that the organization would attract personnel of high quality. For the field of knowledge is one in which the prospects for future development have become an absorbing interest of the entire world. Certainly, there is a far better chance that the Authority would attract personnel of a high calibre than that any purely policing organization would do so. At any rate, it is clear that the success of the organization would depend upon the quality of the administrators, geologists, mining experts, engineers, physicists, chemists, and other personnel, and every possible effort must be made to establish the kind of organization that will attract them.

The problem of the personnel of an international authority¹⁵ is not knowledge alone: *it is loyalty to the purposes of the agency of atomic control*. The problem is summed up in the oath of the League of Nations and the officials of the United Nations—"not to accept or seek directions from governments." Even if the na-

¹⁵ The *First Report* of the Atomic Energy Commission says on this subject only: "It has been assured in the preparation of the report that the staff of the international control agency would be technically competent and loyal to the agency and that it would exercise its functions thoroughly but without encroaching on matters beyond the requirements of the implementation of its mission."

tions ceded their property in uranium and thorium and other fissionable materials, it cannot be taken for granted that the various governments would not seek from their nationals ("denationalized" and offered "compensation," are trivial retorts) services in the interest of their security which would militate against the peace and security of other nations. It is permissible to doubt whether *nothing* at all would be divulged of special advantage to their own government, giving it a superiority over the rest. The officials might prove merely apathetic, or play the game of *ca' canny*.

In various forms the nuclear scientists in the United States and Great Britain have declared that science is an international brotherhood, and that the object of loyalty is the scientific advancement and good of humanity. This would prevent treasonable activities in the interest of any one country or bloc, for that would be tantamount to using science for the making of war. Nothing is so striking in the whole history of the atomic bomb as the tortures of conscience of the scientists who participated in its making. It is a noble contrition.

THE NATIONAL CONSCIENCE OF THE SCIENTISTS

Yet would they stand proof against national temptations? Even Einstein, in company with Alexander Sachs, patriotically furthered the development of the bomb when he realized it was to be a race against Hitler.¹⁶ In my several exhaustive discussions with atomic scientists, they placed considerable reliance on the guardianship of atomic secrets by scientists in the interest of international peace. They pleaded that they were and always would be on the best of scientific fraternal terms with their fellows of any nationality. I inquired how it happened that, though they declared they had entered upon the discovery of the bomb with reluctance, and hoped that they would fail, they had nevertheless continued. My purpose was precisely to throw light on the problem of an all-nation trust in the personnel, not to impute guilt. They fulfilled the unpleasant job, some said, in the hope that it would never succeed; yet they did it. They did it, *it can be judged*, because

¹⁶ Cf. *Hearings*, Atomic Energy Commission, U.S. Senate, Vol. I, Testimony of Alexander Sachs.

their *national* governments asked them to do so in the name of their nations' cause, that is, a war which the governments themselves had entered reluctantly.

Indeed, the story of the League of Nations secretariat, *after* the advent of Hitler and during the heyday of Mussolini and the Soviet participation, shows the mischief that arises when the principals are at enmity.¹⁷ An I.L.O. official was exploited as an agent of Soviet policy in 1945-1946.¹⁸ A British law court sentenced to ten years' penal servitude a scientist named May who had passed on information to a Soviet agent on the same plea the scientists were using:

The whole affair was extremely painful to me and I only embarked on it because I felt this was a contribution I could make to the safety of mankind.

Mr. Justice Oliver, passing sentence, said in answer to May's picture of himself as a man of honor:

I do not take that view of you at all. How any man in your position could have had the crass conceit, let alone the wickedness, to arrogate to himself the decision of a matter of this sort, when you yourself had given your written undertaking not to do it, and knew it was one of the country's most precious secrets, when you yourself had drawn and were drawing pay for years to keep your own bargain with your country—that you could have done this is a dreadful thing.¹⁹

Even Professor Norbert Wiener's rebellion—not “to publish any future work of mine which may do damage in the hands of irresponsible militarists”—is not free from difficulties. If he were the servant of an international body, would he still insist on his own private judgment?²⁰

Postulate agreement among the nations, and the rest is mere machinery; seek to arrive at assurance by machinery, and the machinery cannot give it in an age riven by ideological and national antagonisms. The chasm between the ideological rift *and the per-*

¹⁷ Cf. Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat*, 1945.

¹⁸ Cf. *Royal Canadian Commission of Inquiry*, June 27, 1946, p. 565 ff.

¹⁹ *Report of the Royal Commission*, June 27, 1946 (Ottawa, 1946), pp. 456-457.

²⁰ Cf. *Atlantic Monthly*, Dec. 1946.

fect, the total, assurance which seems to me to be the necessary corollary of the swift and absolute destructiveness of the bomb is not bridgeable by administrative machinery alone. It is a question of will. Professor Oppenheimer, a member of the Lilienthal Committee, expresses a too sanguine opinion:

Third, the plan will bring together, in a constructive, collaborative effort, men of various nations, on a job of vital interest to the maintenance of peace, and the furtherance of human welfare. This is something rather new;²¹ you will get, not only ambassadors, but chemists and physicists, and business men and engineers, in which they will find out how to overcome their national differences, because there is nothing in the setup which exacerbates their national differences [a completely unproven major premise—it could be argued on historical grounds that the contrary is largely if not entirely true]. It is a scheme in which the extreme nationalism, which we all feel to be the true poison of today in the world, will have no place, and in which the sense of fraternity and common understanding will have a chance to get some place.²²

This is a consummation devoutly to be wished; but there are strong reasons for believing that it is not attainable until much more of the poison has been extracted from nationalism. That is the problem. For these men were inwardly saying, not "One world, or none"; they were declaring in behalf of the ways of life of their respective nations, "No world, if necessary"—that is, if necessary for the vindication and affirmation of their own way against terrible odds.

(4) The international reliability of the personnel is an ingredient of successful inspection. We have noticed already that the Acheson-Lilienthal Report paid much attention to inspection. It would be the heart of the day-by-day watch by the Atomic Development Authority. If perfectly safe, inspection could render to the nations an assurance so sound that they could tranquilly rely on a breathing space between discovery of violation—in its very

²¹ Of course it is not. The International Labor Office has been in operation twenty-five years, for welfare only. It has done much and deserves great tribute for its activities and successes. Yet, it has never solved the problem of inspection of the fulfillment of the conventions its member nations have been persuaded to sign. See a weak kind of national substitute for this suggested in the I.L.O. Report, *Labour Inspection* (Montreal, 1945).

²² *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1, 1946, p. 4.

embryo—and the outbreak of atomic war, and could take measures accordingly. The surer the reliance on the efficiency of detection, the less cause for misgivings about the efficiency of punishment, and therefore the less significant the battle over the veto. Hence, the veto power has a relationship with technically and morally impeccable inspection. The Working Committee gave specific and close attention to inspection and supervision, and insists on these in the *First Report*.²³

Yet, in his earlier attitude, Mr. Gromyko ruled out inspection totally! Though the Soviet mind has changed on this, its earlier views are not without reason; what once was, may be again. The Soviet delegate said in the Atomic Energy Commission on July 31, 1946:

No inspection as such can guarantee peace and security. The idea of inspection of atomic energy is greatly exaggerated in importance. It is a too superficial understanding of the problem of control. A system of inspection as a means of control is not in conformity with the sovereignty of states.

In fact, inspection could be made a powerful factor of control; without it, no control is possible. It could be so effective, indeed, that nationalism might never allow it to be instituted.

Mr. Gromyko's only alternative, then, was for the Security Council (if *it* were responsible) to use the same means as in any "dispute" or "situation" that is a threat to peace. This, we infer, means putting violations on the agenda of the Council, discussing, considering, and "investigating." Each such stage could be an obstacle erected by any recalcitrant power and its friends with votes. But experience (Spain and Franco) had already shown that "investigations" need not be on the spot which festers; and that the Big Four interpretation of the voting procedure of the Council (Article 27) subjects the institution of "investigations" to the veto power! This interpretation was deliberate, and the U.S.S.R. had a weighty part in enacting it.

The Soviet rulers evidently did not wish inspection in Russia, even though it meant investigation everywhere! Their fear of outsiders cannot have been calmed by the Acheson-Lilienthal Report's view that one of the questions for the Committee to solve

²³ For example, see p. 21.

was the use of its Atomic Development Authority technique for *further* world controls! As though one atom at a time were not enough! Nor could their suspicions be alleviated by perusal of an article by Professor Oppenheimer on inspection. Thus:

If you [an inspector] are working in a laboratory, trying to show people how to use a reactor, and also watching so that nothing wrong be done with this reactor, in the dual role, that is, of a helper and an inspector, you're going to pick up the gossip of that laboratory, you're going to be free to pass on the gossip to your own outfit, and there is probably no better way of really having cognizance of what is going on.

This is surely an exquisite example of how *not* to reassure the Soviet! Her vitriolic exasperation with the reports about Russia by the newspaper correspondents of several countries *after* their return from the Moscow Conference of 1947 is an evidence of the resolution to hide the truth.

"SHARP TURNS" BY THE U.S.S.R.

On November 28, 1946, during the discussion in the General Assembly of the United Nations of the Soviet Government's proposals (of October 29th) for a general reduction of armaments, Mr. Molotov began riding two horses at one time: general disarmament and atomic control. He now followed Stalin's recent declaration (September, 1946) on the need of "strong international control" of atomic energy. He now believed it possible to "reach an agreement on the concrete matters relating to control." Hence, he proposed "within the framework of the Security Council . . . international control operating on the basis of a special provision which would provide for the establishment of special organs of inspection."

In view of the Soviet's past attitude, much suspicion attached itself to (a) its linking of general disarmament and atomic control and (b) its conversion to inspection. It was even suggested in the Assembly that the former was introduced to delay atomic control. Outside the Assembly it was suggested that general disarmament was intended as a bargaining counter for atomic control as the U.S.S.R. wanted it. Or, even, as mere propaganda. At any rate, when questioned on inspection by Senator Connally

and Sir Hartley Shawcross, Mr. Vishinsky declared that the "control system" with "special organs of inspection" must be subject to the voting procedure of the Security Council, that is, the veto! He was pressed by Sir Hartley with the point that the inspection process might be vetoed. "Any system," he said, "which is to be more than a pious hope, must enable an international body to enter any country without fear of 'veto' or prohibition of inspection." Mr. Vishinsky reiterated his principle of unanimity and made doubly sure the assertion that "my government does not mean to renounce this principle." Mr. Vishinsky was then pressed heavily by other delegates to the effect that inspection and control were "absolutely fundamental" and could not be subject to veto. Mr. Molotov on December 4, unsuccessfully attempting again to merge general disarmament and atomic control, stated that, while the Security Council would decide on arms reduction—including the production of atomic weapons—and the establishment of control commissions by *unanimity* of the permanent members of the Security Council, the control commission would work according to the rules prescribed for it by the Council. But Mr. Molotov's own words were so roundabout as to defeat confidence in their meaning.

In the upshot, both U.S.S.R. and Polish delegates abstained from voting on the acceptance by the Security Council of the Report. While abstention has come (*perhaps*) to mean that the proposal is not vetoed, it does *not* mean surely that the abstainers accept the validity of the Report as a binding policy of the Council.

The Russian opposition to the American proposals, now in the main the policy of the rest of the Security Council, persists. On February 14, 1947, Mr. Gromyko rebuked the eight months' delay since the Russian proposals had been presented, and repeated his and Mr. Molotov's general arguments for urgency, especially in the outlawing and destroying of stocks and manufacture and the resolutions accepted unanimously by the General Assembly for general disarmament (!). He charged that the atomic proposals violated the Charter provisions for "unanimity" or the veto, "undermining the foundations of the very existence" of the United Nations. He deplored the possibility that insistence on punishment without veto destroyed confidence since it assumed the Great Powers would be violators of atomic controls (!). Punishment there must and would be, but in accordance with the Charter

formula of voting. Within this (exactly how is not noted), control and inspection would operate by majority vote "in appropriate cases." But which?

On February 18, 1947, the U.S.S.R. submitted a series of amendments and additions to the Russian Report. They reaffirmed the Soviet's rulers' attitude, as described developmentally above: to secure a prompt convention; to have controls over the existing plant put into effect *immediately* thereafter; to have the convention "administered within the framework of the Security Council"; to provide control and inspection with majority decision in "appropriate cases"; to provide for self-defense, as in Article 51, against grave violations. It will be seen that the veto on punitive measures remains; and where it does *not* apply in inspection is not specifically stated. Before this, on December 5, 1947, Mr. Baruch had again forcibly recommended no American yielding on the veto.

(5) The pothole over the veto could be dispelled if the assurance were established of ever effective inspection and a strategic balance, securing a period between detection and the formation of an armed punitive coalition. Without these the party in possession rejects the veto; the atomless party exacts the veto.

Now, public attempts have been made to minimize the importance of the problem of veto power. Henry Wallace, for example, has declared:

The veto issue is completely irrelevant, because the proposal "to abolish the veto" which means something in the general activities of the Security Council, has no meaning with respect to a treaty on atomic power.

These are extremely dogmatic words. He proceeds:

If we sign a treaty with the other nations, we will have all agreed to do certain things. Until we arrive at such a treaty, we, as well as other major powers, will have the power to veto. Once the treaty is ratified, however, the question of veto becomes meaningless. If any nation violates the treaty provision, say of permitting inspection of suspected illegal bomb-making activities, what action is there that can be vetoed? As in the case of any other treaty violations, the remaining signatory nations are free to take what action they feel is necessary, including the ultimate step of declaring war.

Other writers even invoke Article 51 of the Charter, allowing self-defense if attacked; and others go *even further* (all to meet the Soviet's persistence) to allow "self-defense" on breach of the atomic treaty.

It is necessary to dispel the confusion regarding the nature of the dispute about veto power. It is not folly or groundless obstinacy on the part of the United States and its adherents. What the United States Government has asked is, substantially, that when violations have to be punished, or otherwise corrected, in the definition of the line between dangerous and non-dangerous activities, some kind of majority vote shall settle the issue, unobstructed by any single power which may itself be the violator. The object of acting without obstruction is to give all nations the steady assurance that they may rely on punishment of a violator. The purpose of assurance is to stop violations by clear *anticipation* of punishment, which cannot be impeded or delayed or fumbled by a legal obstacle, the veto.

It happens that there are other nations in the world besides the Soviet Union, a fact of which Mr. Wallace shows no keen awareness in his speeches and writings. It is perfectly sound to proceed by treaty, provided that the treaty stipulates that its sanctions will operate without *one* nation being able to say "No." It is hardly a responsible answer to say, as Mr. Wallace says, that in that case, as in other treaty violations, war can be made upon the aggressor. The whole purpose of the atomic control plan of the United States is to *avoid* going to war. If war is the *ultima ratio regum* in atomic violations, then no treaty is required at all. All can bide their time.

If the purpose, however, is to prevent war from ever coming (it would be an atomic war if it came), then a hint must be taken from the practice of modern governmental methods in national states: they *anticipate* crime or misdemeanor, and set up administrative controls so that it may never occur. This is preventive. Similarly, in the world at large, it is necessary to prevent a violation of atomic controls from ever happening. This can be done if the weaker nations can anticipate tranquillity, and if the stronger must anticipate corrective action. But such anticipation is altogether unreliable if the sanction operates *after* violations: and it cannot be realized if suspects can prevent inspection or other measures by their single vote.

Nor is that the only point of importance. Whenever a unanimous vote on the Security Council is achieved (7-4, the five permanent powers concurring), the legal *obligation* follows that all member states of the United Nations must fulfill their pledges regarding sanctions and give every facilitation against the aggressor. If the vote is not as stipulated, then no legal obligation binds the members to take their pledged action. The police, as it were, are sworn out, not in. The significance of the United States' atomic proposals is to exempt from obstruction by the veto the certainty that the member states will fulfill their obligations, which become due only when there is a valid vote. This can be achieved by getting rid of the veto power if the Security Council handles the atomic control or—if a treaty arrangement is deemed preferable for any reason—by stipulating that these important and assurance-giving decisions shall be made by majority vote: a majority that could override the Soviet satellites, or those of other great powers, if it is to be a real international sedative.

So far from being an "irrelevant" issue that "should never have been raised" (Mr. Wallace's words), the veto issue was raised by men who seem to me to have been farsighted and rational. For they seek a solution that avoids war as an outlet, with a collective threat to prevent its ever being necessary. That is as far as human good will and thought as yet can reach.

Mr. Wallace has been so trenchant that he has cut away the ground from under his own feet.

(6) If, now, the problems mentioned are difficult of solution, perhaps impossible by free agreement, it is exceedingly hard to envisage how the consent of all nations can be obtained for the *ownership* or dominion over the raw material in their own soil by the Atomic Development Authority. The material varies in amount in different countries, and surrender requires a remarkable act of self-abnegation, whatever the price. This holds good also of geological information. Unless a strategic balance of possessions of ore can be arranged, and inspection of their use, who can be expected to surrender ownership and information, even among those who have neither? Information reaches me from a very credible source that the world's largest supplies of thorium are in Travancore, India, and that its Prime Minister, on being asked whether it was intended to yield it to international control, answered, "We will keep it, and use it as *we* want to use it." On

October 23, 1946, Professor Alexandrov, Soviet expert on the Atomic Energy Commission, proposed a world survey of uranium and thorium deposits, and exchange of information on mining and extraction. But he did not *pledge* acceptance of an *international* survey!

(7) Finally, *the timing* of the stages is a problem which has not been solved to the satisfaction of the Soviet Union and her satellites. From the point of view of the Soviet rulers, the United States has the bomb and will have an advantage at all times until "safety" is assured in the American definition of "safety," which will include solicitude for other nations who are friends of the United States, that is, on the continent of Europe and elsewhere. This would seem to make the time envisaged far off, indeed. Consequently the Soviet rulers question the earnestness of the United States. The Greek Kalends and the atomic bomb go ill together. There is no doubt about the acerbity of the Soviet's view of the delay: Mr. Gromyko's words are almost reminiscent of Hobbes's diatribe against the nasty state of nature. Thus, at the Atomic Energy Commission's session of July 31, 1946, he burst out:

But at the same time the United States seems to consider the present situation perfectly normal. A situation in which there is no agreement, no convention, no guarantees forbidding the production and use of atomic weapons. The United States seems to regard only the future as of the very greatest importance in this connection but at the same time regards the present situation as perfectly normal. But it is obvious that the present situation is abnormal. . . . I don't see how one can ask other states blindly to believe in the good intentions of the United States and to accept the United States proposal as regards atomic weapons and at the same time to doubt the good intentions of others.

THE SITUATION

No nations other than the Soviet Union and Poland seem to mistrust the American attitude. Some Americans, including Henry Wallace, protest against the American procedure. "In other words," he says, "we are telling the Russians that if they are 'good boys' we may eventually turn over our knowledge of atomic energy to them and to the other nations. *But there is no objective standard of what will qualify them as being 'good' nor any specified time for sharing our knowledge.*"

It is true that there is no objective standard of what will qualify them as being "good." The implications of this awful truth are so tragic that they are not even canvassed by their discoverer. He himself is willing to "trust" the Soviet rulers—though he uses the obscurantist term "Russia." If we must wait until "good" is defined, we shall wait until death strikes. The only alternative is acceptance of international procedures as the test of good public faith. This involves submission to an international body, and *no veto*. No veto abolition, no trust; no trust, no disclosure; no disclosure, fear; if fear, *perhaps* war; if war, perhaps then a policy of self-defense.

The United States, after prodigious labors, discovers a weapon which might give her domination of the world. In generous, conscientious regard for the welfare of mankind, she offers to share the secrets of the bomb (it is true, some time ahead) *and to submit herself* to the elaborately strict discipline of a new organ of world government. This is magnanimity itself. No other nation at any time possessed of such a secret has come near to the exhibition of such practical nobility. This has been recognized by the vast majority of other nations. Only the Soviet Union and Poland stand out.²⁴ Mr. Wallace uses a simple debating device: Suppose, he asks, Russia had the bomb—how would Americans feel? There is a better way of putting Mr. Wallace's difficulty: Suppose the Soviet rulers had the bomb—what would *they do*? Has he a sanguine answer to that?

WHY THE SOVIET RULERS INSIST

The question is crucial. Why have the Soviet rulers refused an equal submission with the United States to such common world control? It can only be because they believe that the controls would work adversely to them. This can derive only from their conviction that they are in a minority in the world and, without the power singly to render ineffectual the action of the controls, would be outvoted steadily *and naturally*. There can be no other explanation; for the benefits, constructive as well as defensive, Russia would get from a whole-hearted assent to the international scheme are immense. The Soviet rulers have something to defend which

²⁴ See State Department Report, previously cited.

as a minority they are prepared to defend to the death, for they are in some danger while the United States has atomic weapons and they have not. They are prepared to court the risk now, and until such time as they can get the weapons for themselves. It is a serious risk, and perhaps it accounts for their almost ulcerated irritability exhibited at the Paris Peace Conference in July-October, 1946, and then, after their scientists had learned much at the scientific and technical sessions, their oscillation into a mood of minor concession.

Or, do they think that the risk is small by reason of the small number of bombs in stock now? Or, especially, that the United States would not use them against Russia because America's democratic system of government and pacific nature of her masses forbid its use, forgetting diplomatically the "inevitable" war, by the "inevitable" bourgeoisie and capitalists? Or do they believe that, whatever the state of mind of the American people, the use of the bomb could not subjugate Russia which, with its protective apron of territories, national and satellite, is capable of absorbing the damage and continuing as a state, resisting the advance of occupying armies, which, in any case, the United States would be reluctant to provide? Are they trading on the precipitate flight home of American armed forces from the occupied enemy lands?

This bomb can undermine the whole of the United Nations Charter. The Soviet rulers may think: "We therefore cannot trust for our safety or the status acquired by our luck in being on the victorious side to anything less than the Security Council and our veto. That may not be enough, but it was the most we were able to obtain, and we cannot for our lives' sake derogate from what we regard as the minimum protection for ourselves."

We revert then to what the Soviet rulers have to defend, thus jeopardizing international peace. This comprises their system of government, society, and economic enterprise based on the Marxist-Leninist foundation, and all the future possibilities of Russia as a nation; also, the status of the leaders and rank and file of the Russian Communist Party. This is their nationalism. They will risk its violent destruction rather than, as a minority in the world, surrender the right to prevent possible extinction by yielding to a majority resolution of punishment against Russia.

They do not trust the rest of the world to let them live and evolve in their own way. Their challenge to the United States, the

possessor of the lethal weapon, is to get rid of the bomb if she is genuinely peace-loving, and bind herself not to make any more.

Many people were chagrined at Stalin's coolness toward the danger of the Great Bomb.²⁵ What did they expect? An exhibition of public cowering? Yet, there is a curious gap between Stalin's declaration of unconcern about the bomb, and Gromyko's and Molotov's expressed concern and news from Moscow which has been already quoted, not to mention Dr. Werner Heisenberg's report of Soviet solicitations to German atomic scientists to work in Russia.²⁶

It may be doubted whether Stalin believes that the bomb is not a serious force. For after only a month or two of quiet, Soviet concern started on a crescendo from Molotov's promise—or threat—"We shall have atom bombs also" (November 6, 1945) to continuous accusations of "atomic diplomacy," "atomic imperialism," and so on. The politicians' report on atomic dangers matters less than the scientists': Hiroshima and Nagasaki were more damaged than Stalingrad, terrible as the damage in that city was. If Stalin believes his own words, then Gromyko has been playing a comedy in the name of the Soviet Government.

It is a blithe view that the bomb could not decide the outcome of war: this depends on the number used and the ability of the power dropping them to continue until the political life of the victim nation shall become impossible. Surely Stalin cannot think that the *Soviet state*, that is, the integrated network of political chiefs and serried hierarchy of subordinates, could possibly survive the steady dropping of five hundred atomic bombs at the right places and intervals?

Relief for the Soviet rulers, it is true, is to be had by breaking the monopoly: they must be moving earth for uranium and heaven for the science of the bomb. Is their policy to stall until they have succeeded, and also try to talk the United States out of the bomb, by throwing in general disarmament or trading the settlement of Germany and the rest of Europe still held in pawn by the Soviet military and Communist Party clutches?²⁷ How the use of the bomb can be prohibited short of the Baruch Plan, Stalin

²⁵ Interview, Sept. 1946.

²⁶ Fully reported in the *New York Times*, Feb. 24, 1947.

²⁷ This appears probable from the Stalin-Stassen interview, and the Gromyko speech of May 19, 1947—part of Stalin's "skirmishes."

does not suggest. There are various possibilities. One is to wait and suffer dread until Russia can drop the bomb—as Stalin says, “Atomic bombs are for intimidating weak nerves”—on the other parties, perhaps. Another is reliance on American public opinion to get “outlawry” conceded, as in the Soviet control plan. In his answers to Harold E. Stassen on April 10, 1947, Stalin placed reliance on “the conscience of the people”—but did not say *which* people. Or, again, reliance might be placed (especially when the Soviet rulers have the bomb) on all the other nations being so fearful of the future that they will join the Soviet delegate in voting down the American scheme. The Soviet rulers with the bomb would have Europe and Britain in pawn. Or, finally, the U.S.S.R. might propose withdrawal from the United Nations, unless she got her own way with the bomb (outlawry, and destruction of stocks) on the ground that “withdrawal or some other form of dissolution of the organization would become inevitable if, deceiving the hopes of humanity, the organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or able to do so only at the expense of law and justice.”²⁸ The faithful Polish member of the Atomic Energy Commission taunted Mr. Baruch, December 30, 1946, with being the first to suggest such a course if the United States’ discard of the veto were refused. The taunt was false: it was Molotov, on October 19, 1946, who threatened withdrawal.

WHY THE UNITED STATES INSISTS

Why doesn’t the United States destroy her stocks and cease production? She *alone* cannot do so because she is in some danger; and her friends in Europe and the Far East are in greater danger. Since July, 1945, the fiercest differences have divided the Soviet from the rest of the world; the Canadian report on Soviet spies has been published; the Soviet Union has made every use of the power available—namely, her geographical situation in Europe and the Far East, and her manpower. The United States certainly cannot afford to disseminate atomic information to the rest of the world, including the Soviet Union, for information might get back to Soviet rulers by way of friends or satellites or through coercion of weaker peoples. One blanket attack on Great Britain could literally blot out that people of forty-five million. Until a

²⁸ San Francisco Conference Declaration on the right of withdrawal from the organization.

completely binding and effective agreement with sanctions is established, under which no country can withdraw from obligations or evade enforcement, the United States must keep her secrets to herself; and she cannot, she ineluctably cannot, avoid adding to her stock for eventualities.

Hence, beginning with the declaration made by all countries that time is pressing, that its passage simultaneously increases the hazards of perishing and the yearning for the fleshpots brimmingly filled by the constructive development of atomic energies, that "humanity" requires international atomic control, that *fear* of annihilation is justified—the conclusion so far is that nothing can be done. For the parties to what might be done are separated by the wide gulf of nationalistic determination each to make its own way of life prevail, to be entirely assured of its own territory, and even to develop and defend it wherever else that is possible.

The Acheson-Lilienthal Report followed the TVA administrative devices with considerable fidelity. The crucial problem, however, is who will have the final authority when the atomic energy authority's administrators disagree in policy. When the TVA three-man board fell into irresoluble dissensions of policy and personality, the President of the United States plucked out one of the disputants by use of his constitutional authority to see that the laws are faithfully executed. Where is the equivalent global Franklin D. Roosevelt? ²⁹

If the U.S.S.R. cannot agree to the American proposals, then American insistence will bereave the world of tranquillity. If the United States yields to the veto demands of the U.S.S.R., the world will continue to be stricken with fear of violations of the treaty.

On March 5, 1947, Mr. Gromyko gave the *coup de grâce* to all hopes for acceptance of the American plan of atomic control, in a blistering, contemptuous speech, which must have mocked the self-delusions of those who never give up hope of an "understanding" with Russia, though the Soviet rulers repeat to their faces, and loudly, that no "understanding" is possible or wanted:

I have already pointed out that the proposal on granting to an international control organ the right to possess establishments for

²⁹ Cf. Finer, *The T.V.A. Lessons for International Application*, Montreal, 1944.

the production of atomic energy and unlimited power to carry out other important functions connected with the ownership and management of the establishments and with the disposition of their production would lead to interference by the control organ in the internal affairs and internal life of states and eventually would lead to arbitrary action by the control organ in the solution of such problems as fall completely within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.

I deem it necessary to emphasize that granting broad rights and powers of such a kind to the control organ is incompatible with the state sovereignty. Therefore, such proposals are unacceptable and must be rejected as unfounded.

Various unconvincing arguments are cited to prove that allegedly only by granting such rights and powers to the control organ is it possible to establish a system of international control. Thorough acquaintance with the above-mentioned proposals shows that this thesis, by references to control, only covers up a striving to obtain the right of interference in the economic life of countries as will be required by the interests even of the majority of the control organ.

Does this mean, however, that it is possible by using references to international control to agree in reality to granting the right of interference in the economic life of a country even through the decision of the majority in the control organ? The Soviet Union does not wish and cannot allow such a situation.

The Soviet Union is aware that there will be a majority in the control organs which may take one-sided decisions, a majority on whose benevolent attitude toward the Soviet Union the Soviet people cannot count. Therefore, the Soviet Union, and probably not only the Soviet Union, cannot allow that the fate of its national economy be handed over to this organ.

The correctness of such a conclusion is confirmed by historical experience, including the brief but very instructive experience of the activities of the United Nations organs. The Soviet delegation does not doubt that all those who objectively appraise the situation will correctly understand the position of the Soviet Union on this question.

To counter the American plan, Mr. Gromyko, as becomes the diplomat in an age when the balance of power is divided among three, adduced the arguments of the British Association of Atomic Scientists regarding the necessary pervasiveness of inspection—his bugbear. With rejection of the United States proposals for the control of atomic energy, the Soviet rulers have

very probably condemned many millions of men, women, and children to violent death.

THE MORALITY OF THE BOMB IS THE MORALITY OF ITS USERS

Is the use of atomic bombs morally defensible? The President of the United States and his advisers deliberately decided affirmatively, for as Secretary of War Stimson stated,³⁰ "This deliberate, premeditated destruction was our least abhorrent choice" among many such choices in a war itself horrible.

The Federal Council of Churches roundly condemned the act:

Whatever be one's judgment of the ethics of the war in principle, the surprise bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are morally indefensible. . . . We have sinned grievously against the laws of God and against the people of Japan. . . . we are compelled to judge our chosen course inexcusable.

It never carried the burden of responsibility for the lives of one million American and Allied soldiers, and probably as many Japanese; but it undertook to pronounce the action militarily unnecessary—an argument that is not a Christian argument. Furthermore, it refused to accept world government imposed by force, as such "forced rule would gravely imperil essential human liberty and growth."³¹ Thus, no use of the bomb: nor world rule imposed by force. But does not this leave us with an international anarchy which will eventuate in the use of the bomb?

The British Council of Churches was far more circumspect, and not less Christian. It would not judge American action because it was not then in full possession of the facts. Some of its members took the absolute view that war was never permissible, and that they would follow this creed through to the last consequences; but others warned:

If the supreme object of our endeavours is to save humanity from the appalling fate of atomic warfare, to assume that the best means of doing so is to renounce in advance the right of defence might well prove to be a serious miscalculation.

³⁰ *Harper's Monthly*, Jan., 1947—reproduced throughout the press.

³¹ *Atomic Warfare and the Christian Faith* (March, 1946), pp. 11, 15.

It was not easy for the Christian conscience to say so, in view of the diabolical weapons in question, but

democratic institutions are a profoundly significant transcription at the political level of Christian insight, and for this reason demand the active support of Christians. Even the chance of preserving for future generations the framework of free and responsible political action may be preferable to a surrender to tyranny.³²

The American people seemed rather to take the official view and that propounded by the British Council of Churches. A poll by *Fortune* showed an overwhelming acceptance of the policy of ending the Japanese War by use of the bomb. The poll was, of course, taken after the capitulation.

A Gallup Poll taken during the last two weeks of November, 1946, found 72 per cent *against* American destruction of the bombs and cessation of manufacture, 21 per cent in favor, and 7 per cent with no opinion. To such action in proof of good will when asking for international control, 19 per cent answered "Yes"; 5 per cent answered "Yes, if others do likewise"; 65 per cent answered "No"; and 11 per cent had no opinion. That the U.S.S.R. would allow "checking" to see that she did not make atom bombs was disbelieved by 72 per cent; 13 per cent believed she would; 15 per cent had no opinion. Cessation of manufacture and destruction of the stocks, 28 per cent thought, would further an international control agreement; 52 per cent thought they would not; 20 per cent had no opinion.

In August, 1946, according to the survey made on the Gallup Poll principle 41 per cent of those asked believed that the secret of the bomb should be kept by the United States; and another 8 per cent believed it should be so kept, except under certain conditions. Only 6 per cent believed it should be "turned over to the United Nations"; and 3 per cent "turned over" to the United Nations under some conditions. The rest were undecided; or thought the bomb was no secret; or (32 per cent) "*Do not know what the United Nations is*"!³³

The churches and the people could prohibit their statesmen

³² *The Era of Atomic Power* (May, 1946), p. 56.

³³ Quoted in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Chicago, June, 1947, p. 147. The article is a resume of findings of *Public Reaction to the Atomic Bomb and World Affairs*, Cornell, April, 1947.

from using the bomb, as threat or in actuality, but if they did they would assume the consequences as their *own* responsibility. If the United States destroys the bomb, other nations still know or may learn how to manufacture more. The minimum guarantee to the United States and her friends is, therefore, the prevention of their future manufacture. For the knowledge is everywhere; therefore the potential power is everywhere; therefore the unqualified power of control must be as comprehensive. If not, self-defense is essentially unrenounceable, as are all its future risks.

CHAPTER VII

The Troubles of The Three: Great Britain Entangled

As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces towards you. . . . Slavery they can have anywhere. It is a weed that grows in every soil. They may have it from Spain, they may have it from Prussia. But until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and your natural dignity, freedom they can have from none but you. This is the commodity of price of which you have the monopoly.

—EDMUND BURKE, *Conciliation with the Colonies*

THE TRIADIC BALANCE OF POWER

THE VALUES to which the various nations claim just title are incompatible enough to stultify the Security Council through the use or anticipation of the veto. A match might set fire to the plentifully scattered fuses. The interests of nations are dynamic: they look and strive against each other beyond tomorrow. Each seeks the potentiality of the largest freedom of future development.

For various historical reasons, most of the explosive material is concentrated in the international position of the Big Three. If we survey mankind, it would seem true to say that over vast tracts of the earth there is little or no threat to peace. Thus, war will not come from Scandinavia, nor Finland, nor the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy. War will not break out through Canada's doing. A war might start in a Latin American country, in Argen-

tina in particular, but rather against a Latin American neighbor than any great power. As designed, the Pan American system, including the United States, would extinguish the blaze. Fear from Latin America is rather from the infiltration or propaganda of non-American powers. For a long time the risk will be slight. In the Far East, Japan will not rise again, while the United States retains her supremacy. But this may be regarded by the Soviet rulers as a threat to them. The activities of the Soviet delegate on the control council of Japan, Soviet occupation and social organization of the northern part of Korea, the industrial dismantling of Manchuria, assistance in the creation of the Outer Mongolian People's Republic, may be symptoms of trouble in the future—but emanating from outside.

As for China, many factors rule her out as a war-maker. She is ridden by internal strife, based on clashing economic interests and ideologies between Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists. Her too numerous people are normally of miserable physique, since her agriculture is poor. She almost entirely lacks heavy industries, and has extremely small prospects of bringing coal and iron and other minerals and water power together (they are separated by enormous distances). Nor do the culture and domestic policies of her government tend to war.¹

India is for long virtually excluded as a source of war,² for the Hindu religion is and the people seem to be pacific. The Indian state is in birth travail. Her substance is required for a plan to raise her standard of living from the pitiful amount per capita of perhaps \$25 per year, where the population rises by five million souls a year.

The British Dominions are not war-minded: they are fairly wealthy and sensible democracies.

This leaves only Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia—with the Balkan nations and the Middle East, but excluding Turkey if not attacked. The Middle East must be included principally as a focus of trouble because it is a common pathway of the great powers, and because it contains vast quantities of fuel oil.³ The Balkan countries have such a long and bitter history of

¹ Cf. Rowe, *China Among the Powers* (1945).

² Cf. *A Plan of Economic Development for India* (Penguin, London, 1944).

³ These amount (Jan. 1, 1945) to an estimated 27 billion barrels in a world total of 43 billion. Cf. *Petroleum Almanac*, New York, 1946, p. 305. Both figures are very probably serious underestimates.

savage strife among themselves, treachery, ancient grudges arising out of wars, threats, diverse churches and languages (in part, the heritage of Mohammedan sway through dark centuries), that it is difficult to see how they can give the world peace by themselves remaining at peace, or avoid becoming the tools of the three.

This omits Germany—left out of account for herself, she returns in the arena of the three.

If the three could agree, the world would enjoy peace. Their historic situation and present addiction to their own ways of life, so far, have prevented agreement.

The balance of power is the relative strength of nations resulting from a combination of territorial span and position, and the human, material, and scientific resources they dispose of in relation to any armed struggle that may occur between them. World War II radically altered the balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union. It worsened the situation of Great Britain. It immensely strengthened the position of the United States, because she became more organized at home, discovered the atomic bomb, developed a consciousness of power and a hint of duty, and spread to bases beyond her continent.

The balance of power of our own day is triadic—it rests on three powers. When three ⁴ are thrown into a joint enterprise, each with assets of power, and perhaps able to secure more by alliances, it must be the standing temptation of any one of the three to dominate the other two, or to swing one of the others to its side—granted that perfect agreement cannot be unanimously found. Each must be constantly calculating what the other two are planning or plotting. Any friendship between two must be an object of concern to the third. So long as its sole power is not great enough to overwhelm the other two, it cannot but attempt to split them. Or, divide, and be cool! It may infiltrate between them, or seek to weaken both internally—most certainly to surround itself with friends and protectors and combat intrigue against the enemies of its enemies. As Bismarck said to a Russian diplomat: "All politics reduces itself to this formula: Try to be one of the three as long as the world is governed by the unstable equilibrium of five great powers." Instability of relationship between three

⁴ Cf. Wieser, *Principles of Sociology*, for a general discussion of such relationships.

super-powers must be exceedingly acute: like three elephants in a boat.

In the maneuvering of the triad of the U.S.S.R., the United States, and Great Britain, the cards favor the latter two, for they have many and deep-rooted historic reasons for being friends (in no cant sense) and for jointly looking askance at the U.S.S.R. Yet there is still a complication: Great Britain is geographically closer to the U.S.S.R. and is easily invaded. She is vulnerable to almost complete effacement by atomic bombs, or rocket weapons like the V-2's, used by the Nazis in the last stages of World War II.

THE CANT OF "MEDIATION"

Great Britain cannot, therefore, absolutely follow every policy of the United States. To take the full weight of American hostility to the Soviet Union, without assurance of immediate assistance from the United States, is for her a mortal risk. There is always a left wing in Parliament which flies into action when the Soviet Union is not getting justice and Britain is said to be tied to American capitalism; always another wing which makes a foray as soon as the United States policy seems to be isolationist or appeasing Stalin. Some Labor "rebels" perhaps one-tenth of the number in the Commons, strongly dislike American capitalist enterprise in many of its excesses. They have read Myers's *The Great American Fortunes*, Lundburg's *America's Sixty Families*, and other such books. They sicken with disgust at the absence of standards of obligation to society evinced by labor as by the National Association of Manufacturers. Perhaps a deeper pain moves them against the alleged "lawlessness," the loudness, and the crudeness of American culture. At present they are especially afraid of the hostility of American capitalism to democratic socialist progress in America and of its renewal in Europe. At the same time they are sympathetic to Soviet anticlass socialization and social welfare policies, often worshipping the pious declarations more than the brutal and inefficient reality. They are harrowed by present disrespect of the idol created long ago by their adolescent generousities.

At moments when public men in the United States seem to be hostile to the U.S.S.R., Great Britain is inclined to propose that

she should play the role of "mediator" or "bridge" between the two, that is, to attempt to find compromises capable of reconciling them. Neither side likes this. The peacemaker may be blessed—in the end. But in the early stages of diplomacy and war, his reward is usually the contempt and derision of both sides. When Bismarck played the "honest broker" the powers on both sides put one hand over their pocket and the other on their trigger. "Mediation" becomes an instrument a little difficult to handle. American publicists proposed "mediation" by the United States between Great Britain and Russia when in 1946 Mr. Bevin and Mr. Vishinsky or Mr. Molotov began to bait each other over policy that might eventually have involved the United States in military support of Great Britain.⁵ As yet, however, no one has even impulsively suggested that the Soviet rulers should "mediate" between the United States and Great Britain. Elliott Roosevelt is at pains to observe that it was his father's wish to be "mediator" between Churchill and Stalin. Such suggestions could hardly receive a passionate welcome in Great Britain. Any nation prefers to a friendly mediator, who is bound to urge, at times, that she is a trifle in the wrong, dependable allies who will support her knowing that she will not always be in the right. So, the game of maneuver, of blocs and counter-blocs, proceeds—minutely, intensely, with cat-and-mouse vigilance.

The object of playing the balance is to fix the just acquisitions of each player, in territory, resources, control over the power of other nations in an emergency, positions assisting defense, terrain from which attacks could be launched. Since no common independent authority yet exists to decide these claims, their attainment depends on individual pressure to the degree any party feels safe, but always with some risk of war. It is a nerve-racking game, very hard to keep up successfully—and peacefully.

THE BRITISH POSITION

In this situation, how would an Englishman lay his position before his friends? As the facts seem to "take"—if they "take"

⁵ Thus 58 dissidents in the House of Commons challenged the Labor Government Nov. 18, 1946, for having "an alliance with the Soviet Union on paper" and being "fully and exclusively committed to an alliance with America in principle."

at all—only for a rather short time, it is desirable to repeat them.

The controlling and stark fact is that Great Britain is a very small island, a pimple on the northwestern shoulder of the great land mass of Europe and Asia. No one has yet discovered how to move Britain from this position. Secondly, she is almost destitute of resources that can of themselves yield a livelihood to a large population, or fit her for modern self-defense. The excellent brains and character of her people must fail against the population, weapons, and sea and air blockade of a partnership of countries in the vicinity. Hitler almost succeeded.

Britain's existence and her standard of living are founded on the maintenance of sea and air connections with the rest of the world and, at the distant extremities of those oversea arms, the possession of friends who in case of need would send supplies, weapons, and the raw materials of the tools to do the job. Her chief resources at home are iron, coal, a little tin, good grass, and fish; her agricultural opportunities for wheat, barley, oats, and rye are relatively small because of climate. She has no oil, or cotton, or maize, or tobacco, or copper, nickel, rubber, vegetable fats, timber, hydroelectric possibilities; her coal mines grow ever harder to exploit.

It would be possible to maintain perhaps ten or fifteen million people at a much lower standard of existence; but then she could not be a match for an invader. Britain is able to live with her forty-five millions only through importing raw materials, food, and animal feedstuffs which she can convert into high-quality goods by her skill, and through her merchant marine, insurance and banking, and technical services for other nations. Though her economic position is now temporarily critical and permanently precarious, these services are highly valued by the historic faith of foreigners that, *force majeure* being absent, her engagements to perform will be punctiliously met.

On pain of extinction, the imports must come in and the exports must go out.

OF WHAT IS BRITISH IMPERIALISM GUILTY?

A small island urgently needs overseas possessions, where ships may put in for repairs and for haven, and where protection may be given to her bloodvessels stretched across the whole globe.

Britain's island position dictated her policy. The process of obtaining such bases was not always nice. But in past ages it was on no inferior moral basis to that vast impulse which took her people across the American Continent to exterminate the North American Indians, or to the smoking reeking path of the Tsars, reaching out from the Neva and Kiev and Moscow until their domain covered 8,000,000 square miles in one compact unbroken territorial expanse. The American homeland comprises 3,000,000 square miles and 140,000,000 people; the Russian, 8,000,000 square miles and 180,000,000 people; the United Kingdom is 94,000 square miles and 47,000,000 people.

In a mixture of adventure and stern understandable economic necessity, sometimes religious impulse, these people voyaged by stages to the ends of the earth before competitors trod on their heels anxious to follow suit or eject them, with no thought of "empire" originally. This is the meaning of the phrase "in a fit of absence of mind" in Seeley's epigram. Also without any planning, the economic system of the mother country progressed over the centuries. She came to live upon the exchange of goods. Her priority in industrial invention helped forward her desire for markets and raw material, and she became a nation of traders and seafarers. The population grew. Building on well established foundations in the thirteenth century, long before a fleet was built, or the lands across the Atlantic and Pacific were discovered, Britain had established a rule of law and a parliamentary system. It matured. A notable literature existed already in the sixteenth century. The language was perfected. Prodigies in the art of government were performed. A social conscience evolved. Britain is a brilliant and efficient pioneer of social democracy. In a world where the cruelty of man to man is a sad and dreadful fact, any island of cultivated social decency is a treasure. All of England's enemies do her the involuntary and incessant honor of expecting abnormally noble domestic and international behavior of her. Their sneers are often tributes.

All this depends on Britain's access to the other nations of the world. The sea is her protector or her death. Hence the clinging to "empire." If she were certain that the rest of the world was free and secure for the lawful going and coming of her ships and planes, that no place would eject her from trade, that protection would be given to vessels, shores, and skies when it was justly

required, and if the policy of the "open door" to all raw materials and investment were uninterruptedly available—there would be no case for retention of her possessions. If these assurances are not yet possible, it is difficult for most Englishmen to understand why they should scrap four hundred years of labor, much liberalism, and relatively small exploitation, certainly in the last century. They feel it unfair to ask them to be precipitate, while Americans do not surrender California, Texas, Louisiana, Florida or Puerto Rico to the United Nations, or the Soviet rulers the Russian Far East, the Ukraine and the Caucasus. The opportunities of immigration into the United States remain limited. That possessiveness, the British might be inclined to say, is the equivalent of "imperialism." For they might reflect that nationalism expresses itself sometimes in isolation; or again in the acquisition of oversea or near-by lands—that is, "imperialism"; or once more in "exclusivism," to coin a word to signify the monopoly of vast areas of rich land for a comparatively small population which enjoys the exclusive benefit of it. It is difficult to find a moral basis for this last any better than the moral foundations of an imperialism which is expressed as *oversea* enterprise. When the American colonies revolted, they took with them a heritage that in 1776 was *British*; they tore away for themselves and their descendants a portion far more precious than their parents' remnant.

Nations are reluctant to commit suicide, especially to satisfy the unfulfilled ideals proclaimed by other countries. But the tide of world opinion has turned against the British Empire: quite as much from within as well as without. Indeed Englishmen, often deliberately educated colonials to emancipate themselves from their educators. What makes some Englishmen restive is that some Americans, not conspicuously ascetic, continue to flourish in their rich lands and, though knowing that the British have a much lower standard of living, due not to lack of energy, inventiveness, or talent, but to absence of natural resources and a wide area of home markets, worry and shake the "imperial structure," in a mixture of envy, self-righteousness, and genuine nobility. The British do not enjoy being spurred on to energetic self-dissolution by men who lack a full understanding of the imperial system today or the international consequences of its passing. Still less are they enraptured to hear from the Soviet rulers the broadcasts against "imperialism," when they know that the Tsar's own domains, seized

and expanded by the Soviet rulers, were collected by acts of force considerably more ruthless and cruel than employed by the British of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nor, they reflect, do the Soviet rulers allow mankind to immigrate into those millions of unpopulated square miles, even if they were to acknowledge the political submission confidently ordained for Soviet citizens.

Just as the settlers in America during the nineteenth century struck overland, south, southwest, across the plains, and to the Far West, so the British had moved about the world, but usually overseas. The Americans used "prairie schooners"; the British, schooners, for they could not move more than a few miles on their island without falling into the sea. Both the Americans and the British got to Oregon: Why is it an "empire" to one, and to the other merely "America"? The new American acquisitions were territories, *not* self-governed. The British new areas were called "colonies"—like the glorious Thirteen themselves. As time went on and settlement developed, they too became self-governing, or progressed in that direction. The American Federal Union was finally preserved in four years of bloody war; the British Union could not, alas, be of that territorially united kind, for it is scattered beyond the seas. The beneficent union of the Commonwealth and Empire, comprising something over 500,000,000 people, or a quarter of the human race, has preserved peace among its peoples, with developing justice, welfare, and self-government. Benjamin Franklin was not ashamed to use "empire" in its good sense; at Philadelphia in 1787 he prayed:

"And if a sparrow cannot fall on the ground without His notice, is it probable that an *empire* can rise without His aid?"

WHAT THE "EMPIRE" IS

The Dominions, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and Eire, have gone their own free national way. They are held to the Mother Country by a tie little different in nature from that which holds them to the United States, or to one another. It is the tie of common descent; of language; of sentiment; of a common ideal of government and man's destiny. They act by compulsion not one whit. They are utterly free in their form of government, their everyday administration, their representation in

other countries; their treaty-making powers; their status in the United Nations, as earlier in the League. Their economy is altogether autonomous, their tariffs are raised and lowered as they themselves see fit. Even people, born and bred in Great Britain need entry permits. If there is preference for British immigrants, it is not by British compulsion: in 1947, Canada established a separate Canadian nationality status. Finally, the Dominions have the supreme freedom to stay neutral (as Eire did) or go to war reluctantly (as South Africa did) or enter early (as New Zealand and Australia and Canada did). Australia decided against conscription; Canada, for a form of conscription which could not commit French-Canadians against their will to anything but home defense. India is to all intents and purposes independent. She was on her road to independence as far back as 1890, at the insistence of *British* democratic leaders and their popular following. Burma and Malaya move along the same route to freedom.

Other than the Dominions and India (which constitute four-fifths of the area and seven-eighths of the total population of Britain overseas), the British Commonwealth and Empire comprises the colonial empire, or dependencies, variously named crown colonies, protectorates, mandates, making one-fifth of the total area, and one-eighth of the total population. Some have advanced degrees of self-government, like Burma, Southern Rhodesia, Jamaica, and Ceylon. Some, like Gibraltar, Singapore, and Hong Kong—strategic fortresses—have powerful governors appointed by the mother country, but have also elected representative councils. Some are merely small outposts on islands in the Pacific: they are administered by British officials entirely. The West Indian islands, with a large colored population, have long-established representative governments, though not fully national self-government. The British islands in the Indian Ocean, comprising many petty monarchies, have British governors or residents with local representation. In Africa the older west-coast colonies have representative institutions, and much of the trade and the professions is in the hands of the natives. Deep inland, native chieftains rule, and the old tribal arrangements have been maintained, or were restored, when experience suggested that the tribes could only understand their traditional loyalties and obligations.

Some of these colonies, especially the inland African ones are as primitive as prehistory: yesterday their people were cannibals.

No Englishman need be anything but proud of British interests and governmental action regarding these, especially during the last forty years: cruel internecine wars have been abolished; health, welfare, diet, improved hospitals, traveling doctors and nurses, rural dispensaries, agricultural methods have been introduced; local handicrafts, improved in technology; processing plants and methods have been established to utilize vegetable fats and bean-bearing trees, hides and skins; and transportation has been commenced and improved. Cattle disease has been put down; deadly insects, combated; forestry, fertilization, measures to counter soil erosion, taught and applied. The natives have been drawn into local administration as policy advisers and makers, and as officials and managers. The ideal of trusteeship has been elevated and devotedly observed by thousands upon thousands of silent official workers, subsidized by the mother country, and directed and supervised by her for the benefit of the native peoples.

The colonies, dependencies, and protectorates operated under the rule of the "open door" to the trade of all other nations down to the Great Depression: neither imports nor exports were obstructed for preference to the mother country. Where the areas set up tariffs for their own protection that protection hurt the mother country equally with other nations. Nor did the mother country tax these areas, or tolerate slavery or "forced labor." Great Britain obtained advantages from being the colonial power.⁶ But in an age of nationalism, with high tariffs set by other nations, the growth of the British industrial and military power is not especially indecorous. So far as oppression is concerned, the British system is almost other-worldly as compared with the empire of the Tsars. Nor would it be unfair to observe that after 1820 slavery ceased in British territory. Nor did white man's slavery prevail, as in Tsarist Russia until 1861, and perhaps beyond the Emancipation to the Soviet revolution—some would say beyond that still. Nor did colored slavery prevail as in the United States until 1865, nor persist in the milder form of "depressed classes" as even now.

Yet even so the British conscience is smitten. Everywhere Britain retreats; partly because empires across the seas are conspicuous compared with those of overland acquisition.

⁶ Cf. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Colonial Problem* (1941).

IMPERIAL LIQUIDATION

Imperialism ought to be defined as the domination of other peoples: as rule over them against their will, and without their participation in their own government and self-determination of policy, in order to master their destiny as they want it, freely. It is grievous and is impermissible on democratic principles. The only possible plea in mitigation of the guilt it carries with it, is genuine solicitude for the education and welfare of the people and their preparation for self-government. *If* such extenuating services can compensate for unauthorized rulership, then the British deserve the world's applause for the spirit and policy of their trusteeship for colonial peoples. The world will long remember, when it shall have fully learned, the grandeur of its unifying, assuaging gift to India, now brought to self-government. The British originated the maxim: "Good government is no substitute for self-government."

Yet, whoever may preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, that liquidation eventually cannot but come. In the main a fortuitous and unplanned growth, it has entered an era when the total end-effect is inconsistent with the principles of legitimacy of our time.

The crucial question is, Liquidated at what pace? Even a Labor government—sincere with the sincerity of men of some Christian piety, like the founders of their movement, lay preachers in the chapels, or humanist-rationalists—cannot make the British Isles budge from where Nature placed them, in the Atlantic. As soon as a British Government can budge them, preferably to the coast of the United States (off Massachusetts, to convince the Irish in America that the British of today were born innocent of responsibility for Cromwell, De Valera, or Lloyd George), British policy may abruptly change. Till that time, the retreat from empire cannot but be consciously gradual. It could be hastened by the assurance, if permanent and dependable, of succor from other countries, and the cessation of international enmities.

Until then, faced otherwise with national suicide, Britain will keep tenacious authority over the footholds she still has by treaty, or dominion, or influence, though with ever greater liberality of rule.

The essential point is that Britain does not need the sea lanes to get into her colonies or India, but to get *out* of Britain. Wherever there is the prospect of industry and trade, to sell and buy so that she may manufacture and live, she needs safe approaches and access. It used to be argued that Britain needed the Mediterranean to get to India, her colony: it is now sometimes suggested that such access is less necessary since India's independence. This is a complete misunderstanding of the British situation. The Mediterranean is needed to reach many places in the world where trade and raw materials are available, because the resources do not exist in Britain herself. She needs the seas as much as do Holland, Belgium, Scandinavia, and the rest of the world which is heavily dependent on manufactures, trade, and imports. Those nations needed to do less about the protective arrangements for themselves than Britain, because the latter in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, industrialized and richer at an earlier stage, assumed the responsibility, bore the brunt, and yet was generous to them, peaceable toward their commerce, and had no hostile or dominating tendencies.

The Mediterranean is to the British Isles as the Trans-Siberian Railway is to the Soviet Union. That railway, connecting Great Russia and the Urals with the Russian conquests and colonies of Eastern Siberia and Manchuria, the Soviet rulers regard as under their complete and unchallengeable sovereignty. The Panama Canal and the United States internal railway and road system are analogous.

No British cabinet—whatever its principles or name—that neglected this need of life could survive a single day the uprising, not of the capitalists, but the masses of British working men and women.⁷ For the nation belongs to them and the middle class, who have the overwhelming weight of political power.

Sheer British obstinacy in wishing to remain alive is a nuisance

⁷ Cf. The answer of Mr. Bevin to his critics, May 29, 1947, at the Annual Conference of the British Labor party:

"Reference was made by one speaker in connection with the Middle East to the fact that we ought to hand this over to an international concern. I am not going to be a party to voluntarily putting all British interests in a pool and everybody else sticking to his own. The standard of life and the wages of the workmen of this country are dependent upon these things, as indeed they are upon other things. Why should Great Britain be the only country to hand over? Many of these other countries have great resources internally.

to many Americans. It is hard to forget the annoyance of some Americans during the spring of 1941 with continued British resistance to Hitler. If only the British would stop fighting, the burden would fall from the American conscience! William B. Ziff (if I am not mistaken, of the race of Prime Minister Disraeli and Lord Chief Justice and Viceroy Reading) also has a simple solution: that the British go back to Great Britain!⁸ A young American, having heard a frank account of British problems, asked me in all seriousness whether the world would not be at peace if the British moved out of Great Britain. I asked him, "Could all be admitted to the United States?" He counter-suggested the Dominions; for example, Canada. He was nonplused to learn, for the first time, that the Dominions had their own restrictive immigration laws, and that Canada in particular could never be of any substantial relief because the *French Canadians* would probably revolt against the entrance of Englishmen, Scotchmen, and Welshmen who would help outweigh them in numbers, and so in political control.

Yet if such a depopulation occurred through quick reduction of the standard of living or migration, or through birth-restriction to the twenty million deemed by Dean Inge a desirable number for a splendid civilization, what then? An unpopulated Britain would always make a valuable dependency of some European power. It would not be left derelict. This would be one of the bases reaching out into the Atlantic. With its coal and iron it would still be desirable. It would, of course, include Ireland; but hardly an Ireland with the free and Catholic polity of Mr. De Valera, and preserved in its freedom by Britain's most noble forbearance at the time of her utmost need.

Could the United States tolerate such a change? Hardly, after the experience of Hitler's strategy of securing the approaches to his enemy: hardly, after the successful invasion of France. Britain is a gateway to Europe, and a bridge from it; a spacious ware-

Is everything to be put into an international concern or is it this one place because part of it belongs to Great Britain? I am not ready to do that. Another thing that I must emphasize is that the Dominions would not for one moment agree to it. India is dependent upon this oil as much as we are, and as India is going in for greater industrialisation, it will become more and more vital that these resources should be maintained."

⁸ W. B. Ziff, *Two Worlds* (New York, 1946).

house for atomic bombs; a platform for rocket installations; a capacious harbor of modern submarines.

No wise foreign policy will require an immediate major operation to reverse a four-hundred-year-old evolution at one stroke. Regard must always be had for present and future utility and ideals. It seems as though the old country will have to be maintained. Its splendid man power and brain power could not be despised were total war once again to afflict the earth.

The problem of British imperialism resolves itself then into two: the dismantling of existent alien rule in colonial territories; and the rate of dismantling.

The first question is substantially answered by two measures, the provisions of the United Nations Charter regarding the "non-self-governing territories," in the initiation and drafting of which Britain and Australia took the lead. These affirm:

Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government⁹ recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories.

To this end, the member-states pledge themselves

to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses; to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement; to further international peace and security; to promote constructive measures of development.

In a further Article it is agreed that the policy of the member-states in regard to such areas must be

⁹ Including the United States, for Puerto Rico.

based on the principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.

It is open to the General Assembly (in which Great Britain counts only for *one* among some seventy independent member-states, but the Soviet Union providentially for three), to debate and make recommendations on the fulfillment of these pledges.

The record shows that the core of the principles laid down in the Charter was applied in the British Colonies, not with total and unexceptionable completeness but to a gratifying degree in a world of peoples whose own actions are too often inferior to their qualms of conscience, and whose declarations of idealism frequently demand not their own but other peoples' philanthropic self-sacrifice. Some, perhaps most, of the phrases of "trusteeship" and "mandate" were coined in Great Britain by that large group of persons who have always existed as sturdy and effective champions of acts of humanity and charity.¹⁰

Similar principles are applicable to territories held in trust, formerly called "mandates."

This then is one of the answers to the charge and the problem of "imperialism." It implies, though it does not directly state, the principle of the "open door," a principle long ago applied with a high degree of fidelity, in a world of harsh alien tariff systems, in the British Colonies. Where any firm may come in, and trade, and invest on equal terms with any others, the resultant competition for the labor and goods of the native people is itself an automatic check on oppression. If rubber, cocoa, tin, palm oil, sugar, bananas, tea, coffee, cotton, were dear or cheap for others they were the same also for the British manufacturer and consumer. Short of slavery, the "open door" is a safeguard of the work and resources of the non-self-governing areas; and in British territory there was no slavery, for Britain led the world in its abolition.¹¹

¹⁰ See the Royal Institute of International Affairs study, *The Colonial Problem* (London, 1937), and International Labor Office, 1944, *Social Policy for Dependent Peoples*.

¹¹ Cf. H. U. Kantorowicz, *The Spirit of British Policy* (London, 1931).

WHEREVER POWER IS UNPOSSESSED, THERE IS A CLAIMANT

The second part of the problem of British imperialism is the speed of its dismantling. The answer is to be found only by reference to the political designs of other powers. The identity of those who have an interest in dismantling Britain is an index to its proper tactic.

If Britain this day abandoned her positions everywhere, practically the whole world would be open to Russian expansion or American influence. The wide area of the world and its strategic points would lie, inviting or threatening, before them. The spirit of British self-preservation, which happens to be incarnate in her democracy, regarded as hostile by the Soviet rulers, would be in imminent danger of complete extinction. She resisted Hitler unbowed if very bloody, while the Kremlin befriended Hitler and the United States was at peace. The rupture of Britain's contacts with the rest of the world involves the downfall of the mother country herself. This disaster might be followed by the seizure of her possessions abroad; the homeland would follow. A sound Soviet case could be made for sending Germany west to Britain, even as she has sent Poland west to Germany, and even as the Western powers were at one time prepared to condone Hitler's advance east to Russia.

The effacement of Britain, even its beginning, or even its threat, could bring no particular happiness to the democratic countries of Northwestern Europe. Britain was their bulwark: with Britain weak or in the hands of a foreign power hostile to their independence, their social system, the exercise of their faith, they would be encircled, and severed from the United States. Rather the same holds good of the British position in various "spheres of influence," so called: Iran and her oil, and her bridge-like position from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

Britain has for centuries supported the independence of coastal countries. A friendly power, in the long run, is one that enjoys political independence, unoppressed by her sponsors. Thus, the interests of Britain have coincided with the desire for national independence. She could not proclaim such a policy for the seaboard, without being committed to the principle for non-coastal peoples also. Words are sometimes bonds, even though not fully

so understood or intended when first expressed. This is particularly true of the policies of systems of government founded upon the right of voluntary association and free opposition.

Lands rooted in the heart of a continent are disposed to be less kind to the independence of the coastal areas. Such peoples have a very strong interest in expanding to sea outlets, and therefore in controlling the coastal lands that lead to them. North, south, east, and west pressed Russia; and in the degree of her strength no area was allowed to stand independent in her path. Thus she confronts Britain and the coastal nations who have an interest in being free. The Black Sea, the Danube, the Baltic, the Arctic by Finland, the icy waters that wash the northern shores of Sweden and Norway, the Gulf of Finland, the Kuriles, the Bering Sea, the waters off Manchuria and Japan, at one time even Alaska—she has sought and seeks to possess or dominate them. For at any point confidence in egress is valuable; at any point an enemy might penetrate. So also with the Dardanelles. The control of the Straits, recently demanded in the strongest terms, is useful for defense of the Black Sea lands but not so useful as general exit, unless openings south, into the Mediterranean and west of the Dardanelles, are obtained also. Hence, Soviet agitation for a place in the government of Cyrenaica; hence agitation by Bulgaria for a port on Greek territory (Dedeagatch in Thrace); hence an interest in satellites in Yugoslavia and Albania¹² which dominate Greece and the Adriatic. Hence an interest in part of the Mediterranean as far as Italy. Nor can Spain be left out of account with the exit it could give to all the seas if Britain were dislodged from the Straits of Gibraltar. None of these places could assure the Soviet rulers of the outlets they need unless the hinterlands are controlled. For the U.S.S.R. bears down as a power from a vast hinterland behind them, while Britain, small as she is, comes ever as a suppliant from the sea.

In supporting the Ukrainian delegate's statement, in 1946, that the presence of British troops in Greece should be considered as a threat to the peace of the world, Mr. Gromyko for the Soviet

¹² Let it be noted that Great Britain appealed to the United Nations for redress of her grievance against Albania—loss of warships and lives by mines in the international seaway off Albania. The U.S.S.R. supported by Poland (Feb. 24, 1947) contemptuously objected to the subject even going to a committee for consideration. They know how to squeeze!

Union (which had carefully disassociated itself, of course, from collaborating with the "independent" Ukrainian Mr. Manuilsky in raising the question) demanded to know "when it was necessary to have foreign armies in the country of a United Nations member during a vote." It may be suggested that Mr. Gromyko knew the necessity well enough: that British troops must be there as long as a Northern power with a hostile mentality and political system drives to the sea at a point which would cut the naval artery of the forty-five million people who live in Great Britain, and the many friendly lands which depend on her to support their freedom and political independence. Those lands, like Greece, are internally assailed by minority movements, supported by the Soviet rulers, with a doctrine that minority dictatorial rule is justifiable. That is the clash. Mr. Gromyko's chief even suggested on February 9, 1946, that the clash is predestined.

If Britain might be induced to commit national suicide in a love-pact of the powers, she can hardly be expected to die by her own hand for the gratification of those who still contrive to live on the fat of the land. Time for adjustment is necessary in the interests of her population who are to this extent innocent, that they had no part in the piecemeal development of four hundred years. Had they had a choice they might well have left the British Isles with the Pilgrim Fathers, bag and baggage, for the same rich destination. Time is necessary. It may even be in the interest of European nations that the imperial dismantling shall not go far while there is a peculiar regime in Russia.

If there is no substantial dismantling, then there must be all mitigation. That is developing fast and has made remarkable progress, as the reader may prove for himself in the published reports. It is the way of trusteeship; eventual self-government; eventual treaty arrangements providing for defense possibilities and the "open door"; and protection for investments which are the *bona fide* result of generations of hard work of the British masses, no matter who made the actual investment. To the extent that investment was fair, and made without duress, it ought to receive protection.

Clearly, those who admire the smart and easy cliché that the United States must avoid "endorsing British imperialism," or being "trailed along at the end of the British kite," and must pursue an "independent American" policy, have not reflected suf-

ficiently on America's own independent and selfish interest in the maintenance of this amazing attenuation of an empire, which they miscall with indignant gusto and low-down scowl, "British Imperialism." They should picture the world not merely without these world-wide bases, but *without Britain*—for that is the issue. National fears in relation to other national fears form an inseparable network of mutual influence. The idea of an "independent, separate" foreign policy is quite impossible. This is clear in Greece, Iran, and India.

During the Iranian crisis before the Security Council, in the spring of 1946, it was reported by Michael Foot that a Persian cabinet minister admitted Iran's weakness as the lack of navy, air force, army, and money. But the minister claimed to have a secret weapon: "*We are the best double-crossers in the world.*" It is the only weapon such a country could employ, situated between Russia in the north and Great Britain and the United States in the center and south. Doubts were openly expressed at the Security Council, to which the Iranian Government had applied for aid in securing the exit of Soviet troops from Iran, whether the Iranian spokesman and his government had been truthful in their appeals. The Soviet seemed ready to occupy any vacuum left in power arrangements.

In India, Pandit Nehru, who found rebellion against British justice far easier than rendering justice to seventy million Mohammedans, proclaimed Hindu predominance and the non-partition of India on the principle that the defense of India cannot be jeopardized by such communal divisions. Mr. Nehru's closest potential enemy is Russia, coming through Afghanistan. But, having presided at the freeing of India, it is to Mr. Nehru's interest to keep India free to carry on an all-India policy. He once explained to the Mohammedan minority (equal to half the population of the United States, and half again as large as the population of Great Britain), with interests and spiritual values differing enormously from the Hindu, that if they take "direct action," then either "direct action" wins by force, or the government wins by the same means. No withdrawal measures there! But that is not all. The inseparability of the entangled threads of the nations becomes noteworthy in remarks made by the disappointed and disaffected leader of the Moslem League, Mr. Jinnah. The Moslem population of the Middle East is involved, for Britain *and the*

United States. Mr. Jinnah said—and his words could have been prophesied:

The Russians have more than a spectators' interest in Indian affairs, and they are not very far from India either. It's a serious menace, and if Britain pursues its present policy of completely eliminating the Moslems not only from India, but from the entire Middle East, Britain is in my opinion pursuing a very serious and dangerous policy.¹³

By "eliminating the Moslems," Mr. Jinnah referred chiefly to the British Government's declaration that it could not allow a minority to frustrate a constitutional settlement for a free India.

This incidentally should dispose of the conscience-easing, intellect-saving insinuation that the British practically gave birth to Mohammed in order to face the Hindus with ferocious religious opposition and strife: thus the British could keep the two communities apart and, by dividing India, rule it. India is more divided with the British out than it ever was with the British in. The government of passionate communities cannot be conducted entirely by non-violence, except when non-violence is exerted against the British, who have a saving conscience.¹⁴ The Hindus, who were encouraged by Mr. Nehru to vilify the British, now are themselves vilified by him as "more bestial" than human beings could be. This was said when he observed what atrocities they committed on the Mohammedans in Bihar.

As for Palestine, Britain's strategic situation in the Middle East was favored by its occupation. In return she stood between the mutually murderous Arabs and Jews, ensuring the Jewish population's sixfold increase in twenty years (1922–1942) from 84,000 to nearly 500,000, while the Arabs failed to double their original population of 589,000. The British Government, and only the British Government, held a protective hand over the Jews. Some Arab massacres occurred: there would have been many more. British soldiers alone—"mercenaries," paid men, as some confused-with-suffering Zionist has called them—held the ring while the Jewish population multiplied, bought land, and

¹³ United Press interview, printed in *New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1946.

¹⁴ Once again, as in the establishment of a constitutional *modus vivendi* in Canada in 1867, the benevolent genius of the British has brought blessings to India in the scheme of June, 1947.

throve on hard labor and skill, with the support of funds mainly from the United States and Great Britain. It is characteristic of minds inflamed with nationalism to forget services rendered, and reward them with hatred. It should not be forgotten, however: *British soldiers alone defended the Jews. Nobody else supplied physical help, except a few orange-eating tourists.*

How intractable the Jewish-Arab embroilment is, is shown by the Report of the Anglo-American Palestine Committee: both sides have "right" on their side to something in Palestine. Arthur Koestler, a friend of the human race, recently¹⁵ observed how intractable was the problem, if both sides were considered.

The Palestinian problem is simple for anyone who takes justice to be either that of one disputant or the other, Zionist or Arab. Or, as in the case of the United States Government, which is on occasion sufficiently detached in interest to expect the reign of ideals without sacrifices, is not ready to match GI's for Justice with British Tommies for Justice; or, ignores that the British interest in access to a Middle East plane-oil-and-navy base is not its own interest only, but the American people's also. Both sides, therefore, have some responsibility for future trouble. American sympathizers and Zionists have been cold to proposals to open American havens; neither is ready to venture United States troops.

Zionism never can solve the "Jewish" problem, which is the almost universal hatred of the Jews: but it can exacerbate it, and tend to alienate the Jew's most decent friend among the nations, Great Britain. It is a nationalistic slander, designed to cover error and impotence, that Britain prevents Jewish and Arab amity. Their nationalisms are both genuine, and their objectives are opposed of themselves. Britain cannot give away what belongs to the Arabs without their consent.

The Soviet rulers can afford to regard the Palestinian embroilment with the greatest calm. They would not lift a hand for the Jews, for many reasons, while the Arabs, whatever finally happens, will be only lukewarm friends of the British, having failed to obtain the full sovereignty of the Arabian Peninsula that was promised in 1915. And the Arabs have no need to show gratitude to the British, whose joint military operations with them and contributions in arms in the War in the Desert enabled

¹⁵ *New York Times Magazine*, September, 1946.

them to shake off their centuries-long subjection to the Turkish Empire. Whoever wins in Palestine, the Soviet rulers must think, the British will not; nor therefore will the United States. Nothing can be of more exquisite political interest than the handling of the problem by the United Nations to whom the British Government submitted the problem in May, 1947. The Soviet Government then suddenly showed solicitude for the Jews, and as much for Palestinian independence.

GERMANY

We may turn to the relations of Britain with the Continent of Europe. Britain's security and her survival require that no single power in Europe alone, or in assured alliance with others, shall occupy the Lowlands, and encircle her as Hitler in our own time, almost succeeded in doing, the sea lanes and the various approaches to her major ports. On the more vulnerable side, from London along the Thames Estuary to the North Sea (alias the "German Ocean") and in wide margins north and south of the Estuary, England descends and flattens out opposite the Netherlands. No barriers of hills and mountains are presented, but an easy, open road. For centuries the British have been pervaded with anxieties to avert the amalgamation of Europe under one state. It ought not be believed that Britain is responsible, through continual cunning infiltrations of secret agents, for the growth of European nationalisms. They arose and flourished and fought for themselves. Some, indeed, were so intensely proud that they even attempted to conquer Britain: the Dutch, the Spanish, the French, the Nazis. The last two pincer attacks before Hitler's occurred in 1692 and 1715: a simultaneous attempt at invasion from France by way of Ireland and sea battle for the control of the Channel, to restore the Catholic James II. Both were defeated. From the Battle of La Hague in 1692 to 1942 the British Navy ruled the seas, and none could touch it, not even Napoleon. In 1942, during World War II, the United States by her marvelous feats of building and training overtook Britain. She can keep the lead as long as she wishes, without evoking from Britain anything but a mild professional nostalgia, if that.

Britain's continental problem from the 1890's was Germany; it became serious about 1900, when Germany began to build a

navy, making diplomatic threats and openly avowing evil intentions toward Britain.¹⁰ Germany priced too high the alliance or treaty of friendship for which Britain for some years actually beseeched her diplomats. Among other things, the German Government wanted the alliance directed against France, and asked British backing for Germany's possession of Alsace-Lorraine. It expected British neutrality if it should fight France or Russia. But this would have been to agree to German mastery in Europe. Britain appealed for a naval holiday: she disliked being beggared by naval competition. Germany refused—taking the request as a sign of weakness. The Germans were a rising nation: they wished protection of their trade against alleged British jealousy; but they also looked for world rule, for colonies. For years the Pan-Germans and the Navy League had been inflaming German middle class—among them a youth named Hitler. To Germany, a fleet meant expansion and force. Even without it, she was the greatest military power on the Continent, and could not have been invaded. But, to Britain, loss of the fleet spelt starvation. The German Government was unyielding. The consequence was the alignment of Britain, France, and Russia on one side, and Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy on the other in the years before World War I.

Britain's problem is still Germany. Here is a block of nearly seventy million people of sturdy physique, industrious, prolific, inventive, industrialized, and habituated to military authority and war but, in liberties, accustomed only to those *granted* to them, not at all to those captured. If they have revolutionary fervor, it has exercised itself in the suppression of the liberties of other nations, not in the conquest of liberty for themselves at home. Their own national unity was welded together, as Bismarck said that it must be, "not by speeches and resolutions . . . but by blood and iron." Never, from the late Middle Ages, had the firm power of some state ceased to rule them, whether it was a single Germanic state among the scores that existed until Napoleon's invasion or, finally, the German Reich of 1871. For at first the state was regarded as the prince's estate, a property. He and his military establishment sternly governed the economy of the people: he managed large sections of commerce and industry, since the richer the land, the better off the army and the political strength

¹⁰ E. L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (London, 1935).

of the state as compared with those of neighboring states. The authoritarian philosophy flourished as never elsewhere; a systematic myth of nationalism burst forth in unparalleled fervor; the doctrine of organization developed more brilliantly and harshly. Coming into existence with the Slavs on the east, the French on the west, the Austrians on the southeast, Prussia had to be hard and efficient, not liberal. It produced three supreme militarist blackguards in three centuries: in the eighteenth, Frederick the Great, a wretched versifier; in the nineteenth, Bismarck, a wretched pietist; and in the twentieth, Hitler, a wretched painter. By 1689 the British had secured Parliament's triumph, through sixty years of unceasing and sometimes very deadly conflict; by 1689 the Prussian State exhibited its supreme attainments: autocracy, a standing army, and expert, trained public administration. No elected parliament existed anywhere in Germany until 1852 in Prussia, and 1867 in Germany. Neither of these had full political responsible authority: authority was in the hands of the King or Kaiser or his ministers.

The eighteenth century saw the victory of an autocracy that was never seriously challenged until 1919, and then not challenged decisively. As the historian Ernst von Meier put it: "Prussia is an army with a land, not a land with an army." Frederick the Great himself said, the agreement between him and his people was that they could say what they liked, so long as he could do as he liked! Even the civil service was militarized by various devices. Authority and pride in partnership, and the absence of real parliamentary power or opposition, made Prussia and then Germany formidable foes, as Austria first and France later found to their cost.

The German spiritual disease consists in never, by executing a king like the British and the French, or expelling one like the Americans, having shown the resolution to govern themselves. No one has been able to determine exactly the historic reasons of this civic docility, but the world has suffered bitterly for it in two world wars. The Germans have never recovered from the arrogance of unmerited victories, that began with the rape of Silesia in the Seven Years' War. They form a compact, obedient, inventive, organizable people. That is the British problem and, as finally shown in World War II, especially the problem of Europe, including the Soviet Union in spite of the fact that her rulers tried

to escape their responsibilities and ruin by propitiation of Hitler. For Britain the solution can only be either the disappearance of Germany or her disciplined behavior. To talk of friendship in this generation is not possible in any genuine sense. Destruction cannot be desired by Britain, first of all because her humanity will not entertain the idea that *all* Germans are guilty of the sins their government committed, or that all are beyond redemption. This is conspicuously a tenet of the Labor and Liberal parties, and many Conservatives support it. The British Parliament was the first to insist, with deep and spontaneous feeling, that the German people should not lack a subsistence ration in the fall and winter of 1945-1946, and it required that the Government should provide for this out of short British stocks.¹⁷ This was not a bit of the rare old British "perfidy" directed against the Soviet Union: it was an outburst of simple and praiseworthy humanity.

Nor would the British wish to see the ruination of Germany, for Germany is an exceedingly important economic producer, and British, European, and world trade are knit together in a tight reciprocal network. Germany's prosperity is essential to European and British prosperity.¹⁸ The labor of forty million skilled and semi-skilled German workers in a heavily industrialized economy with highly advanced technology, in many instances surpassing Britain and the United States, is not a bagatelle the world may prodigally throw away, least of all Britain, which lives by manufactures and commerce. In 1929 (before Nazi distortions began, and before the Great Depression took full effect) Germany was Britain's third best supplier and second best customer. The capture of Germany's markets could not compensate Britain for the loss of skilled German man power.

Nor is it thought advisable to pulverize the Federation which arose out of a powerful unifying emotion—strong enough, alas, to enfeeble the liberal parties in Germany. Perhaps more good nature will be born of unity, in the long run, than of an unredeemed aspiration nurtured in the bitterness of enforced disintegration.

Finally the conundrum remains, of filling the vacuum of a Germany reduced to rubble. Such problems have faced Britain

¹⁷ See Parliamentary Debates, Nov., 1945.

¹⁸ Cf. League of Nations, *Europe's Trade* (Geneva), 1941.

in the past: for when France was supported against Spain, France became the menace; when Prussia was assisted in her ambitions to oust France in 1713, Prussia entered upon her role in the European balance; and when supported in 1756 waxed supremely. The displacement of Germany must surely be followed by the relative and absolute strengthening of the Soviet Union.

Britain has sought since 1905, when her genuine proffers of friendly alliance were rejected and mocked, and she still seeks to overcome the German menace by fair dealing, and by instituting, as a standing threat, what Bismarck called his worst nightmare, "the nightmare of coalitions" against Germany. That is to say, a threat of a two-front war, from east and west. This, also, was Hitler's doctrine to the German people. Unmindful of the fate he predicted, and in wildest hubris, he brought his fate upon himself: he could not avoid the thing he prophesied he should avoid.

The twenty-year British alliance with the Soviet Union, and the desired fifty-year alliance,¹⁹ embodied the conviction that this for Britain (and for Russia) would abate the menace of a Germany which, united and containing that mass of human beings, must always be an object of apprehension. For the powers west of Germany, whichever side of the Atlantic they were on, the problem of Germany would be simple if the Soviet Union did not exist. For the Soviet Union the problem of Germany would be simple if only the Western powers did not exist. But since both Western powers and Russia do exist, they are inexorably doomed to attempt to win and use German man power, science, and territory, if both continue to exist, at least in their present respective strengths. Both sides have to promise the Germans the reward they would most like, in return for German good will in a possible war: their continued unity.

The Soviet Union has tried to win Germany before today—whether under the Weimar Republic, under the Nazis, or through the Free Germany Organization of officers formed in Moscow after Stalingrad. Other Soviet roads to security are the piecemeal destruction of industrial potential, dispersion of the Junkers and division of their estates, and the fostering of the Communist party (under various names) in the zone of Soviet occupation. The extension of Poland westward means that Poland will one

¹⁹ See further, below, p. 216, fn. 30.

day have to make dire payment, and her fear of vengeance will force her to rely on the friendship of the Soviet. Perhaps this is a calculated Soviet policy. The handling of the Russian occupation zone, severed from the rest of Germany and made subservient to the Russian economy despite the clear terms of the Potsdam Agreement, and the peremptory declaration of a *fait accompli* in the matter of the Polish-German border—in order to erect something akin to a satellite state—are further Soviet insurance. It is a policy sustainable alone because Russia has landward connections with Germany, not only along this route, but through Czechoslovakia, now also reduced to a half-willing satellite state.

The policy that would be right for Britain would also be right for the United States, if peace is to be achieved and sustained. Stimulated by Mr. Molotov's bid for German favor and offer of unity after the United States Government had denounced the Soviet policy of economic separatism, Mr. Byrnes at Stuttgart announced unity and amity for Germany save the Saar, which was to go to France. This could include, first, a federalism with the degree of unity provided in the Weimar Constitution prior to the unitary changes made by Hitler. It would be a basis for democracy in the several states, and would not injure the economic capacity of Germany. If the economy of Germany is to be maintained, her political system must necessarily be unitary—they go together—but need not be highly centralized.

Secondly, Germany would have to be occupied for a very long period to avert any relapse into a dictatorial regime. (Mr. Byrnes proposed forty years to the U.S.S.R.) No political party or political action which imminently conduced to a dictatorial system could be tolerated. The control and the occupation need not be conspicuous, and should not be obtrusive; but it should be known.

Thirdly, unity and occupation would give the Germans time to learn democratic ways (I am no believer in reliance on "re-educating" the German people by either native or foreign teachers). Let there be the maximum amount of propaganda for democracy; but a people's own experience will teach it more. The Germans should be contained in a framework which is not oppressive and would never need to be, while they arrive at their own conclusions and build the habits of parliamentary government. Why a democratic form of government, rather than any other, is necessary in

the interests of peace—its power to control capricious government—is argued later.²⁰ The theory of nonintervention in the form and spirit of government of a people ought to be dead as a door-nail; it has never vigorously lived everywhere; the Soviet rulers support this principle.

Fourthly, a permanent and pervading control of industry to prevent the production of arms is essential. In a war with Russia the Western powers would have to rely on their own arms, not upon any the Germans could make. The occupying powers would have considered the strategic and tactical location of any air bases needed for the disciplining of Germany herself, or for repelling any attempt to use Germany against them.

Fifthly, the powers must always regard Germany as a contingent menace and so be vigilant, provide armaments, and pursue a policy of summary action for the risks which can be foreseen. They can operate under the provisions of the Security Council's duties, and of Article 51 of the Chapter regarding self-defense, in making their plans and calculating the quotas needed. It would do no harm if Soviet representatives secured detailed knowledge of these plans.

Sixthly, German industry with a clearly military potential should be socialized, including physical, chemical, and bacteriological research. On the administrative councils for the management of these would be the Allied (including Soviet) representatives. The Saar and the Ruhr ought not to become the property of any single country. They are productive instruments of Europe and the world. As such they should be placed under international control, including the U.S.S.R. in the management council.

Seventhly, it is necessary to win the battle against German vanity and self-pity. Many thousands of Germans, perhaps millions, personally committed bestial crimes against humanity with their own hands, or knew of them without protesting, or aided and abetted lies, slander, pillage, torture and murder of innocent and unarmed men, women, and children. There is no denying that these crimes were done in the name of their nationalism and by the order of men for whom nearly one-half the voters had cast their votes in the fairly free election of March, 1933. Without any intention of saddling crimes on those who were innocent, a

²⁰ Cf. below, p. 327 ff.

great collective guilt still stains German civilization. The Allied controls have been, and continue to be, almost entirely derelict in their duty to bring these crimes home to the German people so that they may never forget the shameful dimensions of their national guilt. No day should pass without a penetrating reminder of the degradation exhibited by so many of the German people, unrestrained by the rest. The books of German lies, of German murders, of German infanticide, of German tortures, of German imperial boasts, should be circulated by the million, always in quantities sufficient to preclude their destruction by German readers. The placards on the streets should picture their deeds, and the press and the radio should not let any eyes, on any single day, lose sight of their unholy sadism. The reminders should be linked to present German suffering and to the promises of booty, glory, and good living promised them by Hitler. If this is not done the Germans will seriously regard themselves as the injured party. Guilt may sink in during a time of tribulation. The less the Germans are abashed by conviction of their guilt, the more will prolonged coercion be needed to keep them internationally law-abiding.

The German problem is a Russian problem, in fact, *the* Russian problem. For if Germany is strong, Russia cannot avoid being tempted to dominate her, or use her as she did from 1920 (Rapallo) to the Hitler-Stalin pact. Germany can be weakened as an international menace by the measures suggested. They should be executed even if the Soviet rulers are displeased, for such a Germany will be no menace to them, while the measures are just for the Western powers not less than for Germany herself. If the Soviet rulers obstruct these, they ought to be resisted. For the situation presents a dilemma with two very sharp horns: both have to be grasped, the Russian horn no less than the German, in the end, for the sake of both and their close and distant neighbors. For the Russian and German states have been totalitarian over long periods of history owing to their proximity to each other. If both were strong and united, they might rule the whole world. If both were in various ways weakened as warlike forces, but especially if either were much weakened, the whole world could breathe easier, without injustice to the claims of Russia or Germany to peace, security, and welfare.

This is Britain's heavy and persistent preoccupation; but mani-

festly it is no less that of the United States. United States diplomacy and the American people have recognized this more and more with experience of German occupation and Soviet behavior in Germany. Consequently, several most important steps in policy have been made. A bare outline of them reveals the tension between the Soviet rulers and the Western powers.

1. The Potsdam Declaration provided for a common allied government of Germany, common political and economic principles of administration pending the final settlement. Though administration was to be directed toward "the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility," a single government of Germany was provided for in the establishment of the Allied Control Council and specific provision for unified administration in basic economic functions.

2. The government of Germany rapidly deteriorated into four separate, almost watertight, zones, American, British, French, and Russian, disturbing the balance of industrial and food exchanges between the several parts, especially the food-producing east, which was under Russian control. In Berlin the Allied Council became the center of disagreement, disappointment, and frustration.

3. To make some progress, the United States Government proposed (April 29, 1946) a 25-year pact of the four powers to guarantee the disarmament and the military impotence of Germany. Britain and France agreed in principle. The Soviet Government offered objections, among them that they were more concerned with present disarmament, and that such a pact might be an instrument for an evasion of the understandings embodied in the Potsdam Declaration.

4. The administration of Germany went from bad to worse, imposing a heavy financial burden on the American and British taxpayers since the rehabilitation of German industry and agriculture, even on the very low level which the British had been able to get their Allies to agree to, required the import of food and raw materials at the expense of the industrial areas which were under Western Allied control. Therefore, Secretary of State Byrnes declared during the Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers of June 15 to July 12, 1946, the necessity of establishing central administrative arrangements to administer Germany as an economic unit. The British agreed. The French agreed, the price being the award to France of the Saar. The Soviet Government did not respond, but continued to squeeze out of their zone all

the industrial plants, currently produced goods, and agricultural produce possible.

5. On July 10, 1946, Mr. Molotov trumped Mr. Byrnes's unity card, by inveighing against the policy of "agrarianization" of Germany (The Morgenthau policy), and supporting the "unity" of Germany by a fierce denunciation of dismemberment, federalization, and the creation of autonomous states—all a caricature of discussion in the western countries. In spite of the fact that a Germany with fairly weak internal structure is a guarantee for the security of Poland and Russia, the Soviet rulers had evidently concluded that a strong unitary Germany suited them: it is ironic to notice that they were refusing to accord to Germany what they claimed they had given to their own "republic" within the framework of the Union Constitution of Socialist Russia. But a highly united Germany does leave her government open to total seizure by a totalitarian political party; a "federal" Germany makes possible the alignment of western and eastern Germanic states as allies of western and eastern foes. But the Soviet may get part in a control of the Ruhr by a unitary government.

6. Hence, on September 6, 1946, Mr. Byrnes took the striking counterstep of speaking directly to the German political leaders of the vicinity, and declaring that American policy required the obliteration of zonal barriers and unified economic administration. He adverted to a previous invitation of the American Government to unify the economy of its own zone with that of *any* other prepared to come in. To this the British assented, and merger arrangements were prepared. But the Soviet authorities declared that this was a step toward the division of Germany, implying hostility toward the Soviet Union. This the United States Government denied. Since the problem of demilitarizing Germany must be pursued the more seriously as it was now acknowledged that for the sake of the European and world economy German production must be restored, the United States was now ready to make a treaty with the major powers for as long as forty years. But so long as the need existed for the occupation of Germany, "We" (the American forces), said Mr. Byrnes, "are not withdrawing. We are staying here." On October 22, 1946, Mr. Bevin in the Commons broadly endorsed the Stuttgart policy.

7. Soviet German policy, and the administration of the Russian zone, as well as the political maneuvers designed to secure the supremacy of German Communist leaders, continued to cause much international mischief, friction and western chagrin.

8. Secretary of State Marshall attempted to settle the German issue at the Moscow Conference of March–April, 1947. The re-

sult was complete failure. Some of the particulars may be noted. Opposed to too great strength of the central government, lest a coup like Hitler's in 1933 be repeated, a decentralized political system, after the American constitution was suggested. The Soviet refused this, claiming, in propaganda fashion, that this intended *dismemberment*. Economic unity was rejected by the Soviet Union: the merger of the American and British zones was bruited to the world by her as *dismemberment*. The proposal for a four-power pact for the disarmament and guardianship of Germany was rejected by the Soviet method of proposing so many amendments regarding the future government of Germany as to turn it into a controversial and complicated treaty. The Soviet insisted on reparations out of current production, claiming that this method, as well as the amount of ten billion dollars for them was secretly agreed to at Yalta, and endorsed at Potsdam. Mr. Truman, Mr. Byrnes, Secretary Marshall, and the British delegate denied this interpretation of the conferences, but were prepared to allow a limited amount from current production: any substantial amount would cripple German economy and cause the burden of rehabilitation to fall on the Western powers. The Russian claim for finality of the Polish borders was rejected. The crude Russian claim to "German" assets in Austria was rejected: but the Soviet refused to accept mediation on this subject, and refused to accept assets under the terms of the Austrian law applying to all foreign investments. The Soviet demands would have kept Austria a permanent puppet state.

In submitting the United States proposals for a German policy, Secretary Marshall took the very wise step, in view of the Soviet insistence of a "democratic" Germany, to state explicitly what the United States meant by a democratic Germany. The American Memorandum in this regard (March 21, 1947) is a model of succinct good sense, and constitutes an acknowledgment of the trouble caused by failure to define terms at previous conferences with the Soviet Union.

EUROPE

Britain's interest in the Continent is twofold. The first is avoidance of sudden attack upon her or the countries on the coastal fringe, which, in any case, she would be forced to repel. The second is the reign of political stability in Europe. Until the latter is achieved European production and buying power

will not furnish Britain with supplies or customers; Britain can only flourish amid peace and quiet. These two things need examination.

In 1935 the defense of Britain was summed up in the declaration: "Britain's frontier is on the Rhine!" This was the response to threats of air attack. The island safeguards of Britain have shrunk, the Channel is not a big enough trench. Hitler's technical unpreparedness alone averted an invasion of England when to repel it would have been impossible, and when it would have taken, as Mr. Churchill admitted, God's good time until the transatlantic world liberated her. But since the advent of the flying and the rocket bomb, which, used earlier and with some increase in technical efficiency, might have destroyed Britain, Britain's defense frontier has expanded all around her to the arc of the threatening countries of the North Sea. The Soviet rulers know this well enough. They were still at peace and friends with Hitler and Ribbentrop when Norway, Holland and Belgium were occupied and when Sweden was cowed, and they had time to prepare war college memoranda for a military science and political delectation. The mysterious missiles reported over Sweden in the summer of 1946, and the Soviet possibility of reaching Norway by land, have not failed to have their amity-producing effect on these two democracies. Norwegian reaction to a Soviet request for a base on Spitzbergen was not sharply adverse. Sweden did not respond with impressive amiability to the United States Government's request that she make no trade pact with the Soviet on a basis which would exclude the United States from her former open trade opportunities.

Britain is beholden as well to France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark for a wide buffer of protection by distance and of time to catch her second breath for a strong struggle, if a long struggle is still possible after these countries have been subjugated. Britain in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was chary of guarantees and commitments like permanent defensive alliances. These tend to surrender the initiative to the more restive member of the alliance, while the more sober has to pay the debts. She pursued the policy of balance and "the free hand." Nor were these countries anxious to make such permanent agreements, for though they estimated they could depend on a British promise, they could not be *absolutely* sure. They were closer to immediate

attack over land frontiers by swift-moving, massive forces. Their respective populations were: Belgium, 8,400,000; Holland, 9,000,000; Denmark, 4,000,000; France, 40,000,000, against Germany's nearly 70,000,000. Hence, the vacillations of French policy in the interwar years. French politicians were split into two groups, one favoring the idea that if France must be a power of the second order she might as well be so to Germany, who otherwise might subjugate her. Some support might come from Italy and Spain ("Latin sisters!"). But another, the successful group, believed in their British friendship, unwilling to submit themselves to the mercy of Germany, *Nazi* Germany, expansionist, and the enemy of their other friend Russia. For Russian alliance had been pursued as French salvation down to the French-Soviet Pact of 1935. Holland and Belgium protested their neutrality even to the very day when the Nazi columns were pouring in and her planes were raining bombs. They would not concert a common defense policy with Britain and France for fear of the enmity of Germany. Even the Maginot Line was left incomplete at the Belgian border in deference to the Belgian Government's fear of German revenge. In vain, with tears in their eyes, they showed the Nazis their clean white skirts of chastity; the Nazis did not understand neutrality.

For their own safety, these nations more than ever need a permanent defense arrangement with Great Britain, on whose soil during World War II they were able to prepare for their national redemption. As soon as this is said at least two problems arise. The Soviet rulers denounce a "western bloc" in general as something which must be necessarily hostile to her. They and their foreign friends suspect European federal proposals, even when only economic. They claim that peace in the general framework of the United Nations is alone permissible. On the other hand, some French statesmen believe that their salvation may rather come from the kind of alliance they already have with the Soviet,²¹ an alliance clearly aimed at the overthrow of any German attempts to rise and repeat her aggressions. If the Soviet is not at peace and in confident relationship with Britain (which entails also the United States, since she is the arsenal of democracy

²¹ The Treaty of Alliance of Dec. 10, 1944, designed to secure immediate joint action in self-defense against a German military renaissance.

and the transatlantic connection and lifeline of Britain), France is torn between the west and the east, and especially between Britain and Russia.²² Once again, *she* is impelled to seek the role of mediator, to have both as her friends, but this is not a steady assurance for either of the parties whom she is courting and needs. Neither will be quite ready to let her choose the other: and she will vacillate between the two—not a happy situation for a Europe which lives in fear of atomic warfare. The Soviet objections to western defensive pacts should be noticed, the constant support which the Netherlands gives Great Britain on the Security Council, and the balancing acts of France. De Gaulle on July 28, 1946, reiterated the policy of balance: ²³

Who then can re-establish the equilibrium between these two new worlds (United States and U.S.S.R.)? Only the old world of Europe, which, during so many centuries was the guide of this universe, is alone able to provide the necessary element of balance and understanding which is tending to split in two.

Is it not all built on sand?

Britain, let it be repeated, cannot support 45,000,000 people at her standard of living, which is not so high, without a world at peace, manufacturing, growing crops, and trading. Her policy is stability and quiet everywhere in the world. Since her immediate danger comes from Europe, any disturbance on the Continent is a disturbance of her livelihood, which might, in case of serious trouble, be altogether upset. *After seven years the British still live on the most meagre rations*, and struggle desperately and critically, if gallantly, to regain their economic balance and standard of living.²⁴ Her program is stabilization of Europe: it is generally antirevolutionary anywhere, whatever the status quo happens to be. It supports the majority, even if the majority finds distasteful the brand of "democracy" the Soviet rulers believe to be the best for the masses. Therefore it lets sleeping dogs lie and

²² The signing of the Franco-British Treaty of Dunkirk, March 1947, for immediate defense against German uprising was preceded by information to the Soviet at every stage of the negotiations.

²³ *New York Times*, July 28 and 29, 1946.

²⁴ Cf. *Economic Survey for 1947*, British Government White Paper, February, 1947.

does not shake at any time the dominant authority in power: in Greece or in Spain. Instability is chiefly a Soviet export, and the Soviet rulers know it; Britain perforce resists the Communist party. During a long period in the nineteenth century British liberalism (in Whig as in Tory governments) assailed the Continent with a moral and physical power which brought national independence to subject or disunited peoples and political liberty to the upper and middle classes, and then just as certainly to the masses. Britain's policy is still that democratic kind of liberty, not the Soviet rulers' kind. It would seem from recent *free* voting in Europe that it is the kind supported by more than three-to-one voters,²⁵ even though postwar desperation favors irresponsible agitation and promises.

APPROXIMATE PERCENTAGES OF VOTES CAST
BY PARTY GROUPS

Country and election date	Communists ¹ per cent	Soc. Dem. or Labor parties per cent	Christian Dem. or Moderates per cent	Liberal, Conser. or minor parties per cent
1945				
Great Britain, July 25 ..	2	51	9	38
Hungary, Nov. 4	17	21	62	..
Bulgaria, Nov. 19	88 ²	(Fatherland Front)
Austria, Nov. 25	2	46	52	..
1946				
Soviet Union, Feb. 10 ..	98 ²
Netherlands, May 17 ..	10	29	32	29
Czechoslovakia, May 26	38.1	13.9	34.3	13.7
France, Oct. 21, 1945 ..	26.1	23.4	23.7	26.8
France, June 2, 1946 ..	27.2	21.0	28.2	23.6
Italy, June 2, 1946	18.9	20.7	35.4	25.0
Poland, June 30, 1946 ..	68	(4 coalition parties)	32	(Mikolajczyk Peasant P.)

¹ Including such Social Democrats or other groups which find themselves forced to affiliate with Communists in so-called National Fronts, Unity parties or Fatherland Fronts.

² No other parties allowed to propose candidates. Protest votes were registered by invalidating the ballot or voting against the single official candidate

²⁵ The table of approximate percentages of votes cast by party groups was compiled by Professor Sidney B. Fay in *Current History*, p. 81, Aug. 1946.

BRITAIN AND EUROPE ARE ONE

The conclusions are inevitable.

1. The problem of peace as it faces Britain is not severable from the problem of peace and security that confronts the European nations. Mistakes will follow any policy that attempts to separate the fate of Britain from that of Europe.

2. The dismantling of the British empire is not severable from the question of the survival of the mother country as a self-defensive fighting unit, with the economic welfare necessary to support military strength. Cut the arteries and she will die; if she dies, or is enfeebled, a brave ally is lost, and the European nations must gravitate to submergence under German or Russian hegemony.

3. The problem of the character and purposes of the Soviet regime is not severable from the future of Britain and Germany. Her strength and intentions will decide whether the latter are to continue in a state of permanent readiness to meet attack. If she acquires the atomic bomb she will be the taskmaster of Europe and Britain; for Western Europe and Britain are more urbanized and therefore more vulnerable than she.

4. Since this is so, the fate of the European nations and that of the British empire are not severable from the world interests and the security of the United States. The territories and the seas in which the United States has an interest interpenetrate with theirs, and Europe, after all, is one tract of uninterrupted land. In the air and atomic age, Britain is joined to the Continent.

5. It is a fallacy peculiar to contemporary discussion that Russia and the United States live side by side as two political systems with none, apart from theirs, of any account. De Gaulle talks of Soviet Russia and the United States assuring the peace of the world between them. This fallacy is dangerous and is dealt with further at a later stage of the discussion. But it is essential to observe now that this is a mere figment of the imagination; it leaves out of account all the lands that stretch between and beyond. The fate of any one of these is a matter of concern to all, and to the two principals. These lands will so plan and manage their fate as to involve the principals. They cannot help but look for foreign friends and objects of protection.

If the Continent of Europe were subdued, a virile and splendid civilization would go down to perdition. In the Northwest the

courage and genius of many centuries have built a heritage of faith in the gifted works of the individual mind and character. Perhaps more tenderly than any other country in the world, Great Britain protects her heretics and eccentrics. For mankind today no option is available between the ideal and the entirely corrupt society. The human race is forced to choose between several imperfections: whatever is chosen can only be better than some other, it cannot be perfectly the heart's desire. Such a choice is that impending between British civilization and any other which might offer a threat to its existence. Nor is it given to man, in affairs between nations, to ally himself with another on terms that convert his friend immediately to the exact formula of his own principles and sentiments. If his general end is the survival of that friend and his culture, he may not be able, with the alternatives open, to give aid on exacting terms. He cannot say: "You may only receive my assurance of help if you execute to the uttermost the policy that pleases me." For, in the first place, in the world as it is, his assurances are given partly for his own benefit. Without his contribution, he may in future find himself bearing an even bigger burden in lives lost of his own countrymen and in his own nation's economic strain. But also, as suggested in the problem of dismantling the British empire, immediate insistence on courses which create power vacuums throughout the world, may ruin both recipient and donor.

Consequently, an international friend is faced with the hardly alterable fact that he must condone some of the things he would rather not: he must stomach economic methods or political pathology that sicken him, for fear of much worse. During a war, the end justifies the means among members of an alliance, although the means are often distasteful. The most murderous must be dealt with first. Think of the Darlan episode to save American lives; the surrender of Poland to Soviet mercies; the relinquishment of a Balkan campaign at Stalin's request; the acceptance of Tito's rule in Yugoslavia; the acquiescence in Soviet rule in Rumania and Bulgaria; the continuance of the Dutch empire in the East Indies; the acceptance of Argentina as a member of the UN. So it is in this present twilight stage, which is neither peace nor war, but liquidation of war and an aspiration ever striving for peace, but as yet no peace. As Hobbes said: "Where there is no assurance, there is *Warre*."

Occasions may arise, such as a challenge of the presence of British troops in Greece, when the American and other delegates, who usually fully cooperate with the British, can stand aside from British interests:²⁶ it is beneficial that they should do so. But substantial inroads on the British way of life are hardly politic, given the balance of imminent forces all over the world.

THE GIFT OF BRITISH CIVILIZATION

A magnanimous civilization would be lost to the world, and the world is not rich in them. For British civilization is not merely a state of mind, a religion; it is a way of life incarnate in governmental and social practice. It has given inspiring examples and assistance to the world: it has much more yet to give. It is not effete, nor decadent, but virile and sensitive. It is the land in which *there is least anti-Semitism* (which is synonymous with cowardice) and the most social sobriety and civic poise.

Within its policy, founded on a parliamentary basis since the thirteenth century, someone has always vindicated the dignity and the worth of the individual. The bitter struggles to realize this, and the excesses of class domination are not forgotten. But all things in their era are relative to what man might, in that era, perpetrate in his ferocious moods, and what he was, then, actually committing in other lands. Through the larger part of English history care for the individual glows more brightly with each passing generation. And there is always a robust disposition to assert and protect the rights of the individual. This gave birth to freedom of expression, association, meeting, to freedom of opinion and of the press, at once the fruit and the buttress of government by participation of the governed, for the common good.

It was in this country that in modern time the theory of tolerance (Milton and Locke), and the theories of the social contract (Hobbes, Locke, Hume), and of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" (Jeremy Bentham), and of the liberal economy (Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill) were first thoroughly discussed and disseminated throughout the world. It was under the dim roof of the Mother of Parliaments that Edmund

²⁶ By the early spring of 1947 American detachment was seen to be impossible, even from an American point of view.

Burke taught a respect for human nature above the sharp hammer blows of mere ratiocination, and in golden rhetoric, that "Magnanimity is not seldom the wisest course in politics." Tom Paine, whatever the irritations that forced him to migrate, was a spiritual gift of precious value to British citizens at home and to those overseas in America. England's masses, and a very considerable party, supported the American Revolution because, being fellow citizens under the same sovereignty of the British King in Parliament, they realized that every liberty won by their fellow citizens overseas was also a liberty won for them. Britain at home could not wholeheartedly send all her armed force to fight the colonies; the people of the colonies had allies in their kin who still dwelt in the mother country.

While acknowledging the right of the majority to govern, a doctrine of liberalism, of self-restraint and tolerance for the minority guaranteed by legal devices, has tempered the potential force of the majority. John Stuart Mill was one of the world's chief expositors of this attitude. Tolerance has pervaded the people, growing in their community life through the centuries, but stemming also from the aristocracy, which until 1832 had the major part in government. Its two main wings, Whig and Tory, were obliged to compete for the vote of a public not universally enfranchised, but enough to make political competition serious. The liberal wing espoused the cause of popular government and tolerance. The dictum that a love of individuality and a habit of tolerance spring from aristocratic groups is not wholly devoid of truth. In any case the British middle and working classes have entered into this heritage fully. The British Labor party, which elected to office, can constitutionally do anything it likes with property interests, likes to do only what is "fair."

An observer, originally hostile, thought, after examination of an ocean of evidence, that British home and foreign policy deserved praise for its relative chivalry, objectivity, or fairness, and humanitarianism.²⁷

British poets, playwrights, and novelists have heaped rare jewels on the world's literary treasure. To a quite remarkable degree a large part of the population enjoys its inspiration and the solace of its wisdom. Its people are among the foremost of con-

²⁷ Cf. H. U. Kantorowicz, *The Spirit of British Policy* (London, 1931).

tributors to science and technology. They are honest hard-working craftsmen.

Liberal government, utilitarian law, a noble and enchanting literature, acute economy theory, practical, operative civil liberties, public service, the ideal of a sober gentleman, the love of nature and magnanimity to man—these are not something to destroy, for they still palpitae with creativeness.

Britain has still to make a fresh and peculiar contribution, with which it is today in heavy travail of mind and character. Is it possible for the masses to govern themselves and remake the economic system with fuller organized partnership by the whole community, which owns and administers a large part (but by no means all) of the productive system, and yet maintain efficiency of production, incentive to effort and invention, a sense of popular participation, the initiative and high spirits of democracy and individualism? Britain's experiment will show how much equality men can endure when, by its political system, freely chosen after long and open argument, it is supplied with the opportunity of setting aside functionless privilege, and deciding what is the concrete meaning of distributive justice.

It is precisely this enterprise and the liberal spirit in which it is being undertaken, that is so hard for the Soviet rulers to swallow. The Labor party is not Great Britain, but it is highly representative of it, in this second half of the twentieth century. What smites the Soviet rulers so much with chagrin, is the fact that Britain has found her own way to social justice through the democratic process. She can acquire liberty, equality, and fraternity without brutality or Karl Marx, or Lenin.²⁸ It is a shockingly bad example for the rest of the world—from the Soviet standpoint. Labor's assistance to the Social Democratic parties of the Continent is regarded by the Soviet rulers as hostile to itself, and as treachery to "the working classes." Since 1920 the Labor party has never swerved in its policy of friendship to Russia and hostility toward the Communist party. Almost year by year the Labor party rejected the Communist applications for affiliation as a party. From time to time it has expelled or reprimanded

²⁸ In his talk with the British Labor party's goodwill mission of August, 1946 (reported in the party's *Annual Report*, May 1947), Stalin is "gratified to know that two great countries were traveling in the socialist direction—Britain in the roundabout British way."

those who suggested an alliance with the party in a "Popular Front." And the essential reason for its rejection of the party and of Soviet Communism is that the cardinal article of its political faith is majority rule and tolerance for the minority, whereas the Communist party believes that the supreme good is its social policy, to be implemented by a minority and carried through by force, if necessary.

British Communists have too often revealed their nonparliamentary temper to be accepted into the Labor party.

In this way the class war grows more bitter as capitalism rots. There is an actual war on, and all attempts to cover it up with phrases, or patch the crumbling system of wage-slavery with reforms are bound to fail. . . . They (the rulers) will gamble on a new war, and start deliberately shutting down industry to teach the workers a lesson. Strikes will follow, greater than that of 1926, and led by men who are not afraid of hurting the bosses' feelings. And this process of breakdown and class war will go on until the workers smash the capitalist State and, one way or another, get a workers' government that knows how to act.

We in Britain are members of an International Party millions strong, working for the same ends and helping each other throughout the world. This is the only sort of organization possible for those to whom internationalism is more than a mere phrase. The Communist International represents the ideas that have already freed one-sixth of the earth's surface (namely, Soviet Russia) from the waste and tyranny of capitalism.

The Labor party is rapidly becoming a third capitalist party.²⁹

When the Labor party rejected the Communist party's request for affiliation with it in 1943, Mr. Herbert Morrison, speaking for the Labor party executive in successful opposition to the proposal, said:

I say that when the Labour Party deals with a political party of that kind, which can order and require men to corrupt their conscience and their real thoughts, that is not a thing that is clean. It is unclean, and if they come into this Labour Party we would become unclean by the contact we would thereby contract. They believe in dictatorship. They do not believe in parliamentary democracy. . . . I will say that

²⁹ The excerpts are from *A Statement of Aims and Policy*, published by the Communist party of Great Britain, London, Aug. 1928—a fair sample.

even if they say they do not believe in dictatorship, I do not believe them. And we ought not to believe them. They still do believe in dictatorship. They still do oppose parliamentary democracy. They still believe in revolution by violence. They still believe that bloodshed is necessary. Their argument is not that they want it, but that it is inevitable because the capitalists will resist, but they say it in a way that indicates they will be disappointed if the capitalists will not resist. They believe in violent revolution and in preparing for it. I say you cannot mix our policy of government by persuasion and convincing the electorate, with that policy which fights elections and prepares for violent revolution at the same time.*

It was therefore in the stars that Mr. Bevin and Mr. Molotov (and Mr. Vishinsky) should be antagonists. To Mr. Molotov, Mr. Bevin is a representative of the type of "Social Democrats" of the Continent, which the Moscow-inspired Communist parties regarded as worse than the Nazis, from the standpoint of a Communist victory in those countries. Shortly before Hitler's invasion, the Soviet rulers had called British Labor leaders "Social-democratic lickspittles." To Social Democrats, democratic government, majority rule by peaceful persuasion, is the only legitimate basis for authority and the making and enforcing laws. Indeed, in the interwar political battles inside Germany, prior to the triumph of Hitler, Moscow and its German Communist friends persecuted the Social Democrats with at least as much spite as did the Nazis. They even invented for them the title of "Social Fascists." They cannot stand these good-natured Bible-quoting men. They cannot accept the sincerity of these other representatives of "the proletariat." Revolution and force and absolutism are to them the acid tests of sincerity, and government by a minority of those whose sanguine views of the nature of man and the objects of social policy they recommend. The British Labor party is an obstinate and efficient band of people who stand in the Soviet's ideological way, and the way of a Europe submitting to that ideology. This is the indigestible, unchewable, unspewable bite.

The Soviet rulers seem to forget the chivalry of this same party which never allowed persecution of the Communists in Great Britain without protest; this party which, in 1920 led by this

* Report, Annual Conference of Labour Party, 1943, p. 167.

same Mr. Bevin, took direct action to terminate the war against Russia by refusing to load the ships with arms. They seem to disregard that the Labor party genuinely advocated an armed anti-Nazi policy from 1933 onwards; that they advocated an agreement with Russia against the men of Munich. They give little weight to the association with the Russian trade unions in the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Committee shortly after the Hitler invasion. They seem to discount the dynamic policy of Lend-Lease for Russia. It is as nothing that British Trade unions supported the Soviet policy of establishing the World Federation of Trade Unions. They show but a sour response to their pleas for magnanimous policies, and for a fifty-year alliance.³⁰ Whenever they can rub in British weakness, they do: thus in vetoing the Security Council decision favoring British claims against Albania; conceding the Pacific isles to the United States when Britain, with maritime interests could not fully or at once do so; momentarily slackening international tension in October–November, 1946, after British members of Parliament had criticized the government for too close an attachment to United States policy.

Can it be supposed that Europe can find the mental composure necessary to fair and firm dealing with the Soviet Union when an

³⁰ On Dec. 22, 1946, Mr. Bevin fresh from the meeting of the Security Council in New York, broadcast to the British people. His main purpose was to answer the Labor party "rebels," especially the charge and the innuendoes of alliance with the United States and neglect of the U.S.S.R. The headline in the *Daily Herald* next day was: "We are not tied to the USA." But *Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1947, chose to declare that when Mr. Bevin said: "She does not tie herself to anybody, except in regard to her obligations under the Charter . . ." this meant that "Bevin is renouncing the Anglo-Soviet Pact of mutual aid," and the British request for a fifty-year pact was "not serious." In fact, Mr. Bevin's speech was full of sympathy for better relations with the U.S.S.R. As *Pravda* is the organ of the Russian Communist party, whose Secretary is Stalin, Mr. Bevin was forced to ask Stalin by public note whether he agreed with that interpretation. He again proposed an extension of the treaty. Thus challenged, Stalin answered (Bevin had also sent him another message saying he was perturbed about Field Marshal Montgomery's report that Stalin shared the view that the Anglo-Russian Treaty was "suspended") that he had been perplexed by Bevin's broadcast, but that now no misunderstandings existed: the treaty was fully in effect, with obligations of both sides intact. Before a fifty-year treaty could be made, the treaty must be "freed from the reservations which weaken" it.

The meaning of the incident is obscure. Was it a move to rub in British weakness? Was it a move to get reaffirmation of Britain's ties to Russia, thus weakening the American connection?

American statesman³¹ in high place can make the following declaration?

But our supreme interest here in the United States is peace—and it should be our function to preserve the peace by mediating between the two nations. We would not take the side of one against the other. *For aside from language and a common literary tradition, we have no more in common with imperialistic England than with communistic Russia.* We should take only the side of world unity, only the side of making the United Nations an equitable instrument for a just and endless peace.

Only “language and a common literary tradition, imperialistic England”! Were more errors of history and comprehension ever compressed into so few words?

It has never been easy to develop a great society from a mass of primitive human beings. The history of the world is littered with dead and sickened cultures, of the attempts of men to live together in peace, decency, charity, and justice. Others may have more grandiose philosophies than the British. But here is a society which has taken many centuries to create, a gleaming example of philosophy and character in *action*, of liberties guaranteed, of force made gentle, of subtle but unbreakable social devices and mechanisms and manners invented to offer the brief life of man its chance of mutual service and a degree of happiness. Those who comprehend that all virtue is comparative, that the step to bestiality and barbarism is not a long one backward, will acknowledge that this is holy ground. They will understand that any lighthearted contemplation of courses tending to its destruction would be a crime against humanity beyond superlatives. Who does not understand is no statesman, for he has failed to face the statesman’s distinctive task, his odious duty—to choose.

They must ground their policy on the expectation that such a society will not easily abandon its sap and spirit; that it will provide for its defense, and seek friends who will do likewise. Indeed, in the midst of economic distress of the acutest kind, directly resulting from the immense war effort of six full years, the first in and the last out, her first provision is for defense, and her

³¹ Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace at the first anniversary of Roosevelt’s death, April 13, 1946, *New York Times*.

economic planning is second.⁸² When such a society is asked by a power like the Soviet rulers to enter into general disarmament it must answer, as its Foreign Secretary and its delegate to the General Assembly of the United Nations answered, that until it is assured of dependable collective security by the international power of inspection and control of promises in treaties, it cannot discard its arms. Nor would it yield to guile or force, nor abandon its democratic principles, nor its sober habit of seeking peace by fair persuasion of the adversary.

⁸² Thus, the *Economic Survey for 1947*, which is the government's plan, begins with an allocation of nearly 1,100,000 men for the armed forces at the end of the year, at a time when imports, capital equipment and maintenance, civilian consumption (still on wartime rations) and the public services depend desperately, even almost disastrously, on man power.

The Soviet Despotism in Russia

Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new.

—KARL MARX

A DESPERATE MINORITY

THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT is illegitimate: a usurper. It is a persistent minority in its own land, and a permanent minority in the world of nations. From this sinister and tragic truth stem all the self-inflicted tortures of Soviet rulers, and the flagellation they visit on the Russian and every other people.

The Soviet system of government was conceived in subversive hatred; it has continued to function in defensive and missionary hatred. Hatred has been its prevailing passion, notwithstanding the first generous promptings of Marx and Engels. For it governs without the freely given consent of the Russian people in an age which avows that free consent is the only legitimate foundation and right to sovereign authority. That principle, indeed, was the alpha and omega of Karl Marx.

The government of Soviet Russia, like other constitutions, does not and can not live unto itself. It is a casual but integral chapter in the constitution of the community of nations. If sick it could not fail to infect the world.

The Politburo of the Russian Communist party, the real government of all Russia, writhes in the toils of its own deeper conscience. It feels guilty, and is guilty. It cannot shake off the indifference and execration which are the responses to its arrogance and illegitimacy. The Soviet rulers cannot forgive other nations and their leaders who are innocent.

Except for the democratic, none of the principles of legitimacy

hitherto invoked by government in its long and often black annals, has survived the scrutiny of reason for its validity, or the test of long term spiritual and material advantage for the broad masses of the people.

The underlying theory of the Soviet state at one time acknowledged this. "All power to the Soviets!"¹ cried Lenin's generation of Bolsheviks. But the disposition of power in the Soviet state, as contrived by Lenin's heirs, almost contemptuously rejects it. And, indeed, Lenin's perversion of Marx established the practice and the theory of the Communist party—dictatorial Soviets, not *free* Soviets. The legitimacy of government is, in our own day, properly as the Declaration of Independence announced it:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, *deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.*

This principle may be fulfilled where the acts of government are only those which the majority freely vote, where sanction is by peaceful and unhindered persuasion, and where the very legislators and executives may, by the same sanctions, be disciplined, expelled, and replaced by the people. Other forms of government, however glowing and even sincere in their promises of spiritual and material welfare, are evil. For they can only do good by personal accident, and briefly, if at all.

Governments not founded on consent are obsessed by dark terror of the men and women they govern. In every form of government many people are disaffected by the ends and the obligations imposed on them. The most charitable alleviation of the pain of obedience is offered by democratic government. Those who are inevitably compelled to suffer coercion have genuine opportunities of airing their convictions, persuading others to join them in protest, and of modifying the convictions of those in control. Finally, if their opinion is of wide appeal, it may some day control or share in the making of law.

¹ Though the emphasis may have been rather on power *away* from the Duma and other rival institutions, than on power *to* the popular representative bodies.

The Soviet Government, commanding *all* economic and social opportunity, banishes this safety valve. Its rulers are therefore forced to exercise continual and punitive vigilance against their own people. The democratic order is viciously reversed: in democracy the people are watchful and punitive of their government; but in the Soviet despotism the government is inquisitorial and scourges its people. The government is forced into a continual punitive expedition against its own fellow nationals, under the impulse of a self-constituted mission. Wearing the hair shirt of grandiose promises, it seeks to spur the people on, by aggressive and defensive sadism, to their fulfillment. It is hard for common men to share such enthusiasm for pie that is not on the table to eat.

The Soviet rulers are unhappy and fearful men. Probably no people in the whole world are at heart more unhappy than Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky, Zhdanov, Beria, Malenkov, and their fellow members of the supreme Soviet cabals, for all their bright exterior brashness. Like most other men they would welcome affection, though their shells are hard. But they have placed themselves where they are besieged and beset by disregard or hatred. They yearn not only for approval, but for the tranquil assurance that the approval is *right*. Harassed, hunted down by the secret violence done to their own consciences, they unslackeningly seek out, and if necessary, destroy the objects of their fear and unhappiness, above all, that opposition which silently and passively suffers, reflecting the Soviet rulers' failure to convince. A dictatorship which fails to get the margin between 99.99999 per cent of the votes and unanimity, in an election managed entirely by itself, suffers more unhappiness than any democratic party which may find itself hopelessly outvoted.

For the rulers, only too conscious of their immense efforts for the "good of the people," sense enmity and reserve, and are suspicious of dissatisfaction. They are tormented by their own speculation whether something is wrong with their purposes and work. Unsparing of themselves in constant and stupendous strain and effort, utterly self-sacrificial as they undoubtedly are, the Soviet rulers give short shrift to men and women who do not sincerely applaud their self-advised generosity. Their despair is, paradoxically, that even when the public applause has not been stage-managed by themselves, they can have no conviction of its genuine-

ness. They know the deceptions they have practiced during the elections, whose conduct is lip-worship. Self-disgust is never a solid foundation for charity to others. Since the opposition has no constitutional standing—except on the gallows—the Soviet rulers are forced into an endless search for latent heresy. Obligated to be careful not to publish an excessive number of examples of disaffection and subversive activity, they keep their procedures secret, and by forfeiting the popular response, make errors. Compelled to ferret and suspect, they are the more vindictive. It is a crowning indignity to the Soviet rulers (less so to Stalin than to the younger politicians nurtured in the system and promoted for successful operation within it) that they must not only explain their good intentions and expound their ideology, but, above all, stop constructive work in order to avert and suffocate opposition.² They are perpetually under tension: the line of “traitors” is very long and new betrayers emerge at every opportunity. Kravchenko,³ Barmine,⁴ Krivitzky,⁵ and Gouzenko⁶ are more recent⁷ “traitors”!

Even in governments intimately associated with their people by means of elections and political parties, at given moments, cleavages still develop between the policies of the government and the hopes of large sections of the population. Some residual annoyance and unfriendliness always remains between the two. In the Soviet system a special tension exists between the highest leadership, the rank and file of the party, and the social and industrial groups upon whom it must in the first and last resort lean. Consider the Soviet leaders' complaints on the violation of party rules relating to fair dealing among party members, expulsions from the party, investigations before expulsion, and failure to criticize officials or to renew annually by open election the local leadership of the party, substituting appointments by friendship of what we would call patronage,⁸ and the caustic

² Consider the purge in the Ukraine. See Barrington Moore, *Review of Politics*, January, 1947.

³ *I Chose Freedom*, New York, 1946.

⁴ *One Who Survived*, New York, 1945.

⁵ *In Stalin's Secret Service*, New York, 1939.

⁶ Igor Gouzenko, cipher clerk, Soviet Embassy. Cf. note 28, p. 280 below.

⁷ K. M. Alexiev, commercial attaché, Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

⁸ 18th Congress Communist Party, Cf. *Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1939.

excoriations of managerial slackness and workers' inefficiency.

All things fall as burdens on the central leaders. They need to be aware of all happenings past, present, and possible. Their government cannot have confidence in the free, uncontrolled, unauthorized loyalty of anybody, since it was not chosen, but in October, 1917, imposed itself, without even a positive program! It has since become responsible for all the troubles of all the Russians.

No work by Karl Marx ever taught the functions and methods of government. Marx's implication was, that after the revolution, government would be simple. And it might have been, if democratic. Now all rulers have sins on their consciences. Retrospectively they perceive that more cogent thinking, less or more excitement, additional courage, might have produced finer results, saved more lives, or avoided economic disasters whose scars may, as things went, be seen on the faces of millions of families. Even rulers who live sun-blinded by the blaze of an ardent ideology, and to whom that is supreme justification, cannot in time avoid seeing men as men and not as equal wooden pieces in a Marxian game of chess.

In the Soviet dictatorship no outlet exists for relief of the rulers' heavy conscience except to mortify themselves or to punish others. For theirs is not a shared responsibility. The ability to impute responsibility to others legitimately is a constituent element of democracies—to an excessive degree, it has sometimes been complained. Such sharing of the blame with the citizens and not merely with a few fellow dictators, permits relaxation toward one's self, and mollifies hostility toward critics. Marx never contemplated the dictatorship of a party; his vision was absolute democracy, the dictatorship of the whole proletariat! Marx, however, was wiser than the Soviet rulers. He expected the *masses* to govern. It was Lenin who perverted Marxian desires for democracy by his premature and ruthless avidity for the Revolution, and a dual Revolution at that. For he was not content to overthrow a tyranny; he erected another in its place.

Have the Soviet rulers a conscience about human life? Hardly when they are in company; separately, perhaps. And the less they can express it, the sharper the torture of their psychosis.

They cannot share the solace of confession with others. No two of them on leaving the meeting can share their disagreements

about aims, methods and persons. For neither is sure he will not be denounced and punished. The fate of the "old Bolsheviks" at Stalin's hands is an awful warning.⁹ Severity, spite, malice and suffering follow. They cannot be good-natured men.

I fled Him, down the labyrinthine ways
Of my own mind . . .
Adown Titanic glooms of chasmed fears . . .
Fear wist not to evade . . .

This perpetual fear of "betrayal," and the gnawing thoughts of disregard and detestation, evinced in the largest, most brutal and omnipresent police system the world has probably ever known (perhaps Hitler's Gestapo equaled it) are not the only pangs the all-powerful Soviet rulers suffer. They endure paroxysms of irascibility because they have concentrated within themselves almost every part of the social, economic and cultural life of their nation. They organize the party to remain in power, they spy on party members to prevent disloyalty or dangerous action through ignorance; they spy on their armed forces through the NKVD; the management of the army and navy is given to the most trusted elements in the party to forestall the rise of a Napoleon who might erase Stalin; they control all government units in vast areas, watching the local soviets and on the alert for deviations in the press; they manage every aspect of economy, production and distribution! In addition, they must handle their stormy relations with the rest of the world on two levels, the formal diplomatic, and the informal Communist International.

This is the situation of the harassed Soviet rulers. They have assumed, even seized, a superhuman domestic and foreign task. They lash out savagely in their desperation of deadlines, five-yearly, yearly, quarterly, and monthly timetables, pressure for results, and ever-elusive success.

THE SECOND STRONGEST NATION

Now, if this system of government ruled in a small faraway land, unpossessed of vast natural resources and a prolific man

⁹ In Sayers' and Kahn's *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, New York, 1946, pp. 80 ff., there is an unintended effect—it is shown what a dreadful state of oppression and terror dissentients from the Kremlin must experience. See especially p. 108 for the gifted Bukharin's feelings. He talks of "this stinking underground life."

power, we would not need to feel concern for all humanity outside, though we could grieve for the people within it. But the Soviet Union today is the second strongest nation in the world. With the fulfillment of its three five-year plans, and certainly with the development of some of its territorial accumulations, it will be exceedingly powerful.

The Bolshevik minority is tortured, and it tortures others to acquire *acceptance*, not merely "recognition," as a legitimate government. And if it cannot succeed in this, then it plans to arrange world affairs so that, in the time of its minority, it stakes out the territorial and other conditions of its continued existence and advance to maturity. Trotsky was right, and Stalin knows it: the world outside *must* be changed! Having mastered all that Trotsky realized thirty years ago, Stalin is now making international hay while the sky is livid. The Soviet minority will seize all they can while the postwar going is good.

It is impossible to ignore the Soviet, because the Soviet will not relax its grip on the world; it will not retreat and cannot retreat, for it is caught in the serpentine toils of its own despotic creation. It will not surrender the promises it has made to itself and its people; it will not emancipate itself from the pretense that most of those promises have been demonstrated by its own experience to be hollow and false. The obstinacies involved in its own illegitimacy, the false front covering its disillusionment force the world's attentions upon it.

Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, would seem to be a confession of inevitable war. Molotov has hardly missed a single opportunity to make "offensive" intransigent remarks of the same character,¹⁰ vying with Mr. Gromyko in the United Nations

¹⁰ One of spitfire enmity may be cited, opposing open access of all nations to the Danube area (*New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1946), and delivered two weeks after Stalin's "pacific" declaration. "If we apply equality of treatment to countries in different economic categories what will remain of the industry of some of them? What will remain, for example, of the industry of Rumania and Yugoslavia? I believe we shall be forced to conclude that American capital would be in a position to buy up these countries and be master in these states.

"Even today one can be in one's own country, can turn on one's own radio and hear an American program. One can be in one's own country, go to a movie and see there mostly American films, not because they are good but because there are so many of them and because they are backed by a great economic force.

"Can we think for a moment that small states can fight, can enter into com-

Security Council. All over the world the Soviet Union incessantly conducts a vituperative propaganda campaign against the United States and Great Britain, a "war of nerves." A sample, which the Labor party *Cards on the Table* pamphlet says is difficult to forgive is a Moscow broadcast to Norway on June 8, 1946, saying: "This noble country (England) went to war because it and its fascist reactionary leaders love war and thrive on war. The attack on Hitlerite Germany was purely incidental." A favorite Soviet story is that a depression is sure to come in a few years and that "Capitalists" will then divert the public and keep their grip on the American economy and workers by a war against Russia. John Strohm reports hearing this in Russia also!¹¹ We return to these maneuvers presently.

All statesmen with primary responsibility for foreign relations weigh not only the immediate war power of other nations, but must charter their country's course by *the future*. Stalin and other Soviet rulers have announced their aims. They mean what they say.

1. They will seek destructive atomic energy.¹²
2. They will invent other weapons of mass destruction of which they talk darkly.¹³ They especially publicize their scientists and Russian achievements, which have much impressed some American atomic scientists.¹⁴ They are alleged (and claim the right) to

petition with the United States or Britain and can practice democratic politics? No, it is impossible. Those little states, enfeebled by war, would have to give way before the force opposed to them.

"There may be states that are not enemies but our Allies that will be placed in complete dependence on the dollar and pound sterling. Do you have doubts? I shall cite the words of Senator Thomas reproduced in one of the last numbers of the *American Magazine*. Senator Thomas declared, 'It is not fortuitously that often the dollar has been the instrument of our foreign policy and we have been able to create a veritable democracy of the dollar.'

"I believe private capitalists can become the veritable owners of whole states where they can do what they wish and act according to their lights as the result of the power their dollars give to them."

Molotov has even recalled that in 1856, when the Danube was internationalized, slavery still existed in the United States—he managed to link the two facts.

¹¹ *Chicago Daily News*, October series in 1946. He is echoed by Mr. Gallagher, Communist Member of Parliament, in the British House of Commons.

¹² November 6, 1945, Molotov speech; and often since.

¹³ October 29, 1946, Molotov.

¹⁴ Cf. almost any number of the *Information Bulletin* of the Embassy of the U.S.S.R.

have captured a number of German scientists to secure war secrets and assistance in the development of these secrets and others.¹⁵

3. They have stripped enormous amounts of machinery from Manchuria, Korea, Austria, Germany. They encourage German factories to produce goods of warlike use.¹⁶ They have been unwilling to permit an allied investigation of the stripping of war factories.¹⁷

4. They have announced a series of three five-year plans,¹⁸ with some emphasis on goods for civilian consumption, but overwhelmingly more on heavy industrialization.

We must achieve a situation where our industry can produce annually up to 50 million tons of pig iron, up to 60 million tons of steel, up to 500 million tons of coal, and up to 60 million tons of oil. Only under such conditions can we consider that our homeland will be guaranteed against all possible accidents. That will take three more Five-Year Plans, I should think, if not more. But it can be done and we must do it.¹⁹

The plans for transport, rolling stock, trucks, electric power, rubber, fuel, the machine industries, and training of labor match this increase.

5. They have maintained in unarmed lands considerable forces.

6. In spite of their grievous losses of population in the war, set at 7,000,000 dead, Russia still towers in population above her European neighbors. She has announced health and cultural methods which must reduce mortality. She no longer tolerates abortion. Divorce has been made difficult.

The institute of Population of Princeton University, has made the following estimate:²⁰

¹⁵ For example, *New York Times*, Feb. 24 and 25, 1947; Oct. 25, 1946.

¹⁶ Russell Hill, *Struggle for Germany*, London, 1946, pp. 138 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 171 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. *Information Bulletin*, U.S.S.R. Embassy, Supplement on Fourth Five-Year Plan.

¹⁹ Speech, Stalin, Feb. 9, 1946.

²⁰ League of Nations Study, *Future Population of Europe*.

	1940		1970		Per Cent Increase
U.S.S.R.	174	million	251	million	44
Europe (less U.S.S.R.)	399	"	417	"	4.25
Germany	69.5	"	69.8	"	
Latvia			1.9	"	
Estonia			1.0	"	
Lithuania			2.66	"	
Czechoslovakia			14.9	"	
Albania			1.3	"	
Bulgaria			7.32	"	
Poland			41.4	"	
Rumania			25.3	"	
Yugoslavia			18.5	"	

Here is a potential thunderbolt. To this potentiality it is irrelevant to offer the answer that Russia is exhausted by her terrible war losses. Foreign policy necessarily anticipates the future. Excited nationalism, small faith in treaties, weakness of the United Nations, the rancors of World War II, unflagging expressions of contempt, the atom bomb, and, above all, immense discordance of western and Soviet social values, lead steadily to war. Neither statesmen nor people can neglect their responsibilities for security, peace, and justice. Consequently, closer analysis of the Soviet state is essential.

VIOLENCE AND SECRECY

The concern of the rest of the world with Russia is first with its government, and only second with its people. All recent observers report the amiability and likableness of the Russian people.²¹ Their history and literature support this. Other nations need not worry that the Russian people will menace peace more seriously than any other people. Indeed, by reason of the vastness of their homeland, the small comforts they have hitherto enjoyed, and the enormous possibility of pacifying them by giving them their land in private ownership, a better opportunity exists in

²¹ Among many works, Stevens, *Russia Is no Riddle*; Brooks Atkinson, articles in *New York Times*; Winter, *I Saw the Russian People*; Winterton, *Report on Russia*, London, 1946; Lauterbach, *These Are the Russians*; Deane, *The Strange Alliance*; Werth, *The Year of Stalingrad*, London, 1946; John Fischer, *Why They Behave Like Russians*, 1946.

Russia for a peaceful and generous populace than in most parts of the world. The character of the people need cause no worry.

Or ought it? *If* the alternatives of social policy were freely presented to them, and *if* they were free to establish their own government, and they *still* preferred actual Soviet rule, no alternative would remain but force against force to decide which civilization was to be paramount. We cannot altogether eliminate from our minds the correction of a people which tolerates a homicidal despotism. But, today, the Russian people are sinned against, not sinning.

What is especially abominable and dangerous in Russia for the rest of the world is that the Russian people are in the grip of a small minority founded on naked force. Coercion and consent form an amalgam in every kind of government; in the Soviet system coercion is supreme. Two evils follow: (a) The Soviet rulers are without spontaneous popular acceptance, and (b) they rule by a theory of human nature which is crassly false. This suggests how important to society is the study and criticism of emergent philosophy, logic, political and economic theory. At the root of the Soviet despotism lies a false theory of human nature. Stalin is a philosopher king in the captivity of a diseased philosophy. A fanatical attachment to philosophical and psychological untruth, implemented through strict control by force over nearly 200,000,000 people, must continue to be a terrible obsession for all mankind.

The outside world has no means of knowing the opinions and wishes of the Russian people, as their government, installed for their benefit by the Soviet seizure of power forbids free expression. The cardinal and crucial features of the Soviet governmental system are, therefore, in a vital sense, a part of the world's constitution. They need understanding.

The Soviet constitution of 1936, the one that is so often vaunted as "democratic," is an imposed, not a chosen constitution, fastened on the Russian people by a dictatorship not of their seeking; indeed, forced upon them by naked violence. It has been so contrived that it bears some superficial appearance of popular acceptance,²² but it is only the direct successor of others stemming from the seizure of power in 1917.

²² Cf. Anna Louise Strong, *The New Constitution of the U.S.S.R.* (1936).

At no time from 1917 to 1936, and at no time since, have the Russian people been in the slightest degree free to make or amend a constitution of their own: the Bolshevik leaders have been sitting firmly on their necks.

All Soviet authority came from the seizure of power by Lenin and the Bolshevik section of the Socialist Democratic party in November, 1917. *The leaders of this party did not make the Russian Revolution.* This occurred in March, 1917, and was made by soldiers in mutiny, a peasant rising, by the leadership of the bourgeois parties and the moderate labor forces, and the abdication of the utterly discredited Tsar. This liberal democratic revolution was supported by all parties, so that the war against Germany might be continued. In the latter even Stalin, Kamenev and Muranov for a time concurred. The famous Bolshevik leaders were not present during the real, the March revolution. They arrived later; Lenin arrived on April 16th, Trotsky on May 17th. In July Lenin attempted a coup in Petersburg. It failed. In October (November 7 in the Western calendar), 1917, began the "ten days that shook the world."²⁸

That seizure of power was engineered by an almost infinitesimally small minority of the Russian people, without even whole-hearted support of Lenin by the Bolshevik or Social Democratic party. Two figures demonstrate the act of unsanctioned force. First, the rumored numbers of the membership of the party at that time: in April, 1917, 40,000; in August, about 200,000. Secondly, the elections for a Constituent Assembly arranged by the government of Alexander Kerensky and held as late as November 25, 1917, during turmoil and violence, which markedly favored the revolutionary groups against the moderates, bourgeois and aristocratic conservative, showed these results:

Russian Socialist Revolutionaries	16.5 million votes
<i>Bolsheviks</i>	9.0 " "
Ukrainian and other non-Russian Socialist Revolutionaries	4.4 " "

Such figures had no holiness for Lenin, Trotsky, or Stalin. With the superior knowledge of tactics to which they had devoted a quarter of a century's morbid theorizing they took full advantage

²⁸ The title of John Reed's famous book. He was a firsthand observer.

of the people's war-weariness, their frightful losses in battle, the spontaneous mutinies in the armed forces, the decrepitude of tsarism and the incapacity of the liberal revolutionary government to replace that fixed star of the Russian state, the Tsar. No scruples about force or the sanctity of legal methods of transition deterred them; no sober calculation of the policy for the Russian people thereafter was relevant. To them, force was good and sanctified by the interest they claimed to represent, though they had not been authorized or elected as representatives to use it by the people. The elections referred to were derisively scoffed at as a corrupt bourgeois trick to stave off the Revolution which alone would give the people the rights they needed, and for which many of them were crying out. Lenin dispersed the Assembly.

Lenin had always worried about the attitude of the peasants in a revolution, a famous question in Socialist literature. Peasants are not revolutionary: they are ready to rise for land which will be theirs in private property. With private property they are content and conservative. But the Russian factory and city workers were less than 2,000,000 in a population of 180,000,000. It was necessary to win over the peasant masses, the "reserve of the proletariat," and the Bolshevik leaders would be the spearhead of the latter. The first proclamation of the Bolshevik Military-Revolutionary Committee on November 7, 1918, in St. Petersburg contained as the second promise in its program: "The immediate handing over of large proprietorial land to the peasants." That fetched 'em, the "vacillating, the noble peasantry," as Lenin referred to them.²⁴ But the land did not go to peasantry. The Bolsheviks appropriated the land for "The State," in other words, the Bolshevik leaders, to be utilized as they ordained. The peasants were the Bolshevik cuckolds.

No substantial intermediate organizations of workers or entrepreneurs, or churches, or even peasantry stood with their interests and leaders between the Bolshevik leaders and the millions of scattered atoms of people in their thousands of villages—we can almost say, between the Bolshevik armed groups and—nothing. With arms, it was a walkover. And yet the seizure of power only barely succeeded—as Trotsky says, for a long time it was "a revolution on the telephone."²⁵

²⁴ "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder" (1920), p. 13.

²⁵ *Lenin*, by Leon Trotsky (1925), Chap. V.

Violence, and violence alone, without benefit of electoral consent, was the first foundation of the Soviet state, and the influence of that violence has never ceased. For those acts of smashing force, implacable and ruthless, gave to a small minority the power of continuously imposing its will on the nation, if it were clever and unscrupulous enough. No one denies the consummate "political" ability of the Soviet rulers; and as to their scruples, they have always maintained that the end justifies the means, even if the end ceases to be "communism," and becomes power. For they personally embody Communism, whatever they happen to think.

The Soviet rulers, therefore, wrote the 1936 constitution as it pleased them. It was ratified by a national Congress of Soviets composed of their own party, perhaps admitting some outsiders whom they selected.

The Soviet Union has no political parties springing directly, voluntarily, and spontaneously out of the people and its needs to express the popular will. The Communist party by persuasion, guile, or force wrests the machine and armory of political power from a proletariat and a peasantry whose livelihood depends on productive machinery and property seized by state controllers who, themselves, are in the hands of the rulers at the top. It is a question of your vote or your job!

If the Soviet constitution is democratic in its provisions, it is despotic in origin and operation; if democratic in its permissions and rights, it is still no constitution for democracy. For enshrined within it is at least one poisonous and fatal flaw—it grants predominance over all political associations to only one party, the Communist party—all other groups need *prior* permission, one way or another, of this party before they may be formed. Wolf will not let wolf live. Superficially democratic in its institutions and pronouncements, it never possessed a democratic spirit, because it was created and operated entirely by men to whom democracy has always been a joke and a hated enemy.

CONTEMPT FOR THE AVERAGE MAN

No political parties but the Communist exist. The constitution of 1936 says of this party: "the most active and politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other strata

of the toilers . . . the vanguard of the toilers in their struggle for strengthening and developing the socialist system and which represents the leading nucleus of all organisations of the toilers, both public and state." This article, which clearly states the monopolistic supremacy of the party, and this party only, begins by giving the "right of combining in public organisations" to the citizens of the U.S.S.R.—but, as the article shows, under the aegis of only one party.

The empire over all political operations of the party is intentional; it is avowed; it is a triumphant boast. But praise of the party's capacity is synonymous with contempt for the incapacity of the masses. No one outside Russia need be unaware of the monopolistic position of the Communist party. Stalin makes the position perfectly unmistakable in answering foreign criticism of the constitution of 1936:

This group of critics maintains that the absence of freedom for parties in U.S.S.R. is a symptom of the violation of principles of democratism. I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, *just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.* If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution.

As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable—in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasant, etc. But in the U.S.S.R. there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there are only two classes, workers and peasants whose interests—far from being mutually hostile—are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence there is no ground in the U.S.S.R. for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, freedom for those parties. *In the U.S.S.R. there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end . . .*

Yet where class interests and conflict have been abolished and the remnants of old classes liquidated (claimed in an earlier part

of Stalin's speech), and saboteurs wiped out, it is difficult to appreciate the reason for a single party which "courageously defends the interest of the workers and peasants." Against whom or what? The party is, in fact, defending the workers and peasants *from their own wishes* to be other than the Communist party thinks they ought to be and is determined they shall be.

It was Lenin who preached the evangel of the government of the socialist state by a minority, for the good of the majority, and no questions asked. Lenin's perversion of western socialist (and Marxian) doctrine, which looked to an act of liberation followed by government by the people, is vital not only to the understanding of Soviet government in Russia, but to the high strategy of the Soviet rulers abroad. For Stalin applies Leninism, not Marx.

Reformism or liberalism had practically no possibility of success in Tsarist Russia. Lenin's self-elected task of overthrowing infamy could therefore only be accomplished by revolution, insane in the ferocity of its hatred. His first impulses were generous, and on a high plane of humanism. But, after all, many other wicked tyrannies had, before 1917, been struck down by challengers uncontaminated by subsequent dictatorial delusions.

However, Lenin, on the scent of revolution, was hypnotized by Marx, in his time *the* revolutionary theorist. Lenin had the acetylene cutting power; Marx handed him a complete philosophy to inspire a sanguine faith and rejection of compromise. But Marx was guilty of shocking errors about the lessons of human history, all, be it said, in the grand cause of liberty and social justice. Another legacy to Lenin was the axiomatic need for revolution to liberate mankind from the tyranny of a class government of landlords and capitalists—these being the pillars of the state, whatever its bourgeois form. Revolution must and would come through the proletariat, the most conscious element in industrial society. It suffered most and had most resolution. It would "expropriate the expropriators."

At this point Lenin made the deadly decision which is costing the world its peace and may yet again cost it oceans of blood: he rejected the gradual spontaneous rising of the masses and selected the "professional revolutionary" organization to be the "vanguard of the proletariat," and later, its dominator. This tactic of the

"professional revolutionary," with the gospel that the end justifies the means, came to Lenin from a far less reputable source than Karl Marx. This source was no less than the revolutionary nihilist group which flourished from 1870 to 1887, the People's Will party (*Narodnaya Volya*). This society assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Its leaders were executed. But Lenin's elder brother carried on their purposes and, while participating in a plot to assassinate Tsar Alexander III, was caught and hanged.

Narodnaya Volya had been composed of men and women entirely dedicated to the revolution: their heroism and determination were unbounded. The end justified the means—the iron will, the inflexible purism of the aim, the entire corruption of ordinary morality based on the keeping of promises, truth, loyalty to comrades, respect for life. It was conscious martyrdom, sustained by lies, betrayals, and the incrimination of friends in order to subject them to absolute obedience and homicidal opponents. Its purest gem serene was one Nechaev.²⁶ He was the apostle of the revolution above all morality, and his whole life, from his student days to the end, was devoted to fomenting revolution. His *Revolutionary Catechism* (which Marx repudiated) indicates the atrocious lesson that Lenin learned.

The revolutionary despises and hates present-day social morality in all its forms and motives. He regards as moral everything which helps the triumph of the revolution . . . All soft and enervating feelings of relationship, friendship, love, gratitude, even honour, must be stifled in him by a cold passion for the revolutionary cause. . . . Day and night he must have one thought, one aim . . . merciless destruction.

Look at Lenin's speeches and writings, and this ancestor is present.

The proletariat was incompetent to divine and will the end and tasks of revolution. Thus, Lenin:

All worship of the spontaneity of the labour movement, all belittling of the role of the "conscious element," of the role of the Party of Social-Democracy, means altogether irrespective of whether the belittler likes it or not, strengthening of the bourgeois ideology among the workers.²⁷

²⁶ Cf. E. H. Carr, *Michael Bakunin*, pp. 375 ff.

²⁷ *Selected Works*, p. 61, Vol. II.

Lenin distrusted, even hated the working-class movement—it could not make a revolution! It would be content with reforms, shorter hours, a little more pay, better factory conditions. The Fabian Webbs would never make a revolution, neither would their clients, the trade union leaders and rank and file.

Without a revolutionary party, there can be no revolutionary movement. . . . The role of the vanguard can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory.²⁸

Strikes were not *struggle*, but only outbursts of desperation and vengeance :

The workers were not and could not be conscious of the irreconcilable antagonism of their interests to the whole of the modern political and social system, that is, it was not yet Social Democratic consciousness.²⁹

Lenin was perfectly right. Without such ruthless leadership as his, the working-class movement would remain the working-class movement, because the mass of workers are not ruthless and revolutionary. They must be made so. Lenin wrote :

The theory of Socialism, however, grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals. The founders of Modern Scientific Socialism, Marx and Engels themselves, belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia.³⁰

Of course, the workers would not think of these theories, for the very reason that they have not thought of them, i.e., they are wrong. This consideration gave no pause to Lenin. He was so possessed by hatred of the trade unions that he was reduced to pitting the semiskilled against the skilled, the unskilled against all other workers, and common labor against craftsmen, for the upper ranks were not revolutionary, in his opinion, because they were bribed by a share of the profits of imperialism! (It is most interesting to notice that in Stalin's state common labor is not put above the skilled—it is despised!)

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 48.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

Perhaps Lenin bore great humane goodwill toward the workers. Yet it is far truer to say that he was moved more by hatred of Tsarism and bourgeois and democratic society, than by compassion for the masses. He actually had no positive program of government. He sought a revolution that could not be reversed. This was the grand and sinister damnation of the Bolshevik seizure of power. Long before, in 1904, a noble woman, and a more resplendent Marxist than Lenin, *but* in the best tradition of western humanism, Rosa Luxemburg, foretold the results of Lenin's mortal guilt. She wrote, in criticism of his ideas:

Now, however, the Ego (or "I") of the Russian revolutionary reverses itself with express speed, and once again declares itself to be the all-mighty pilot of history—on this occasion in the very highest majesty of the Central Committee of the Social Democratic labour movement. In doing this the bold acrobat ignores the truth that the only entity to whom falls the role of pilot is the mass-ego of the many.

The one personality which can now lead (the workers' movement) is the mass-ego of the proletariat itself, which insists with all its force on committing its own mistakes and learning historical dialectics through its own experience. And, finally, let us speak openly within our own circle: mistakes committed by a really revolutionary working-class movement are historically infinitely more fertile and valuable than the infallibility of the very best "central committee."³¹

Where Lenin leads, Stalin follows. Stalin writes:

Here, in the Soviet Union, in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the fact that not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without directions from the Party, must be regarded as the highest expression of the leading role of the Party. *In this sense* it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is *in essence* the "dictatorship" of its vanguard, the "dictatorship" of its Party, as the main guiding force of the proletariat.³²

The dictatorship of the proletariat consists of the directives given by the Party plus the execution of these directives by the mass organizations of the proletariat, plus their fulfilment by the general population.³³

³¹ *Neue Zeit*, July 1904, Vol. XXII-2, p. 535.

³² *Leninism*, p. 34. New York, 1934.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

Absolute rule, then, by a minority which seized power as a minority, by violence, in the name of a theory or ideology not emanating from, nor shared by the people, was the essence of the Leninist heresy.

WITH CLARITY FOR ALL

This infamous heresy has put not only Russia but the world on the rack. For the legitimacy of the regime is founded not upon popular desire—that was frankly and contemptuously abandoned as the ground of authority—but on a barbarous perversion of the Marxian misconception of history and human nature. Yet Marx, at least, taught that at a certain stage of economic development the *proletariat* would make the revolution, and the *proletariat* would govern.

This minority status of the Soviet rulers applies to the world at large, not merely Russia.

Nothing will raise the revolutionary energy of the world proletariat so much, nothing will shorten the path leading to its complete victory to such an extent, as this decisive victory of the revolution that has now started in Russia.³⁴

Stalin can never be less forcible than Lenin, and he declared, in his address to the seventeenth Communist Party Congress:

The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world proletariat, its vanguard; and our republic is the cherished child of the world proletariat. International ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of the capitalist countries; the fraternal alliance between the workers of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of all countries—this is one of the cornerstones of the strength and might of the Republic of Soviets. The workers of the West say that the working class of the U.S.S.R. is the shock brigade of the world proletariat. . . . It imposes upon us the duty of working better and fighting better for the final victory of socialism in our country, for the victory of socialism in all countries.³⁵

This then is the order of importance: the Marxian doctrine above all morality—for it is morality, and nothing else is. But

³⁴ Lenin, Vol. III, pp. 82-83. Quoted in *Short History of the Communist Party*, (Moscow), p. 360 (1939).

³⁵ Stalin, *Leninism*, January, 1934.

for Lenin and Stalin this must be Marxian doctrine supported by a vanguard conscious of it as the inspiration and spur of the working class. The party, as an organization for this purpose, is to prepare the revolution at home and abroad. And, finally, those at the summit of the party wield supremacy over the rank and file, for one interpretation alone of the doctrine is possible in the flux of affairs and expediency of the revolution.

In Russia an enormous gap yawned between intelligentsia and people. But in the western lands, from Germany to the United States, the working-class leaders, who had emerged from the people, the middle-class and the wealthy intelligentsia mingled with the people. In Russia, Lenin's machine would operate in the gap. His early idea was that it should be a *link* between the masses and the state; in 1917 that, with their help, it would irrevocably bind the masses to the revolution, irrespective of whether they liked it.

Therefore the party must insist on the principle of *centralism*—the total submission of rank and file to those who had captured the central executive committee.

Lenin argued that, after the end of the conspiratorial period, *democratic* centralism would replace centralism. That is to say, the principle of election would prevail. But that conspiracy never ceased: it simply moved its headquarters to Moscow. Expediency and opportunism, the Machiavellian laws for keeping power, produced not democratic centralism but dictatorial centralism. Lenin's personality and tactical cleverness won him the domination of the party; sometimes by a very small margin. The party's reunion occurred in the very middle of the Russian Revolution, July 6 to August 3, 1917, in Petrograd, five months after the overthrow of Tsarism by the bourgeois, the army, the peasants, and the workers. The party was a battle organization, subject to the utmost persecution, with Lenin and other leaders intermittently in hiding.

It follows that in the single party in a land where the property and press are altogether in the hands of the central government, and where admissions to and purges of the party are effectively in the leaders' hands, the rank and file have no control over the men in command. Where a party is not created by the spontaneous association and voluntary activity of its members, but is fashioned by a few leaders who select who shall rise to the top, and where no other independent organization can possibly be born to chal-

lenge those leaders, the rank and file are in servitude. Only the effective right of voluntary association, without previous authorization from the police and without the constitutional guarantee of the monopoly of leadership for the Communist party, would permit external pressure. The organization of such an opposition was attempted about 1927. The leaders, all the most distinguished old Bolsheviks, led by Trotsky and Zinovief, were expelled from the party, but allowed to return after recanting. Then in 1929 another group, led by Bukharin and Rykov and Tomskey, revolted against the central committee dominated by Stalin. Again these were given the chance to return to the fold. But these, according to the official short history of the Communist party, thereafter became a "white guard of assassins and spies" (p. 324), and Kirov, Stalin's closest colleague, was shot dead. This organized opposition was repressed by the bloodiest persecution. Nearly all of the first generation of Bolshevik leaders were executed and enormous liquidations and purges of the rank and file of the party were carried out.

The Communist party is the Tsar of Russia, and its Political Bureau, the supreme organ of the party, wields the rod of empire. The whole country is honeycombed by an organization ramifying to the tiniest extremities of the state, penetrating into each house and room with a satanic ingenuity far surpassing the most ambitious dreams of a tricky American ward heeler or precinct captain, the classic feats of the Jesuit Order or the perfidious counsels of Machiavelli.

It has as its assistant, the Ministry of the Interior's special police, armed, secret, deadly, the NKVD, numbering, it is estimated, some 250,000. To these are entrusted the sovereign tasks of spying, discovering, denouncing, trying, incarcerating; sending some persons into forced labor and executing obstinate dissenters and heretics. When Stalin affirms that the party courageously defends the interest of the working class and the peasants, he has fashioned this sharp and supple instrument for the purpose. It is everywhere. Its adversary is independent brains and character. The two cannot live together.

It would be wrong to think that the Communist party is merely a repressive police organ. That would be to mistake its significance for the world. It is a kind of militia, but it is also a kind of church; it is, as the Webbs have called it, a "vocation of leadership," it

is the agency and the body of a theocracy which totally combines the spiritual and secular arms, authority and force. It is vowed to self-denial, to educating itself and the people; it is vowed to self-criticism, to the service of the people in the name of Marx; and it is held to strict discipline and decent action, to a social and party altruism. If meriting penance, penance might be execution. Among its members are hundreds of thousands of inquisitors and executioners, and scores of thousands of informers. The good of the people is the good which the Central Committee of the party have directed shall be reckoned their good. If they educate, they also have to reconcile; if they cannot reconcile, they must correct; and if correction is not induced by persuasion, violence is regarded as clean, wholesome and surgical. The most terrible sin, after the mortal one of doubting the Politburo's infallibility, is to sell indulgences to lax party members or ordinary people. The magnitude of the never-ending repression is an index of the Soviet rulers' disbelief in the justification of their rule, and a lurid sign of their own terror.

The size of the party is now some 5,000,000 in a voting population of about 100,000,000. The Young Communists' Organization numbers some 20,000,000. The party is big enough to cover the country. Yet restriction to only five per cent of the electorate enables the party leaders to establish and advertise a kind of *elite*. Election to the party is difficult, as fairly serious entrance conditions are prescribed. Smallness of number permits selection to counteract dilution of opinion and weakening of cohesion. For the more individuals in a party the more individualism. The growth of party membership from 200,000 in 1917 is important, since it *may* represent a conscious policy of increasing the party to closer coincidence with the number of adults. But there is still 95 per cent of the way to go!

The bigger the party, the more widely spread is the essential doctrine; and this serves its purpose, provided Marxist theory be studied as the leaders interpret it.

THE DECLINE OF MIND

The study of Marx is always declared to be one of the most solemn duties of candidates and members of the party. This requirement produces awkward moments for the Politburo. If men

read for themselves, as once they read the Bible in its translation, discord is not impossible. Some readers may think they are more orthodox than the leaders, even than Stalin himself. They may even believe, as some have done, that Stalin is a betrayer of Marx and Lenin! Or they may misread the doctrine, and false ideas may enter their heads.

Stalin must continually exert himself to convince them that external reasons still exist for the continuance of the state, that is, the dictatorship. For they are surrounded by "wolves" and "bandits"—capitalist nations, inevitably permanent enemies. The state, as had been promised in Engels's and Lenin's myth, should have withered away. But, if a dictatorship arises for the destruction of classes, is it not bound to continue to function, since those same tough elements in human nature, which originally gave birth to classes, will go on propagating classes?

The rank and file need to be warned that the duty to reinterpret Marx is permanent.

We have no right to expect of the classical Marxist writers, separated as they were from our day by a period of forty-five or fifty-five years, that they should have foreseen each and every zigzag of history in the distant future in every separate country. . . . We can and should expect of the Marxist-Leninists of our day that they do not confine themselves to learning by rote a few general tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the essence of Marxism; that they learn to take account of the experience gained in the last twenty years of existence of the socialist state in our country; that lastly they learn with the use of this experience and with knowledge of the essence of Marxism, to apply the various general theses of Marxism concretely, lend them greater precision and improve them.³⁶

And as he said to Harold E. Stassen: "As for Marx and Engels, they were unable to foresee what would happen forty years after their death."³⁷

A Daniel come to judgment! This is most welcome doctrine. But where is the encouragement, let us say, to any clever young man to offer his independent views formed on these premises: Marx *plus* experience? May he talk freely? Supposing he affirmed that the central bureau's interpretation in his opinion was

³⁶ 18th Party Congress, *Leninism*, pp. 470 ff.

³⁷ *New York Times*; transcript of interview, May 4, 1947.

false or corrupt? Could he seek adherents? Would they denounce him? Indeed, his path is too strait and narrow. For at the previous party congress Stalin was telling of the sad fate of some of the party comrades who had innocently assumed that they, as well as he, had a right of continuous reinterpretation. They may have then recalled the passages from Lenin which Stalin quoted on this occasion, *requiring* the party members to improve on Marx and Engels. Where did it lead them but the firing squad, after a nasty public trial? Indeed, Stalin was advising his comrades to take care that, while they were looking for Right deviations, they did not fall into a Left deviation—for exile or death, or, at the least, expulsion from the party would be their reward. And then he laughingly asserted that Left and Right could get mixed up! What is the value of freedom of doctrine unless it is convertible into policy? Where is the stimulus to improve one's mind, unless it can mold the policy of the highest leaders? It is an unfortunate embarrassment to think: I'm sure that Stalin is wrong—but worse to be too terrified to say so. When the leader of a party speaks thus to his followers, what is it but an incentive to learn by heart what the leader has said?

Sometimes while fighting against the Right they turn away from the Left deviation and relax the fight against it, on the assumption that it is not dangerous or hardly dangerous. This is a grave and dangerous error. (*Leninism*, p. 349)

What is a man to do? It is safer to abandon theory and submit to the leader. *Primum vivere* . . .

Hence, theorists may cause trouble to themselves and the party. Yet if theorists are terrified out of circulation, what is their substitute for refreshment of thought and policy?

The spiritual and practical difference between Soviet rule and democratic government is as night and day, and surely to the immeasurable merit of the latter.

But the Soviet rulers pretend that they have the whole and ultimate truth about human nature and government, and something must be said briefly on this. For it is the underlying and damnable heresy. The Soviet rulers are caught in its toils. They cannot escape from their creed without admitting that their revolutionary work after 1917 was unjustified because their creed was malignant; that of the dual revolution, the overthrow of Tsarism

and the establishment of despotic Communism, the latter is reprehensible. They realize that they must, to their grief at first, repudiate Marxism unceasingly to retain their system of government. Their torsion impels them to chastise their people and the rest of the world with scorpions.

The Soviet leaders cannot be happy if their followers think, and they cannot be happy if they do not think. The rank and file can hardly ever be happy if they are thoughtful, unless they rise to the top, where whatever they say will be regarded as thinking. But could they be happy with such conditions of success?

In the Soviet state the party emerges from a doctrine: in democratic states the parties emerge out of their members, and even what parties shall arise and of what character, is determined by free association. If Stalin believes that parties are unnecessary in the "classless" state, what is the meaning of "necessity"? Why is he unable to trust the result to the people who may spontaneously choose their way of life and organization of their representatives in whatever form they think right? His only answer can be that when he has taught them what to think, and liquidated deviators, the remnants will be a party unable or unwilling to think. In which case he will certainly have abolished parties. But that requires fraud and force, and brings terror and unhappiness to those who exercise it. When they meet the indomitable force of the outside world, and do not receive their accustomed acquiescence and adulation, they react with spite.

It is quite impossible within the compass of this chapter to expatiate on Marx's theory, Lenin's adaptation of it, and the vast, arid desert of Marxist disputation. The principal tenets of Marx were elevated to a supreme and absolute philosophy, religion, and obsession by Lenin, who was no philosopher, and misused, misstated or jettisoned it for purposes of action. The cult is now guarded by an infallible pope, Lenin's successor, who alone is in the position of being able to tell what Marx means today, and to pass off counterfeits as the currency for his continued absolutism.

Above all, Marx taught, and they say that they believe, that history can tell all that the statesman needs to know, and all that the people ought to worship. It is decisive. It is the history of class struggles.

Stalin summarizes his faith for the benefit of members of the Communist party:

Hence social life, the history of society, ceases to be an agglomeration of "accidents," and becomes the history of the development of society according to regular laws, and the *study of history of society becomes a science*.

Hence the practical activity of the party of the proletariat must not be based on the good wishes of "outstanding individuals," not on the dictates of "reason, universal morals," etc., but on the laws of development of society and on the study of these laws.

Further, if the world is knowable and our knowledge of the laws of development of nature is authentic knowledge, having the validity of objective truth, it follows that social life, the development of society, is also knowable, and that the data of science regarding the laws of development of society are authentic data having the validity of objective truths.³⁸

The Marx-Leninist dogma is founded on materialism, that is, a denial of the validity of spiritual values in social policy. And Marx regarded religion as the "opiate of the people," which it can be. For religion consists in attempts to explain the worth of man, his destiny on earth by the argument that man has a soul or spirit made by a God or by Nature, with values like Justice, Virtue, Good, Charity, Individual Integrity flowing *direct* from that source, and properly in control of human relations, not excluding the economic. If it is God, it is revelation. If it is Nature, then philosophers have not been content with measurable space, dissected time, and hard matter, but have questioned its "reality," its meaning. Such mental operations were detested by Lenin who shrewdly saw that they postponed revolution by leaving the world of faith open to man, whereas he wanted to put them in the blinkers that would stop their wandering away from this Russian terrestrial concreteness. Naturally, Stalin follows with "brilliant generalizations," as becomes a former theological student who decided the Church was humbug, and who has not yet had the time to follow the thinking of Jeans, Eddington, Sherrington, Mach, Jules Poincaré, Bergson, or Bertrand Russell.

The Communist leaders have no use for sceptics of materialism, or worshippers of a non-Communist God. They prefer sceptics of non-Communist gods, and worshippers of their materialism with themselves as popes and priests. But they have not yet explained away the human, spontaneous intellectual development of

³⁸ *Leninism*, p. 415.

the natural sciences on which the epoch-making changes in economic systems are founded.

Now, all their assertions are sufficiently true to persuade those who want a revolution in any case to put themselves under the domination of leaders absolutely. Their affirmations are corrupt and wrong enough to ruin a nation, that is to say, the happiness of its people. For either the Stalinists apply Marx, or not. If they do, then their refusal to admit the spontaneous consciousness of man ruins their thesis on the nature of consciousness. They do distrust Marx on this: for they did not allow the stages of economic and social development in Russia to progress as Marxian history recorded and predicted they would and must. They kidnapped Marx, then history. They wrought a double revolution, assistance in the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, for which justification was more than enough, and, later, *the despotic conversion of the economy of the country into an economy designed to justify their existing Marxian consciousness*. The consciousness of the leaders was prior to the economic system they established. And to justify their consciousness (to keep Marxism as their guide, since otherwise they had not the slightest notion of how to guide the economy of a society), they decided to alter the entire economy so that the productive relations ensuing would produce a *post facto* justification. Industrialism gave them the factories. Collectivization of agriculture was preferred to individual ownership and Danish cooperatives, because peasant proprietors had a "bourgeois mentality." The Soviet rulers force the society to fit their doctrine, and to depend upon their everlasting power. But they can only do so by fraud and force, for the doctrine is untrue to human nature. Stalin must impress upon his followers that the few things which Marx and Engels had to say regarding the role of great men should be stressed more than they had intended, so that the Soviet intelligentsia might be justified, and especially, that Stalin and the Politburo be duly respected and deified. They also serve who only stand and hate.

The Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist theories reduce the individual to a groveler. He becomes the automaton of history and properly the puppet of those who are most conscious of history. But these reject any other history except the total view they have adopted. However, they were not disinterested; they had a purpose—revolution. Whatever the original humanism of Marx or Lenin or Stalin,

the consuming dogma became as contemptuous of individual men and women as any Asiatic despotism. It ascribes to them no creativeness; seems to recognize no personal differences in character, though it does in working ability; and none in outlook and desire. It answers none of the grave questions which have really troubled men and women and caused them to enter political life to make a society safe and rewarding. They seek no ultimate answers to: What is the nature of destiny? Why are men born? What is the nature of life itself? Is man immortal? *How much economic welfare is worth striving for* as compared with other values: leisure, the pursuit of art, the right to be lazy, the right to choose one's own job, the choice between satisfaction from more productive activity and being free to do nothing, or to criticize, or to start business for one's self, even if that means much less income in its material form? They do not explain patriotism and nationalism—why *should* a man die on the battlefield? They have tried to make this merely a problem of physical self-defense, but they have never explained why life should be preserved in the terms in which most men have pondered the question.³⁹

The Communist sophists of the Soviet rulers rejoin that these questions are either unimportant, or cannot be answered, and in either case it is idle to let them obstruct the road of social progress and the work of the party. But the questions are important, and if the answers cannot be given with certainty, this leads to a conclusion drastically adverse to the despotic system erected by the Soviet rulers. As for the importance of the questions, men have always speculated on them, and cannot help doing so as they arise from the deepest part of men's spiritual nature. As the earlier discussion of ideologies suggested, they irresistibly lead or impel men to give enduring loyalty or foment rebellions. It is man's very nature never to stop seeking an answer to the wherefore of life, the tragedy of death, and the way to spiritual assurance of immortality. His loyalties to family, city, state, other men and the world, are governed by the answers. As for the theme that no complete and final answer for these insistent perplexities can be discovered, the materialist conception certainly is not one, if no other is. No answer that is not accepted as satisfactory by all can

³⁹ Marx, in his *Communist Manifesto*, accuses "the bourgeoisie" of "drowning the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour . . . in the icy water of egotistical calculation." What else have the Soviet rulers done?

give men happiness, if it is the happiness of men which truly concerns us. Even more significant is the conclusion that no one man, no small clique have the philosophic right to claim that only they are right, and to install their assurance in the form of a despotic constitution of unconditional surrender to their sanguine creed. The way of happiness, and of compassion (for the hot fury of philosophic certainty is homicidal and sadistic), is the democratic road which opens the way, encourages each man to seek and express freely his own answer to the immense finalities that coursed through the mind of Job and the songs of David, and leaves abundant latitude for variety of mind.

The doctrine and the force have been in the hands of men who have been hunted all their lives; first by the Tsarist police, then by their own old colleagues in the Revolution; now again by their new colleagues, and also by the fear that many men have valid reason to kill them. They have denied the rights of initiative to men; they cut down in swathes those who possess ideas. Yet in spite of all their efforts, they suffer the bitter disappointment that they must ever increase the force they thrust into the venture to keep the economy going; to squeeze the amount of work from the "toiling masses" needed for *their* plans; to keep the peasants satisfied and working, and to throw off the terrible spectre of democracy—that far larger portion of the world which is wealthier and lives more happily than Soviet workers, in spite of unemployment in time of depression.

The Soviet rulers realize, and too many of their foreign-service soldiers now know, that they have attempted an utterly impossible task. For, technically, their planning is too wide and all-inclusive: *if* they achieve quantity, they fail in quality. The most dependable incentive has been taken from the peasantry. The rulers have tried to do too much too swiftly. Their methods do not and cannot secure the willing, conscientious cooperation of the many millions. Furthermore, they have failed not principally for technical reasons or lack of productive efficiency. The agricultural experience of other countries, especially of Denmark, shows that far better alternatives than the Russian are available. No; the failure issues from their very hold on power, partly to support a doctrine that denies the sound, spontaneous impulses of human nature. Russia could have had, as other countries have, modern methods of sowing, reaping, joint buying and selling, by a free

cooperative method. But the party leaders feared and declared that peasants were the continuers of bourgeois mentality—meaning that they wanted liberty, some free choice in production, their own possessions, the right of inheritance, and that they would probably be hostile to drastic state action. This, however, would contradict Lenin and Stalin.

What the Bolsheviks would never acknowledge was the alternative to their dictatorial ways of proceeding. The *Communist Manifesto* says:

The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, that is, of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.

This is eminently true. But it did not need any Marx to tell us that. It was known, long before Marx was born, by the founders of the American Constitution, and by those who, in the era before and after 1832, fought for universal enfranchisement in Great Britain and elsewhere. It cannot be regarded as an exercise of candor, then (indeed, it sounds like cajolery), when Stalin explained to Mr. Stassen in the interview published May 4, 1947:

We should respect the systems chosen by the people and whether the system is good or bad is the business of the American people. To cooperate one does not need the same systems. One should respect the other system when approved by the people. . . . We must start from the historical fact that there are two systems approved by the people. Only on that basis is cooperation possible.

But it is an untruth that the Russian system was chosen by the Russian people. The Leninist creed rejected such choice; Lenin operated on the assumption that popular choice was false and impossible; Stalin concurred and not only acts, but also talks (elsewhere), always on the same despotic basis. And the wily Stalin contrasted "monopolistic" (America) with the "totalitarian" (Soviet). But the economic structure and operation are *not* the paramount issue between the systems: the issue is the democratic in contrast with the despotic.

A democratic vote is a portion of sovereign power. Voting de-

livers the regulation of the social progress that humanity can endure into the hands of all men. But the Leninists and Stalinists subordinated all to their slogan: "Force is the midwife of every society pregnant with a new one." Only Russian Tsarism made force necessary for one country, for reasons concerned with autocracy, but less with economy. Lenin was an accident and his attachment to Marxism was an accident. Stalin writhes in the constricting toils of errors which have been perpetuated to perpetuate his power. For the Soviet rulers are so terrified of what lies in the Russian nature, which they profess to understand deeply, that they realize their power would not continue were it the free gift of the people to bestow. They are forced to continue force by their own errors and disappointments. They will continue to make everyone suffer for this, as they have already done.

Russia therefore has its third empire: the first being the Muscovite Tsardom (1535-1584); the second Peter the Great's empire (1682-1725); while that of Lenin and Stalin is the third. If Lenin's doctrine of rule and leadership and force are not imperialism, it would be interesting to know what is. No one can define exactly when Napoleon the Jacobin became Napoleon the Bonapartist—but the transmutation occurred. Such has been the fate of Stalin and his group. The Soviet rulers are trapped in the ferocity of their own obsessions: a decrepit and invalidated ideology, hypocrisy in pretending to have faith in it publicly, and acute realization of the true foundation of their status: brutality.

THE MERIT OF THE REGIME

Now, I shall give praise to the merits of the regime. When the world is faced with grave decisions, the circumstances should be clear. There was a humanist impulse in Leninism and Stalinism. It was a revolt against Tsarism. It was antityrannical. After more than one hundred years of occasional revolts against Tsarism since the French Revolution, always cruelly, even bestially suppressed, Russia was still a foul, corrupt despotism. Attempts at reform were mercilessly suffocated by the Tsars' armies and police. To rid the world of such a tyranny was an act of humane liberation. If the Bolsheviks had cooperated with other parties, especially between February and October, 1917, a social democracy could have been established. They detested the exploitation of the peasants by

"the 150,000 landlords," and rightly. They would not tolerate the exploitation of the industrial workers. The early generations of industrialists and merchants are not angels to the peasantry just come in from the fields to the factories and workshops. The exploitation of another's labor, made possible by the ownership of the instruments of production by those able to acquire or invent them, amass them by avarice, or gain them by outsmarting good-natured people, or outmaneuvering the guileless, can be cruel. Society cannot wholly trust the rule of competition to assure fair treatment for the workers. Only many decades of organization rescued the workers from oppression and secured them a fair share of the product of industry. Revolt was a generous and proper impulse on the part of the Leninists—but the trade unions could have done the job—given time. They could even have pressed employers so strongly as virtually to convert them into badly paid commission agents of labor.

Justice was also on the side of Bolshevik hostility to class differences. Though neither Marx nor Lenin clearly brought out this point, their aversion was rather to the principle of heredity, which placed the heirs at a point on the curve of income, political power, and social prestige, above their services to society. It was a protest against the inhumanity which treated the toiling masses as natural inferiors, and invented methods to reduce them to social inferiority. But the United States abolished class differences by forming a classless society, and so have other democracies formerly in the aristocratic tradition.

It is not Marx nor the democracies who are forty-five or fifty-five years out of date, but Stalin's Bolshevik economy and dictatorship.⁴⁰ Other nations are progressing toward the valid among the Marxian goals more certainly and even more speedily than the Russian state, though in speaking to the British Labor party delegation, in August, 1946, Stalin denigrated such progress as "roundabout."

Supporting Bolshevik enmity to exploitation and class was the animating idea that the task of the French Revolution, a society of liberty, equality, and fraternity, had not yet been fulfilled, but should be, as early as possible. I stress to the maximum my agree-

⁴⁰ See the highly interesting Report of the Soviet High Commission on Education on the Teaching of Political Economy. The excuses invented for retreat from crude collectivist teachings are delicious.

ment with this basic doctrine, which, now obscured, is the distant precursor and perhaps the future objective of the Soviet rulers. They have mistaken their own path so seriously that one cannot confidently say they would be happy if they were successful. Their vehicle is so undependable that they have left the road. Moreover, the Soviet rulers consider themselves and the Communist party to be the vanguard of the world. It does the world no harm to be continually reminded of oppression and cruelty rampant in the various nations and colonial possessions. Indeed, the chief complaint on this score is that the Soviet fails to apply its propagandized cures to itself, its own despotic position. The Soviet physician clings to his sickness. But that Soviet Russia has a gospel for other nations is, regardless of the disreputability of the source and the egoism of the motives, beneficial to human progress.⁴¹ It has sought, also, not entirely without ulterior motives, the establishment of "socialism in one country" as an enticement to others.

These are the values which the Soviet rulers have offered to the world, and instituted and defended at terrible cost. People who indulge an irresponsible disposition to maul the Soviet system should bear in mind that it originally accomplished an act of human emancipation of the noblest significance. Its policy of raising the standard of living by applying modern science to lighten human toil in a land where men and women and children were literally beasts of burden, is also an act of liberating the mind and inventiveness.⁴² From this I will never derogate.

The appalling, the most grievous tragedy of the situation is that these splendid social services are accompanied by political disservices so signal that they must cease, if the world is to find peace, security and justice. The Soviet rulers have continued and transmitted to the rest of the world the vileness of the Tsarist abomination they overthrew, and the fury they employed in its destruction. It was in the power of the Bolsheviks to show the disease was not hereditary. Their failure in this is their crime.

Democracy implies first and foremost the power of a people to dismiss its government by votes *against the will* of that govern-

⁴¹ Cf. *Communism in Action*, Legislative Reference Bureau, 79th Congress, House Document No. 754, pp. 33-54.

⁴² E. H. Carr in *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* has summarized the Soviet influence on the world. But the thesis is so grossly exaggerated as to do serious injustice to democracy in the western nations.

ment. No one, not even Stalin, pretends that it is possible to vote Stalin out of office. That is the acid test of democracy which the Soviet system cannot meet. It is conclusive that the Stalin system is a despotism. The Soviet rulers may profess the good of the people *for* the people. The only guarantee the Russian people possess is the good faith and ability of the rulers. The people are not asked to define their own welfare as they spontaneously decide, yet that is the essence of democracy. In the western definition and practice, the good of the people is guaranteed only if the use of authority is explicitly commanded by the people. Nothing else is a real guarantee for them or for other peoples.

As the speeches of Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky, Zhdanov, and others are read over their years of absolute power, especially those to their own party followers at the congresses and conferences, and as the tale of their activities concerning the Russian people becomes longer and more circumstantial, it is impossible to prevent the mind returning to the passage from Colonel Edward Saxby's picture of England under Cromwell:

What is the City but a great tame Beast, that eats and carries, and cares not who rides it? What's the Thing call'd a Parliament, but a mock compos'd of a People that are only suffer'd to sit there because they are known to have no Virtue, after the Exclusion of all others that were but suspected to have any? What are they but Pimps of Tyranny, who are only employed to draw in the People to prostitute their Liberty? What will not the Army fight for? What will they not fight against? What are they but Janizaries, Slaves themselves, and making all others so? What are the People in general but Knaves, Fools, and Cowards, principles for Ease, Vice, and Slavery? This is our Temper this Tyrant hath brought us to already; and if it continues, the little Virtue that is yet left to stock the Nation, must totally extinguish; and then his Highness hath completed his Work of Reformation. And the truth is, till then his Highness cannot be secure. He must not endure Virtue for that will not endure him.

CHAPTER IX

The Soviet Minority in the World

It is excellent
To have a giant's strength ; but it is tyrannous
To use it like a giant.

—*Measure for Measure*

THE INEVITABILITY OF VIOLENCE

SOME PEOPLE strongly urge that the Soviet dictatorship would not have needed or employed violence had it not been for foreign intervention to overthrow the Bolsheviks.¹ They hold the view, not that the Soviet rulers are entirely blameless, but that the violence would have been less severe, would perhaps have disappeared after a short time. It seems to me, however, that the nature of the Communist seizure of power rendered inevitable both the intervention and violence of the Revolution. Lenin hardly had a bias against force or fraud when the success of the Revolution was in question. The official history of the Russian Communist party glories in it.

Furthermore, Lenin considered his revolution far more important than staying in World War I on the side of Russia's allies, bound not to make a separate peace. Inevitably the Allied powers felt very differently about this choice. Lenin had some pretty vitriolic things to say about the Allies. He published their secret treaties. They were bourgeois governments to whose imperialism Lenin had ascribed the war—after it broke out.

As for the subsequent, postinterventionist phase of Soviet terror and dictatorship, who can believe that the Soviet policies, the expropriation of capital and the land, and the suppression of the

¹ Cf. F. L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics*, and Sayers and Kahn, *The Great Conspiracy: The Secret War Against Soviet Russia*, 1940.

Ukraine and Georgia, could possibly have been enforced without the violence actually employed? Their purposes may have been actuated by humane intentions, but the party leaders did not tarry to educate the populace. Their blows rained down on the good as well as the bad among humanity. Nobody from abroad forced them to murder their own good *moujiks*.

Moreover, they at once declared themselves the leaders of the world revolution.

To attain the victory of the world proletarian revolution the fullest confidence, the closest unity and coordination of all revolutionary activity of the working classes in all advanced countries are necessary.

These conditions cannot be realized without a complete break with and bitter opposition to the bourgeois perversion of socialism which has obtained the upper hand in the higher circles of the official social-democratic and socialist parties.²

This policy they have tried to effectuate for nearly thirty years. The only real political issue between Stalin and Trotsky was the tactic of dealing with the outside world: whether to build up strength at home first and then stir up revolution throughout the world, or whether to pursue the domestic and foreign revolutions simultaneously. At any rate, with only variations of rhythm and force, the Soviet rulers conducted a shrewd, persistent, unabashed, cynical campaign against other nations suitable to favorable or unfavorable circumstances at different points of time.

Through the Communist International, through their state diplomatic agents, and using official propaganda media, the Soviet rulers waged a steady onslaught on the whole world. They used the Communist parties of other countries to intervene in the latter's internal affairs. Their hand was in Germany, where by 1923 they fomented a revolution, unsuccessfully. Their agitation was visible in Great Britain, with the Zinovief letter of 1924 and the maximum excitement at the time of the General Strike of 1926 and the heaviest unemployment between 1929 and 1936. Down to Hitler's invasion of Russia, however desperate the travail of Great Britain, the Communist party tactic held that the war was "imperialist." The sabotage of production was encouraged. The then Minister of Labor and National Service, Mr. Bevin, declared he

² Program of the Fifth Congress of the Russian Communist Party, March 1919, revoked since then and still standing.

could not forget or forgive this, for sabotage was sabotage against the interest of the British working class in their own sober deliberate entry into war. The Soviet leaders intervened in every anti-colonial movement. They tried to stir up the American Negro. They fomented Communism in Bavaria, in Hamburg, in Hungary. They encouraged the French Communist party to espouse policies which served Russia, not France; they helped to weaken France and made her the readier for Nazi slaughter.

When German Communist revolutionary plans failed, the Soviet rulers turned "friends" of Germany, and close connections were established between the two military establishments, enabling the Germans to evade some of the Versailles disarmament arrangements. They detested the bourgeois states, but did business with them with the aid of loans, which these states were glad enough to give. They infiltrated the trade unions everywhere, in astute and disloyal minorities, to bedevil the Socialist parties, and provoke the workers to discontent with their leaders by the method of character assassination. They converted democracy's opportunities to agitate for their principles into subversions of democracy, which they hated almost more than the Fascist and Nazi regimes. In 1931 the German Communist party joined the Nazis to turn the German Social Democratic party out of office! The Soviet rulers were on good formal terms with Mussolini. . . . Their purpose was to divide and beset, and keep the world astir with troubles for their selfish benefit. If completely successful, then foreign countries would be friends of the Soviet; if only partially successful, the Soviet would still have friends in the Communist parties, or in liberal groups, and among "fellow-travelers." Thus, they would have the advantage of a brake upon the policies of other states. For many years the League of Nations was to them the "Plague" of Nations; until, with the advent of Hitler, they saw as Mr. Churchill saw, the need of collective security.

Hitler was their mortal menace. The Soviet rulers believed Hitler would inevitably be used by the Western powers to overthrow them, and thus save themselves from his demands. Poland was no darling of the Soviet rulers; nor Rumania, nor Hungary. In the first, the nationalism of the masses had expelled the Russian Communist invasion. In the second, Communism had hardly any footing: the peasants wanted to own their land. In the third, the activity of Béla Kun led to a bloody and permanent fiasco. When

the Soviet rulers entered the League for "collective security," it was for Russia's sake. Mr. Litvinoff's eloquent and intelligent proposals to define and outlaw aggression and insist on complete disarmament, could not be taken seriously, because the past diplomacy of the Soviet rulers, their dictatorial and cruel system of government, and the Comintern's world-wide war for Communism, thrust upon all other nations the dilemma of choosing between two repulsive regimes, the U.S.S.R. and the Nazi-Fascist. *If* the choice was unavoidable, bitter as it was to make, it should fall in favor of the U.S.S.R., for she at least represented progress from autocracy to a benevolent dictatorship.

The Western powers wanted neither. They were more intent on staying out of war, than on making the choice. The Soviet rulers' problem was to see, as Stalin had declared at the congress of the Communist party, that they were not used as "the catspaw to pull other people's chestnuts out of the fire." Britain and France (ought not the United States to be included?) and Soviet Russia should confess that they were equally designing in tactics and egoists in objectives. Yet the deliberate, calculated, signature of the Pact with Hitler fastens an indelible felonious stain on Stalin. Even F. L. Schuman's history, which plays hide-and-seek with morality, finds an apology for this difficult to imagine.

The Hitler-Stalin Pact made World War II certain, and ensured that it should be a war against the *proletariat of the west*. According to official evidence at the Nuremberg Trial, Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland on August 24th, 1939, *the day after the Pact was signed!*, though the campaign had been long in psychological and military preparation. *Pravda* rightly affirmed (August 23, 1940), that the Pact had "guaranteed Germany undisturbed security in the east." The Soviet rulers had not the slightest mercy on the "workers and toilers" of the world outside their own borders, and none inside. At the Nuremberg Trial, also, it was disclosed as part of Ribbentrop's defense that Molotov had negotiated with Germany, following the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, giving Russia the Baltic States, all Poland she had occupied, part of Finland, eastern Rumania, control of the Dardanelles, control over Iran and Iraq, and domination of the Persian Gulf.³ General A. Rudenko, the Soviet prosecutor, objected to introduction of the evidence, but some particulars spread.

³ Cf. *New York Times*, March 29 and March 30, 1946.

ONLY ONE LOYALTY: THEMSELVES

The Soviet rulers have ever regarded the continued existence of their revolutionary power as the supreme object of policy. For this they will sacrifice anything on the assumption, it may be supposed, that so long as that power is intact, even in a smaller territory (as at Brest-Litovsk,⁴) then some day that power and empire can be recovered and augmented. Perhaps it is truer to say simply "their power," rather than "revolutionary power," from a foreign relations point of view. In the interwar years the Soviet rulers were always ready to retreat, first "communistically" when it assisted Russia, and then nationalistically.

Their fulcrum of power is their holy of holies. Not to have signed the Hitler Pact was assuming a risk, but a noble risk. The Soviet rulers did not choose the path dictated by philanthropy. They retreated into the dark den of the stupid myth that this was "another imperialist war," to cover their shame, which, immediately after the betrayal, they veiled with astute smiles.

The myth may be contrasted with Stalin's speech of February 9th, 1946. Which explanation does he think correct? Or are both examples of Lenin's precept to suit the tactics to the times? An anti-Soviet war was for obvious reasons not possible. Those who risked war to see Hitler stopped at Danzig were not prepared to see him strengthened by a victory over Russia. They could not have induced Hitler to fight Russia in any case. At that stage, the principle of the "no two-front war" ruled his mind. The truth is that the Soviet rulers, who make a well advertised fetish of their mastery of history, never could read British history or character correctly—they underestimated the force of the British pledge to Poland. If the Soviet rulers complain that they could not assist Poland because the government of Polish colonels refused access to Polish territory, it must still be acknowledged that in the light of later maltreatment of Poland, they were right.⁵ Even so, in 1938, and as late as June, 1939, Litvinov and Molotov encouraged

⁴ On this Lenin said: "Intolerably severe are the terms of peace. Nevertheless, history will claim its own. Let us set to work to organize, organize and organize. Despite all trials, the future is ours." *Short History of the Russian Communist Party*, p. 219.

⁵ Cf. Halpern, *Liberation—Russian Style*; and Anonymous, with Preface by T. S. Eliot, *Dark Side of the Moon*, New York, 1947.

the Poles with promises of assistance. Nor could the Soviet rulers expect a good internationalist reputation after the treaty they made with Ribbentrop, and their subsequent moral support of Hitler. Their first Finnish war and the brutal scrapping of the Baltic nonaggression treaties strip them of all claims to superior morality. But if they have not this, what have they? Nothing but ugly naked power. And all who see its character cannot but take note.

It is incontestable that, for all their early humanitarian origins, the Soviet rulers are unscrupulously cruel. As time has gone on the magnitude and barbarity of the forced labor camps have been revealed. The estimates of inmates range around 14,000,000. The details are revolting.⁶ Only very small minorities are prepared to accept the Russian Communist system for their own countries.⁷ Probably none, except a score of venal or visionary or power-lustful zealots, are prepared to receive them as occupants of their countries, even on so-called missions of "liberation" and "assistance."

The Soviet rulers did not enter World War II until the knife was at their throat, and blinded by their ideological interpretation of personal and national character, could not see the knife approaching! Their congratulations on Hitler's military successes and their references to France and Britain as "aggressors," together with reproof for their failure to make peace after the fall of France, were not infrequent. Stalin actually declared (*Pravda*, November 30th, 1940): "The ruling classes of England and France rudely declined Germany's peace proposals as well as the efforts of the Soviet Union to attain the earliest possible ending of the war"! On several occasions the golden opportunity was presented to the Soviet Union to act chivalrously as a rescuer of the proletariat. The first was the actual outbreak of war in September, 1939. Once the armies of Germany, Britain and France were in the field, Russia's misgivings might have been stilled, but her rulers preferred a share of Poland. A second came just prior to French capitulation. The French "toiling masses" were about to become Nazi serfs. The Soviet "vanguard of the working classes" hung back, and their local French vanguard was no help

⁶ Cf. *Figures of Elections*, pp. 208 above.

⁷ Cf. *Communism in Action*, *op. cit.*, Chap. V.

against the Nazis. A third occasion for proletarian intervention was offered during the continued resistance of Great Britain. But it may be asked, why should the Soviet rulers rescue *foreign* proletariats, when they had forsaken their own? The Soviet rulers were callous to everything but the safety of the land of the Bolshevik Revolution, with the accent on Bolshevik faded, singing small to Hitler, and kept snug as yet by the tenacity of the British.⁸ Sheer ineptitude left the U.S.S.R. open to Hitler's attack. It was not foreseen. It was not believed, when Britain and the United States advised of its imminence.

The Russian masses fought with unparalleled valor, but they fought as bravely for their fatherland under the Tsars. Indeed, from the beginning of World War II, the Soviet rulers appealed primarily to the Russian people with such a crescendo of emphasis on nationalism and patriotism and the *Russian* heritage, that the Communist appeal was swamped. Resplendent uniforms, decorations, medals, stars, strict discipline in the hierarchy of the armed forces, the accumulation of privileges and amenities for officers, the separation of officers from rank and file, exceptional military education for the children of officers, the idolization of the nation-builders and Tsarist military geniuses, Peter the Great, Catherine II, Kutuzov, Suvarov, Nevsky, expressed and symbolized this strident trumpet blast of patriotism. The Soviet rulers also found it profitable to restore religion, once "the opiate of the people," but now a national inspiration, and the Church repays Stalin with the adoration of "the divinely appointed leader."

DID NOT BELIEVE THEY WOULD SURVIVE

A social and diplomatic fact of unsurpassable importance is the intense sigh of relief breathed by Stalin,⁹ Molotov,¹⁰ and others¹¹ at Russia's victory—their realization that the economic system did *not* break down or the Russian people revolt! That reiterated note of self-congratulation—echoed in the Stalin-Stassen interview—should be remembered: it is clearly regarded as a vote of confidence, unexpected, perhaps undeserved. It is as though the

⁸ Cf. *Communism in Action*, op. cit., Chap. V.

⁹ Stalin, Feb. 9, 1946.

¹⁰ Molotov, Nov. 6, 1945.

¹¹ Vishinsky, in *The Soviet State, Information Bulletin*, Nov. 20, 1945.

Soviet rulers can hardly believe their eyes and ears. They ought not, if they infer it means a vote against democracy.

Yet, it must be properly accounted to the credit of the regime, that *perhaps* its doctrine of the equality of opportunity and education, and its welfare services for the masses made all the difference between Tsarist defeat and Soviet victory in war, saving millions of Allied soldiers from death, and even perhaps, deciding the outcome of the war. But the Soviet rulers themselves were saved by the democratic west from the destruction which almost befell them. Whereas the story of Russian valor was told everywhere in the west, the story of the west's aid to her was recounted grudgingly and maliciously. The Soviet rulers were determined not to give due credit to Lend-Lease, to Western courage, to the winning of the war against Japan by Western arms and the first atomic bomb. The full measure of American and British assistance is still deliberately hidden from the Russian people.

The abyss between the west and Soviet Russia is reflected in a number of things that require appraisal. First is Soviet "suspicion" of the west, partly the fault of the west, but with the Soviet rulers far from innocent.

THE ANATOMY OF SOVIET "SUSPICION"

The Soviet has some ground for suspicion. The U.S.S.R. was not recognized, except grudgingly. Recognition was subject to agreements forbidding her to propagandize. In Britain her trade premises were provocatively raided for "documents." Elsewhere she was persistently baited by press campaigns, police annoyances, popular insults. The Labor parties of the west refused to accept the Communist party in any alliance against the "Munichites," in the "Popular Front" movements sponsored by the Communist parties and its non-Communist well-wishers. The trade unions fought her local friends and rejected contact with the Communist parties. Russian "trade unions" and social and economic achievements were pilloried by democratic governments and all political parties. Her rulers were ridiculed and reviled. During the "purges" they were denounced as murderers. Their legal processes were condemned as corrupt. The great treason in her own land had its outside backers of whom the official *History of the Communist Party* remarks on page 330, in language that says more for the west than its authors perhaps intended:

The surrounding capitalist world, striving to undermine and disrupt the might of the U.S.S.R., worked with redoubled energy to organize gangs of assassins, wreckers and spies within the U.S.S.R. This hostile activity of the capitalist encirclement became particularly marked with the advent of fascism to power in Germany and Japan. In the Trotskyites and Zinovievites, fascism found faithful servants who were ready to spy, sabotage, commit acts of terrorism and diversion, and to work for the defeat of the U.S.S.R. in order to restore capitalism.

The failure of France to keep her word at Munich, and British pressure on Czechoslovakia to yield to Hitler, caused the Soviet rulers to suspect an anti-Soviet coalition. The general attitude of the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments was frightening. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Lloyd George had occasionally praised Mussolini highly, not least for ridding Italy of the Communist terror, which never existed there! The failure of the League in the Abyssinian affair and against Japan, and the lack of a strong counterinterventionist policy in Spain, with its anti-Communist flavor—were interpreted as evidence of sinister designs against the security of the Soviet. The “inevitable” capitalist war was in preparation; hence the Soviet was in a perpetual state of war, and the war was a “just” war.

The alliance of World War II was preceded by the Soviet attack on Finland, justified by the same arguments as Hitler, Mussolini, and other imperialists of a bygone age had often used: “necessary for self-defense.” The U.S.S.R. was consequently *expelled* from the League as an aggressor; but other aggressors, Italy and Japan, had been able to seize their booty and to resign! Also during the first year of the war, suspicious tendencies in the public opinion of Britain and France, and even the United States, which was very friendly to Finland and bitterly hostile to the Soviet, were plentiful. Allied plans had been found for the use of Turkish bases for the bombing of Baku and Batum.

Thus objects of “suspicion” were abundant and justified. They were not material enough to infer an intention to attack Russia. But the Soviet rulers consider all neutrals to be enemies. Mr. Churchill’s speech on war alliance with Russia on June 22, 1941, and Mr. Sumner Welles’s announcement on June 23, 1941, that the United States would supply Lend-Lease, were no glowing augury for a long future of trust and harmony. Mr. Churchill,

promising all aid and friendship, nevertheless said: "No one has been a more consistent opponent than I have for the last twenty-five years. I will unsay no words that I've spoken about it." Mr. Welles, direct from conference with Mr. Roosevelt, and emphasizing the benefit to America's defense and security of "any rallying of the forces opposing Hitlerism," said: "To the people of the United States, this [denial of freedom of worship] and other principles and doctrines of communistic dictatorship are as intolerable and as alien to our beliefs as are the principles and doctrines of Nazi dictatorship." These sentiments cannot easily be washed from recollection.

During World War II the suspicions of the Soviet rulers never ceased. Would "the second front" ever come? On the Western side it was often seriously questioned whether the Red Army would ever take the offensive against the German Army. It was debated that it might stop at some point, make another pact with Hitler, and throw the brunt of the war on the Western Allies. Who could cheat whom? Would the west let Russia bleed to death? Mr. Churchill's suggestion at Yalta of a western attack through the Balkans (to keep the Russian out of eastern Central Europe) was firmly rejected by Stalin. Cruel Russian demands on Poland properly embarrassed the United States and Great Britain. Their reluctance in yielding to the Soviet claims, brutally demanded and executed, again increased Soviet "suspicions."¹²

Today, the Soviet rulers' "suspicion" seems to be even more intense than before World War II. In spite of public professions of a policy of noninterference in the governments of Rumania, Bulgaria, Germany, and Hungary,¹³ except for the extirpation of

¹² Great Britain had obligations to the Polish Government under the Mutual Assistance Treaty of August 25, 1939. There were moral obligations also stemming from the Atlantic Charter.

"The Soviet Government in the Soviet-Polish Agreement July 30, 1941, recognized the loss of validity of the territorial changes produced by the first Soviet-German Treaties of 1939; and the Declaration of December 4th, 1941, said, 'In peace time their relations will be based on good neighborly collaboration, friendship and mutual honesty and observance of the undertakings they have assumed.' Later there followed the Soviet demand for the Curzon Line and the Soviet institution of the Lublin Government, a determined intolerance of a 'strong and independent Polish State.'"

¹³ On March 4, 1947, it was necessary for the United States Government to protest the cruel persecution of the duly elected Hungarian non-Communist political leaders. But the Soviet rulers, aided by the remarkable efficiency and harshness of the general representing Russia on the occupation council, and

Fascism and the Nazis, she holds them with governments of Soviet choosing cruelly enforced or, as in Austria, dominates them by a policy of economic stranglehold. As Great Britain is the weaker, answers to her protests have been far less respectful than to the United States. With heavy contingents of Soviet troops in Rumania and Bulgaria, the Soviet-propped governments have flouted the promise of free elections and have scoffed at the United States and British official protests. In the Russian zone of Germany, the Communist attempt to dominate political life has been pursued by the usual iniquity of persecution and murder of opponents. The infamous campaign has been led by Pieck and Albrecht, old well-nurtured Soviet friends,¹⁴ yet Soviet Communism has been rejected by the voters.¹⁵ The Soviet ruler give

avored by the Communist leader Deputy of the Cabinet, M. Rakosi, Russian nurtured and Soviet trained, persisted with their plan to make Hungary "democratic." The Smallholders party, which had gained 57 per cent of the votes at the elections of November, 1945, was displaced in early June, 1947, from its preponderant position in the government, its leaders arrested or scattered, the Prime Minister, who resisted the Communist coup, forced to flee, amid charges of an "antirepublican" or "antidemocratic" conspiracy alleged to have been engineered by these men. To the American complaint that Russia was guilty of "most flagrant interference" in Hungarian affairs; that the three powers were entitled to an investigation, and that the Yalta Agreement regarding the government of the former enemy countries had been violated by Russia, the Russian commander General V. P. Sviridov, replied with a tart, contemptuous, truculent, evasive note, brusquely rejecting the American request, and rejoicing that "democracy" had defeated a conspiracy against it. He pointed out, what had not been evident enough to the whole world, that it was the Russian policy not to interfere in the affairs of other nations, and suggested that American interest in the matter disregarded this principle! The reason for the coup, prepared long before the Truman Doctrine was uttered, was the approaching ratification of the treaties with the Danubian countries, the prelude to the withdrawal of the occupying powers' troops. Thus 17 per cent of the voters rule the country and prepare new "elections." It is a pity the United States Senate did not ratify the Hungarian Treaty earlier.

¹⁴ Cf. article in the *American Mercury*, Nov., 1946, by Ruth Fisher; and Boris Shub, *This Month*, Nov., 1946, p. 25. Mr. Shub served with the U.S. Information Control in Berlin. This is corroborated by Russell Hill's *Struggle for Germany*, London, 1947. Mr. Hill was correspondent in Germany for the *New York Herald Tribune*.

¹⁵ On Oct. 21, 1946, the Berlin Municipal Elections, in which roughly two million votes were cast, gave the following results: the Socialist Unity party (Communist, favored by the Russian authorities with food, newsprint, office room) obtained under 20 per cent; the Social Democratic party (persecuted in the extreme, and its position confused for the electors by the Russian imposed merger of some of their leaders with the Socialist Unity party) scored

no rest, but stubbornly pursue the policy of getting and holding all they can for the longest possible time; not allowing Europe to find peace, because peace would make Europe strong.

Hardly a conciliatory action among the many that were made to still Russian suspicions was accepted with clear good grace. Yet much was done, especially by President Roosevelt, and following his lead, by Great Britain. He is reported to have described his design as intended to "enroll the Soviet Union as a sincere and willing collaborator in postwar settlements."¹⁶ With this purpose, from Teheran onwards, he attempted to reconcile British-Soviet differences at the many points where their interests clashed. This was not easy; indeed, it was not possible. Mr. Roosevelt came to recognize this, saying, it is alleged, "The Russians are not playing fair with me. They are ignoring the spirit and the letter of the agreements which I made with them."¹⁷

The Western powers let fall a veil of oblivion over the Soviet rulers' annexation of the Baltic States. No great opposition was made to their appropriation of slices of Finland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Germany. They obtained the Kurile Islands without any hocus-pocus of "trusteeship" or mandate obligations. (Yet they bitterly protest the desire of South Africa to annex South West Africa!) They returned not only to the northern half, but to *all* of Sakahlin in the same unrestricted sovereignty. They resumed their status in Manchuria. They obtained the right to occupy Northern Korea for five years. Poland was extended deep into Germany, and Rumania into Hungary—with Western consent. The Soviet rulers, while the going was good, acquired their position in Yugoslavia (destined most probably to be the point of origin of the next war) by establishing Marshal Tito, and so bringing Russian influence of a very direct kind into the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and applying it to Italy and Greece. They asked for and obtained the right to deport millions of Germans from Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.

just under 49 per cent of the votes; the Christian Democratic Union, 23 per cent; the Liberal Democratic party (conservatives) about 9 per cent.

¹⁶ Demaree Bess, *Saturday Evening Post*, June 29, 1946, p. 10. Cf. also Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It*, New York, 1946, for an account of the conciliation of the Soviet Union.

¹⁷ Bess, *Saturday Evening Post*, June 29, 1946, p. 98.

SWEET ARE THE USES OF SUSPICION

What weight can be ascribed to the "suspicion" of the Soviet rulers as a factor in international policy? Their suspicion that many people in many lands would gladly support the destruction of Soviet power is well founded, but grossly, even dangerously exaggerated, as to quantity, force, and imminence. This hostility is not pure reciprocation for the subversive desires of the Soviet rulers. It springs in part from detestation of the Soviet ideal of Communism, of the incontestable and vaunted despotism of their rulers, but still more from dislike of their annihilation of democratic rights and individualism of all kinds. Some unfriendliness expresses the egoistic attachment to an unplanned economy by a few who take excessive advantage of the freedom allowed them by a democracy.

It is submitted, however, that the Soviet rulers employ "suspicion" far beyond the degree warranted by these factors, and as a deliberate psychological weapon against the nations. By agitating suspicion, they play on the sense of guilt felt by so many innocent people of good will, and impel them to wonder whether there is not, after all, some reason for remorse and reparation toward Russia. This perturbation puts them on the defensive and induces them to retreat. The more just a western statesman is, the greater is the power of this plea that an injustice is being done to Russia. Quieter nations are worse off than troublemakers—this was also a dictum of Mussolini and Hitler, and is a regular tenet of German classic diplomacy.

Soviet "suspicion" is, however, something more than this. Much Soviet "suspicion" is the direct personal fault of the Soviet rulers themselves. They rose from obscurity to power by a lifetime of conspiracy and were hunted by the police, their lives worth perhaps only a minute's purchase. Or they have been educated and indoctrinated entirely by such men and promoted for fidelity to them. They remained in power only by executing thousands of their comrades, and by conducting an incessant search, revolver in hand, for conspiracy and betrayals. Of course, they are "suspicious." Their "suspicion" is intensified by their status as a despotic minority, guilty of enforcing on others harsh servitude, and wearing a yoke of impossible duties and the wind-searched

rags of a Marxian faith betrayed because its true ethos denied them the right to autocratic power. They know they are cheats. They expect punishment to follow.

In part, therefore, Soviet "suspicion" is unappeasable because it lies in the character of the rulers and their despotism. In part, it may be allayed by ignoring it—when they require concessions. But it cannot honorably be appeased, since it involves claims on the vital interests of others and concessions of ultimate principle, which is moral suicide.

Since the close of the World War II, the Soviet rulers have established many other foci of "suspicion." Their request for a billion dollar loan was "lost" in passage between the United States Foreign Economic Administration and the United States State Department. The United States loan to Great Britain was publicly advocated (most improperly and unfairly for the borrower) in part as strength for an ally of the United States and the Western democracies against potential Soviet aggression. The Colmer Committee of the House of Representatives made drastic proposals regarding loans to Russia—none except on conditions guaranteeing the "open door."¹⁸ The demand for an "open door" for *all* nations to trade in the Danube Valley made by the United States and Great Britain, and for collaboration in international control (nearly 100 years old) of the Danube, was resented and ferociously repudiated at the various peace conferences of 1946, especially that of July. Even the proposal made at the General Assembly of the United Nations for an international conference was rejected! And a similar proposal made by the Economic and Social Council was for long obstructed, then met by the Soviet's promise to be absent. It even appears that Czechoslovakia, to whom the United States Government was prepared to make a loan, demurred at a clause requiring her to join a world trade organization, lest this might "exclude" the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc of states. The American demand for the statement of the Lend-Lease account was for long received with dignified silence. The British zone in Germany has been the object of continuous Soviet criticism—alleged to harbor hundreds of thousands of Nazis in uniform—yet when challenged at the Moscow Conference in the spring of 1947, incapable of substan-

¹⁸ Cf. Eighth Report, *Economic Reconstruction in Europe*, 1945, pp. 29 ff.

tiation by Mr. Molotov. In Britain and elsewhere the Polish Army of General Anders, numbering 60,000, was repudiated by Poland and the Soviet as an insult and menace to Polish sovereignty—though only 23,000 were agreeable to repatriation. (The Soviet rulers have Poland to the Curzon Line; the Polish Government is their nominee; Poland has been put at their mercy by the crime of extending it into historic German territory—and *still* the 60,000, or rather the 40,000, stick in their throat. You can be a friend only if you totally submit!)

Suspicion was aroused by British and American denazification, not quick or thorough enough in Soviet rulers' opinion. Yet Mr. Bevin proved to Mr. Molotov at Moscow that only *one* Nazi held office, and he had been cleared by a German court. But to the list of names of many Nazis in office in the Soviet zone presented by Mr. Bevin, Mr. Molotov made no answer. Their judge in the International War Crimes Tribunal protested the release of Schacht and von Papen, and the prison sentences given other Nazis. The cruise of units of the American fleet in the Mediterranean in probable support of Greece and Turkey against left wing and Soviet pressure, caused chagrin and more suspicion, at least, before Stalin declared himself "indifferent." The military exploration of extreme North Canada together with Canadian Forces, the assimilation of American and Canadian arms, American Army Air Force flights over the North Pole and other long distance flights, the official declaration of assimilation of United States and British arms, and the continued operation of the American-British Combined General Staff were by no means sedatives to the Soviet rulers. They saw Hitler almost destroy Russia. They have heard or read of foreign demonstrations of Soviet inefficiency. They were unwilling to have too many foreign journalists at the Moscow Conference of 1947. These "suspicions" were "right": it was necessary after the conference to declare the journalists' reports about Russia to be "slanders" and "lies," in spite of the extremely varied political outlook of the respective newspapers.

For the Soviet rulers are still a world minority, and indeed, far more of a political minority than when World War II began. For, in the course of the long intellectual struggle, the social and economic superiority of the social democratic states has become increasingly obvious to the common man. As a tempting short cut

to an economically better world, dictatorship is discredited—the west sees it to be only a sharp cut.

Time, permitting the accumulation of knowledge of Soviet *action*, has enabled the untruth of Soviet professions to be more correctly evaluated. Historic reasons, other than dictatorship, can be given for Russia's economic backwardness. Yet the appalling technical inefficiencies of the despotism, however kind the intentions of the rulers, have been nakedly exposed. Soviet Russia is no longer an assignment in Utopia. Her rulers cannot deliver the goods as efficiently as democratic systems, assuming an equality of natural resources, climatic endowments, and geographical expanse. Her politico-economic system is impossibly overcentralized. Her discipline of work is grinding (years ago unemployment pay was abolished!) and production is comparatively poor. *If* a clear-cut choice had to be made between the capitalist incentive of profit, and fear of sharp punishment by rulers who live in an atmosphere of betrayal, then the former gives the happier results for the greatest number.

THE WAY OF MINORITY RANCOR : SOVEREIGNTY

Since the close of World War II, the minority rancor-morale of the Soviet rulers has been especially obtrusive. The most masterly exponents of the veto power while the United Nations was being established, they have remained its preeminent manipulators since. All of Mr. Roosevelt's persuasion was necessary, after the failure at Dumbarton Oaks, to secure Soviet agreement to exempt from the veto "procedural" questions, and to exclude the parties to a dispute from voting in the pacific stages of settlement. In the General Assembly Debates, beginning November 14, 1946, to modify the veto, Mr. Vishinsky affected to argue that the agitation was a design by the small nations simply to divide the Big Five! As the British delegate, Philip Noel-Baker observed: "There could have been unanimity on nearly every occasion if our Soviet colleague had decided on unanimity."

The Soviet delegates were firmer than any other nation in support of the principle of the sovereign right of states to withdraw. They had to be vigorously pressed to admit that Article 35 could be interpreted as not preventing an international situation or dispute from admission to the agenda of the United Nations.

They later used the interpretation to raise the issue of the British in Greece. Soviet diplomats more than any others opposed the keeping of the matter of Iran on the agenda. They insisted that the reports of the Security Council to the General Assembly should not be subject to criticism, as this would reduce the stature of the Council. But they permitted the Assembly only to respond to the *problems* raised in the reports—a symptomatic difference.

They were the strong advocates of the qualification of "peace-loving" for membership to the United Nations. What they mean by this term has been revealed by events. The Soviet did not attend the Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago in 1945, because Spain and Portugal were to be present. (Portugal was an opponent of the Soviet's admission into the League in 1935. The Soviet does not permit flights across Russia.) They resisted the admission of Argentina in a masterly, but unsuccessful, campaign at San Francisco against American championship. But later they resumed good relations with the Argentine Government at a period when the United States was at serious ideological odds with the Perón government. They demand the ousting of Franco, by force if necessary; a procedure which would embarrass Britain and the United States. They refuse to admit Spain into the World Court. They have rejected the membership of Ireland and Portugal, but advocate the admission of Albania and the Outer Mongolian People's Republic. Mr. Vishinsky's definition of "peace-loving" appears to be "anti-Fascist," and "anti-Fascist" means "pro-Soviet."¹⁹

The Soviet delegates, far more severely than other great powers, have steadily opposed the demands of the small nations for a more effective share in the management of world affairs through the United Nations. They more than others have advocated intervention in the affairs of other countries, such as Spain and Iran. In the latter they encouraged and assisted a rebel movement in Azerbaijan after having evaded the clear terms of a treaty; and then, when the central government of Iran sent troops to oust the rebels, strongly warned the government to keep its hands off. But the central government won, presumably because Moscow considered the risks of conflagration

¹⁹ Cf. Speech before Committee III, General Assembly, United Nations, November 6, 1946.

too serious. Yet they have been the grand objectors to the presence of the British in Greece, and Holland in Indonesia. Mr. Gromyko with the same object has besought the United Nations to inquire into the deployment of Allied troops in countries not formerly enemies. The United States and Britain countered with a demand for a census of troops everywhere. The Soviet then proffered a new plan to the Assembly: "general disarmament," including the atom bomb. The Soviet delegates have played tactics delaying the fuller definition of the fundamental rights proposed by the Charter to be progressively applied to all peoples.²⁰

The U.S.S.R. was the only state to request that United Nations officials be *persona grata* to their nations, though it was well established League of Nations' practice that they were exclusively loyal to the instructions of the world organization, a tenet also adopted by the United Nations. The Soviet secured a triple representation on the General Assembly (the Soviet Union, White Russia, and the Ukraine. The British Commonwealth votes are legally and actually in a far different category, for the Commonwealth possesses no monopolistic Communist party to force the Dominions into line.) Thereby the U.S.S.R. has three voices for one Politburo. Thus, M. Manuilsky, the Ukrainian delegate and sometime secretary of the Comintern, is able to resume the charges against British presence in Greece when Mr. Gromyko's scene is over. Those votes, added to those of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, may some day decide the elections to the nonpermanent seats on the Security Council.²¹

Against considerable opposition at San Francisco to Article 6, which provides that a member of the United Nations persistently violating its principles may be expelled, the Soviet insisted the Article be retained. Since a recommendation for expulsion could come only from the Security Council, the veto power would be invoked, and the expulsion of the U.S.S.R., or a power favored by her, could hardly occur, but she could worry other powers.

The Yalta Agreement of February, 1945, required that the governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, and other liberated states

²⁰ Cf. *Journal*, Economic and Social Council, for 1946 and 1947, and especially papers of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Freedom of Information and the Press.

²¹ In November, 1946, as a kind of retaliation against the Soviet demands, the small nations would not vote for places on the Economic and Social Council for Poland or Yugoslavia.

or former Axis satellites, be established "broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through *free elections* of governments responsive to the will of the people." American correspondents, diplomatic observers and escaped nationals have shown far beyond the shadow of a doubt that these lands have been infiltrated and bullied by Soviet and Comintern agents, their governments planted, the opposition dispersed or murdered, the elections faked by open terror or chicanery. In June, 1947, as part of a seemingly general plan of Communist domination, the chief Bulgarian opposition leader was imprisoned on the usual charges of plotting to overthrow the government—the government of Georgi Dimitrov, former Secretary-General of the Communist International. To American and British protests false and scoffing answers have been made with a more ringing truculence in the replies to the British, as they are less powerful and momentarily in trouble, and such truculence serves the Soviet overlords.

The western boundaries of Poland were by the Potsdam Agreement provisional and to be determined at the peace settlement. On September 4, 1946, Mr. Byrnes reminded the powers of this, but within a few days Mr. Molotov gave a brusque answer in Frederick the Great's true style—the fact was accomplished! In these areas Stalin admits there are sixty divisions, while Mr. Churchill claims there are 200. The Soviet rulers arrogated to themselves one-half of Hungarian industry and transport by a trade treaty of October 21, 1945. When the British Foreign Secretary, to whose island country every minute opportunity of trade is truly vital, protested, their answer was: "The Soviet Government does not consider that legitimate British interests are affected by these agreements!" (Notice the unilateral definition of "legitimate"!) Later they seized Hungarian oil fields. The industries of Rumania have been organized into Soviet-Rumanian corporations, with a one-half share for the Soviet, though this was a field of British and American investment and trade up to the war. A large part of Austrian industry has been seized as "German" assets, though the assets were taken by the Nazis by duress.

The Soviet rulers have loosed a "war of nerves" on Turkey for the cession of areas along the Black Sea that they covet, and the "return" of Armenian provinces formerly "belonging" to

Russia. The maintenance of defense preparations is an intolerable drain on Turkish resources, lowers the standard of living of her masses, and also imposes a strain on Britain and America, Turkey's supporters. The Soviet Government made an agreement to supply the Yugoslav Army with equipment and to develop the government's armament factories.

The policy of Mr. Truman, of March 12, 1947, described as the Truman Doctrine, was a direct, a desperate, and an unavoidable consequence of the knowledge of Soviet policy and tactics so far indicated.²² The Doctrine was pronounced a few days after a speech of hate made (March 6) by Mr. Gromyko in rejecting the American (and the Atomic Energy Commission's) proposals for control of atomic energy. It should not be believed that the Soviet behavior in Hungary or Bulgaria is an answer to the Truman policy: that behavior began long ago. Indeed, it began with the seizure of power in Russia in November, 1917. The Doctrine was written with abundant knowledge of the assistance of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania (the first two of which are ruled by men nurtured for years in Moscow), to Greek guerrillas fighting against the Greek Government which had been duly elected by the Greek people and under the observation of hundreds of British and American and French observers. The United Nations' Commission for investigating the Greek border conditions was contested in its formative stages by Poland and Russia; allegations of the disloyalty of some of the United Nations secretariat coming from those nations have been made—though not yet clarified—the whole Commission has, with only Polish and Soviet unfavorable votes, declared the complicity of the three countries named as being the prime source of Greek troubles; Bulgaria has refused to allow the necessary on-the-spot investigation by the Commission's officers; and the Soviet and Poland voted in favor of a resolution by the former to restrict the investigating activities on the border. For their argument is that this would constitute "interference in their internal affairs."! It is unavoidable to draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union wishes to install a Communist regime in Greece, though the Communists are in a small minority, and is not unhelpful in keeping up a cruel torture of the Greek people by the wasting war on their

²² This account was written several months before March, 1947.

economy entailed in fighting off the guerrillas—a running sore.

The enormity of the Russian rejection of a Commission to supervise events in the border lands of the Balkan countries may be measured by the high hopes which adherents of the League entertained of such Commissions “on the spot” to abate hostility merely by their presence, to discourage breaches of the law because they could observe and publish them to the world, and to be witnesses of aggression. Here was one effective instrument of world government, without force, but exercising the coercive effect of an outsider’s impartial revelation of the facts. Suppose the famous Lytton Report on the Japanese-Manchurian affair had preceded aggression, instead of succeeding it! But this is exactly the situation in the Balkans. Can a nation that rejects such a Commission be “peace-loving”? Decidedly not!

Such international behavior is the demeanor of a minority obsessed with the certainty that it is a *permanent* minority, and is fighting a crucial battle that must not be lost. It builds barricades for its sovereignty, assets for bargaining with other peoples, and satellite votes to throw into the scales. Contemporary insistence upon procedure by treaty is strongest with the Soviet Union: for it allows her to avoid general commitments and to define her engagements point by point as it serves her policy, or stay out.²³

The people of the Soviet Union were not allowed to experience a detailed and lively nation-wide public discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the United Nations Charter such as occurred in the United States and Britain. Ratification was a simple act of the Presidium: there were no congressional debates, no committee hearings, no cross-examination of Molotov by a free press and independent representatives of the public. In fact, the original reluctance of the Soviet rulers merits careful remembrance. It was all that Mr. Roosevelt could do to get Mr. Molotov to attend: the Soviet rulers did not see why the world could not be managed by the Big Four alone—perhaps the Big Three.

²³ Cf. American Journal of International Law, October 1946, for an article on “The Second World War and International Law” by Eugene A. Korovin, Professor of International Law and Juridical Institute of the Ministry of Justice, pp. 751 ff. This article places a seventeenth century value on absolute state sovereignty *for the Soviet Union*, but manages to safeguard the supremacy of Soviet Communism wherever Moscow desires to intervene.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ISOLATION

The Soviet Union is not a member of any of the world economic and social agencies, excepting the World Health Organization. She is not a member of the World Court. Though many concessions were especially made for her sake at Bretton Woods and she was frequently entreated to join, she is not a member of the World Bank or Monetary Fund. She is missing from the ranks of the Food and Agriculture Organization.

She has cold-shouldered the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Her Yugoslav protégé (represented by an observer, Vladislav Ribnikar), has very pointedly asked whether the materialist conception of history—recognized and its general outlook adopted by a great country, the Soviet Union—would be part of the educational doctrine of UNESCO, and whether world education and world peace would be possible without it?²¹ Stoutly inveighing against a forcible dissemination and imposition upon the peoples of the world of UNESCO's "own philosophy labelled 'World Scientific Humanism,'" he admonished the conference:

Let us not forget that the campaign against dialectical materialism was one of the main features of the Fascist regimes: they called upon the peoples to fight the Soviet Union in the name of European civilization. It is impossible for UNESCO to take a similar attitude, while declaring itself in favor of international cooperation and the "free flow of ideas."

The absence of a Soviet delegation to the General Conference shows that such work cannot succeed. It seems unnecessary to point out that no cultural cooperation between the United Nations is conceivable without the collaboration of the Soviet Union, just as it would be difficult to imagine the United Nations without the Soviet Union.

It was hardly proper of Mr. Ribnikar to forget that the Fascist and Nazi regimes were fought not only by the Soviet Union, but by Western democracies who do not accept either his or Stalin's philosophy, or even their *political* application of Marx.

²¹ UNESCO, General Conference, First Session, Verbatim Record, November 21, 1946.

She has rejected invitation after invitation to return to the International Labor Organization from which she was expelled on her ejection from the League in December, 1939. In the I.L.O. she was in an uncomfortable minority, partly because her representation lacked free delegates of the trade unions, since Soviet trade unions are altogether state dominated. But the I.L.O. also contains, by Soviet definition, states that are or were not "peace-loving": Portugal, Finland, Argentina. The Soviet rulers and the Comintern venomously hated the International Federation of Trade Unions, founded in Amsterdam in 1919—the good, genial, *democratic* workers who would not follow the path blazed by Lenin, but were the mainstay of the democratic I.L.O. Therefore, they astutely organized the World Federation of Trade Unions, installed in Paris, November, 1945, to represent the world-wide left wing trade union movements under the secretaryship of Louis Saillant, secretary of the French Confédération Générale du Travail, now very far to the left. Thus, in part, the consistent failure of the Comintern in the interwar years to capture and use the trade unions is redeemed. The U.S.S.R. proposed that the World Federation be accorded special representation on the Economic and Social Council and full participation without vote, so that it, rather than the I.L.O., might be spokesman of labor. They secured the right to have their motions put on the agenda. They have been fierce in assailing, and successful in deferring, establishment of an International Relief Organization for displaced persons, regardless of the suffering of so many of these proletarians, if this permits relief to refugees who do not wish to return to Russia, Poland or Yugoslavia, "criminals" according to Mr. Vishinsky. The attitude to the nascent International Trade Organization is one of aloof sneering *in absentia*.

What is the explanation of this resolute self-exclusion from the agencies? The answer is obvious. In the first place, Soviet Russia's completely planned economy does not require steady economic relations with other countries. Assistance in health alone has industrial and military advantages. But for the rest, she prefers to acquire friends, supporters and protection with the minimum concession on her part of her national independence. Membership in the W.F.T.U. gives this to some extent. But her home labor standards are a matter for herself. For decades she will not compete in foreign markets: she can be self-sufficient,

for the standard of "self-sufficiency" is what the Soviet rulers say it is, and not at the level the Russian people independently will that it shall be. She does not seek foreign trade, for she has a vast area of economic development in her national grasp. She can raise credits other than through the World Bank. She produces enough gold for extraordinary trading needs. She can see no wisdom in assisting to develop the economic strength of countries whose foreign policy she does not dominate. Besides, she never ceases to profess belief in the doom of capitalist enterprise: why hitch her wagon to a train that must jump the rails? (Some American apologists for Soviet Russia's isolation are already using this argument as a Soviet merit!) Better to adapt the economy of Poland, eastern Germany, Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to hers, and keep out the United States and Great Britain. Her whole history since January, 1946, on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has been a merciless spoiler's tactics: to prevent progress toward a European Economic Commission, to prevent the opening of the Danubian areas.

Members of the specialized agencies are pledged to give considerable information to officials who are capable of putting statistical two and two together.²⁵ Why suffer publicity when so little the Soviet rulers want is obtainable in return? Every revelation of poverty or incompetence, or brutal work-discipline must produce a loss of prestige abroad. It is expensive for Russia and bad for her foreign Communist advertisers.

Finally, it would be politically foolish to become a member of any international agency in which the Soviet was most likely to remain a permanent minority voter, for the agencies usually vote by simple or two-thirds majority vote. Why be outvoted even on mere recommendations? Why have one's minority position perpetually demonstrated to a vigilant world?

EXPANSION OR DEFENSE?

The Soviet policy is first a policy of disengagement, of strategic isolation. Her rulers seek all the advantages of sovereign independence for themselves, with the simultaneous right to inter-

²⁵ See Article XIV of the Final Act of Bretton Woods.

fere in all things everywhere else. They throw apples of discord among the other members of the United Nations. They prod Britain with the slander that the United States is usurping her former world position; they have attempted in the negotiation for extension of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty to get Britain to incline away from the United States,²⁶ and restrain free press comment on Russia. They suck from surrounding nations whatever of independence and wealth they can for the enhanced strength and security of the Soviet Union; they encourage the resurgence of the tactics, if not the organization, of the Communist International, dissolved in 1943 in an ambiguous statement. Soviet rulers are obliged to persuade their people by consummate perversion of the truth, that other nations, especially the Western ones, have nothing to offer them of the social values they are planning to provide; that is to say, wealth. They sever Russia from the rest of the world; they hide; they subvert foreign strength by propaganda, especially among colonial peoples.

Since Soviet rule is illegitimate government, it is organized for secrecy. It can neither admit the full and fair reporting of other systems, nor the authority of the United Nations when it asks for freedoms. Nor can or does it permit the entirely open and continuous reporting of its procedures, policies, or operations. After considerable censorship of news reports from Moscow, the broadcasts carried on from Moscow during the war were permanently banned in November, 1946. It is more difficult to censor a broadcast than a written report.²⁷ Reporter after reporter has been expelled from the Soviet Union or Soviet dominated areas.

The Soviet rulers are consigned to a permanent minority status on two counts: their authority is illegitimate, and their secrecy sunders them from the rest of the world. They are perfectly happy with this situation: they value the possession of their persecution neurosis. The rulers must vaunt the purity of their regime and seek a reputation for it, sullied though it is by the treaty association with Hitler, or nothing would any longer shroud the viciousness of its employment of force and chicanery.

²⁶ This is the interpretation some foreign commentators put on the stipulation that Britain should not take part in any bloc or action aimed directly or indirectly against the Soviet Union. Cf. *News Chronicle*, London, April 21, 1947.

²⁷ The disclosures in Paul Winterton's *Report from Russia* may have inspired the unfriendly ban. And see p. 336 ff. below on the Soviet attitude in the United Nations Commission on the Freedom of the Press.

All these characteristics of attitude and activity make very difficult the answer to the conundrum, whether the Soviet rulers are animated by ideas of world expansion and world revolution, or merely by the need for security and defense. *No one is in a position to tell for certain: this in itself is ground for grave international concern.* Let it not be forgotten that the very issue of war and peace may depend on our inability to gauge the state of mind of twenty men—perhaps even of one man. The free expression of spontaneous and widespread opinion that would enable an observer to deduce a fairly reliable judgment, does not prevail. Only the collective, undifferentiated mind of a secret conclave, the Politburo, thinks, decides, and speaks. The most startling reversals of Soviet and Comintern policy have occurred without any warning, without any straw in the wind of public opinion to guide and calm foreign statesmen and peoples. This is partly due to a formula for diplomatic tactics—Lenin's policy of "sharp turns."

The speeches of Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky and Gromyko, the articles in *New Times*, the other authoritative journals of the regime, the essays on tactics by Lenin, and the long zigzag course, the pressures and the alternate brusqueness and wheedling of practical policy over thirty years, warrant some fairly firm conclusions. Wherever they can the Soviet rulers will sponsor Communist parties and Communist regimes, if there is any prospect of their subservience to Moscow. The closer the areas to the home borders, the fiercer their resolution, and the more infamous their methods as necessity dictates, as in Poland, Germany, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and the refusal to evacuate Austria. If opposition is encountered, backed by an imminent threat of force, they will retreat, as in Greece, Turkey and Iran, to return again as defensive pressure is relaxed. They will exert pressure as unflaggingly as the water in a high dam which seeps down wherever a minute fissure allows it to escape. They will encourage their ideological friends everywhere to the disruption of other nations' policies. For the larger their Communist parties and block of votes, the better the chance of coalition cabinets in which they have a ministerial share, penetrating to the most central and intimate councils of other peoples, with access to significant official information. Their radio and press services will be used to exacerbate class differences in other countries. Confusion,

dissension, uproar, unrest abroad are allies of the Soviet rulers. It is the Soviet version of "Divide and rule!" The Canadian Royal Commission has in photostatic detail shown the manner of operation of the Soviet Foreign Service, the military attache, and NKVD abroad.²⁸

No democratic nation today has within the Politburo of Soviet Russia its own ideological representatives, friendly supporters, or even its own political party colleagues, as the Soviet rulers have in the Prime Minister and other ministers of Czechoslovakia; four ministers (health, food, public works, and reconstruction) in the Belgian Government; and in the French Government, M. Thorez, the Vice-Premier, and the ministers of National Defense, Labor, Public Health and Population, until the Socialist Prime Minister, M. Ramadier expelled them and was upheld by the National Assembly. No country has in the Soviet Union the right to run a journal like the *New Republic* under Mr. Henry Wallace in New York, nor to raise public parliamentary objections to the policy of the Presidium of Council of Ministers, as Messrs. Gallagher and Piratin in the British House of Commons.²⁹ Such tolerant practices are not admitted in the Soviet system. Partisan dissidents are killed long before they arrive at the threshold of the Politburo.

The Soviet rulers do not necessarily want other countries at present to go Communist altogether: this would frighten them, for they fear the loss of world leadership, and other countries might outshine the Kremlin in economic planning and its fulfillment. But it is essential for a permanent minority to be able to count on both friends and confusion abroad.

What a blessing for the world, what a promise for peace, if the Politburo and the Soviet Council of Ministers received as equals the representatives of foreign democratic political parties of all colors! The distance the world is from that event is roughly the distance the world is from peace!

The Soviet rulers are certainly concerned today with the se-

²⁸ "To investigate the facts relating to . . . the communication . . . of secret and confidential information to agents of a foreign power." June 27, 1946, Ottawa, Canada.

²⁹ Before the House of Commons Debate, November 18, 1946, when some Labor party left-wingers revolted against the government's alleged "pro-American" and "anti-Russian" policy, K. Zilliacus, M.P., explained *his* opposition to the government to the Newcastle Branch of the British-Soviet Society.

curity of the land of Soviet revolution. If they can acquire influence and domination abroad, well and good—but not to pursue this at an exorbitant cost, such as a tangible risk of war. Otherwise, the priority is reserved to security and defense.

Now the degree of concern for security may be so passionate that it produces exorbitant and resented demands on others. If the man in the street, out of sheer concern for his own security, went back and forth to office and home in an armed truck with a flying squad of tommy gunners, violating speed limits to avoid being shot, it may be accepted that he would induce military reactions, even without an ideology. The Soviet rulers are in just such a position. They have made, as has already been noted, the most exaggerated demands on other nations for their security, partly as a product of their "suspicion." And their suspicion is, in part, a product of their Marxian-Leninist dogma of the inevitable hostility of the rest of the world, of their fanatical, unrelenting, unappeasable hatred of capitalist and social democratic societies. They need a justification to live by, a cause for sustaining pride; and though it is time-worn, the only thing that distinguishes them from marauders or sheer lusters after power is the incense of the Marxian creed.

When the British and American governments proffered assistance to Russia on Hitler's invasion, reserving their disavowal of the Soviet regime, Ambassador Maisky declared on September 24, 1941, on the Soviet signature of the Atlantic Charter:

The Soviet Union defends the right of every nation to the independence and territorial integrity of its country, and its right to establish such a social order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and necessary for the better promotion of its economic and cultural prosperity.

Could it be honestly judged that the Soviet has given the benefit of this principle to other lands in anything like the measure she has demanded and wrested it for her own domestic advantage? Excessive defensiveness in a world of nationalism can provoke courses leading to war.

THE ADVANTAGES OF SECRECY

The maneuvers, the risks, the alarms, that accompany a triadic balance of power have already been indicated. The balance is made

the more delicate and unstable by the added risks of the atomic bomb. These risks are immensely aggravated by the secrecy of the Soviet system of government.

The Soviet rulers can know all that any national of a democracy can know about the policies of his government. They may buy and translate newspapers from every city and village in any foreign country. In a day or two the Drew Pearsons may disclose what was discussed at the last Cabinet meeting or executive session of the Foreign Affairs Committee. In the British House of Commons the irrepressible sons of justice will force the government to reveal enough of their mind in debate as to make the rest a matter of easy inference. If the Soviet rulers misinterpret, they do so because they are blindfolded by their own Leninist handkerchief,³⁰ and by their own illegitimate status. They even misinterpret deliberately to provoke explanations, apologies, and confessions.

THE DANGER OF SECRECY

Yet who, outside the Politburo, can penetrate the labyrinths of Soviet policy? Who can gauge the respective strengths of Stalin, Molotov, Vishinsky, Malenkov, Beria, Zhdanov, and the rest? Who knows, as one does so circumstantially in a democracy, whence they came, by what means they rose, their talents, their values, their proclivities, where they are tending and why? The Politburo, the Presidium, and the Council of Ministers are inscrutable. But political inscrutability cannot fail to be the progenitor of suspicion and fear. The statesman responsible for the safety of his country, when confronted by secret conclaves, is under obligation to assume the worst. He cannot possibly assume the best. He must allow a margin of defensive preparation for the contingencies wrapped inside the mystery. Inquiries like those on the Gallipoli and Mesopotamian disasters in World War I, and the Pearl Harbor calamity in World War II, with their furious yet proper democratic search for responsibility after the fact, are indicative of the nervous vigilance and the anxious economy of risk imperative in a democratic Secretary of State.

³⁰ See, for example, the comment in the *Short History of the Russian Communist Party* on the British General Strike of 1926, where it is held that failure to arrest the workers' leaders was a mere subterfuge by the bourgeois government!

The black secrecy of the Soviet rulers, the common knowledge that, on principle, their government contemns truth and candor; its ability to employ what it calls "the monolithic granite power" of 180,000,000 people at any given time; to act quickly and inquire afterwards, are nerve-racking to those responsible for the security of their own people and their friends. Perhaps undue sensitiveness and alarmed suspicion in democratic peoples result from these Soviet qualities, sharpening the tension implied in the balance, and transforming each move in the increase of Soviet potential strength into a danger signal. The point is, nobody knows, or has a chance of knowing. The Soviet rulers were once the loud champions of open diplomacy!

Will it then be war?

HOW TO AVOID WAR

A world war might happen again some day, even if the Soviet rulers and regime did not exist, since the kinetic energy of all other nationalisms presses the peoples toward a collision. But a contemporary survey of mankind indicates that over the greater part of the world peace might well prevail for half a century, and *if* so long, then much longer is possible. Existent nationalisms, tense and fraught with appalling possibilities of violence as they are, might still remain unbelligerent and cooperative if exceptional irritants were absent. But, the Soviet Union happens to be, both deliberately and involuntarily, a most exceptional irritant. As long as it remains what it is, a vast, powerful, populous, growing state, covering one-sixth of the land surface of the earth and ruled by a few men who ruthlessly seized power, unhallowed and unlimited by popular demand or sanction; governed in the name of a distorted conception of human nature and destiny, and by principles and techniques which cause it to hate and despise the rest of the world, so long must all nationalisms be exacerbated, alarmed, angered, resentful, mistrustful, and prepared for self-defense.

It is true that from time to time a Soviet statesman makes a public pronouncement in praise of peace and in rebuke of "warmongers," or, as Stalin said to Stassen, "I want to bear testimony to the fact that Russia wants to cooperate." Then the degree to which international peace of mind is in Soviet Russia's power, can

be measured by the immediate relief that is everywhere expressed, the strength of the wish for peace that is father to the thought. But within two or three days, perhaps a week, hope slumps again, because the Soviet Union is still itself; demands concessions, takes what it wants, or does not give what it ought; or simultaneously with the benign pacific observations has vetoed a reasonable proposal in the Security Council, or displaced some legitimately elected government. The jubilant editorials die down. And the essence of the decline of hope is that the distrust of the Soviet Union's unfathomable, but suspected purposes, cannot be dispelled. Attention may again be drawn to the bubbling editorials written on atomic power, until on March 6, 1947, Mr. Gromyko mercilessly made cuckolds of all who hung upon his lips!

The Soviet rulers are also caught in the toils, for they are an illegitimate minority government. They know they are difficult. They seem to enjoy the consternation and dismay they cause. If they detached themselves from their chosen exclusiveness, they would be ruined—they think. Through all their peaceful pronouncements they remain themselves. And they are masters of strategic propaganda, at retreating, outflanking and advancing. Some such statements³¹ have recently denied the danger of a new war, blamed military men for rumors of war, denied that encirclement of Russia was possible or desired (later affirmed it!); denied by implication the brazen Russian violations of the Potsdam Agreement; rejected the suggestion that the Communist parties of other countries are being fostered by the Soviet Union, and affirmed "unconditional" belief in friendly and lasting collaboration between the Soviet Union and Western democracy—in spite of doctrines consistently to the contrary from November, 1917, down to and beyond Stalin's speech of February, 1946.

How much more powerful a testimony of truth would the following deeds be: the evacuation of Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary; cessation of moral support, directly or indirectly, of Greek Communists; relief of pressure on non-Communist German politicians and labor unions, cessation of offensive support of Marshal Tito and Albania, withdrawal of support for a Bulgarian port on the Aegean, encouragement of unhindered free-

³¹ Stalin's statements to Hugh Baillie, Oct. 28, 1946; to Alexander Werth, Sept. 24, 1946; to Elliott Roosevelt, Dec. 21, 1946; to the British Labor party delegation, Aug. 1946; to Harold E. Stassen, published May 3, 1947.

dom of elections and maintenance of civil liberties in the various governments on Russia's borders; the "open door" in the Danube region; acceptance of the United States plan for the control of atomic energy; the abatement of heavy reparations demands, cessation of browbeating of Turkey and Iran.

A NOTE ON SOVIET POLEMICS AND OBSTRUCTION

The patient observer will have noticed the cleverness of Communist polemical and propaganda maneuvers. Of particular interest are the following. The memory of President Franklin D. Roosevelt is constantly invoked to shame the present-day "warmongers" and those who willfully misunderstand Soviet Russia. The impression is given that, if he had been alive, present "mistakes" would not be made, and there would be peace and friendship. This tactic glides over the fact that Soviet Russia was at loggerheads with most other countries of the world before and during the President's tenure. It omits, which is more important, that his cooperation with Russia was sometimes at the cost of other nations, and always to Russia's benefit, even down to Yalta. It would not be unjust to hint that the President might have "got tough" with Russia long before Mr. Truman and his advisers did. Again, mud is thrown at journalists who give sincere but unflattering accounts of conditions in Soviet Russia. At meetings one can observe individuals who circulate and seek to counteract the effect of open argument by private whispers to the effect: "After all, he is a professional lecturer, and what you take to be flawless logic is only the result of his training and experience!" Another gambit is the gambit of "brutal frankness": the Soviet rulers may say what they like in as gross a form as they like—after all, it is only what everyone thinks, but they are more forthright, and it is quite refreshing! This gives the Soviet rulers a welcome for their favorite weapon, denunciation of character. And, finally, this is all backed up by the most agonizing tricks of using procedural argument and debates on order to delay action.

No one can mistake the tone and temper of the argument: it is intransigent to the point of sadism. This is the most dangerous sign of trouble for the future. What is the meaning otherwise of all the vilifying invective, and Stalin's confession to Secretary of State Marshall during the abortive Moscow Conference of 1947:

These were only the first skirmishes of reconnaissance forces on this question. Differences had occurred in the past on other questions, and as a rule after people had exhausted themselves in dispute, they then recognized the necessity of compromise. . . . It was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic.

Yet as Secretary Marshall commented: "The patient is sinking."

The Soviet purpose is manifest from Soviet strategy: the strategy of fatal delay. It is hardly possible to doubt that they desire the death of Europe—almost "genocide," but not by Hitler's direct methods. They act as though they believed that they are entitled to destroy Europe for the sake of their own preservation, without the slightest concession from themselves. The all-excusing answer is to show their wounds suffered in the war, and to claim that the Soviet Union by her sole effort won the war, and hence, that they must first destroy all "Fascists." What can be the purpose of their unconscionable delays; absence from meetings of the Allied Control Council and the various organs of the United Nations; tricks of procedure; tergiversation over the terms of reference to committees; repeated return to questions already voted on, and unfavorably to them; "walk-outs," abstentions from voting, recondite objections to the order and contents of the agenda; obscurities of language in their proffered amendments; making decisions depend on other decisions which are never made or are dragged out; pretenses of injustice from the Chair?

Surely it is not fecklessness; for they are past masters of committee business. It must be designed to wear out Western patience which, desperate, may surrender to Soviet demands, or withdraw American troops and statesmen, or pay tribute of large economic gifts to break the deadlock. "If not this," they may say, "then let the outer world go to the perdition which it deserves—let it have a taste of the trouble the wars of intervention in Russia against Lenin gave us"! Witness the devious tactics on German unity, the contrived slovenly deliveries of goods and produce in Germany and Austria, the tricky avoidance of decision on the Austrian Treaty, obstruction of the appointment of the Governor of Trieste, and so on in scores of daily instances.

It is not surprising that Mr. Bevin, fearing Soviet delays on Secretary Marshall's European aid plan, should have bitterly complained out of England and Europe's utmost need:

I will not be a party to holding up the economic recovery of Europe by the mess of procedure, terms of reference or all the paraphernalia which may go with it. . . . If there is to be a conflict of ideologies I shall regret it, but if it is forced upon us we must face it . . . I do not believe that the Western World in the long run will be the sufferers if there is a conflict. I have seen so many conflicts and so many dictators attempt to suppress liberty in the world. In the end it has been the dictators who failed.

Mr. Bevin was speaking in the House of Commons, a notoriously cool assembly (June 19, 1947). Almost simultaneously *Pravda* (June 19, 1947) attacked Dean Acheson for his criticism of Soviet delaying tactics, saying:

Cynicism of the dollar, atomic diplomacy, greed of American monopolies, greed of unchecked expansion covered by the figleaf Truman Doctrine, have liquidated without the faintest trace the prestige of the American policy won by Franklin Roosevelt. . . . Acheson cannot accept one simple fact—that the U.S.S.R. does not exist as an object of American speculation; but as the greatest power in the world, the sovereignty of which no one can diminish no matter how fat his pocket is with dollars.

A "sharp turn" of policy seemed to occur in October, 1946. Shortly thereafter the Soviet peace negotiators made a number of minor concessions to American and British opinion, enabling the treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary to be agreed to. Stalin had begun to make pacifying speeches in September, 1946, but simultaneously his various delegates breathed fire and slaughter in words and obstinate obstructions. By the end of October the Kremlin must have had before it some disconcerting truths. These were: (a) knowledge of the power of the atomic bomb passed to them by their delegates on the Scientific and Technical Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission which had just made a thorough survey of the production of atomic energy and its control; (b) the rising tide of American resentment as seen in newspaper editorials, as well as Congressional impatience; (c) mounting adverse public opinion polls in the United States; (d) election results in Europe and the United States, and finally, (e) an increasing firmness on the part of the State Department. It was seen to be most necessary to temper the continuing effect of Stalin's speech of February, 1946, on the inevitable incom-

patibility between the Soviet system and the bourgeois democracies. Hence, the machine went into operation. But the Kremlin soon resumed its old, old rut: it collided with Mr. Bevin on the fifty-year pact, it ignored American notes regarding Lend-Lease; it claimed it had been insulted by the State Department's charge that it was "aggressive and expanding," and refused to accept Secretary of State Marshall's disclaimer; its grip on Korea was disclosed more vividly, and its vilification of Britain and America, and especially its stigmatizing of persons (e.g., John Foster Dulles) surpassed its former zenith. Character assassination is a regular tactic of the Soviet rulers, and it deprives the person attacked of credit in his own country. Naturally, it is impossible to use the same tactics on a Soviet politician.

The Molotov speech of October 29, 1946, is identical, almost verbatim, with the article in *New Times* of August, 1946.

Its cardinal features are: (1) the defense of the veto and the principle of unanimity of the great powers; (2) the implied but clear threat that if this were shifted the Soviet Union would leave the United Nations; (3) the claim that those who propose modification of the veto power do so for "world domination"; (4) denunciation of pressure exercised by the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain by "dollar diplomacy," "dollar democracy" and "atomic diplomacy"; (5) rejection of the Baruch Plan for atomic energy control as "selfish"; (6) contempt for the bomb as a decisive weapon and a threat that Russia could use weapons worse than the bomb; (7) a warning that those who would proceed by force against the will of the Soviet rulers would be defeated; (8) demand that the Soviet proposal for a census of the armed forces and their disposition by the member states of the United Nations be carried out.

Only some of these tenets can here be traversed. Molotov argued that for defense and security, the Big Three *must* cooperate—of course, on an equal basis. But unity means no domination of *any one* power among the great powers, that is, no domination of the Soviet Union. There is opposition to this principle.

Consequently there is a desire to utilize the renunciation of this principle in order to enforce a system under which decisions would be adopted by a majority vote. . . . It would be extremely shortsighted to regard this campaign as a fortuitous and insignificant mat-

ter. It would also be naïve to overlook the fact that the campaign has assumed a character which is definitely hostile to the Soviet Union.

He converts the dispute into a cleavage between "two principal tendencies": one which bases itself on the United Nations—that is the Soviet principle; the other:

the covetous imperialists; the reactionaries, aggressive imperialist circles who, for the sake of achieving world domination, can embark upon a reckless aggression and the most hazardous military adventures. . . . We must recognize that the policy of these circles aimed at achieving world domination is diametrically opposite to the policy of international collaboration and peaceful competition of social systems . . . the proponents of this imperialist and profoundly reactionary policy see the greatest obstacle to the realization of their expansionist plans in the Soviet Union.

These extracts demonstrate that there is imputed a willful "imperialist" and "expansionist" policy (endorsing Stalin of February, 1946, and contradicting Stalin of September) in which the Soviet Union is supposed to be a victim, and again in which she is a world St. George. The fact is that, while the British empire has been loosening and has been deliberately allowed to become liberalized—as in India, Burma, and Egypt—the Soviet Union has vastly expanded its own sovereign territory and acquired buffer-satellites and spheres of influence more than any nation at any one time in wars since the eighteenth century. Mr. Molotov observes that when the United Nations Organization was in the process of establishment, it was unmistakably known that:

the efforts of states with various political structures should be united for the sake of peace and security. The war vividly demonstrated that states with widely different political structures had extremely important interests in common which they could uphold only by their joint efforts and on condition of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. This was recognized by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

On this basis the principle of unanimity was adopted for peace as it had been for war. Supposing, then, the veto power were repealed.

It is quite obvious that the repudiation of the principle of unanimity of all the great powers—and this is, in fact, what this proposal for

the abolition of the veto amounts to—would mean in practice the liquidation of the United Nations Organization because this principle is the cornerstone of this organization . . . inasmuch as the United Nations Organization is based on the principle of the unanimity of the great powers, the abolition of this principle will result in the collapse of the very edifice of the United Nations.

Mr. Baruch was no friend of the “common people.”

He [Baruch] would like to see all people satisfied with the freedom under which only the lucky ones can enjoy the benefits of life, not only in time of prosperity and peace but amid the conflagration of war. His sentiments are alien to the people who sweat in heavy daily toil or who with their own hands and at the cost of their life defend the freedom and future of their native country. *Otherwise public men belonging to his class*, too, would have to agree that in our time the so-called “common people” are mostly concerned for peace and security.

Molotov argues that Mr. Baruch's point of view—that, if necessary, the people of the United States would have to fight for the defense and prevalence of their way of life against Soviet demands, rather than have a “hateful peace”—indicates lack of confidence in the future development of the United States, and its struggle to live with and defeat the Soviet idea in “peaceful competition.” He argues that this philosophy “strikes only by its irresistible trend towards expansion and unchallenged domination of the world.” The Soviet “people” have no such uncertainty as countries with “unstable economic and political prospects! We have a profound faith in the growing strength of the Soviet people.” They are not afraid of “peaceful competition of states and social systems.” The Soviet Union is not “contaminated by imperialist ravings of world domination.” (Molotov's swing into immediate harmony with Henry Wallace's train of thought; “peaceful competition between the systems,” and reference to “unstable economic and political prospects” [*Sixty Million Jobs*] is noteworthy.) He proposed a general reduction of armaments.

This speech, which “takes the fight to the enemy” is a masterpiece of suppression and disingenuousness. The Soviet rulers, by the shrewdest masterstrokes of their wartime bargaining power, and the planned presence of their armed forces in certain areas, deliberately seized the territories and spheres of influence they

coveted, appropriated every vantage point of international status they calculated they needed without an iota of magnanimity, or even a decent regard for their associates or the proletariat of Europe, and have clung like leeches to the anemic peoples on their borders. They cleverly wielded the ever implied threat of a separate peace with Germany to make Russia's single voice louder than that of the United States and Britain together.

It is hardly surprising that the Soviet rulers should wish the international balance thus sedulously established to remain so much to their advantage. Now, having secured the spoils, they affect to complain of injury when other nations challenge such unashamed acts of force or guile. The Soviet rulers know very well what they have done, and why, but they pretend that it is offensive and "reactionary" of eye witnesses (thus their rebuke of Dean Acheson's testimony to the Senate that Russia's policy is "aggressive and expanding") to state their mind, attempt to abate the obvious evils, or obstruct their repetition.

To pin special personal blame on Mr. Baruch is jejune. He was appointed by the United States Government, a government that reproduces the mind and voice of the American people by a process rejected on principle by the Soviet overlords. It is infantile to attempt to sever the "common people" from his proposals: Mr. Baruch is their product. It is a mistake, demonstrated frequently by the Communist International, to believe that such confusing and dissension-making tactics can succeed when they can only disgust. The Soviet rulers have always been unsuccessful in such maneuvers, because the masses of the west find unpleasant the political ideals of the Soviet rulers, their sadistic political controls, as well as their servile economic system and low standard of living, and to fool all the people all the time is not possible, even in Soviet Russia. It has been a constant mistake of the Soviet rulers to pretend to believe that democratic statesmen and people are not as astute as they believe themselves to be, but only "corrupt." The voting record of the free peoples at every election since 1918 is to the contrary.

FUSTIAN ABOUT "PEACEFUL COMPETITION"

Mr. Molotov knows that his "peaceful" competition among diverse systems could hardly be fair competition, for he was a

member of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International from 1928 to 1934. Would he permit free, unsupervised entry into Russia of an association of Western political parties, allowing them to enjoy the same immunities, privileges and protections as the Communist parties and their "fellow travelers" enjoy in the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, and almost any other land in the world? Would they be allowed to hold appointive and elective office?

Is the conception of "peaceful" competition between the Soviet and the democratic systems more than a tactical slogan? If it is "competition," it must be at least between two alternatives and tend toward a purpose. What are the alternatives, and what is the purpose? The alternatives are political and social systems. But how can like be compared with unlike, planned economic welfare being the main asset of the Soviet rulers, and cultivation of the individual of the democratic countries? This oversimplifies the contributions of the competitors, for the democratic countries would rightly argue that they do, and can, and will continue to effect economic improvement. What would the basis of comparison be? What Russia was economically in 1917? An adequate basis for appraisal cannot be found, for the Russian advance might have been more considerable than it has been, if under the auspices of a liberal democratic regime. And this entirely ignores the question of Soviet honesty in reporting the census of progress. But the Soviet rulers have so organized their government as to be beyond all competition in the telling of unverifiable stories.

Then competition for what? For the loyalty of the masses of the world? This, surely, can be the only prize worth entertaining in such a challenge to international competition. But this is a grave disclosure of Mr. Molotov's mind. The challenge, however, could be taken up, on the basis of the assessment of the results by a Commission of the United Nations, if given free scope, on its own definition of its inspectorial and census-taking needs, to observe at firsthand, continuously and freely, and to report without censorship, all aspects of the Soviet economy and society. And to make the appeal to the world's loyalties on a fair foundation, the Soviet ought also to admit the authority of any individual or group in Russia, native or inspired from outside, to agitate for those civic values which Soviet policy normally persecutes.

This indicates the true pact that might save the peace of the

world. It would be the exchange of the atom bomb and disarmament on the one side, for a revolution by consent of the government of Russia that will permit the peaceful competition there of ideas and economic systems as different from the Soviet rulers' principles as these are from the Republican and Democratic parties' in America and the Labor and Conservative parties' in Britain; a revolution letting them seek membership, acquire funds, run newspapers, hold meetings, and seek office unhindered by the government, the censorship, or the police.

This is the true bargain: competition on *equal* terms. Will Molotov, Stalin, and the Politburo be persuaded of the implications of their own challenge? Or is the challenge merely one more piece of strategic phosphorescent bait, taken verbatim from Mr. Wallace's September fishing-basket, to make the foetid hook of offensive-defensive diplomacy more tempting; an attempt to talk the United States out of the atomic bomb? If the challenge is insincere, let us be spared the echoes of Litvinov's "general disarmament," the tears about the "impoverishment of military expenditures"! A minority will always find disarmament to its taste: sixty-nine states will be disarmed before Russia is! But her own man power and strategic areas will remain undiminished. If Mr. Molotov's challenge is not designed to be effective, his hands stretched out in philanthropic appeal are, alas, not white, but only whitewashed.

CHAPTER X

Persuasion or Force?

Now music's prison'd raptur and the drown'd voice of truth mantled in light's velocity, over land and sea are omnipresent, speaking aloud to every ear, into every heart and home their unhinder'd message, the body and soul of Universal Brotherhood; whereby war faln from savagery to fratricide, from a trumpeting vainglory to a crying shame, stalketh now with blasting curse branded on its brow.

—ROBERT BRIDGES, *Testament of Beauty*,
Book I, 728-736

THE PROSPECT

THE PREVIOUS analysis warrants a forecast of the probable course of world affairs.

For a long future, tolerable though not perfect peacefulness is to be expected, if certain exceptionally sore spots are excluded. But these need urgent attention.

The most acute area of trouble is Soviet Russia, largely owing to her peculiar characteristics, and partly because of the different view of life taken by other nations. Next, Germany is a seedbed of future war, since it appears to be only too true that having been abjectly defeated, her rancorous pride will allow her no rest.¹ Again, her sufferings are attributed not to a lost war for a bad cause,² but to the vindictiveness of other nations—democracies—and perhaps less so of Russia.

The other sore spot is the Balkans, where the tensions are

¹ Hauser, *A German Talks Back*; and Drew Middleton, *Our Share of Night*, New York, 1946.

² Shotwell, *What Germany Forgot*, New York, 1940.

desperately grave and apparently incurable. A remedy is the cessation of rivalries there of the great powers. Tito's ambitions, British sensitiveness about Greece, and the pressure for a Mediterranean port for Bulgaria, reasonable enough in *itself*, disclose the incendiary possibilities.

Russian quiescence and the discriminate dismantling of British "imperialism" would give reasonable hopes of a long peace. A truce of fifty years might usher in a long era of welfare, liberalism, and serenity. The physical exhaustion of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. by the war, and the intrepid pursuit of higher standards of living in the United States promise a truce, even if an angry one, for ten or fifteen years. Stalin requires seven years for urgent reconstruction, but the devastation is so enormous that much longer may be forecast.³ If sparks do not come from the Big Three, there will be no conflagration; if they are struck elsewhere, the Big Three can extinguish them.

In a longer period, the force of nationalism is not less, but more conducive to strife. A new flame in any one of the sacrosanct autonomous communities, small or large, may set fire to all.

The control of weapons of mass destruction, principally the atomic bomb, requires, but cannot obtain, regulation by continuous international administration. Majority decisions are needed, but as yet they cannot be obtained by a peacefully made social contract.

The procedure of the United Nations for the pacific settlement of disputes is still at the mercy of a veto of one of the Big Five. For when the Security Council needs to proceed beyond mere debate to "consideration" and "investigation," which might lead the Council to conciliation or even pressure for a peaceful settlement, the necessary step is (according to the interpretation of the articles in question) subject to the veto power. As for action that should be taken, or a recommendation leading to action, and therefore binding on all members of the United Nations to fulfill their pledged obligations to take collective action in the measure decided by the Council and its military staff committee, that can be blocked. It can be blocked by the very powers who are themselves likely to be in dispute with each other, or whose friends need and will receive their support.

³ Cf. *Economist*, March 15, 1947.

To supplement the Charter by a series of treaties, which is entertained (on Germany, on atomic energy), throws some doubt on confidence in the Charter. And the more treaties, the more anxiety about their fulfillment. If it is merely a matter of variant interpretations, only three member states have accepted the full jurisdiction of the World Court: Britain and Holland without reservations, the United States with reservations. Russia and Poland have not accepted its jurisdiction.

As for the panacea of world government, relying as the advocates do, upon voluntary contract among nations, this is no pillar upon which peace in our time can be founded.

What then is to be done for peace after the years of exhaustion and the cruelest memories of suffering have become faint? Is simple reliance on the United Nations sufficient? There are some services which it can render.

Providing it can be kept together, the Organization can assist in three ways, and the longer they can be pursued without interruption by force, the greater the amelioration they offer. First is "the mobilization of shame." In open forum, seen and heard by the whole world, nations find it invidious to act coercively, to threaten, to do injustice, that is, to treat other nations as they would not like to be treated themselves. It is a hopeful factor for the world that governments and nations dislike being unmasked and shamed as ignoble. Britain has been influenced in Greece and Palestine, France in Syria and Lebanon, the Dutch in Indonesia, and the Soviet in Iran, by the challenge of public criticism. When a defendant offers an answer, he necessarily enunciates a moral principle. The other party may also take advantage of it; or, if the principle is indefensible, it may be censured by the United Nations. Thus, censure by the General Assembly of the treatment of Indians in South Africa will bear its fruits, though it put Field Marshal Jan C. Smuts, the inspirer of the Preamble of the United Nations Charter, in the awkward position of resisting the wishes of the General Assembly. Nations are averse to being proved liars or evaders of their own declared standards. Time may, as in some parliamentary governments, crystallize a body of universal principle.

Secondly, the procedure of the United Nations permits the early and continuous ventilation of issues which might otherwise nourish suspicion, fears, armaments, threats, and war. Examples

are seen in the work of the Balkan and Palestine Commissions.

Thirdly, the Organization may form a new, tangible world focus of loyalties, and this practical political center move men's minds increasingly toward an interest in and a duty toward all humanity, if the fabric of economic and social welfare is, and is clearly seen to be, the product of United Nations cooperation.

It is manifest that gains for permanent peace from these devices require a long truce, with a firm prospect on the part of all of a renewal of the truce. The longer the United Nations can be kept in busy and useful operation, the better the prospect that it will continue to be peacefully busy.

CLEAR AND IMMINENT DANGER

Now, anyone who can read is aware of the misgiving which the loopholes in the foregoing survey leave. If the absolute reign of peace is put aside as impossible, the steady and solid assurance of a shorter peace is also wanting. What is to do the work of government within the life of each single state in the world of states? What is to change the laws of existence as necessity requires, continuously and for the welfare of the majority in a state? What organ can make these laws binding on all individuals? If no permanent comprehensive executive can be installed, what device is the alternative? In the absence of a permanent judiciary, with a jurisdiction that extends to all controversies, how can peace be maintained?

Nothing remotely resembling government of this character exists in international life. No common legislature holds session, since nations transact their rules of intercourse by treaties, the acceptance and denunciation of which is on their own terms. They have not formed a representative assembly founded on a vote according to population. The process of adaptation to social change does not take place within a continuing established agency where change is peaceful because the will of the majority is the principle of change. A national legislature is the product of a people; the General Assembly of the United Nations is composed of the representatives of governments, and the treaty-making conference is composed of governmental delegates.

No executive leadership, as in a cabinet or presidency, marks the international scene. The international secretariat of career

officials and experts is not the coordinate and single agency of a state and its legislature, but the specialized agencies (International Labor Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, Monetary Fund, Bank of Reconstruction, etc., and the various commissions) and the Secretariat of the United Nations. Above all, the secretariat's enforcement powers are weak, stopping usually at the frontiers of each state, where it hands over the function to the national government. The usual rule is the enforcement of the treaties and conventions to which a state has given its hand through the government of the states, enforcement depending upon their several good faiths.

Finally, in most cases and in the first instance, international adjudication occurs almost always in the courts of each separate state. Sometimes disputes and claims are submitted to arbitration—but the judgment of international disputes by the separate national courts predominates. From 1899 some important submissions have been made to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague (confining authority only to the parties who voluntarily agreed to accept it and objects they voluntarily regarded as “justiciable”). Since 1919 the Permanent Court of International Justice carried this function a little farther, being replaced in 1945 by the Permanent International Court of Justice. It is still restricted in authority much as were its predecessors.

Some writers, especially Hans Kelsen,⁴ believe that peace may come through the steady widening of the scope of such a court's judgment and the universal submission of states to its jurisdiction. They argue that just as Anglo-Saxon common law was developed by the equitable sense of the judges declared on occasions of dispute, so here, too, litigation of international disputes would evolve a body of common law. The answer is, that history shows that the making of law by judicial declarations is far too slow for the complexities of a growing society, that it needs a statute-making body to anticipate conflicts between majority groups and classes, and that *power* is needed to resolve ultimate social disputes concerning national values and sovereign authority. The International Court can do much to help the Security Council with advisory opinions, and to lead the way to justice by its judgments and dicta. It cannot conceivably be the organ of settlement of

⁴ *Law and Peace* (1941).

great political issues in the contemporary global balance of power.

Whether the state operates dictatorially or democratically, it does not wait on unanimity. Its authority is all-inclusive, and what its all-inclusiveness shall mean to each interest is determined by majority vote. The operation of international relationships depends upon the principle of unanimity, and this unanimity has to be produced from case to case. It has no continuity.

Why has the state such indubitable advantage as a government? The answer may give a clue to what all nations together, or one nation predominantly, must do. First, the individual is born in the state: he is born in its chains and is cradled by it. While he must obey, he need not fear. No alternative organization can normally give him the benefits he needs as well as this supreme association. No other has as much opportunity to exert a superior hold over him, since his state is so pervading in its authority, ubiquitous and all-powerful. Secondly, even if he attempted to overthrow the state by means of rebellion, dissent or disobedience, the chance of success is so remote that he may as well resign himself to authority from the beginning and try other ways of achieving some secondary satisfaction. Thirdly, the individual's physical, mental, or moral powers, however superior to those of all other individuals in the community, are rarely sufficient for him to risk a challenge to the state on the plea of superior brains, moral excellency, or vital mission. Some individuals who needed revolution to accomplish their aims have tried such a challenge, but the prophet or hero has had to find a large minority, or a majority, for success. Perhaps he will be forced by the prevalent spirit of majority rule to abandon his quest, a course which the fanatic Nietzsche thought was Christian cowardice. He cannot conquer except by peace; resistance is almost certain defeat. Therefore, even if an angel or a beast (to reverse the Aristotelian aphorism), the individual is driven into a compromise with society. "Working from within" is the golden rule of the state; hence, revolutionaries and adventurers of all kinds, from pickpockets to ideologists, dislike the state. But average men do like the state; and even men far above the average in talent, character, and imagination are able successfully to carry on their creative work therein, provided they do not seek the state's subversion.

Fourthly, in any single state there is much homogeneity among men and women. Where homogeneity is strikingly absent, author-

ity may be rejected, or protection and freedom to minority groups may be denied, which means that they become resentful and therefore hostile to the authority of the state. The individual is taught from birth that there must be unity, peace, and order, although within them there may be diversity, creativeness, opportunity, and justice. Justice means to him that the standards of political judgment and decision will be the same for everybody. As situations develop, and in the play of argument, he will with certainty be able to find protection against abuse of power. The law that gives him sanctuary and tranquillity will be upheld. Social change through the governmental organs we have described will be peacefully instituted if he proceeds on the elemental basis; namely, the majority principle, persuasion, and free elections.

The differences between the characteristics of the national state and the international "community" need not be labored. They are all too obvious: the geographic separation of nations, their huge and resistant diversity, their history of enmity, their fear of extinction, their birth independent of a common superior, the unverifiability of the justice of the claims of each on the rest; the ordinary man's fears of the policies and characteristics of other nations; the lack of a common language, the lack of a common press. All these lead us into the paths of destruction. They produce, and are produced by, the want of a common morality.

Yet the apostles of world government, or something like it, say: "Achieve a common morality to achieve a common government!" There they reach their impasse. For they speak to cast out war, but to cast out war you must cast out its controlling causes. Yet these causes may arise in any of many nations. The common morality argument is one that is preachable only if we can conceive of a multitude of nationalisms pulling themselves up out of their nationalism by means of their own nationalism, that is, by their own bootstraps.

PERSUASION OR FORCE

Now the way toward world organization that can give, not the perfect assurance of peace, but peace to a substantial degree, can be found along the alternative paths of *Persuasion or Force*. These alternatives, acknowledged by several writers on war and peace, but not clearly brought into the open, need careful consideration.

If persuasion can promise fulfillment of the conditions of peace, it should be employed. This is what the advocates of world government call "education." But education must have a content. Its probable effectiveness is a function of the doctrine to be taught. It must carry conviction. Neither the doctrine, nor the problem of educability or effectiveness has been given adequate attention. I distinguish four broad possibilities for effective appeals to reason, or persuasion, latent in the assumptions of the writers. They are humanity, prudence, bribes of material advantage which stands between persuasion and force; and fear. Their meaning must be explained, and their respective importance weighed for a peace-giving nexus of nations, or an alternative to it.

HUMANITY

Our noblest and wisest teachers have taught us the duty of humanity. "Do unto others" . . . "Love thy neighbour as thyself" . . . "Suffer little children to come unto me" . . . "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." Above all: "Charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up." Thomas Paine said:

The duty of man . . . is plain and simple, and consists of two points. His duty to God, which every man must feel; and with respect to his neighbour, to do as he would be done by.⁵

In essence, humanity is a recognition of the sameness of all men, the sanctity of their personality, that is to say, that this value stands above all other values.

It is thus expressed by one of its most illustrious prophets, Joseph Mazzini:⁶

In whatever land you may be, wherever a man is fighting for right, for justice, for truth, there is your brother. Free men and slaves, YOU ARE ALL BROTHERS. Origin, law, and goal are one for all of you. Let your creed, your action, the banner beneath which you fight, be likewise one. Do not say, *The language which we speak is different*; tears, actions, martyrdom form a common language for all men, and one

⁵ *Rights of Man.*

⁶ *The Duties of Man, Duties to Humanity.*

which you will understand. *Do not say, Humanity is too vast, and we are too weak.* God does not measure powers, but intentions. Love Humanity. Ask yourselves whenever you do an action in the sphere of your Country, or your family, If what I am doing were done by all and for all, would it advantage or injure Humanity? and if your conscience answers It would injure Humanity, desist; desist, even if it seem to you that an immediate advantage for your Country or your family would ensue from your action. Be apostles of this faith, apostles of the brotherhood of nations, and of the unity of the human race. . . .

The appeal is heard in the doctrines of the Stoics and the teachers of natural rights. It speaks out loudly in the Declaration of Independence. Humanism is based on the essential equality of all people, whatever their race or color or existent stage of civilization. Karl Marx's formula is: "Proletarians of the world, unite; you have nothing to lose but your chains!" The Atlantic Charter expresses it in the assurance, "that *all* men in *all* the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want." The Charter of the United Nations stipulates it in its Preamble:

To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.

A day will surely come when the doctrine of humanity will be the salvation of mankind, for it casts down arrogance and commends affection, charity, mercy, and unity. It vindicates a single standard for all, one purged of privileges that fail to serve humanity. It admits the value of perfecting the personality and works of others, and serves as a rein upon ourselves. It insists that opportunity shall be opened to others.

Now the dictates of humanity are difficult to institute and maintain, even within a single state. The quest of them has taken centuries, sacrificial centuries. Democratic revolutions have been required to produce even such an imperfect approximation to humanity as now prevails. That mankind has traveled thus far did not result from merely quiet persuasion, the amiable pursuit of philosophy, the spread of education, the ministrations of the Churches, alone. The centuries of oppression, of inequality, and man's inhumanity to man surpass those of kindness and justice. The achievement of a single humane civic standard needed much

force to produce and protect it. The state, which could eliminate major oppressions, was necessary to success. Even though the state itself originated in oppression of the majority by a minority, it commanded reciprocal humanity among those subordinated. Later the majority acquired the power to govern itself, and the opportunity to practice humanity.

We have seen, however, that the humanity of Christianity itself has disintegrated into several major churches, and many more millions live outside the churches physically and spiritually. The humanity of the religions of the East are not attuned, but could live together, with those of the West, if the religions of each were indeed the governors of the human will. But, above all, nationalism cuts across humanity, and sunders mankind with its differences. All God's children got different ideologies—going to call names all over God's Heaven! ⁷ States are founded on the good of mankind: but they arose at different times, each with its own assumptions regarding its good. Each embodies its idea of humanity vigorously enough to obey the Mazzinian command (saintly man that he was):

It is of little avail that you call yourselves pure; even could you by isolating your selves keep your purity, you are still false to your duty if you have corruption two steps off and do not strive against it. It is of little avail that you worship the truth in your hearts; if error rules your brothers in some other corner of this earth, which is our common mother, and you do not desire, and endeavour as far as lies in your power, to overthrow it, you are false to your duty. . . . And you, while you remain inactive, do you dare to call yourselves believers?

There precisely is the difficulty. Humanity may be entirely sincere in the heart of the believer; but it may be sincerely different from that of other believers. Within the state the differences have been mitigated by the means and through the historical process we have mentioned. Humanity is strong within nations due to their historic differences, geographical separation, and spiritual evolution; it is a passionate, but a self-regarding humanity. No superior common to all assuages the differences of humanity

⁷ Note Stalin to Stassen: "If we start calling each other names . . . it will lead to no cooperation."

between nations; and *it is even a duty of one humanity to fight to overcome the other*. And saintly men have said so.

For clarity on the subject of humanity some further reflection is necessary. It is first imperative to clear away certain prevalent fallacies. One is embodied in the phrase, "reach an understanding" with a country, and its companion phrase, "to understand a country." This is discernible in the view that the system of Western democratic government and the Soviet system can, like diverse religions in the past, "live side by side," or "grow each to meet the other half-way."

THE NATURE OF UNDERSTANDING

"Understanding" does not certainly imply "acceptance." To know all is not to forgive all. Understanding will disclose the compulsions under which other people labor, and the purposes that inspire their zeal. To know their compulsions, whether they are like our own or present special difficulty, as, for example, Germany's position between the Slavs and the French, Russia's quest for warm water ports, her economic backwardness or her late release from serfdom, or Britain's dependence on overseas communications and protective bases, is to produce kindness and reason, with some concessions on our part. It is clear, however, that one could only go a certain distance in this path of understanding and making concession—the other party might require more than concession, actually surrender to his necessities. *Must* Turkey have Russia on her doorstep because the Soviet rulers want an outlet to the Mediterranean? *Must* the Arabs receive a half-million Jews into Palestine because Hitler and the Poles and Tsarist Russia were murderously anti-Semitic? A world authority, a superior common to all the claimants for "understanding" would appreciate and could remove all the national arrangements which are a bar to concessions—if they existed, that is, if the present disputants for "understanding" allowed them to exist. Some allowances may be made for physical and historical compulsions, but the problem of "understanding" is much more difficult when it concerns diverse ways of life. If they agree, they agree. If they involve nothing or little that is hostile, to reach an understanding is not difficult. But a diverse general political objective, an ideology, may actually provoke more militancy if understood

than if *not* understood. In certain situations today, those who "understand" the Soviet rulers are either silent, will not even write or publish, out of horror, or they are ready to speak of "preventive war."

"To reach an understanding" is simply to make an agreement to cooperate for peace and to tolerate each other's differences and claims. Its feasibility depends on clear discernment of what the other nation wants, what faith can be placed in its promises, what values for ourselves can be obtained thereby, and how much we, as a nation, and as separate responsible individuals must surrender to the various claimants of our own and our friends' justice, security, and welfare. This is to argue in a circle, because it is still arguing within the historic and existing nationalistic balance of power.

Where "understanding" is the essence of peaceful processes, we are entitled to believe that, in the long run, democratic systems of government are preferable to dictatorial, because they admit freely to all the people a knowledge of the circumstances as seen by the other side which is negotiating or wrangling with us.

The argument of "living together side by side" is based on false mental images. It is preferable to analyze this by reference to an actual situation, and above all, the relationship between the United States and U.S.S.R., especially since this has been raised by Henry Wallace. He says:⁸

The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to work in the same world is, from a historical point of view, pure propaganda. Several religious doctrines, all claiming to be the only true gospel and salvation, have existed side by side with a reasonable degree of tolerance for centuries. This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated by absolutist governments.

It would be better for Mr. Wallace's case, always, if he refrained from an appeal for a grant-in-aid from History. Consider how slipshod are the assertions made! He has omitted the Christian-Mohammedan conflicts over centuries; he has left a lacuna for the peculiar methods of certain missionaries in the East and in Africa; he abridges to nothing Roman Christianity; he has treated

⁸ *The Fight for Peace*, p. 12. Letter of July 23, 1946, released on Sept. 17, 1946.

the Papal onslaught on heresies to an oversight; he skips the Inquisition; he ignores the wars of religion; he neglects the rise of religious indifferentism and materialism; he overlooks the vital fact that tolerance succeeded the establishment of a sovereign authority in each nation *by force*, and that, between nations, nationalism has taken the place of religious creeds. Thus, appealing to history, but omitting all its content, he can be happy in his hallucination. It is open to doubt also whether "a *reasonable* degree of tolerance" can satisfy the international tensions of our own time. How did the United States, "a democratic island" in a "world dominated by absolutist governments" for the first half of its existence, succeed in maintaining itself? The others were too far away or too preoccupied to do harm. But, above all, by showing military strength and prowess; by fighting in Florida and buying Louisiana, by threatening war on invaders of Latin America, by encouraging like-minded allies in the south; by yells of "54-40 or fight!" In the circumstances, his use of the words "pure propaganda" is at least unfortunate.

The opposition of "isms"—communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy is not a candid representation of the situation. "Isms" can live side by side: the question is, can nationalisms, spiked with these "isms"? *That* is the problem.

Thus Mr. Wallace—with the best of philanthropic intentions I admit, and admire, and share—perpetrates a double fallacy, to believe that an enumeration of Russia's necessities can be met by the appropriate pacifying concessions by the United States, and that the only parties concerned are the United States and Russia, with a vast hiatus in the lands between. His state of mind is this:

The Russians have been constantly invaded.

Soviet Russia was invaded 1917-1921.

Soviet Russia was invaded by Hitler.

Western defense and security measures seem to have (to the Russians) an aggressive intent.

The atomic bomb in American hands worries them.

The atomic control proposals are improper.

The British obtained a loan, Russia did not.

The West resists Soviet attempts to get a "warm water" port and "friendly" neighboring states.

She believes she is now entitled to the status of a major power.

She regards Western interest in "democracy in Eastern Europe"

as encirclement by unfriendly neighbors ready for an attack on her.

It will be seen that (a) any guilt on the part of the Soviets is either overlooked altogether or minimized and (b) no account is taken of the situation of other European countries and the invasions they have suffered.

The Russians have been invaded; but where did the original Russians come from? They invaded other people's lands. How did they get to Sakhalin and even Alaska? To Manchuria and Korea? To Poland on the Baltic coast? For 700 years they have pursued a grim path of conquest and Russification until even the United States trembled in 1821 and produced the Monroe Doctrine. They are as blamable as all other people, if we are at all to blame for ancient wrongs; and they were especially brutal to subject peoples: ask the Poles and the Turks. Ask, also, the Finns and the East Germans of today.

The problem of "aggressive intent," as well as the British loan, has been dealt with in the treatment of "Russian suspicion."⁹ The atomic control problem has also been amply treated.¹⁰

The West resists Soviet attempts to control the Dardanelles, because it is a key to the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean. Is this not reasonable? The domains of the Soviet are vaster than those of any other land in the world—not small, resourceless, surrounded by sea, or dwarfed by vast overbearing neighbors. Her rulers and people should be the happiest of any in the world. Why should they be allowed to strangle other nations?

Mr. Wallace can only bolster his support of Soviet subjection of Eastern Europe by a plea that is shameful. "Our (United States) interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, *where democracy by and large has never existed . . .*" Life, Mr. Wallace ought to know, consists of more than corn on the cob; it includes the tenets of the American Declaration of Independence. He seems prepared to condone nineteenth and twentieth century corruption and despotism in Eastern Europe for Russia's sake. Who is he to deny those millions their heritage, if he really believes in the Common Man? Does he believe in democratic values and a single standard for all, as he reiterates? Then it is proper

⁹ Cf. pp. 266 above.

¹⁰ Cf. Chap. VI above.

that those who have been maltreated, first by Turkish despotism, then by Tsarist intervention, and more recently by Comintern influences and betrayals, should also be assisted to come into their democratic heritage! It looks as though Mr. Wallace were prepared to throw away much which is the heritage of other peoples for American propitiation of Russia: this is an exercise on a theme already discussed in this work, *Peace by Sacrifice of Others*.

Finally, can the two systems "grow" toward each other, the West becoming more socialist or communist, while Soviet Russia becomes more "democratic." Growth is possible for the West, because it is democratic; that is, growth along the lines of gradual but steady increase of state activity of an equalitarian, planned character, designed to increase production, promote greater justice in distribution, and abolish exploitation of labor by private enterprise. This is inevitable, as it is in the interest of the masses who have the votes. But it is a mistake to believe that *this* would appease the Soviet rulers. They are not primarily interested in democratic social justice for the workers of other countries; they are interested in their own dictatorial power and plans effectuated by it. Their quarrel with the West is not socialism, but democracy: they have, since Lenin, denied democratic values, that is, government by the people and all civil liberties. Their despotism is as heavy and brutal as ever. Nothing I can see can change this except, possibly, a popular uprising twenty-five or fifty years hence, when education has been so developed that 5,000,000 Communists will be swamped by vigorous popular heresies. But not yet. However, some, including Mr. Wallace, rely on this fallacy also. Mr. Wallace wrote:

I am convinced that we can meet the challenge [of another system as a successful rival to democracy and free enterprise in other countries and perhaps even our own] as we have in the past by demonstrating that economic abundance can be achieved without sacrificing personal, political and religious liberties.

But we have already suggested that the appeal of the Soviet rulers is no candid appeal. The United States could never compete with the Soviet rulers in fairy tales for poverty-stricken populations, though it has not the slightest fear of any comparison, past, present or future, as a wealth-making and wealth-distributing apparatus. Nor has Britain, nor any of the Western and North-

western industrial and agricultural peoples. Many who enjoy the blessings of American and British liberty tend to forget its meaning, and then propitiation of despotism becomes easier. Mr. Wallace talks as though the United States had no social values worth defending or teaching. It is not irrelevant to observe that M. Dimitrov, the Russian sponsored leader of the "Fatherland Front" in Bulgaria, denounced the opposition voters in the elections of October 27, 1946, as "traitors" like Mikhailovitch, and referred to his execution. *Pour encourager les autres!* The contemptuous rejection of American protests by the Rumanian Government at the falsification of the November elections is also worth meditation.

But the Russian rulers are guilty and feel guilty. Concessions and assurances by the West cannot satisfy them. They can be controlled only by reducing their power or by firmness on the part of others. I am forced to the most unwelcome conclusion that reliance on humanity for peace is not safe enough and that its two corollaries of "understanding" and "existence side by side" ignore too many difficulties. The Soviet attitude to a UNESCO "world scientific humanity" will be recalled,¹¹ and their reluctance to accept international guarantees of civil liberties proposed in the United Nations is noted later.

Nationalism stands between men and humanity, except as yet for a few. Yet perhaps many would be released from nationalism, if the shell were broken. How can it be broken? If we ignore time and future wars that may retard progress toward humanity, then we might rely on long term evolution. The existence of the United Nations would assist such an evolution. Travel, communications, enlightenment, and world-wide public debate dissolve irrational animosities: all this, if no account is taken of time—or of unpropitious accidents. In the short run, beyond the years of postwar exhaustion and reconstruction of our time, it is, by itself, unreliable.

Prudence

Can prudence do what humanity is too slow to accomplish? I mean soberly consider the costs of war and, therefore, determine

¹¹ Cf. p. 167 above.

not to undertake it. The effectiveness of prudence may perhaps be measured by reflection on the direct costs of war, in men, in money (that is, labor, skill and resources): indirectly in the distortion of peacetime national economies for defense, and in the possibility of the breakdown of civilization.

In World War I¹² it is estimated that the direct costs were 186.33 million dollars, and the indirect costs another 60 billion dollars. The casualties were some 10,000,000 dead, over 6,000,000 seriously wounded, 14,000,000 wounded not seriously, and nearly 6,000,000 prisoners or missing. These figures include those who died of war induced influenza. In World War II a rough estimate¹³ is as follows: the direct military cost was 1,117 billion dollars, that is, five times the direct and indirect cost of World War I. Casualties amounted to (including civilian) some 22,000,000 dead, and 34,000,000 wounded.¹⁴

Can anything valid, regarding the influence of losses on prudential restraint from war, be deduced from these figures, or even those of the losses of particular countries?

The losses in World War I, and its aftermath in economic dislocation and aggravation of the cyclical depression, did not prevent World War II. Many writers warned about the cost of a new war. Before that, nothing could surpass the prudence of Norman Angell's classic, *The Great Illusion*. The "men of Munich" were particularly astute at recommending the avoidance of war, in view of the terrible cost to be expected. But millions of people despised them for it. Offers of loans were made to Hitler's government as a cheaper way of arriving at even unpleasant agreements. The democracies were reluctant to undertake peacetime preparations, objecting to a dislocation of the normal economy just as the world was beginning to rise out of the 1929-1936 depression.

However, appallingly great the loss in lives and wealth, its deterrent effect evaporates a few years after war. First, the losses are distributed among several nations—not, it is true, equally and

¹² E. L. Bogart, *Direct and Indirect Cost of the Great World War*; 1919, pp. 267 ff.

¹³ Estimates made in survey by the American University (J. A. Brady) and supplemented by other statistics: *World Almanac*, p. 523, 1947. They are supported in the *Annual Report of the Bank of International Settlements*, March, 1945.

¹⁴ A Vatican estimate, reported in *World Almanac*, p. 521.

in proportion to national strength; but the loss is not anywhere crushing in relation to national power to produce again. In a few years the ravages of wars (as fought in the past) are made good and forgotten. Better machines and industrial processes raise per capita productivity. That productivity is less than it might have been, is a very thin consideration at the present stage of civic sensitivity and education.

As for the bereavements, time has its magic consolation. The anguish for our beloved ones becomes but a yearning, and life, which is a sturdy opponent of grief, renews itself.

Man can not rely on prudential considerations of the past costs of war to deter him from war, except for periods of a decade or two, nor to keep the peace when afflicted by fear of another country. The vindictive, the revengeful or aggressive aims of willful groups in other countries, sometimes supported wholeheartedly by a considerable proportion of the population, may override the cost in lives in pursuit of a crime against humanity. The losses of the French and the British in the First World War had a very considerable influence on their subsequent pacifism, the French particularly. Millions in both countries abjured force,¹⁵ but it was reluctance to fight rather than readiness to capitulate, in pursuance of their just aims. There were some things France would not surrender to Italy (Bizerte and Corsica and Nice), and some things she felt she could not yield to Hitler (her alliance with Soviet Russia). Britain could not concede certain territories, friendships, or values to either Italy or Hitler. They were obliged to have recourse to war regardless of the prudential cost, which had been counted over and over again.

It may be otherwise with the cost of another war, fought with the weapons that exist or are being invented. The cost of reconverting cities to be less vulnerable, of shelters for a large proportion of the population, of the need to live underground, and the destruction promised, may become peremptory deterrents. But to be effective the deterrents need to be universal and of a maximum severity.

I say *may become*, for it is difficult to convince enormous populations prior to practical experience. This question must be raised again under "Fear." Mere figures mean nothing as a con-

¹⁵ Cf. the *British Peace Ballot*, above p. 45.

tinuous stimulation of devotion to peace, even to sophisticated political leaders. The grave question arises whether it is desirable to educate the population so that figures do produce caution in a world where some other nations, by negligence or from deliberate policy, withhold from their people the facts that might create fear of offensive action.

The worth of human lives is rated more highly in nations ruled by the people, where the lives of the citizens are their own, than in governments which, loving all men as they proclaim they do, nevertheless are not obliged to ask their permission before making war, or to reckon with their reluctance. This is a particularly important consideration in estimating how much of a deterrent the threat of atomic warfare is.

The costs of civilian defense have risen. The control of science accompanied by grants of money from the state for military purposes is a dead loss. The Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Professor Vannevar Bush, quotes¹⁶ the Joint Letter of the Secretaries of War and Navy to the National Academy of Sciences:

This war emphasizes three facts of supreme importance to national security: (1) Powerful new tactics of defense and offense are developed around new weapons created by scientific and engineering research; (2) the competitive time element in developing those weapons and tactics may be decisive; (3) war is increasingly total war, in which the armed services must be supplemented by active participation of every element of civilian population.

To insure continued preparedness along farsighted technical lines, the research scientists of the country must be called upon to continue in peacetime some substantial portion of those types of contribution to national security which they have made so effectively during the stress of the present war.

Of incalculably greater consequence is the failure to knit the world into the economic whole that it properly is, with full regard for the distribution of men's skills, raw materials, and climatic endowments.¹⁷ A friendly plan of movement of men, skill, investment, and production, unobstructed by national frontiers, could raise the standard of wealth immensely and contribute to peace.

¹⁶ *Science, Endless Horizons*, p. 12.

¹⁷ Cf. Finer, *The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations*, 1946.

For example, the genuine scientific endeavor of the Food and Agriculture Organization could be fulfilled to establish a world plan of agricultural production based on the areas of maximum productivity and minimum effort for each commodity. But each country reflects that this plan may reduce its self-sufficiency in time of war. What salvation could be found, for example, in concentration mainly on protective foods, when proteins, cereals, and fats are essential to our survival? Hence arise the tariffs and other ingenious distortions, even the attempt to establish "socialism in a single country," and to hold great areas, like Russia, Siberia, and the Danube Valley, in a walled-in and armored economy.

Every nation knows this is heavy loss. The loss was demonstrated to all by the reports of bodies like the Economic and Financial Section of the League of Nations. It has made little difference, except (a fact which has some value), to establish a deep regret in the hearts of *democratic* statesmen, whether partly socialist or capitalist. Nationalism supports the expense. And because it does, there is fear everywhere, and economic perversity.

Finally, under the guidance of prudence, there is the possibility of "the downfall of civilization." This has been suggested by Norman Cousins, Raymond Swing, Professor Einstein and atomic scientists, like Professor Oppenheimer. Can this be the lever with which to move the world to peace? a lever which will lift *all* nations? Or even the few in the West, including Russia? To be effective, some requisites are wanting. Not enough people know what "civilization" is. How can they be expected to see the depths upon depths that have brought man crawling up from the primeval mud to his immensely complex interrelated life, based upon science and an intricate social heritage of law, literature, niceties of language, subtleties of expression, the variety and hierarchy of his institutions? How many have been taught to the degree that it is a political imperative, to see that the whole difference between a baby born in the Stone Age and one born today is this social heritage alone; to understand that human nature has only changed in so far as throughout its life it becomes the beneficiary of this embracing but destructible bequest outside himself? How can the masses be expected to comprehend, as education has hitherto been fashioned, the rich thoughts they share that are not theirs, but those of devoted and unworldly sci-

entists, poets, religious leaders, novelists, lawgivers and jurists of genius. How deep and solid and closely woven the matted texture of society is; how the whole of life depends upon the sustaining network of mind and mind in the world, without which the fall of man to the level of beasts would occur! If it is argued that peace need not depend upon the mind of the masses, but more upon their leaders, are there enough leaders who know enough about civilization to care for it to the degree indicated? In some countries the leaders could not be persuaded to care for it. There is one other difficulty. Civilization is divided within itself. Democrats, Fascists, Communists, Yogis and Commissars have different ideas of civilization. Some might look with equanimity on the destruction of another's civilization. It takes but one to start a war.

Hence, especially in relationship to the tyrannical factor of time, the effectiveness of prudential considerations against war is not high. It could become so, if all nations together taught a common doctrine of prudence with the same intensity and earnestness, and if governments were convinced of the common interest of all nations in its consequences. All international agencies, general or special, are a support to this end, and therefore not to be discarded.

Bribes of Material Advantage

Thus, neither humanity, nor prudence seem separately, or in combination, to give assurance of peaceful behavior—whether that means concessions and submission, or militant obstinacy to secure the right settlement.

This leaves a policy of bribery to promote adequate world organization. I refer to the economic benefits that would come of a world well knit together and with the assurance of friendliness and peace. The bribe would be economic welfare. It could not be a great bribe, for not the whole world is rich. Only a few countries are really well off, and much poverty still prevails within them.¹⁸

¹⁸ Cf. Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, New York, 1940, pp. 2, 3.

"Summarizing these figures, the world is found to be a wretchedly poor place. An average real income per worker of 500 International Units or less (in round figures a standard of living of two pounds or \$10 per week per breadwinner) is the lot of 81 per cent of the world's population. A standard of living of 1000 International Units per worker per year or more is found

But there are many poor countries, and these can be given sufficient hope of improvement in twenty years to cause their governments to pursue a peaceful policy. The total gain is less important than a steady and progressive increment year by year to sustain hope. Really substantial gifts, loans, and assistance over a short period are not possible, for the capital and the technicians are insufficient. In most cases help involves some immediate loss to the donating nations, and adaptation of some of their industries and their tariff policies for the purpose. This obstructs contributions large enough to mollify such national resentments as we may know in our time. To bribe the Soviet rulers in this way is impossible: they own too large a field of exploitation. They are in a position to give access to vast lands, but would give it, if at all, only on terms of submission to their form of government and political morality. Nor is their political system such as to induce the masses to press them. No consideration of economic improvement of their land by the Jews satisfies the Arab ruling class that in return they should reduce Arabian sovereignty. The Arab statement of May 9, 1947, at the United Nations proceedings on the Palestinian problem expressly repudiated the economic argument as "immoral." The same lesson is taught by Irish relations with Great Britain, and the Latin-American countries and the United States.

These examples are evocative of the hopes and expectations of wealth aroused by the Atlantic Charter, the Economic and Social Council and the special agencies of the United Nations. It does not follow that economic inducements should not be tried. Especially in stricken Europe, where misery may cause men and women to ally themselves with extremist dictatorial leaders, economic assistance may help.

only in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Argentina, Great Britain and Switzerland, containing between them 10 per cent of the world's population. Another 9 per cent of the world's population is found in the principal industrial centers of Europe with an average real income per head between 500 and 1000 International Units. About 53 per cent of the world's population, including the whole populations of India and China, enjoys a real income per head of less than 200 International Units. Average real income per breadwinner in China and India is about 120 and 200 International Units respectively."

An International Unit was the purchasing power of the United States dollar in 1929.

Fear

If humanity and prudence are dubious pillars of peace, can fear be relied on? As already observed, this stands between persuasion and force. The cohesion of nations, and submission to a single law within them, is assisted by internal fear of foreign nations: it is part of the appeal of nationalism. But there is nothing outside the world as a whole, no enemy, to bring all the nations together; for example, to induce Soviet rulers for the sake of peace to abdicate in favor of a democratic government, to persuade the United States to become Communist to please the Soviet rulers, or the British to abandon their islands and migrate to Texas or Manitoba. Humorists have suggested that if Martians threatened to invade the world the nations might form a peaceful federation. However, the history of mankind rather suggests that in an impending invasion of Martians, one or more nations would become global Quislings, let them in, and as allies help to destroy the rest.

THE FEAR OF ALL AND THE FEAR OF SOME

Now there are two main hypotheses: (1) fear common to all, and (2) fear by one, or some, nations of the single or combined power of violence of others against it.

Could a common fear be a cohesive element? This is suggested of the atomic bomb and the other existing or potential weapons of mass destruction. For instance, when an atom bomb is dropped, the nation attacked hears the explosion and sees the fires and can undertake a counterattack, but a bacteriological war would be over before its victims knew that it had started. Would the need for universal inoculations for all the deadliest bacteria produce peace?

The deployment of terror to produce peaceful-mindedness, the taking of right measures for peace, the surrender of privileged positions, and the submission of disputes to the arbitrament of majority decision in all cases,¹⁹ has not yet been given adequate consideration. It is a favorite last-ditch argument of "world

¹⁹ In this case the claims of disappointed nations might be increased. Where they feel injustice, e.g., refusal to permit immigration, they might say "stand and deliver!"

government" advocates. One World or None! In the evidence given by the atomic scientists before the United States Senate, the theme is recurrent. "Tell them, and tell them quickly," they are saying, "lest they perish!"

Now there should be much assistance from professional psychologists on this subject. They have not, however, supplied the knowledge needed. Therefore I am bound to rely on my own observations in many many nights and days of bombing on land and on sea and of submarine alarms.

The problem is whether fear that is intensive enough, influencing everybody and continuing with undiminished intensity can be produced? Let it be remembered that we can hardly have *actual* danger to help us, but only the memory or imaginative anticipation of it. I am concerned with fear of death and wounding. On the whole, our knowledge of morale under bombing, and the threat of more, indicates that only those who are actually bombed, with the bombs falling very close, are powerfully affected. The further the distance from the bombing, the less the effect. And the distance for the fading of impression need not be great, not even one mile. Even if the bombs fall only in the next block, the effect is theoretical; it still is impersonal, it still cannot happen to me! There are humanitarian outbursts of sympathy, but fear of a peace-compelling intensity is rare. If the person is killed, he ceases to be a part of public opinion. If he escapes, the chances are that he will be very cocky, ascribing his fortune to God, or luck, or something in his own destiny or virtue—in any case he will not feel very afraid and hardly humble. He adapts himself to the situation. If he moves out of the dangerous area, he requires readaptation on returning. He acquires a protection of brooding or jocular fatalism. All countries subject to bombing for any length of time experienced difficulty in persuading people in the safe areas to feel sufficiently with their fellow countrymen to billet them. These even resisted or cheated the billeting authorities in quite a substantial proportion of the cases. Class feeling was often a barrier to understanding and mercy; but distance, not at all great, was only too effective in lessening fear. "You," said David Hume, "have the same propension that I have in favor of what is contiguous above what is remote."

It is very difficult to make people realize the possibility of their own extinction. They do not believe it. Nor do they believe they

may be maimed. They cannot believe that it will happen to them. They may fear more for their children than for themselves, and this is a point worth notice. One of the greatest fears is blindness: could this be permanently kept in mind?

So we come to the degree of permanence of an impression of enough intensity to cause people in their nations to forgo their advantages over others, and to submit their standard of living and ideals to the possibly adverse judgment of an impartial tribunal.

The propaganda about the atomic bomb is already taken for granted, and the bomb has become the subject of jokes and vulgar songs. The atomic scientists are extremely and rightly grieved by the refusal of the people to be concerned over their warnings. They have even suggested demonstrations to keep the idea fresh.²⁰ But demonstrations seen and heard by a small proportion of the population would not have the requisite compelling effect.

Nor is that the only thing to be taken into account. Fear may be too abject for what is desired; or fear may be felt, but overcome. It was correctly observed at the Senate atomic hearings that hysteria might be generated by propaganda, and wrong political reactions produced. Prudence was set forth as the proper alternative. Hence the dilemma: to frighten people enough, and yet not so much as to make them imprudent. Imprudent proposals, flying on the wings of fear, were the surrender of the bomb secrets to other nations, and preventive war.

Now experience has shown that if a nation believes its cause is just, it will readily face frightful danger. Some will take the risk of being utterly destroyed rather than surrender. In World War II times of severe anxiety were experienced in Great Britain, but resolve was more for effort and sacrifice than surrender. A government well organized technically to cope with dangers, having done all that it is humanly possible to do, and having the free support of its people in what they themselves believe to be a just cause, would not easily succumb to fear. If a nation were very small, and stood no chance of survival of physical life, it might well surrender; but that, too, is doubtful: the stand of the Greeks against the Nazis in World War II offers a clear example.

²⁰ Atomic Energy Committee Hearings, pp. 22, 23 and 125.

Some light is thrown on this subject by Dollard and Horton's study of *Fear in Battle*, based on the experience of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War, volunteers, who "had in common the belief that by volunteering they were fighting for democracy." The findings are most pertinent to our own theme. Seven out of ten men reported experiencing fear when going into first action; 64 men out of a hundred agreed that they became less afraid the more times they went into action. Fear is greatest just before *action* (not, surely, in the piping times of peace!). The most important factors in controlling fear are: devotion to cause, leadership, training and matériel. Eight out of ten men believe that *hatred* is important to the effective soldier—but *hatred of the enemy's cause*, not of him personally. Fear may actually stimulate a soldier to fight harder and better, if danger to self also suggests danger to the outfit or cause.

Can we then expect that fear produced simply by retailing, even by the most graphic methods of the film, will damp war-mindedness if danger to self suggests danger to "the outfit" (the nation) or "cause" (democracy or communism)?

Fear was, apparently, not fear of *death*. It was fear of being wounded, and, in descending order of fear, of wounding in the abdomen, the eyes, the brain, the genitals, the legs and feet, hands and arms, face, the torso. No fear was felt of being shot through the heart, despite "the propaganda of childhood."

Only 3 per cent of the men were chiefly frightened by the sight of bomb damage: this, let it be realized was real bomb damage, not simulated damage, or pictures of it. Firing back (as I know myself) reduces even the fear (38 per cent) of falling bombs, or sound and concussion of bombs exploding (33 per cent). The fear of being a coward showed itself in 36 per cent in first action and 8 per cent for veterans; fear of being crippled and disfigured for life, 25 per cent and 39 per cent respectively; fear of being *killed*, 25 per cent and 24 per cent respectively; captured and tortured, 8 per cent and 19 per cent; and fear of painful wounds, 6 per cent and 10 per cent.

A current legend is that belief in luck or fatalism helps the control of fear. Of the veterans, 58 per cent realized that they *could* get hit; and a little higher percentage could not be comforted by the idea that if they were hit, they would never know the difference. Nevertheless, they continued to fight. Only one in four felt

protected by luck or fatalism, and therefore did not care. *Nearly six out of ten did care, yet they fought.*

Suggestions for the treatment of panic did not usually include psychiatric treatment.

The substitute which these men seem to offer is discussing with the man "what he's fighting for." These men believe that devotion to war aims plays a great role in controlling fear. If a man knows what he is fighting for, and has an intense personal need to win, his zeal in battle will tend to triumph over his fear.

This advice was given by 77 per cent. Others suggested leadership, military training, matériel, information about the situation, *esprit de corps*, understanding and control of fear, hatred of the enemy, and distraction and keeping busy. These results tally with my own carefully kept record of the experiences of myself and friends and family under bombing, with close danger of death.

CAUSE TRIUMPHS OVER FEAR

This part of the argument may be concluded with a quotation from this investigation:

All say that having a clear idea of what is at stake in the war makes a better soldier. All testify to the usefulness of discussing war aims and their importance in the personal lives of men. All stress the value of thinking that another world will follow when the war is won. Men fight better when they recoil in imagination from the prospect of the world the enemy intends to create. The inevitable fear of battle has a powerful opponent in this profound conviction of the justice and importance of the cause.

The carefully compiled and appraised findings of the United States Bombing Survey of Germany shows the tough resistance of even urban communities under devastating air attack. In unbombed cities, 9 per cent of the population showed "demoralizing fear"; in the bombed cities, only 16 per cent. The members of the Nazi party, and those sharing Nazi ideology maintained their morale better than neutral citizens. Continuous heavy bombing soon led to diminishing returns in effect upon morale. The general conclusion (page 106) is of vital importance to the present theme:

The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control, they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained. *The power of a police state over its people cannot be underestimated.*

Let it be borne in mind that this is behavior under actual attack, not the behavior that might be expected under the influence of mere memory persuasion, months or years or a generation after experience.

My conclusion is that a nation, convinced of the justice of its cause; proud of its history, hopeful of *a better world in its own way*, with another nation to fear or hate (sometimes identical), and with plausible or specious grounds for imputing blame to it, would find it difficult to bow all heads by fear. This would be especially difficult before what was to be feared had been experienced directly by the majority of the people.

It is noteworthy that no *government* has as yet commenced a campaign to terrorize its own population: not one of the Big Three, the two democracies or the Soviet rulers. The last named has made light of the atomic bomb.

At this point what is, perhaps, a vital distinction must be made between the masses in a nation under terror and the coterie of leaders, if that nation is not democratic and the leaders are not of democratic selection. A democratic mass of citizens will, I think, sustain each other morally during the terror, before it, and in its aftermath. If some are lost or cowardly, many others are there to take the vacant posts. The stakes for a democratic people are so varied and universal and direct that perhaps they cannot be intimidated. But where a rather small ruling coterie pursues governmental ends of its own volition, and for personal power, even in the name of a doctrine which is again rather a personal preference than an emanation of the people, *perhaps the threat of impending terror is more disciplinary*. Then it would have to be brought home to them clearly, firmly, and inevitably, that their own power was certain to end.

My conclusion is that fear of a common and general type is

not for whole peoples, or for all nations equally and simultaneously, a final deterrent. It is not yet great enough for them, in retrospect or in foresight, to find it intolerable as compared with the many other values which they pursue. This is partly the failure of propaganda techniques. But it is much more the refusal of the will to accept intimidation, and therefore to make the instruments which would bring it home effectively.

What remains of any hope of success is the installation of overwhelming fear by one nation or a union of nations able to do it. This can effectively influence a nation (especially if it is ruled by a few men unsupported by the masses), only if it is known to be, and is, overwhelming; if its use is certain, drastic and complete; if no procedural loophole or crevice enables the culprit to escape correction or the superior force to fail in its responsibility. Propaganda would have to accompany force where the masses are attached to their delinquent rulers mainly by force and propaganda.

Nationalism, then, still stands sufficiently in the way of world organization to bar a lasting peace. It is productive of tensions, even among peoples of like political tradition and convention. Where a great tradition of world power is allied with a sanguine ideology, or a determination, above all, to hold power, the ways of humanity, of prudence, of bribes of material advantage, and even of fear, to the destination of peace are unreliable, but if any of these is to be depended upon, it is fear in the present and proximate future.

The wise and the peaceable peoples will advance the tenets of humanity by all means open to them. They will play upon all prudential considerations. They will need to make sacrifices of a transitory and sometimes permanent nature to raise the living standards of those amenable to the appeals of humanity and prudence. And they will need to be wary of increasing the economic strength of governments who steel themselves against such appeals and generosity. Above all, reluctantly and sorrowfully, but in duty bound, they are compelled to prepare to play on fear, at home and abroad, if they would have peace.

Face To Face With Duty

O, how comely it is, and how reviving
 To the Spirits of just men long opprest,
 When God into the hands of their deliverer
 Puts invincible might,
 To quell the mighty of the Earth, th'oppressor,
 The brute and boistrous force of violent men,
 Hardy and industrious to support
 Tyrannic power, but raging to pursue
 The righteous and all such as honour Truth!

—MILTON, *Samson Agonistes*

Westward the course of empire takes its way;
 The four first acts already past,
 A fifth shall close the drama with the day:
 Time's noblest offspring is the last.

—GEORGE BERKELEY, *On the Prospect of
 Planting Arts and Learning in America*

IF MORE THAN a truce is sought, and an armed truce at that, then more earnest ways to peace must be considered. Three various paths have been stumbled on. These are: (1) Woodrow Wilson's idea that world organization must be founded on the basis of "self-governing" nations; (2) that a world bill of the rights of man is necessary to peace; (3) that intervention in the "domestic" affairs of nations is sometimes necessary. All of these imply the exertion or the threat of force somewhere in the world of today, though the threat need not be an overt menace—fear can be the disciplinarian.

Wilson saw that peace arrangements based on the word of autocratic governments were precarious. He therefore insisted in 1918 that peace with Germany should be a peace with its people. Later, in establishing the League of Nations, he pleaded

that it should be founded on the membership of self-governing states.

In his reply to the German note of October 20, 1918, he declared:

The President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have been hitherto the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war, the government of the United States cannot deal with any but *veritable* representatives of the German people who have been assured of a *genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany*.

Wilson insisted that the basis of "self-governing" statehood was essential for the proper operation of an international organization. At the session of the Commission commencing February 6, 1918, he proposed that, apart from the signatories to the Covenant (a serious but unavoidable exception):

Only self-governing States shall be admitted to membership in the League; colonies enjoying full powers of self-government may be admitted . . .

There was no confusion as to the meaning of "self-governing," though there were embarrassments in its application. Did it mean "self-governing" from an external point of view, or "self-governing" from the standpoint of a nation's internal institutions. The question of India arose; and this produced a discussion on the governmental system of Germany, the Philippines, and even Japan! "inducing a retort from the usually silent Baron Makino."

Wilson's idea was clear. He declared:¹

I have spent twenty years of my life lecturing on self-governing states, and trying all the time to define one. Now whereas I haven't been able to arrive at a definition, I have come to the point where I recognize one when I see it. For example, regardless of how it appeared on paper, no one would have looked at the German government before the war, and said that the nation was self-governing. We knew that, in point of fact, the Reichstag was controlled by the Chancellor, that it was an absolute monarchy. On the other hand, some govern-

¹ D. Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, I, 165.

ments are in terms less liberal than Germany was, and yet we would agree in calling them self-governing.

We have said that this war was carried on for a vindication of democracy. The statement did not create the impulse but it brought it to consciousness. So soon as it was stated that the war was being waged to make the world safe for democracy, a new spirit came into the world. People began to look at the substance rather than at the form. They knew that governments derived their just powers from consent of the governed. I should like to point out that nowhere else in the draft is there any recognition of the principle of democracy. If we are ready to fight for this, we should be ready to write it into the covenant.

He denied India's right to be called self-governed: Westminster and the princes governed her.

He later pointed out that in the original American draft the qualification was, "Only states whose governments are based upon the principle of *popular self-government*."

Wilson's idea was wise. It was trebly proven by the experience of the League with Mussolini, with Germany under Hitler, and with Japan. The League could not appeal to the people against their belligerent dictators while their countries were members.

The League, indeed, virtually ignored Wilson's principle. It preferred universality of membership, and strategic considerations determined admission. Thus, the report on the admission of Abyssinia in 1923 doubted her ability to fulfill her international engagements. Yet she was admitted by unanimous vote. Nothing was said about "self-government" in Wilson's sense. When Germany was admitted in 1926, she was certainly in the heyday of Weimar democracy, but the persuasive cause of admission was an amalgam of the Locarno Pact, fulfillment of the Treaty of Versailles, and French security. Then, one year after the accession of Hitler, and shortly after the massacre of Roehm and others, France, Britain, and Italy for obvious reasons needed the presence of the Soviet Government, while the Soviet rulers desperately needed "collective security." The League's Committee did not so much as raise the question of "self-government."² But Portugal, Switzerland, and the Netherlands spoke and voted against Russia's admission. Belgium voiced her opinion but abstained from voting.

² Assembly, League, 1934, p. 17 ff., and Ninth Meeting, Sept. 18, 1934, p. 63 ff.

Argentina abstained on grounds of a diplomatic insult. The Portuguese representative's statement summarized the views of the objectors:

There is manifest opposition—I may even say incompatibility—between the principles advocated by Soviet Russia in the economic, juridical, political, and moral spheres and the conceptions which form the basis of our ancient civilization and constitute the very essence of our culture and ethics.

Mr. Motta for Switzerland added an objection to Communist propaganda for world revolution. But M. Barthou, the grand French diplomat, reached the vital point promptly: "You want peace; you are here to organize and promote it and to defend it throughout the world, and you propose to isolate Russia by offering her the worst insult you can offer any country." M. Benes spoke in the interest of European peace for Russia's admission. The Soviet has a long memory: this was not forgotten, nor her exclusion from the League in 1919.

What philosophy of peace lay behind the principle? Wilson nowhere stated it completely or directly. It is clear, however, from Wilson's wartime speeches and the drafts of the Covenant by Colonel House and himself, that the relationship between democratic government and peace was regarded as cause and effect.

In his speech to the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference, January 25, 1919, he said:

We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those foundations were the aggression of small coteries of civil rulers and military staffs.

He evidently believed that the word of a democratic government, such as that of the United States, could be relied on more certainly than that of autocratic or aristocratic powers, and that they would be more inclined to peace; that, at least, their form of government would give stability to their engagements, assurance to the rest of the world, and that war would not be lightly undertaken.

DEMOCRACY

A strong case can be made for Wilson's view. It is most urgent that it should be understood and accepted as a basic axiom of international order.

Three matters need examination: the value of democracy for peace; the minimum institutions required for it; the relationship of infirmities in democracy to the main service it renders.

In a democratic system, that is, one where it is acknowledged that authority springs from the people, and where the institutions are both representative *and* responsible, policy is finally determined by the free vote of the people in periodical elections. In the intervals between, several political parties freely organize the electors and focus their mind and will on the government. This process entails open discussion during elections, and in the intervals also, of the value of party policies for the interests of the people. A cause and a consequence of the system is a free press and other channels of information and debate which have every reason to bring into open circulation all information and opinion concerning policy and achievement.

An organized opposition is an integral and natural part of the system. In some countries it is even cherished and salaried because it is the alternative government.

Sooner or later, then, all secrets come out; all values are publicly examined; mental reservations are forced into the open or can be guessed and their validity challenged for the good of the people. The propaganda of other parties or groups is stripped by public criticism. These procedures are safeguards against secret courses, minority intentions, ulterior and undisclosed motives, and breach of faith. They are a check upon the government, and a source of assurance to other nations, affording the latter a relatively good opportunity of knowing their position. There may be confusions, but they are not intentional, hidden or unchallengeable confusions.

The mere existence of opposition groups with their various constitutional rights of dissent and obstruction, with their ability to harass and press the government, and check it in courses which might, without widespread agreement, take the nation into war, is a moderating influence. It divides the nation, requires the greatest

common denominator for the operation of policy, retards decisions over a time, compels second thought, and prohibits caprice.

Democratic government guarantees a more objective view of other peoples' claims, since there are always individuals or groups within a democratic country who sympathize with foreign claims, and can freely give them full publicity. They cannot be ignored. Furthermore they can propose to their fellow countrymen that foreign claims be weighed against the cost of resistance to them.

Above all, a multitude of people in the nation, subject to open criticism and exposed to challenge, continuously have their standards of behavior examined by the criteria of their own claims to democracy, equality, and freedom. Their claims are employed against them when they are unfair to others. Their democratic principle is a source of agitation and moderation. It has a direct relationship to the idea of humanity previously discussed. It is the political instrument of vast numbers of people, not a mere cult in the minds of small groups, or cliques, as in, say, a well-disposed autocracy. In a democratic system, the theory of government and its institutional arrangements of checks and balances are the guardians of fundamental rights. This is discussed more thoroughly presently.

The minimum institutions to safeguard a system of government of this kind are obvious. First, there must be periodical elections; they may be more frequent than a fixed term, but a fixed term must be short enough to hold the government to the will of the people, and make it anxious, if it wants to return to power, to act as the people stipulate. Its power must be contingent on good conduct, as "good" is defined by the governed. Secondly, the legislature in which the preponderant power should be lodged, especially that of finance, the establishment and control of the armed forces, the declaration of war and peace, and the ratification of treaties and agreements, should have the right to call itself into session by a stated proportion of its membership, in addition to the number and length of its regular sessions, and to determine its own agenda. To allow, as in Soviet Russia, the Congress of Soviets to be convened only at the decision of the Executive³ or of a very small committee, is to surrender power into the hands

³ There are two constitutional exceptions: a session must be called within a month of the elections; and (never so far used), any Republic has the right to ask that the Soviet be convened.

of the smaller body. Thirdly, the right of candidature in elections must be subject to the very minimum of formalities, and any body of five or six citizens (even this may be omitted) should be permitted to endorse candidates. Fourthly, the right of voluntary association for any civic purpose, and especially for the formation of political parties, is entirely indispensable. Fifthly, secret ballot, with precautions by the parties or candidates involved to secure the honesty of elections, of propaganda, of the keeping, counting and registration of the ballots. Sixthly, no intimidation by arms, bribery, or otherwise, can be tolerated, whether during or between election periods. Seventhly, no detention or molestation of candidates and voters is permissible except on warrant of the judiciary, and for crimes and misdemeanors within the laws already in being, and then only with the judicially provable absence of intent of political obstruction.

It is not my business to judge whether these arrangements can be successfully instituted in any country that does not possess them, or has tried them and failed. These form the minimum basis of democratic government. In time they will yield the values adumbrated above for the peace of the world, especially if we assume, as we have done in talking of the people as distinct from the government of Russia, that the people are on the whole decent and peace-loving, and not exigent or malicious.

Some persons will immediately sneer that there are many flaws in democratic government. There are. Even the oldest democracies are only in their infancy, in the midst of the great stormy oceans of a fast changing world. The splendid fact remains that nothing so far achieved in government works so well for the maximum number, is so little reliant upon coercion and force, as democratic systems. They give a sense of freedom, initiative, tranquillity, and equal dealing. They do this so excellently and unobtrusively that their values are not noticed, which is a drawback. They are subject to such change as the changing mind of the greater proportion of the people wants; and they allow of progress at a speed which the public can tolerate. Democratic government is government which cares for the lives and property of the people, increases the sense of fair play toward others, and therefore better builds, comparatively speaking, the basis of a peaceful world. It is cool tempered, because it rests on the foundation of respect for the other man's person and opinion, and he has the

right to require this respect or, being denied it, to associate politically with the opposition. The rule of social mutuality and reciprocity is not perfect, but it is at its maximum in such a system compared with historical and contemporary alternatives. Its extension of mutuality and reciprocity to dealings with other nations follows.

All this is the background of Woodrow Wilson's view that the governments of the member states of a world organization dedicated to peace and justice should be "self-governing." Other thinkers also have declared that this is necessary, the greatest of whom is Immanuel Kant. First among the wise principles he proposed for the attainment of perpetual peace is: "The civil constitution of every state ought to be republican." This system of government means it must be representative, and this alone avoids the arbitrary or despotic. Only in this form of government is there the promise of perpetual peace. For, since the citizens will be here required to declare whether they want war or peace, they would not decree against themselves "all the calamities of war, such as fighting in person, furnishing from their own means towards the expense of war; painfully to repair the devastations it occasions . . . to fill up the measure of evils, load upon themselves the weight of national debt, that would embitter even peace itself." Whereas, in other forms of government those who declare war may personally lose nothing.⁴ The reasons may be quite frivolous, says Kant, and the justification of war (which decency requires) left to the diplomatic corps! So ends Kant.

In a democratic government the necessity of providing for the concord of so many millions of citizens is a brake on precipitate action. Indeed, it may even produce a paralysis of will to war, when such a will is, like swift acceleration in car driving at a dangerous crux, a necessity. This propensity of democracy to pacific methods, because it is a government by a purposely divided will, answers a question often asked. It is thought that the cause of war lies in big states, for they have great power and, omitting the question of will to war, the ability to wage it. Hence, if their power was reduced, for example, by disarmament, there would be less chance of war. This proposition would be true, if they were

⁴They may even gain—see the paeans on this theme in Soviet literature: above, pp. 238, 255, and 260.

thus disarmed. It is also suggested that small states do not fight each other, and that therefore a disintegration (a Balkanization!) of the great states, for example, the United States and U.S.S.R., would be of assistance in maintaining peace.⁵ It is true that they will not dismember themselves. It would in some respects be unfortunate if they did. For the more frontiers, the more the occasions of dispute, and wars can be conducted by coalitions of small powers as well as by great.

Where large and small states conduct their affairs by a democratic system there is in a sense a certain dismemberment. It is not a dismemberment of territory, but it is a division of interests, outlooks, and of opinion, and this is supported by the machinery and processes of government.

It may be noticed that the size of Prussia in the Reich meant political ruination for all, because her polity was antidemocratic until 1919, and it was thenceforward out of tune with the other states. It is noteworthy that *democratization* of Prussia was regarded by Hugo Preusz as necessary to the Reich, and as more necessary, division of her representation in the Reichsrat.⁶ Not only is the difference in form of government a menace to peace for the reasons given already, but it constitutes one more of the differences between nations making for pride on one side and discredit on the other.

This, then, that only democratic states may be member states of a world organization, is one of the principles necessary as an assurance of peace. But its *voluntary* establishment is not to be expected.

Of the two great world powers, one is democratic; the other continues to be autocratic, and even despotic.

HUMAN RIGHTS MAKE PEACE

Since World War I, a bill of fundamental rights for all individuals everywhere has been increasingly recognized as a necessary foundation of a long peace. States which denied to their own citizens justice and mercy, were militarist in their foreign relations. Their incitement of their population against other nations

⁵ *American Philosophical Society, Proceedings*, 1945, observations by Jacob Viner.

⁶ Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, I, Chap. X.

was unopposed. Men of conscience in other countries were antagonized by their atrocities. Hence the conviction that peace required the universal existence of certain fundamental rights.⁷

The rights usually advocated may be listed and their relevance to peace stated.

1. Liberty of person; no arbitrary and unauthorized arrest; no prolonged detention; no inhuman and cruel punishment; safeguards of evidence and procedure in criminal cases, and delivery from detention through writ of habeas corpus or equal instrument.

This keeps clear the way for open discussion, for freedom from molestation of free political activity. It enables refutation regarding pacifism or publicity considered by the government to be internationally dangerous to it.

2. Full freedom of religion.

The suppression of spiritual leadership is used for totalitarian domination of citizen loyalties and breaks down checks and balances productive of tolerance and moderation. All the energy and passion of spiritual need is focused into one channel open only to the rulers of the state. Such control is usually inimical to the spread of humanity, for while the religions teach that all men ought to be treated equally, religion subordinated to nationalism intensifies differences.

3. Freedom of speech and expression in writing and by other means shall not be denied or impaired.

4. Freedom of association and assembly shall exist.

These freedoms are foundations of the formation of the public mind; they are the guarantees that it shall be informed, the assurance that mind may contend with mind for influence upon the highest counsels of the nation. The United States Supreme Court has declared that such rights are even beyond the power of elected majorities to abridge.⁸ Their significance has already been ex-

⁷ Cf. Lauterpacht, *An International Bill of the Rights of Man*, 1945, for an extended discussion and literature.

⁸ Cf. Justice Jackson in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* (1943). "One's right to life, liberty . . . and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."

plained: to defer decisions, to give consideration to the interests of other nations, to moderate and temper extreme courses; perhaps to reduce passion, where that is warranted. Without these rights, the reign of reason is impossible. With them the reign of unreason might at least be modified.

What, then, is the reign of reason? Reason between nations means that international decisions are governed not by (a) prescription, that is to say, that economic and other privileges already acquired are reserved to those who possess them without any justification in present utility, without taking account of the needs of *all* mankind; or (b) by aristocracies or governing classes whose status and pretensions are founded on history, or unproven claims to moral or technical superiority, even when these aristocracies happen to be working men in America, Australia, Canada, or Great Britain, who benefit from prior acquisitions of skills, or lands rich in resources, which they barricade against the influx of backward peoples. Instead, (c) reason requires a single moral standard, that is, the application of the principle, in all controversies, that other peoples are morally as good as your own, and therefore should have their claims satisfied on that basis. The use of a double standard, indulgent to one's self and one's nationals, and severe or contemptuous to others, is unreasonable.

5. Sanctity of the home and secrecy of correspondence.

6. Full equality before the law, and equal treatment of all nationals by the state; no discrimination on account of religion, race, color, language or political creed; full and equal protection in the Bill of Rights for aliens; no expulsions of aliens legally admitted.

These make certain that no individuals or groups shall be outlawed in their own nation, and so denied a share of policy-making sovereignty.

7. The right of emigration and expatriation shall not be denied.

It is important in the interests of the development of a world-wide fund of information that people who want to leave their countries may be able to do so. To deny men this right is to deny to other nations the right to hear at first hand what they have to say. Such a prohibition is in the interests of belligerent states and hostile to peace. It was practiced by Nazi Germany and Fascist

Italy, who permitted their subjects to leave only in the interests of the regime, and with the special injunction that they represented their country and regime. It is still practiced by Soviet Russia. Moreover, in March, 1947, the Presidium forbade by decree the marriage of Soviet citizens to foreigners, and refuses to permit the emigration of the wives of British military personnel who married in Russia during the war.

8. Free secret and periodic elections for the effective right of choice of governments and legislators.
9. The right to work, to education, and social security.
10. Provision for just and humane conditions of work in co-operation with other states and through the International Labor Organization.

At the San Francisco Conference it was proposed that a declaration of human rights should be included in the Charter. Only this formula was adopted: ". . . in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." [Art. 1, (2)].

The scope of these rights is yet to be decided, though there has been a long listing of them by the Commission on Human Rights of the Economic and Social Council.

The purpose is to oblige states to exercise self-restraints which conduce to peace. Such rights create fissures in the "monolithic" character of the state (a term frequently used by the Nazi and Fascist governments, *and* the Soviet regime). They dissolve unity, favor diversity of opinion and will, buttress the fellowships of individuals and voluntary groups that transcend the boundaries of states. Rights of this kind link people to people, instead of leaving the monopoly of human relationships to the integer we call "state" or "nation." They promote the development of humanity. They facilitate the commingling of the ideas and values of peoples by protecting them against molestation in each state so that they may pass over the frontiers. They enable a communal texture of loyalties to be woven between minds over the barbed wire, and thereby make possible a common civilization and morality. They foster understanding and dissolve iron walls.

This last was explained in the Report of the Secretary of State to the President on the San Francisco Conference:

The United States Delegation has, however, made clear its understanding that the fundamental freedoms include freedom of speech, and that freedom of speech involves, international relationships, freedom of exchange of information.⁹

Needless to say, despite some agitation, it has as yet been impossible to get any guarantees on this score from the Soviet rulers. At the General Assembly Session of November, 1946, the Soviet delegate made an especially vigorous onslaught upon the United Nations Organization's policy of world-wide information services, demanding that they be considerably reduced.

A very considerable contribution to peace would be made if these rights were voluntarily granted by governments, and, better still, if they were instituted by the implacable resolution of their own people.

The proposals of the Charter are permissive, and their eventual scope and significance await the *recommendations* (not the binding law) of the General Assembly. Their enforcement is their quintessence. For effectiveness, publicists propose inclusion in the Law of Nations; in the constitution of all states, validity in the judiciary of all states, a commission of the world organization to supervise the observance of the rights, which commission shall collect information and receive petitions bearing on their observance. They further propose reports to the world organization by this commission periodically, and as infractions occur. The Council of the United Nations is suggested as supreme agency for securing observance. Infractions would be notified by any member state. The World Court would give advisory opinions relating to the observance of the rights. If the Council found serious infraction by a three-fourths majority of its members, it would so declare. If the culprit took no steps to remedy the situation, the Council would take the political, economic, or militant action it deemed necessary.

Thus, national *self-enforcement* is rejected. It is rejected, in part, because the procedure of the interwar Minorities Treaties, though much better than nothing as protection to minorities, was not assertive enough to supply this larger guarantee of rights for a more serious purpose.

Can this device—the international bill of human rights—to

⁹ Page 38.

overcome the sundering effect of nationalisms and ideologies be instituted except by *compulsion*? Some compulsion is admitted in the proposal that a three-fourths majority shall prevail. Can this attempt to subject all governments to a reign of humane law succeed without coercion? Can peace be assured without it? All these questions can be answered in the negative. This dusty answer is only too well confirmed by Article 2, (7) of the United Nations Charter, which protects the "essentially domestic jurisdiction" of the member states. Some states would assuredly vote against the Assembly recommendations for a bill of rights.

Thus, for months the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommittee on the Freedom of Information and the Press of the United Nations have been debating the list of civil rights to be guaranteed in each country, and the problem of the free flow of information. It is noteworthy that the Russian delegate fought all proposals that would give the individual clean-cut personal rights against the state. Particularly was this evident when Charles Malik, the delegate from the Lebanon (and *rapporteur*), set down (February 5, 1947) in the clearest terms the rights of the person:

1. The human person is more important than the racial, national, or other group to which he may belong;
2. The human person's most sacred and inviolable possessions are his mind and his conscience, enabling him to perceive the truth, to choose freely, and to exist;
3. Any social pressure on the part of the state, religion or race, involving the automatic consent of the human person is reprehensible.
4. The social group to which the individual belongs may, like the human person himself, be wrong or right; the person alone is the judge.

This was rebutted by Mr. Tepliakov of the Soviet Union who opposed these principles. He was against the Commission's considering the principles stated and reserved the right to comment on them after studying them.

On the problem of the agenda for a world conference on freedom of information, Mr. Lomakin for Russia wanted (a) the exclusion of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, but *not* of the World Federation of Trade Unions; (b) rejected the proposed measures (in a minority of one to nine) for protecting accredited correspondents from arbitrary expulsion from a foreign

country on the grounds of state sovereignty; (c) preferred to discuss the "reliability with regard to the news about the nation which has extended its hospitality to him"; and (d) asserted the impossibility of eliminating censorship as it is normally exercised only against correspondents not acting in good faith and whose reports were calculated to create unfriendly relations and misunderstanding among nations. (Cf. United Nations Economic and Social Council Documents, Subcommittee Freedom of Press, etc., May 24 to May 27, 1947.)

A further evidence of the uphill struggle of freedom and democracy, *and therefore peace*, is exhibited in the Soviet attitude toward the Bill of Rights proposed by the Commission on Human Rights, after months had been spent in drafting this for submission to the General Assembly. (See United Nations Economic and Social Council Documents E/CN. 4/AC. 1/ and SR. 3, June, 1947.) On June 12, 1947, Professor V. Koretsky for the U.S.S.R. (E/CN. 4/AC. 1/SRS), traversed this document, with the following obstructive arguments and tactics. He urged (though he was the accredited representative of his country) that he could not express the ideas of his government, and that his government would state its position later. He warned against the Committee's transgression of the border which divides international law from internal law—the field where the "sovereign rights of nations must prevail." The Bill of Rights ought to be so fashioned as to combat and prevent the rebirth of fascist systems and ideology—but "such a bill must not be of such a nature as to interfere in the internal system of various governments"! The standards which were finally adopted should be enforced not by an international agency, but by each government separately, and, since "each sovereign government must set its own standards in relations among nations, the only form which the Committee could suggest, which would be compulsory for any government, would be that of an international convention" (that is, a treaty).

Any action creating a Court which would stand higher than the separate governments and their citizens would inevitably lead to the destruction of governments. It would be an organism which would be working against governments—a new, outside, disconnected organism which would take upon itself the function of regulating the relations between the governments and their citizens. This would violate the provisions of international law.

Nevertheless, he supported two opposed methods of drafting— (a) a simple ten commandments which would be “a bugle call”; and (b) a draft which would not be merely a declaration of rights but would include the details for enforcing them!

He objected to the British Draft as it appeared to be an attempt to transfer certain principles of law to other countries, but, to the British disclaimer that it was only a draft for discussion, the Soviet representative could only reply that (though the Committee had been working for months), he had not as yet anything to contribute on behalf of the Soviet Government. But he repeatedly emphasized the need to war against “fascism” and, also, against “discrimination,” that is, against racial, sex, creed, color inequalities, in law and practice. Hardly much progress by persuasion, there!

In the course of the earlier discussion of the Bill of Rights, and preceding Mr. Malik's definition of the rights of the person, the Yugoslav representative, Mr. Ribnikar, had shown how opposed are the Western (Mr. Malik was a student at Oxford!) and the Soviet ways of life: He said (Commission on Human Rights, January 31, 1947, E/CN. 4/SR. 8):

New economic conditions in the twentieth century had given birth to a collective spirit, a consciousness of solidarity. Personal freedom could only be attained through perfect harmony between the individual and the community. The social ideal lay in the interests of society and of the individual being identical.

We were at present in a transitional period. The Commission should regard the social and political ideals of the middle classes as those of another age, and not look on certain principles as eternal. That was the mistake in the draft submitted by Panama and Cuba, and, more especially, in that of the American Federation of Labor. The International Bill of Human Rights should be in conformity with the aspirations of the popular masses of the world.

It will be observed that to “conditions” are attributed the “collective spirit”: the Leninist movement is thereby exonerated, and “collective” seems to insinuate spontaneous and by popular free demand, whereas the truth is otherwise. It may also be noticed that democracy, liberalism, and charity to human personal rights are not regarded as of universal worth, but as a transient and selfish value of the “middle classes.”

If the rights, then, are voted over the dissent of some states,

they would not implement them because the nature of their polity at home and their relations with the rest of the world renders this honest fulfillment impossible. *In the absence of such guarantees in any land, the other nations must be on their guard: power must do what persuasion and reason cannot achieve.*

INTERVENTION FOR CAUSE

In the past, states have undertaken preventive or aggressive war, or have acted defensively when foreign systems of government constituted a clear threat to their own.

The royal rulers of Austria and Prussia in 1792 allied themselves against the French Revolution in aid of the legitimate government to maintain "the essential bases of monarchical government in France." The French Revolutionary government rejected this in the formal terms of internal self-determination. When, however, the French Revolutionary armies swept through Europe, they acted in the spirit of Mazzini's command to crush wrong everywhere for mankind's sake. They overthrew feudalism and the "legitimate" rulers; they set up free governments, encouraged plebiscites.

The Holy Alliance was an attempt to intervene in order to uphold in Europe the traditional and legitimate forms against the liberal and revolutionary upsurge. Metternich was to replace Rousseau! The Metternichian Protocol binding Austria, Russia, and Prussia, the lairs of callous despotism, stated:

States which have undergone a change of government due to revolution the results of which threaten other States, *ipso facto* cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State into the bosom of the Great Alliance.¹⁰

Castlereagh rejected this, not on the ground that intervention was *never* justified, but on the ground that intervention was proper when their own immediate security or essential interests were seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another state.

¹⁰ Oct. 21, 1820, p. 24.

Only the strongest necessity could justify this. Intervention could not be indiscriminate against "all revolutionary movements."

In April, 1823, the French Government invaded Spain to suppress the revolution. This was one of the events which led to the United States establishing *its* form of intervention: the Monroe Doctrine. The powers of Europe were enjoined not to extend their system to the Western Hemisphere because, "The political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America." The United States supported the principles of government of her "Southern Brethren." Her Southern brethren were in the following decades not always jubilant with American interpretations of brotherliness, and in our own day there are forms of government which threaten the peace of the hemisphere. Even the "good neighbor policy" requires that the dwellers on *both* sides of the fence should be "good."

The Greeks were freed from Turkish dominion in 1827 on liberal principles; Belgium was established in 1831 on the basis of a constitutional monarchy. Russia intervened in Hungary in 1849; France in 1848 against Italian liberal attacks on the Pope's dominions. Italy was freed and unified under a constitutional monarchy. The Balkan States were constituted by the help of outside powers who threatened, held off, or overthrew Turkish suzerainty. In 1863 Britain, France, and Austria planned an intervention in the Russian Government of Poland when that land revolted against the horrors of Tsarist Russification: it was abortive against Russian determination.

Most of the actual interventions were for selfish national reasons, or if they were nobler, they were never couched in the form of a principle that the peace of the world required the assimilation of forms of government.

Some governments were obliged by treaty to establish a particular form of government. Thus Greece, monarchical, with a dynasty chosen and guaranteed by Britain, Russia, and France; similarly, Denmark in 1863; similarly Bulgaria, by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, which stipulated that a "Christian and monarchical form of government be established," the dynasty to be selected by agreement between the powers and the Turkish Government; similarly Belgium in 1831, Rumania in 1866, Mexico in 1864, Albania in 1913.

The Napoleonic dynasty was excluded by the Treaty of Novem-

ber, 1815, between France and the Powers (ignored when Napoleon III became chief of the republic and then empire). In 1920 the royal right of the Hapsburgs was abolished by the Hungarian parliament under threat of allied intervention.

The power to recognize new states or changes of regime is a power that can and has been used to impose conditions concerning the country's government. Thus Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Rumania were required not to discriminate against religious minorities by the Treaty of Berlin. This kind of intervention was continued and widely expanded in the minorities protection clauses of the treaties concluding World War I. The United States and Britain have strongly insisted on "democratic governments" and free elections in Rumania and Bulgaria, sought protection of minorities in the peace treaties of 1947, and have suspended recognition till satisfied on the form of government and the elections.

Though international law requires that recognition should not be dependent on the internal organization of a state, the practice has been otherwise: it was otherwise with France and the American states in 1778, and Britain against the French Convention, in 1792, refused recognition on the grounds of internal polity—(note the fulminations of Burke and his theories); so also Britain's withdrawal of recognition from the Serbian rulers after the massacre of the reigning family. We have already noted the use of nonrecognition of the Soviet regime, and the terms of United States recognition—the internal aspects of Soviet Government were untouched.

The Soviet Government's decided actions have already been recorded. The Soviet rulers, perhaps more than any government since the time of the Holy Alliance, assert the right of intervention—for ideological reasons—in the form of government. More than anyone, theirs is the phrase "peace-loving" states, with whom alone consort in a world organization is possible. The definition penetrates deep into the form of government and even the nature of its social foundations.¹¹ The implacable insistence of the Soviet in the United Nations that Franco shall be overthrown is, whether sincere or not, the clearest acknowledgment today of the contention that the form of government of any state is causally connected with international peace, as well as a powerful argument

¹¹ Cf. Article by Professor Korovin, cited above, p. 274, note 23.

for preventive war. So, too, the Soviet's robust championship of the case of India against South Africa, regarding the latter's treatment of Indians settled there.

Thus, though the theory of "self-determination" has been consistently, reverberatingly, and stoutly proclaimed, and for the most part sincerely, and though it is the foundation of international law, peace has not been possible without some interventions concerning the form of government. For those who had the power to create, or free, or recognize governments, were obliged to acknowledge to themselves and not infrequently aloud, that the form of government unmistakably involved the chances of war and peace. It had to be admitted that some governments, by their treatment of minorities, or their neighbors, or monarchical or liberal form of government, provoked belligerent reactions.

One more theme needs to be introduced into the arguments before the general conclusions are drawn. The United States Constitution guarantees "to every state in this Union a republican form of government." This means, broadly, without concern for minor variations of institutional form,

the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative bodies; whose legitimate acts may be said to be those of the people themselves; but while the people are thus the source of political power, their governments National and State, have been limited by their written constitutions, and they have themselves thereby set bounds to their own power, as against the sudden impulses of mere majorities.¹²

It clearly appears from Madison's contributions to *The Federalist* (Nos. 10, 14 and 39), that republican form of government means "representative," and neither monarchy nor oligarchy, nor pure or direct democracy. Madison's reason is of the most particular relevance to this present argument: he is afraid of the "faction," whether of a minority or a majority; he wants no man to be a judge in his own cause; he does not want the commonwealth to become the victim of "some common impulse of passion," whether religion, the motive of government, personal ambition, or economic interests are the factors which "inflamm

¹² *Duncan v. McCall*, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891), (Constitution, p. 549). This does not exclude the supplementary existence of the initiative and referendum.

them with mutual animosity." Therefore he commends "a republic" which allows of delegation by the people of government to a "small number of citizens" by election.

The point is clear; and the character of the governments at the time the Constitution was established was broadly of this order, that is, not monarchical, but popular in basis, with written constitutions, some with bills of rights and separation of powers. All this indicated the intent of the constitution makers. The political theory of the Monroe Doctrine underlines it. Even so, and in spite of the Bill of Rights and the various constitutional limitations which applied to the states as to the federal authority, one basic difference between parts of the Union was not squarely faced (though it was obliquely squinted at in the debates regarding representation in the Federal Legislature, and especially the equality clause in the representation in the Senate). This was slavery, and its status was settled only, and then not entirely, by the Civil War, and Amendments XIII, XIV and XV. Nor were the Southern states allowed to establish forms of government after the Civil War except to the satisfaction of the Union as regards popular representation and responsibility.

The Swiss Federal Constitution also stipulates that the cantonal constitutions must contain nothing contrary to the federal constitution, if they desire the safeguard of the federation. They are also obliged, for this guarantee, to reciprocate with the exercise of political rights, "according to the republican principle," meaning "democratic" or "responsible." Furthermore, those cantonal constitutions must have been accepted by an absolute majority of the citizens, and be subject to amendment by such a majority.

German federal arrangements until 1871 prescribed "estates" a representative, but not responsible, form of government in the states; or monarchical forms. The Reich of 1871 located sovereignty in the Bundesrat, the Federal Council. This was composed of the representatives of the princes of twenty-two states, and of the governments of the three Hanseatic cities. No express stipulation was necessary, for Bismarck had *forced* the constitution into the pattern he thought would be viable. But the Weimar Constitution, emerging out of World War I, and drafted by a gifted student of constitutional law and political science, contained Article 17. This commanded that the constitution of the states be "free state," i.e., the parliament to be elected by equal, universal, direct,

and secret vote of all men and women by proportional representation. The young Reich took this seriously and overthrew constitutions in Saxony, Thuringia and Bavaria, which had established extreme governments of a Soviet style.

The meaning of all this striving experience is clear. States, aggregations of people settled in comparatively extensive areas, especially the United States, Germany, Australia, the Soviet Union, could not expect the contract, which is implied in a federal constitution, to be fulfilled to the pacification and progress of the union, if the form of government in any state could obstruct obedience and fulfillment of the duties imposed by federal law. They could not tolerate the burdens which would be thrown on some states if others oppressed their citizens and forced them to flee. Anxiety was felt lest some states develop a loyalty to social principle so different from those of the generality, as to draw down upon them scorn, contempt or hatred, or to incubate them to so extreme a degree as to produce disobedience of federal law, secession, or even an aggressive war. Even a defensive war in the name of sectional principles would be of greatest concern to the rest of the union; and this may be said to have been the case when the American Civil War broke out: to the South, it was desperately defensive. In a vast area a federal government may only rely upon the fulfillment of obligations, that is the execution of its laws, and the preservation of the immunities the constitution grants to all the citizens, if it can have confidence in the character of the government prevailing in the several states. For, as Cromwell said, there must somewhere be a *fundamental*.

The Soviet Union is under no illusion about the need for such an assimilation of governments. All the republics grouped within the Soviet Union are Socialist and Soviet and Republican, not monarchies, nor Western democracies, nor bourgeois states. The Union is a socialist state. All power belongs to the working people as represented by the Soviets of deputies of the working people. The economic foundation of the U.S.S.R. is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of property. It is a "voluntary" association of "Soviet Socialist Republics" produced by revolution and war and treaties and a constitution. "Each Union Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R." (Article 16). "In

the event of a discrepancy between a law of a Union Republic and an all-Union law, the all-Union law prevails" (Article 20). The article giving the right of secession to every Union Republic may be interpreted by the predominance and monopoly of the Communist party, which arranges that the rulers of each republic shall be Communist in the measure the party determines is good. Two territories, the Crimea and Checheno-Ingush Republics, were deprived of their status for suspicion of collaboration with the Nazi enemy, and masses of their inhabitants "deported." They were not allowed the form of government they would like. The Ukraine, in 1946, came under penetrating and heavy Communist party reconstruction. The Soviet Union is realist. Stalin, the benign father of the Soviet policy of cultural nationalism, but political and economic unification, gave this interpretation of the right of secession: "A right is not an obligation."¹³ Forsooth!

Now all these devices of government—Wilson's stipulation of "self-government" for membership in the League, and even the "peace-loving" prescription in the Charter, though it is far vaguer than the first; the proposals to grip the states in obligatory guarantees of the fundamental rights of man; the theory and practice of intervention in the form of government of other states; the rule in federal governments securing some assimilation of the forms of their constituent states—all are designed to provide for the whole union the minimum conditions of a unified political morality. They seek a common morality produced by common institutions. The institutions themselves correspond to a principle of obligation and authority, of legitimacy, which itself goes back to a general acceptance of the values of man in society. "Without these assurances," the authors have said, or implied, "we cannot live in peace." The rules have been applied by overwhelming force, as for example, when a state would never even have been constituted unless it accepted them. Or, if the stipulations were not fulfilled, the benefits of the union could be withdrawn. These are sanctions.

We can now return to the main line of the argument. Since a world union of a more authoritative kind than that which now

¹³ Cf. Stalin, *Marrism and the National and Colonial Question*, p. 200 ff. He was urging the Yugoslav communists not to deny rights of secession to Croats and Slovenes. Quære: was the advice merely ideological, or practical balance of power?

exists, is not attainable by agreement, which has been proven, and since one of the chief factors in the success of such a union is the homogeneity of the member states, how can the common authority that is needed be produced?

The common authority cannot be produced by treaty. To wait for education to produce a common morality is to wait until the world is reduced to a few charred ruins.

Mr. Emery Reves, a world government advocate, must be uncertain of his own diagnosis in *The Anatomy of Peace*, for he is uncertain of his own prescription for the future. He says (pages 262, 151, 208):

The longing for security within the nation-state structure is the most dangerous of all collective drives. In the small, interdependent world of today, there are only two ways for a nation to achieve security.

Law . . . Conquest.

Peace among men can only be achieved by a legal order, by a sovereign source of law, a democratically controlled government with independent executive, legislative and judiciary bodies. A legal order is a plan laid down by the common consent of men to make their individual lives, their families and nations secure.

But how was that plan laid down? Was there ever *in the beginning* the common consent of men?

At one time, there were seven Saxon kingdoms in England eternally waging wars against each other. Then a foreigner, a conqueror from Normandy, crossed the channel, invaded the island and unified the bickering, quarreling, warring Saxon tribes. By no imaginable moral standard was this a justifiable act in the eyes of those who lived on the island. It was clearly a case of brutal, unprovoked aggression. But was it evil? Was the unification of the English kingdoms, although brought about by a foreign conqueror, wrong?

And then he gives the same treatment to the conquest of the American West: out went the Indians.

He later proceeds (page 239):

A universal legal order, so badly needed by the world today, far from endangering in any way these cultural differences, is the condition for the maintenance and continuous thriving of such differences. Without union, either the Scots would have exterminated the English or the English would have exterminated the Scots, just as the Romans destroyed Carthage and the Huns destroyed Rome.

What can be learned from the examples mentioned? A lesson, I deeply regret to say, that Mr. Reves has not openly confessed. It is that union in England, the basis of a united peaceful state, was by *conquest*. Union between England and Scotland was a result of English predominance after centuries of fighting. It was assisted by the likeness of their Protestantism as contrasted with Catholicism; and, then, the English had been at times bedeviled by Scottish alliance with France. Let no mistake be made: force was at the basis of these new states.

I take one more example from Mr. Reves's argument. He says: ¹⁴

Poles and Russians, Hungarians and Rumanians, Serbs and Bulgars, have disliked and distrusted each other and have been waging wars in Europe against each other for centuries. But these very same Poles and Russians, Hungarians and Rumanians, Serbs and Bulgars, once having left their countries and settled in the United States of America, cease fighting and are perfectly capable of living and working side by side without waging wars against each other. Why is this? . . . In the United States of America, sovereign power resides, not in any one of these nationalities, but stands above them in the Union.

That is true: "stands above them in the Union." But how did that power ever arrive at standing above them? It was established by a constitution. How was that constitution established? By the act of force which expelled British authority. How was that force ever established in America? By acts of force against the original inhabitants. That is the original of the American state, and of its authority. Before the immigrant people of various nationalities are allowed entry into the United States, they must fulfill the conditions established. If they fulfill those conditions, one of which strictly and elaborately concerns loyalty to the state, while another disqualifies for adherence to the principle of violent subversion of government, they submit to the impact of that governmental force which once was violence. Only from the moment when that force was exerted did an authority arise capable of producing a common morality to support the continued use of force thereafter, wherever disobedience, or local tumults, or rebellion, threatened.

¹⁴ Page 236.

Mr. Reves, and not a few of his friends, fail to draw the true conclusion from their own examples. He is not the first man to cover his eyes with his hands at the sight he sees.

Those who argue for world government, as he does, persistently underrate the difficulties that retarded, and the likenesses that made possible, the formation of the United States. For they wish to show how easy an act of rational will it is that can found a world government. Yet false history is false to human nature and obscures duty. "Easy does it" in history educates only for feebleness. One quotes Tom Paine:

America is made up of people from so many different nations accustomed to different forms and habits of government, speaking different languages, and more different in their forms of worship, it would appear that the union of such a people was impracticable. But by the simple operation of constructing government on the principles of society and the rights of man, every difficulty retires, and the parts are brought into cordial unison.

Surely, this is to make the matter too easy, and to omit too many pertinent considerations. Is it fair to play down the fact that the states fought in common against a common enemy? That though the Confederation was an imperfect form of union, it was a form of union which for over a decade suffered great vicissitudes, yet endured. It cannot be omitted that though the Colonies were different in the respects suggested, they were still infused with a high degree of unity by a very considerable proportion of the population. Of the 3.17 million colonial population in 1790, 82.1 per cent were English, 7 per cent Scotch; nearly 2 per cent Irish; 2.5 per cent were Dutch; 5.6 per cent German; the rest formed less than 1 per cent. Is this not enough? One language was predominant.

British Government, operating not as a factor acceptable to all, but to a large proportion, perhaps a majority of the population, and supported by the royal writ and buttressed by the royal forces, integrated them. Appeals went to the English law courts, even against the governors. The States lived under a force of law which a single authority had supplied through the charters and the governors from the first settlements.

That is not the only reason which renders the easy argument unacceptable. The Constitution of "the more perfect union" was

"extorted from the grinding necessities of a reluctant nation." I omit all the well known stimuli to federation: the economic condition of the country, the fear of Europe and various European claimants to the hinterland of the colonies; the financial difficulties arising out of the flimsiness of the guarantee for the repayment of state and federal debt. I omit also the strong feeling for this new entity "America," amply attested in the literature of the time. It is to be noted, however, that the Philadelphia Convention was called with only a vague statement of its purpose couched in the most modest terms. The delegates were elected by the state legislatures or appointed by the governors. Their powers were limited to revision of the articles of confederation. Their deliberations were secret. But *ratification* was not easy: altogether, it took two and a half years. In the key states of Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, ratification was voted by 187 to 168, 30 to 27, and 89 to 78 respectively!

The United States were created by a mixture of persuasion and force: the force was imported with British settlement and rule in America and was continued when the colonists united to expel it by arms. The persuasion began when the colonists came to America, because they shared in common a common law, the same courts, and a high degree of religious unity in their mainly Protestant creeds. The Dutch and the English had had common ties since William of Orange ascended the throne of Britain.

I think it ought not to be left out of account that those who attended the Convention were of British descent, and had been nurtured in British education, political tradition and practice. Nor ought it to be ignored that, though attention was often drawn to the existent cleavage of economic interests in the various regions of the country, it was by no means as grave or as indurated as such a cleavage is today in our intensely self-conscious societies. The American states were not so gravely plagued by the problem of securing their own way of life, as are contemporary nations, after having been separated by centuries of history and distance. Nor can it be ignored that the Constitution was *brusqué*. The Colonies may have been about to set forth on an era of nationalism, but insufficient time had elapsed to offset the strongly underlying institutions and traditions of unity. As far back as 1643, the New England colonies had first united in defense against the Indians.

Even so, the Constitution may be said to have remained a "compact" only until the dreadful problem of slavery had been partially settled by the Civil War, when the doctrines of the supremacy of union triumphed, and the doctrines of "contract," government by qualified majorities only (J. C. Calhoun), and the right of nullification and secession were subdued. Nor was the conviction of the State of Texas, in 1862, that state's rights and obligations could be renounced at pleasure acknowledged. She, like the other states of the South, was subdued by force and compelled to institute responsible government.¹⁵

The conclusion is that the creation of the United States Government is good evidence of reason operating in difficult circumstances, but also of reason operating in propitious circumstances, circumstances of a kind unparalleled in the contemporary relationships of the many nations. What would have happened had one of the thirteen Colonies possessed a government and social system as different as the Soviet Government is today from Holland, the United States or France, and with as much proportionate power?

The Soviet cannot be bought as Alaska was bought, nor as Louisiana was bought. Is she to be acquired as Texas was acquired, or settled as was the West?

In dark contrast to the alleged American example of prudential reason is the Nuremberg Trial, held because measures of international reason like the Kellogg-Briand Pact collapsed. At Nuremberg an act of force was applied, not by agreement, but by conquerors, in vindication of the reign of law. A morality is being created and impressed on the minds of all beholders; it is a morality which the conquerors claim to be theirs already, and which they pledge themselves to obey.

Justice Jackson's principles of prosecution are of the utmost moment. He said:

International Law is more than a scholarly collection of abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties or agreements between nations and of accepted customs. But every custom has its origin in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated by the action of some states. Unless we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for International Law, we cannot deny

¹⁵ See Chief Justice Chase's observations on the basis of unity in the making of the Constitution in *Texas v. White* (1868).

that our own day has *its right to institute customs and to conclude agreements* that will themselves become sources of a newer and *strengthened* International Law. International Law is not capable of development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations and revisions in International Law are brought about by the actions of governments designed to meet a change in circumstances [A charming understatement!] It grows, as did the Common Law, through decisions reached from time to time in adapting settled principles to new situations. Hence I am not disturbed by the lack of precedent for the inquiry we propose to conduct. . . . It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal.

And among the additions to world organization—for they would be that—Justice Jackson asserted that the heads of states are not immune from penal action because they are acting in accordance with the international law of war; that their subordinates carrying out illegalities at their command are also guilty. Above all, "This is the law."

An act of force achieved this position. It will require its continuance to maintain it, until aggressors have learned what the citizens of individual states have learned, that disobedience is unprofitable and immoral.

Now I have suggested, and I hope proven, that the facts of history and the contemporary world show that the way to peaceful world organization is not to be found by persuasion alone, and that the unions which have been established have required a measure of force, maintainable until a common morality of a very general, but assimilated, nature is evolved.

THE STATE'S ORIGIN IN FORCE

This truth must be added: *No state now in existence, and none we know of in history, was established except by an act of force at some stage in its development.*

I refer to the establishment of a single united government, in the sense previously defined, within a nation, or even a less highly developed society than a nation. At some stage, state and nation came into existence by an act of force which instituted government, and therefore law and order. These provided the conditions of unification of mind and morality, and by the offer of its protection, freedom from fear.

Space does not permit the repetition of well-established history. But the rise of Russia, France, Great Britain, the United States, Spain, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Japan, China, even now in the throes of such a "unification"; India, the Latin American countries, Canada and her internal rebellions, "two nations warring within the bosom of a single state," only too well prove the assertion made above.

Certain historians and anthropologists will attempt to avoid the ineluctable conclusion by referring to early tribal and primitive social organization developing out of families and the rule of the elders, the wise, the magicians, an organization which furthers morality, common work habits, distribution of property and the products of industry by traditional agreement, folkways and mores. I grant this, for it still admits coercion, disobedience, banishment, murder, and revolt. But, as anthropologists like Lowie have admitted, even when attempting to controvert theories like my own (but not identical), once the range of government gets beyond the area of a single tribe, and contacts are made with groups of a different outlook, then conflict and domination is the rule of history. Either a group within a group conquers its own kin, or a group of adventurers from outside conquers another people. Within large areas, as in the feudal wars in Western Europe and Britain, one group strong enough to hold down the rest does so, and thus, finally, brings pacification and a regular order of government. In the course of time, resistance and rebellion being impossible, and with greater justice extant among all subjects, even if the ruling group arrogate to themselves undue aristocratic privileges, pacification, government and equity evolve. As occasion and propitious circumstances allow, revolt converts this into a democratic state, or if a monarchical one, then one in which the rule of law begins to include elements of equality for all, both governors and governed. The ruler is, and declares himself to be, beneath the law.

Such are contemporary states. And one of the charges leveled at them by critics in search of a higher social justice than now prevails, confirms the present view of their history. Particularly is this so with Karl Marx and his followers. Vestiges are still visible of the force that was originally needed to create the state. Examples are: the military and high bureaucracy of Germany down to our own day; the aristocracy and the House of Lords, and the peculiar distribution of landholding in Great Britain: the

position of aristocratic families and the Catholic Church in France; Russia's governmental form, her serfdom till 1861 (and beyond!), before the Bolshevik Revolution possessed these vestigial features in a more than ordinarily grim form; the sheriff and his deputies in some areas in America.

The establishment of government implies the enthronement of a common superior. The common superior never emerged from a voluntary contract between individuals dwelling in a state of nature, for we do not and cannot know what the state of nature was; its discovery would lure us back millions of years. But the constitutional histories of many nations in ancient and classic times, and our own since the decline of the Roman Empire, tell a clear story. The analogy of a contract to establish government, even when used by the hardest headed of all, Hobbes, is a fiction, designed rather to draw the mind to the conditions of peaceful government and the legitimacy of authority, than to record a history. The prime importance of theories of the social contract lay not so much in their account of the way in which a common superior was supposed to have been established, but in their view that without a common superior in the states anarchy, war, and injustice would break loose.

Individuals never existed, but kinship groups did, and woe betide the lawbreaker! Some kinship groups coalesced. The groups, the barons, the territorial nations, like Wales or Scotland, Brittany or Normandy, *were compelled to enter*. Once the authority of the state, the prince, the king, the bishop, the emperor, was settled and largely unchallenged, and his soldiers, taxgatherers, justices of the peace, commissioners and intendants spread throughout the land, tolerance could be granted for religious differences and "national" differences, a tolerance to be throttled if the peace were disturbed. As that grandiose cad, Frederick the Great, acknowledged, tolerance became possible as soon as standing armies replaced occasional mercenaries; heresy made little difference then.

Government, hierarchy, ideology, priests, leaders, coercion, originated in men's wonder and curiosity, economic needs, adventurousness, and pride. They well out of the deep unconscious; and are the progeny of the energies and the power of men which, as suggested in Chapter I, cease only with death. The pattern these wove for the victorious groups became more or less purely

occupied a large area and comprised large populations, complicated wants, abundant and involved and attractive ideas and complex ways of production, necessarily found the early kinship bonds inadequate for all as a common morality until someone dominated them. For above all, before the invention of printing, the educative processes made possible by it were not at the services of the dominating group.

The reflection of David Hume may be taken as most probably correct :

The force, which now prevails, and which is founded on fleets and armies, is plainly political, and derived from authority, the effect of established government. A man's natural force consists only in the vigour of his limbs, and the firmness of his courage: which could never subject multitudes to the command of one. Nothing but their own consent, and their sense of the advantages resulting from peace and order, could have had that influence. Yet even this consent was very long imperfect, and could not be the basis of a regular administration. The chieftain, who had probably acquired his influence during the continuance of war, ruled more by persuasion than command; and till he could employ force to reduce the refractory and disobedient, the society could scarcely be said to have attained a state of civil government . . . We find everywhere, princes, who claim their subjects as their property, and assert their independent right of sovereignty, from conquest or succession. We find, everywhere, also, subjects who acknowledge this right in their prince, and suppose themselves born under the obligations of obedience to a certain sovereign, as much as under the ties of reverence and duty to their parents. These connections are always conceived to be equally independent of our consent, in Persia and China; in France and Spain; and even in Holland and England. . . . Obedience or subjection becomes so familiar, that most men never make any enquiry about its origin or cause, more than about the principle of gravity, resistance, or the most universal laws of nature. . . .

Almost all governments, which exist at present, or of which there remains any record in history, have been founded originally, either on usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of fair consent, or voluntary subjection of the people.¹⁶

He observes how a few people made the Glorious Revolution in 1688 "the majority of seven hundred." He asserts the same

¹⁶ *Of the Original Contract.*

properly of Athenian democracy; observes how the Achaean League employed force to make some cities enter it. If there were an inflexible regard for justice among all men, so that they would not touch each other's property, a perfect understanding of their own interests—then they could have been self-governing by consent. "Reason, history and experience show us, that all political societies have had an origin much less accurate and regular. . . ."

Thereafter, in the course of time, with freedom from fear of war; with the gradual winning of concession after concession from the ruder rulers; with the development of intercourse throughout the whole land because the ruler's police will protect or his courts punish and indemnify, the nation grows; that great society which engenders a common understanding among all, meliorates offensive differences, and promotes homogeneity. Utility flows from this, and loyalty flows to the source of utility. And so advances Edmund Burke's "partnership in all art, science and culture," which again elicits gratification and obedience, even when it rubs us the wrong way in particular instances. Yet the evolved partnership observes restraints, which as both Hume and Burke are at pains to argue, develop slowly but surely, not in the abrupt rupture of society, but in the long succession of generations, "one man going out of the world, another coming into it" in "perpetual flux."

In the annals of states, civil government was needed to establish, protect and foster civil morality. Then such civil morality which originally existed develops and makes possible a milder civil government.

THE REST OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The problem of creating world organization and relationship sufficient to establish the assurance of peace is not one that can await the evolution of a single new world-wide morality. Education alone offers no escape from a Hobbesian world. It will be fortunate if war, with its force, does not burst upon us.

The problem is wider and deeper than the question of the relation of the Soviet Government to the rest of the world. It is the problem of all national governments in relation to each other. But every century, every generation, has its special perplexity; the road is cumbered with boulders that must be removed,

climbed over, or outflanked. In our century above all, and most acutely and chronically, the task is set by the Soviet rulers. The growth of popular acknowledgment of this is most impressive.¹⁷ For they never, never relent, but are incessantly in combat.

Persuasion seems out of the question when mankind has at its disposal only the two ways of persuasion and force, or, since measures of each can be mixed, less of persuasion than of force. This does not imply actual immediate force, not war; it does imply force in being, force prepared for use. If this is not possible through the United Nations—and we have shown that that is too uncertain an instrument—then a preponderant power or powers must provide it. Let it be repeated that not preventive war is in mind, but the preparedness to employ the force of the policeman, when that is seen to be no longer avoidable.

It is of the utmost importance to reemphasize that the hostility between the Soviet Union and the Western nations and, above all, the United States, does not revolve principally around the structure of the economy, whether it is planned, or free, or partly one and partly the other. The issue is between the democratic and despotic form and spirit of government; between political liberty and political servitude. It would be an error approaching the dimensions of a crime to equate either capitalism or socialism with democracy: clarity of mind and just home and international policy can follow only from the supremacy of the democratic principle.

It is essential first, that those who may, with unutterable reluctance, recognize the need for Soviet compliance under pressure, shall clearly dissociate their policy from that of certain public groups. Moral dissociation is imperative in this respect from those clerical and lay members of circles who share with the Soviet the notion of an infallible authority from on high, revealed to and by a hierarchy practicing spiritual pressure and repudiating the legitimacy of government as resting on the individual consent of the governed.¹⁸ It denies the right of individual

¹⁷ The figures of public opinion polls in America and Great Britain since November, 1945, show a steadily mounting distrust and dislike of Soviet Russia.

¹⁸ I am unable to understand the use by the Catholic bishops of the United States of their excerpt from the Declaration of Independence in their statement on *Man and Peace* of Nov. 16, 1940.

judgment. The clergy insufficiently distinguished themselves from the Petain regime; from anti-Semitism in Poland, from Fascism in Italy. Nor was the Hitler regime, whether before or during World War II, forthrightly disavowed. Only those with clean democratic hands in such respects have a right to deal out justice.

Secondly, "individualists" and "capitalists" bear down on the Soviet system for unacceptable reasons; because the Soviet rulers have denied the rights of private enterprise, of *laissez faire*, of hereditary privilege, of the exploitation of labor by owners of the means of production. The social ends the Soviets have inaugurated, I will not say achieved, can be arrived at in other ways than they have employed. Some social and economic planning by the state is necessary and desirable, in the degree and by the democratic means suggested in my *Road to Reaction*. I do not believe that *all* the resources of society can be best administered for the benefit of all throughout the *laissez faire* system, or that the maximum total wealth is producible by it under modern conditions. Some who, not entirely out of a noble regard for *all* individuals, pursue individualism, are anti-Soviet, and for unjustifiably egotistical reasons. Their ambition to throw out the Soviet because they are enemies of social and economic planning by government, two reputable functions, is unacceptable.

Thirdly, Fascist-minded men are still active who would destroy the Soviet regime because it is hostile to racial superiority, militarism, nationalism, and a champion of the idea of human equality and ultimate freedom. And, finally, there are imperialists who would like to assist in the downfall of the Soviet regime in order that their own rule, monopolies and profits in colonies, in trade, in raw materials, should continue unimpaired. Who would want a world organization, not to bring justice and peace, but to support *their ascendancy*, if necessary, by the sword?

These bodies of opinion, and these vested interests, therefore, receive no acknowledgment from me of any right to compel the Soviet Government to behave with democratic decency in international relations. Their grounds of hostility are not legitimate: they do not act in true trusteeship for all men.

Is there a common morality at all between the Soviet rulers and the West? Yes; to some degree. They share the ideal of equality of opportunity. The West gave acknowledgment to this ideal long before Karl Marx was born. The West moved toward it by its

own effective instrument, the equal vote that gives authority over the government, and therefore more and more over society. Western peoples share the *idea* of freedom, including the weakness of the state, even to the principle of spontaneous participation in politics and administration, enjoying equal rights and power. But from this path the Soviet has strayed atrociously, except in so far as it educates its people, the first stage that may lead to ultimate political liberation.

Is this a promise of peace?

It is an essential part of the Soviet rulers' doctrines that they educate the Russian people. Without it their industrialism, indeed, cannot thrive, nor can they draw from the population a stream of recruits for the Communist party. They do not admit, in the social sciences and in philosophy, an education involving the full and fair presentation of values or economic and social systems other than their own. Yet it is tenable, I think, that to make an entire community literate, education through the high school stage, and the provision of libraries, even if carefully selected, must, in the course of economic progress, cultivate millions to whom the despotism of a small minority is intolerable. Heresy is bound to creep in, and may, one day, be embraced by millions. Nor do I think the energetic recommendation of the Communist party leaders that the members of the party mingle with the people is only a technique for more secure domination of the masses by the party. It may be that Stalin, more than his colleagues, is genuinely interested that this take place. For if the people mean something, then Stalin, an aging despot, might be calling upon the masses to save and continue the revolution, his own work as he sees it now, against his collaborators in the Kremlin: another illustration of the historic pattern of the king calling in the people to overcome his rival barons. The most powerful plea was made in 1925 by Bukharin, an old Bolshevik executed in 1936, that education would solve the Soviet system's greatest danger of corruption: the rise of a party bureaucracy parasitic on the masses.¹⁹ Perhaps, then,

¹⁹ *Historical Materialism* (New York), pp. 310-311: "But the question of the *transition period* from capitalism to socialism, that is, the period of the proletarian dictatorship, is far more difficult. The working class achieves victory, although it is not and cannot be a unified mass. It attains victory while the productive forces are going down and the great masses are materially insecure. There will inevitably result a *tendency* to 'degeneration,' i.e., the excretion of a leading stratum in the form of a class-germ. This tendency will

the depreciation of the mastery of Marxism as a qualification for membership of the party, in 1938, and the substitution of "acceptance of the program" was a retrograde step.

I will not altogether discount these forces. But we who look for peace are faced with the spectacle of two curves crossing each other: the one the rising curve of war tension, the other the rising curve of Russian education. It is a question of timing, so far unpredictable, whether the latter crosses the war-tension curve before the ignition point is reached. The argument leads at least to the pursuit of every device for prolonging the truce that does not throw away indispensable strategic assets, or sell other people into irrevocable servitude.

The Soviet regime denies the right of individual property owners to exploit their workers free of socially stipulated conditions of justice. But this is part of the Western heritage, and in addition, every year witnesses improvement through the free association and political activity of those to whom just labor conditions are a major concern. The Soviet system has helped to teach the world, by example of its own alternatives, the brutality of the unnecessary oppressions suffered by the common man in capitalistic countries, and it has agitated for his rights.

Yet, narrowing and parochializing a universal doctrine to the barbarous conditions of an especially backward agricultural nation, and obsessed with vehement bigotry to enforce in too short a period plans that men cannot absorb over generations, Russia has perpetuated the cruel dictatorship of a handful of provincial despots. For the continuance of their power, to whose time limit they offer not the slightest clue and which observers cannot independently predict, they are still prepared to commit cruelties.

The Soviet regime in Russia is the only system of government which seriously and inherently threatens a breach in a long reign of peace. The Soviet problem must be solved, for the Russian people's benefit as well as for that of the rest of mankind. But it must be solved only for a good and noble purpose; for peace, for justice, and for democracy.

be retarded by two opposing tendencies; first, by the growth of productive forces; second, by the abolition of the *educational monopoly*. The increasing reproduction of technologists and of organizers in general, but of the working class itself, will undermine this possible new class alignment. The outcome of the struggle will depend on which tendencies turn out to be the stronger."

To guarantee justice and democracy in the Western sense, not in the Soviet sense, which is no sense at all, is the first essential. With all its many faults, democracy is the best form of government invented by mankind for the maximum number. No other principle of legitimacy can hold a candle to it. Untold sacrifices and struggles have given it strength. It is as close to the tenets of Christianity as our gross human nature has been able to attain. Its sincere operation will bring countless blessings on mankind. For it is the nurse and protector of humanism.

Only those who accept the basic convictions of Western democracy, namely, the single standard of morality for all peoples, including the colored races, and excluding the peculiarly nasty form of cowardice known as anti-Semitism, have any right to embark upon or lend their voices to the regulation of the Soviet rulers. They must be willing to equip themselves to fulfill the domestic and foreign responsibilities their principles entail. Many tasks at home must be taken in hand simultaneously.

Can the Soviet Government be transformed into a democracy in the Western sense by persuasive inducements? The answer is *No*. Not in time, not for humanity, not for the promise of wealth, not for prudence—but perhaps by fear.

An appropriate manipulation of fear, especially, and prudential considerations, *may* prolong peace. The Soviet rulers will yield much if *forced*, rather than face the total loss of their citadel of revolutionary power. They will yield to the pressure of really heavy risks—but there is always the chance of their anger braving the risks. *Yet, on the whole, they may be ruled by their abject attachment to their revolutionary power.* "Skin for skin, yea, all that a man hath will he give for his life." Lenin taught them this during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations with the Germans: territory is secondary to the Revolutionary fulcrum. They would prefer Kuibishev to nothing—if Moscow were denied. They may be warned; they need not be threatened. It is not in the interests of peace to be offensive. Jingoism is costly. To be conscious, constant, firm, is to find peace, and these require a high degree of undivided counsel among the several powers made anxious by the dynamism of the Soviet rulers.

Can the Soviet Government be expected to change in the democratic, and, therefore, peaceful direction we have suggested, *by chance*, that is, by a change in the Soviet leadership through

retirement and succession? Not, I think for many, many years.

I seem to notice a difference of outlook between Stalin and the rest of the Politburo. He makes concessions to flexible interpretations of Leninism; he pleads more strongly for the intermixture of party and people (from above downward); he talks peace. It is possible that thirty years of practical government has retempered the steel in Stalin. He has learned more than anyone else in his realms the limits and the horrible cost of the possible. I do not suggest he would abandon despotism. But alone, he might act at home and abroad in a democratic spirit, seeing the foreign dangers and realizing the future cost to the Russian people. But his colleagues will not easily surrender power, quite apart from whether they are genuine Communists or not. The vigorous younger men who file in line behind Stalin have not been made wiser by the changes wrought in him by the terrible necessities of government. He cannot transfer to them the inner, subtle, yet palpable conviction, molded by three decades of stupendous and dreadful events, by the successive advances, retreats and movements through the maze of obstinate human nature. Compared with him, they are callow, petulant, and brash. They have been nurtured rather as governors of a great empire than creators of a liberal revolution. They are second-generation zealots fed on the acid of bigotry and cynicism. Abdication is not their chosen profession. It is possible that they might quarrel with each other after the big chief's departure. I saw this developing in Italy before Mussolini went to war; he was annoyed when I suggested to him that this might happen. It may be so in Russia. The process might be assisted from outside, but the Soviet Government has its measures against contamination by the West. It has turned the *cordon sanitaire* inside out.

If the method of persuasion is impossible, and the responsibility of compulsion is not adopted, then peace in our time is a bubble destined to be pricked.

Some day the great powers will have recovered from devastation and fatigue: the plans will begin to bear their steely fruit. Provocations may arise for reasons already discussed. Some action may occur, perhaps in a border land, in some satellite territory, and hostilities begin. The United Nations may be stultified by the veto and a war follow.

One of the Balkan States may carry its quarrel to the point

of war, and the great powers may become involved. Or a stimulated Russian Navy may press for a Mediterranean outlet more furiously than today. The developing strength of the Soviet Union may terrify all Europe to an intolerable point; the mere circumstantial rumor that she has the atom bomb, or some other such crushing weapon, may set in motion the armed forces of all nations. A report like that recently made by Drew Pearson, later denied by President Truman that Britain possesses a bomb, (and perhaps designed to "keep the Russians guessing"), might set the Soviet rulers off on a course of reprisals eventuating in war. As the United States strengthens the Pacific Isles and spreads the news that the atom-bomb carriers can travel anywhere in the world and return without refueling, Europe and China may begin to feel Russian ripples. When the Kuriles become offensive bases fears may be felt for Alaska and the Canadian and American Pacific coasts. Germany may inevitably begin to play off the Western powers and the Soviet Union, with or without a long-term pact for her control between them. The Soviet Union may renege the Comintern with the virility taken from it by Moscow in 1943, because it did not then respond to the "historic situation." Britain and France might be frightened by air and rocket maneuvers off the coast of Poland, or convinced by Soviet infiltration into Sweden and Norway that an offensive arc was being drawn around them.

Now the exercise of force can be direct; that is, armed, deliberate, direct, and preventive. Democracies, to their honor, recoil from this. The history of the last forty years has demonstrated that it is sometimes unavoidable. If deferred beyond the appropriate time, the objects may be confused, may even entail defeat; it will certainly mean more destruction.

The problem may possibly be solved by maintaining a heavy preponderance of force in constant being and alert. As this readiness cannot be hidden, and would have no object if it blushed unseen and wasted its sweetness on the desert air, it leads to a policy of balance of power. In a world which has known total and brutal wars, the way to prevent maneuvers leading to war, is by maintaining a preponderance of force.

A proper tactic is the use of the United Nations by the democratic countries with all the sincerity and genuine devotion of their peoples that can be mustered. Their peoples must be stimulated by unflagging and painstaking explanations in and out of session.

THE UNITED NATIONS OR INDIVIDUAL FORCE

Every occasion must be used and sought to invoke the authority and principles of the United Nations. If some nations think to use the United Nations as a vehicle of disturbing and subversive propaganda, as the U.S.S.R. and her two vassal republics undoubtedly do, their maneuvers should be enjoyed, not enjoined. Every and any departure from United Nations principles should be challenged, since if these principles were lived up to everywhere, peace would be sure. It seems that the Soviet delegates are determined to seize for their own purpose as much time in debate as all the other nations together. This tactic, as well as all other transparent maneuvers, can be taken with the maximum good humor. All democratic parliamentary assemblies allow the minority more than its arithmetical share of their time.

Despotisms do not provide for the office of gadfly to the despot: that function belongs to the foreigner. A service can be rendered to the Russian people, as well as the rest of the world, by the abandonment of the sagging backbone and the silent tongue in relations with the Russian delegates. If, to change the metaphor, the blade is two-edged, that is how, for peace and justice, good men should wish it to be.

The democracies of the West must not desert the principle of their own political systems for appeasement. Democracy is the sacred trust of the democracies. Dreadful calamities at home and abroad cannot fail to follow the forsaking of the democratic principle. Men and nations would become truly hollow, and strife and bitter oppression would be man's lot for decades beyond prediction. They must keep the way open for that principle wherever they can, and not abandon such areas as Eastern Europe because, as Aristotle might have said, "they are slaves by nature." Every measure respecting territory and political system, which the Western countries deem just, must not be surrendered lest they perjure themselves; if they morally eviscerate their own society, they will incur the contempt of the Soviet rulers, who will then jeer at how little the champions of democracy really believe in it. This would convince the Soviet rulers that, after all, *they* are right, that man prefers wealth to freedom.

All diplomatic persuasion and encouragement must be used to preserve and promote a free political life everywhere. Economic

pressures to compel the small countries to defend themselves and resist Soviet erosion of their independence are proper. It is justifiable also to deny to them and to the Soviet the economic assistance which would enable them to flout the political institutions protecting the individual and giving a surer guarantee of peace than dictatorships.

All this may postpone the time of violent clash. Acceptance of the American atomic energy control plan would certainly lengthen the peace. If not, the United States cannot avoid shouldering the titanic burden.

Yet, in the United Nations, time will be insufficient for the development of a common morality out of constant debate and discussion of principles which give birth to mutuality.

Some day, it may be—the eventuality may be avoided only if it is entertained—that in a serious crisis the Soviet rulers will apply their veto where they are grossly in the wrong. The consciences of all nations will be revolted. The application of the veto, however, will relieve all nations of their Charter obligations to join in sanctions against the culprit. But on such a crucial occasion the whole world may be morally rallied. That world would be wise if it were morally and physically prepared, each nation in the measure of its ability.

Another possibility has been suggested by Justice Roberts. If the nations of the world were, on invitation, to enter into an arrangement for world government—he calls them “the democratic governments”—and if any country remained aloof (this might be Russia), the rest of the world should go its own way. If this should eventuate in war, as in the course of time it might, the course of the United Nations would be determined.

Ought the possibility of a breach with Russia, as much from the Russian side as from the Western side, to be openly acknowledged and provoked by such an arrangement? Of course, if the Soviet rulers use the “escape clause” in the Charter and withdraw because they cannot abide the principle or practice of the United Nations, or the power policy which surrounds and underlies it, the issue would be settled. The only alternative would be to proceed without Russia and risk the consequences.

The Soviet rulers know this, and they will use the threat of withdrawal for all it is worth. But it may be taken as axiomatic that they will not leave an organization which offers them a world-wide

platform, a sounding board, entree into the secrets and authority which member nations have, and the ability to retard, confuse, and even block the progress of the world organization whenever it selfishly suits them to do so, until they are very much stronger. They will not withdraw until they are ready for defiance to the utmost and are confident of their power to force major concessions, if not to win a war.

Should the kind of proposal advanced by Justice Roberts be accepted? I think not. Some advocate it for the cogent reason that it is better to make it clear to the peoples that the Soviet rulers are the obstacle to a long reign of peace, and that to use for purposes of policy the United Nations, with its weaknesses, including the U.S.S.R., is to hide from the peoples the stern realities they ought at once to face. Yet I do not think that the universal membership of the United Nations causes the peoples to be misled regarding the serious dissensions in it. On the contrary, the United Nations is a forum from which the iron curtain has been banished: it is an instrument which turns the altogether opaque into the comparatively transparent.

The more the Soviet view and demeanor is exhibited and induced in open debate to reveal and expose itself, the more the peoples will learn, by unmistakable visible and audible demonstration, the prevalent proportion of justice and injustice in Russian aims. The succession of polls of public opinion in the United States since 1945 is a remarkable and, on the whole, sound measure of public appreciation of the exposures made in the chain of international conferences. That the Soviet rulers study these appears clearly from the articles in such Russian journals as *New Times*, as well as the leading articles in *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. This is of outstanding benefit to the democracies, both as a fortifier of public opinion at home and as some possible restraint on the Soviet rulers. Everything is to be said for the longest possible protraction of such processes, trying as they may be to the patience of the chief statesmen and leaders of public opinion. The proper rule in world affairs is maximum long-suffering: there is always time for a breach. This, however, presupposes no self-deception, and that peace-loving nations are morally, mentally, physically, and continually prepared for action if "a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism" and so "provide

new guards for their future security." The United Nations could then accomplish its purposes—peace, justice, humanity, economic advancement, trusteeship for colonial peoples—at a fair, though not rapid, rate of progress.

For the avoidance of war, however, the millennial sweep and demiurge of pitiless history, thrust on the nations the balance, and perhaps the rude choice, between two systems: the democracy of the West and the despotic socialism of Soviet rulership. The democracy of the West has abundant imperfections, but inherent in it is the ever-living store of its own remedies: the sovereignty of the people. The Soviet system has its merits in that it is, it declares, dedicated to the good of the people; but, inherent in it is its deadly germ for the Russian and all other peoples—rejection of the common man's sovereign guidance of his own destiny. Such regimes become corrupt and antihuman, nor can this degeneration be avoided.

A preponderant power, raised by conscience and poised in charity, must be held available throughout the years till democracy replaces despotism in Russia.

If the Soviet rulers were overthrown would a widespread and long occupation be necessary thereafter? By no means. The people could govern themselves after temporary hardships. The incipient world organization would inherit a task of merciful assistance. But Russia belongs to the Russian people: assured of their democratic rights, and assisted in brotherhood to institute them, their lives and culture would be no menace to any other people. At peace with themselves at last, in their cities, on their steppes, and on their mighty rivers, they might share their peace with the world.

CHAPTER XII

Destiny Follows Power

We do not what we ought;
What we ought not, we do;
And lean upon the thought
That Chance will bring us through;
But our own acts, for good or ill, are mightier powers.

—MATTHEW ARNOLD, *Empedocles on Etna*

Our defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the
heritage of all men, in all lands everywhere.

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN

WHEN IT IS NOT possible to evade the consequences, it is desirable not to flinch from them. The bitter truth is, that in the absence of a common world superior and a common world morality, peace and justice can be sustained only by intimidatory force supplied by individual nations. For our time, the application of mingled persuasion and force devolves in the first place upon the strongest power, America.

Whether the United States assumes the destiny thrust upon her by implacable history, or cold-shoulders her duty, her lusty life is so weighty that it will, in either event, raise or depress the nations in the scales of the world. Her only choice is between the use of power in anticipatory measures, and the abandonment of the democratic and friendly nations, the latter leading to the blind paroxysm of war.

Can the American people be convinced of the fullness of their responsibility, and therefore impelled to carry out those spiritual and governmental adjustments needed to improve their competence to fulfill their solemn and noble trust to all peoples and to themselves? My own view is that the American people cannot help but rise to the continuing challenge, one might even say, threat. In

any case, no acceptable alternative to her primacy of leadership is visible in the contemporary world. Who would quarrel with his only shield?

A very large proportion of the American people is anxious "to do right." Their consciences are stirred. Their democratic society has imbued them with "idealism" and a sense of responsibility in civic affairs. They yearn for leadership and purpose. They would make the effort and sacrifice which clear and trusted minds showed them to be necessary. But their good intentions are threatened with defeat by their dispersion over a wide area, their everyday absorption in the pursuit of material well-being, and above all by their *distance* from world events, so that foreign injustice and incipient threats to peace do not *move* them.

Many Americans, not less than foreign peoples, anxiously ask whether America is able to develop political democracy and economic justice at home; whether she can establish domestic stability; whether she can achieve industrial peace and continue and accelerate economic progress; and whether, then, as though by cause and effect, she can and will guarantee justice and security abroad? *If* these American qualities needed to be brought to a point of *perfection* before the world could breathe peacefully, the answer would be "No! Not for many years can the United States rise to a perfect standard of international preparation, any more than can any other democratic nation."

The answer would have to go further. For the purpose of successfully prosecuting her world duty, American perfection is not needed: duty can be accomplished much this side of perfection. It is not necessary to wait upon American perfection to commence those works of international policy which will maintain peace and open the field for justice. The cardinal fact is that good, but not absolutely certain, grounds exist for confidence in American ability to serve the world. For the rest, trust must be placed in the effect of evolving events on the remedial virtues secreted in the marrow and soul of her system of democratic government. Is there a single government in history of which a better prognostication could have been made at any time before the actual immersion in the sea of action? I think not.

The sheet anchor of faith that America will fulfill her world obligation is ultimately faith in her democratic system of government. Enough has already been suggested to indicate that the

major and minor flaws in American democracy are not unknown to us, or left out of account. But let no one lose sight of the main treasure: policy, at the mere wish of millions upon millions of American men and women, is in their hands, and their political system enables, even spurs them on to think, meet, associate, testify, argue freely, and enact measures through ingeniously contrived institutions, tried and tested for over 150 years. Through this network of mind and society, what has been good and necessary has finally been accomplished: America has been peopled, settled, developed, expanded, and defended. This is the primordial, incontrovertible and precious good. It is undeniable that the political truth has been impressively brought home to a sufficient number of citizens through voluntary association, meetings, forums, churches, free men talking to free men, the Congress, the Press.

That this process requires time is understandable, though the more sensitive and fearful and conscience-stricken are mortified by the lethargy of their fellow citizens. Yet consider: *This is the first democracy of such vast unwieldy size which has had to make such momentous decisions in the thin realm of contending ideas, and at so great a remove from the burning centers of conflict.* This is a stupendous experiment. It establishes 140,000,000 individual souls as the antennae of public feeling. It is always open to the most sensitive freely to solicit their fellow nationals, to mark the truth and lend their help.

History estimates that the chance that this kind of society can meet the challenge now before it is much better than indifferent; it is even good, but it is not certain. More confidence would be warranted had the United States not lived so nonchalant a life before the slap in the face that was heard around the world from Pearl Harbor. Since then the grounds of faith have been rather more substantial, in view of the lessons taught. Nor will the utterly fabulous works of improvisation accomplished to gird America for victory in World War II ever be forgotten as evidence of trustworthiness and miraculous ability.

A very large and growing proportion of the American people actively participates in the democratic process at all levels. Education is diffused throughout the nation in an unparalleled measure: it is being furthered at an important point in that characteristic act of faith and dignity, the educational provision for veterans.

Despite the mechanical quality of much of the educational process, its superficiality, and its want of philosophical and historical ballast, a massive trend swells the tide toward civic duty and world affairs. That is at once the fruit of democracy and its guarantee.¹

The sovereign vote will eventually establish as much social justice as the masses can absorb. The querulous, the peevish, those who always take a swift pace to the left, however left the most left-thinking people happen to be, the impotent and tormented, ought not to blind us to the existent considerable provision of justice in the system. It would be folly, indeed, a crime, to ignore the civil liberties and the long line of enactments in state and nation since the 1890's: freer, cleaner elections; improved judicial administration, social services; and the major movements under Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and the New Deal, to provide against monopoly, for public regulation of business, to support the farmer, strengthen the bargaining power of labor, cleanse the processes of commerce and finance, and establish social security.

The basic promise of the fulfillment of world trust exists. What must be done to move toward greater certainty? Two tasks impend: first, by unrelaxing persuasion to convince that an obligation exists, and second, to demonstrate that obligation dictates a process of self-improvement tending to make the means sufficient to the end. It is to the consideration of these two subjects that the chapter now turns: World Obligation and the Means of Fulfillment.

AMERICAN WORLD OBLIGATION

INEVITABLE INTERDEPENDENCE

America is inevitably bound to the rest of the world for reasons of economy, morality, and self-defense.

Economic

The standard of living of America's people is vitally dependent on exports and imports. Something like 10 per cent of American workers and their families live on the pay envelope that comes from their foreign customers. This is the best they can do for

¹ Cf. Finer, *Future of Government*, Chap. VII (1946).

themselves, or they would be doing something else. If a like proportion be added for imports, then about one-fifth of the American people make their living by foreign trade.² Cultivated, the proportion could be more. Full employment at good pay requires the promotion, not the slackening, of world economic interdependence.

In some American industries exports are especially striking, and the figures are simply an index of the vital dependence of the prosperity of American workers on such foreign furnished work. Thus, 53 per cent of the refined copper is exported; 28 per cent of the tractors; 18 per cent of printing machinery; 17 per cent of agricultural implements; 15 per cent of medicines; 14 per cent of industrial machinery, and the same of autos and trucks. The farmers sell abroad 31 per cent of their cotton; 29 per cent of tobacco; 21 per cent of rice; 49 per cent of linseed; from 30 per cent to nearly 50 per cent of their fruit; 12 per cent of wheat; and 12 per cent of their lard.³ The fact that a considerable part of the produce can find a market abroad, assists mass production with its economies for American consumers as well as foreign.

Furthermore, certain imports are almost or absolutely indispensable to the American economy and way of life because they supply parts and ingredients without which the rest, which may or may not be home produced, cannot be utilized in the finished product at a price cheap enough to meet the pockets of American consumers. Such, among others, are natural rubber, tin, oil, tungsten, certain iron ores, nickel, zinc, mica, particular kinds of cotton, wool, animal skins, clays. Of the 14 chief components of an American car, imports contribute from 30 to 100 per cent. Over 300 different imports from 56 countries are required to manufacture American cars as good as they are and as cheap as they are. The substitutes for these are either nonexistent, undiscoverable, less efficient, or excessively costly.

The consequence of economic isolation is harder and more disagreeable work, longer hours, more intense application, and not

² See *Estimate of Number of Persons Engaged in . . . Goods for Export*, U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Jan. 10, 1939; also, *Foreign Trade and Domestic Markets*, American Manufacturers' Association, 1935; also Sayres, testimony to U.S. Senate on continuation of Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 1944; and National Planning Association: *America's New Opportunities in World Trade*, Nov. 1944.

³ U.S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1938.

so many or such valuable commodities in return. This has never been the ambition of the American worker.

These estimates are deliberately conservative. The truth is that there is no such thing as "foreign trade": that is a misnomer. America lives on the rest of the world, even as the rest of the world lives on America. No escape from this mutuality exists, except deliberate renunciation of economic welfare, with its grim effect on the size of the population as well as the pay envelope of every family. Perhaps the very rich could afford the consequences, but hardly the masses. If this welfare were surrendered, America would not be less, but more, liable to foreign disdain and defensive weakness, unless all other nations embraced an equal self-abnegation and asceticism.

It is not bestial greed to declare that the fruits of the earth and relief from the burden of hard labor should be denied to no one—so long as their attainment does not rest on other peoples' enforced, involuntary sacrifices, and so long as the miracles of invention are distributed according to service rendered in production. Nor need America be ashamed of her investments in the raw materials or industry of other nations so long as they represent, and to the extent that they represent, bona fide application of equipment and knowledge and organizing skill, and are not bolstered by political oppression.⁴ Indeed, Karl Marx extols commerce as a diminisher of nationalism. It is not to this part of the *Communist Manifesto* that the Soviet rulers look for guidance. The "Open Door," though most clearly announced by John Hay in 1899, is classic American foreign policy, advocated and implemented in a general form by every administration and politician since the foundation of the Republic.⁵ Indeed, was not the Republic itself founded to vindicate the "Open Door" against the mercantilist restrictions of the British Government?

Grave errors in foreign policy will follow toleration of the sneers of eccentric "liberals" at dollar diplomacy, unless it is ap-

⁴ On Dec. 31, 1940, American long term investments totaled nearly 11 billion dollars: 36 per cent in Canada, 35 per cent in Latin America; 20 per cent in Europe; 6 per cent in Asia; 2 per cent in Oceania; 1 per cent in Africa. Cf. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Balance of International Payments*, 1940, p. 52, and *American Direct Investments in Foreign Countries*, 1940, pp. 4, 5. The United States has about one-third of all the foreign investments in the world.

⁵ Cf. Beard and Smith, *The Idea of a National Interest*; and Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny*.

preciated that the masses of the American people have shared in enjoyment of the results. Even if the profits of the business leaders are higher than they need or ought to be, the vast advantage goes to the people. They still use far more barrels of gasoline⁶ than any other people in the world, eat more sugar and candy, and use more rubber. If other peoples are exploited, then, indeed, the American electorate could insist that the share to themselves and their children be reduced. For sugar has meant traffic with Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines; gasoline meant Mexico and Texas, and means the Middle East; rubber means Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the security of the seas leading thereto. The interplay of economic prosperity and moral responsibility is plain; the one implies the other.

Self-preservation

Since making the gigantic effort that founded the Republic, the American people have never even toyed with the idea of national suicide or destruction. For their existence as a community and in its defense, they valorously advanced and dictated the supremacy of their will. They disposed the fate of Latin America and the interests of Europe in that region. They asserted their "manifest destiny" (manifest to them), over the two-thirds of America that once belonged to Spain and therefore, in part, to the Spanish

⁶ The facts ought to be known. In 1938 (taking this year to avoid wartime abnormalities), the United States consumed of petroleum products over 11 billion barrels, or about eight barrels per person; the rest of the world about 800 million barrels, among nearly two thousand million people! All Europe and the U.S.S.R. used less than one-half billion barrels, or less than one barrel per person. Thus the United States used eight barrels per person; Europe and U.S.S.R., less than one barrel per person. The United States share included over half a billion barrels for motor fuel alone, mostly to feed her 30 million motor vehicles. Total American production was 1.2 billion barrels. She imported about 54 million barrels. She exported about 42 million barrels of gasoline; 51 million barrels of fuel oil, etc., 9.3 million barrels of lubricants, and various processed products. It is estimated that her total known reserves are something like 19 billion barrels. At the rate of production of over a billion barrels a year, how avoid using Middle Eastern supplies? Let the American men and women who believe it to be a natural right to drive a car and have electricity and all the amenities, comforts and labor-saving devices using fuel, let them have their say, for what is said is foreign policy! The facts are taken from *Petroleum Facts and Figures*, 1941 edition; American Petroleum Institute. See also Senate *Hearings* on S. Res. 36, special committee to investigate petroleum resources and American petroleum interests in foreign countries.

masses. They were adamant and insistent upon the definition of the Canadian border. They brooked no obstacle to a masterful arrogation of the "freedom of the seas," and almost alone dictated international law on the subject. "The red line of cruelty" was sharply drawn on the long march from East to West over the bodies and gods of the American Indian.

Few Americans are prepared to accept the uttermost consequences of abjuring force. Not a single church has accepted the consequences, for the churches continue to live protected, nursed and kept from harm in the bosom of a society which fights their battles of preservation for them. Self-preservation has not seldom meant an escape from burdensome world responsibilities. Jefferson was even prepared "to be married to the British Navy," if that meant America's self-preservation.

Now the intervening seas have become narrow, and the protecting strength and benevolence of the British Navy is, relatively, not so strong, though still mighty. All who possess shorelines need watching. The stepping stones of Spitzbergen, Alaska, the Kuriles, the Pacific Islands, Greenland, Iceland, and Canada, are as available to others as to the United States for offense or defense. Above all, Latin America is wide open, temperamental, sovereign in its admissions of European aliens, unstable in regime, some of its countries harboring resentments (not always without historical justification) against the North, and of these the Argentine Republic is a problem of the first and growing dimensions. It is not for nothing that Soviet Russia established diplomatic relations with Argentina in 1946 after having been the determined foe of her entrance into the United Nations in 1945.⁷ The policies which follow are not the arbitrary choice of the United States Secretary of State, for the will and needs of the American people determine his duty. As soon as the American people are prepared to abandon self-defense and self-preservation, the Secretary of State and the Senate will find themselves sensibly relieved of anxiety. The living energies, the appetites and the ideals of the individual generate power-politics. The sovereign democratic vote, plus self-respect, equals world responsibility.

⁷ Cf. page 326, above.

Moral Standard

It is impossible for a democracy to cease to be devoted to principle abroad, lest the rot of cynicism strike at the soul of its political conduct in the homeland. The most glorious challenge in political philosophy is Saint Augustine's: "Unless they are founded on justice, what are states but bands of robbers?" An answer to the question would lead deeper into the profoundest recesses of human nature and destiny than the explorations of Dante under the guidance of Virgil. But the answer was given tersely by Christ: "Love thy neighbour as thyself"! It is the inescapable answer for 140,000,000 people in what purports to be a Christian nation, and only this saves them from a domestic plunge into large scale brutality and homicide.

That which distinguishes and dignifies man above the beasts and above the animal in himself,⁸ is his capacity for curiosity which leads him on to discovery of truth, and the faculty of anticipating pain in others, which may lead him to works of humanity. The passions on which these adventurous faculties take wing impel some men and women to remember their neighbor as themselves. Americans have excelled in humane works that seemed not to concern themselves. Their young nation was rent asunder by the travail of the French Revolution. The Civil War was an "irrepressible conflict." No mercenary aim sent young Americans to help the Greeks to independence in 1823. There was nothing to gain but grace, in protests against Tsarist pogroms, Turkish atrocities, or British rule in Ireland and India. Boys and men volunteered in the Abraham Lincoln Brigade to secure for the Spanish Republicans against Franco rights like those embodied in the United States Constitution. Truth and humanity were involved in the battles for and against Hitler and Mussolini, and are involved against Stalin, and the perennial and none too costly recommendations of a policy of unilateral nobility for Great Britain. And, finally, all generations entered two world wars with their lives in their hands. Man does not live by bread alone, but by self-respect; and the bread of affliction is sweeter than moral self-betrayal or murky self-disgust.

⁸ Charles Sherrington, *Man on His Nature*, London, 1944.

Therefore, Americans cannot plead, "Lord, let thy servant depart in peace," until *their* duty also is done. For their community would wither and the world of men outside be poorer, if the shining bonds of the seamless web of morality that unites them were rent. Should they seriously attempt it, Americans would be economically impoverished, live in the dread of self-preservative panic, and be morally destitute.

AMERICA'S SPECIAL OBLIGATION

America's destiny, then, will be costly, because it implies steady preparedness for any war that is forced on her, diplomatic action wherever called for, and a large armed force at what must be for the United States (in the words of War Department publicity), "The highest paid army in the world." It also requires the fostering of the economic advancement of backward countries. Those other nations which have borne the burdens and the cost in the past can no longer do so in anything like the same measure, for their substance has been spent in the struggles for survival.

The heavy cost cannot be avoided. The only question is whether the wise disposition of the unavoidable expenditure can prevent a greater calamity which will carry off millions of lives also. The exact cost cannot be counted: the purpose is hardly on a par with the purchase of a refrigerator or a derelict farm. It is not a little dismaying to see United States Senators, who surely must for long have pondered their nation's place in the world, rattling their dimes in their hands, as it were, when the inevitable, predicted day came to support Greece, and yet asking, "Where is this to end, and how much will it cost?" Mr. Lippmann, lucid and wise, also commits this fault, for his most constant thesis is: Let us consider what our interests are, let us consider what we can afford, and let us do only the things that we can afford!⁹ This is sophistical. Some things must be done, even if they cannot be afforded: "All that a man hath will he give for his life." To keep the standard of living, perhaps a substantial proportion of what we have must be cast upon the waters in ships. If United States Senators are the elected custodians of a vast, rich area of land in the exclusive enjoyment of only one-twentieth of the human race,

⁹ This is the burden of *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, 1943.

and *if* the rest of the world exerts economic and moral pressures upon it, and *if* the Senators would maintain the inestimable advantages and decencies of the democratic way of life, why should they not expect to have to pay for it? The world does *not* owe the United States a living. Nor can the United States live happily and serenely without allies and friends.

In World War II the United States spent directly on war material well over three hundred billion dollars, or the equivalent of three times the total national production of the year 1929, or about twice the total production in a year of full employment. Add the costs of reconversion, the strains of the postwar economy, the effort to arrive at a peacetime system of production and distribution. Nor can we omit the desperate problems in readjustment for millions, the lost years of living, the youthful years destroyed, the hopes that faded, the grey hairs brought down in sorrow to the grave. The losses in a future atomic, rocket, and bacterial war are appalling to contemplate. It is prudent to pay preventive installments.

The United States is the richest and most powerful country in the world, and for many decades, perhaps for centuries, will keep the lead. If anything can measure human obligation to others, it is the abundance of the means possessed to benefit or ruin other people's lives. No other measure of the *degree* of duty exists.

The United States is mighty by a combination of the vastness of its territory, the magnitude of its natural resources, variety of its climate, the education and culture of its people, and their technological ingenuity.

It is a truth of world importance that the original settlers, their descendants, and the immigrants to the United States seized for themselves a vast segment of the earth; this they converted into a society that claims and exercises the sovereign right of forbidding others, however virtuous or godly, to enter it. This, the exclusive, self-regarding, monopolistic exploitation and consumption of so extensive an area, is of primary importance in the weighing of American duty in the world. For no god bestowed this land as an exclusive heritage upon the United States; no concourse of nations benevolently sanctioned this gigantic privilege; no religious authority or world court of ethics ever ordained and legitimized this handsome, unrivaled, bequest. The 3,000,000 square

miles were seized, held, and converted into a sovereign exclusive territory, and largely into private property.

No justification can be urged for this "imperialism," if the term may for a moment be allowed, except the morality of its use. An appeal to international law only gives back what the prevailing powers wrote into international law: for that declares that the "right" to the land is founded on prior discovery, prescription, conquest, cession or purchase. But the only true justification for the tenure of a region and its resources is not the method of its acquisition, but the morality of its use.

Who has the "right" to anything, and what is a "right"? It is not unimportant that this problem should raise its head. For it pursues all national claimants with an inquiry into the morality, dignity, and purported use of their possessions; and the larger the possessions, the more excited the debate. The central claim for a monopoly of land and resources by the exclusion of would-be entrants is the aspiration of the residents to develop a superior civilization. It is for "ourselves," our "destiny," our "self-preservation," our "culture," our "mission," or "a service to Christianity," or because of Anglo-Saxon laws and customs. Even the great liberators Washington, Jefferson and Adams wished to preserve America's Anglo-Saxon culture against immigration.

In the face of so large an appropriation of the world's goods, it is difficult to purge one's self of the suspicion that a debt is owed to the rest of the world.

When Adam delved and Eve span,
Who was then the American?

Nobody excels the author in admiration of the unbounded ability, the inexpressible industry, the suffering and fortitude of the people in taming the wilderness of this continent; in their intrepid advance against the obstacles of terrain, weather, and poverty, to open all frontiers and clear all roads; and, then, to erect a marvelous, dovetailed, carved and polished edifice of law, manners, education and government, a civilization more magnificent than the Roman republic and empire, and accomplished in an incredibly brief span. Morality would say that the enjoyment rightfully belongs to those who have so wrought. But morality would observe, also, that debts are owing. For the fortunate 140,000,000 enjoy a wealth founded on the monopoly of the territory.

Of the original inhabitants hardly a trace has been left after the sternness of the imperial adventure. The economy was nourished by the slavery of a whole people, and their descendants are still subservient, not altogether treated as a people in trust. The original resources above and below the soil were ransacked and rapaciously consumed to create wealth, comfort, and luxury in the shortest time. Millions were enticed from their homelands to build the roads and railroads of the New World. They were given the entree to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." But soon the noble gates were closed; no longer did the poem ring true.

"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door."

In the end, the United States left herself open to the **sarcastic** retort from Hitler:

Mr. Roosevelt declares, further, that it is clear to him that all international problems can be solved at the council table. The answer: Theoretically, one ought to believe in this possibility, for common sense would correct demands on the one hand, and show the compelling necessity of a compromise on the other.

For example, according to all common-sense logic and the general principles of a higher human justice, indeed, according to the laws of a divine will, all peoples ought to have an equal share of the goods of this world. It ought not then to happen that one people needs so much living space that it cannot get along with fifteen inhabitants to the square kilometer, while others are forced to nourish 140, or 150, or even 200 on the like area. . . .

My skepticism, however, is based on the fact that it was America herself, who gave the sharpest expression to her mistrust in the effectiveness of conferences. For the greatest conference of all times without any doubt was the League of Nations. . . . The first state, however, that shrank from this endeavour was the United States.¹⁰

Even though this retort was not in good faith, its weight cannot be ignored. It is true that other peoples have their responsibilities regarding their birth rate. But this does not release the United

¹⁰ Speech of April 28, 1939, in answer to Roosevelt's message inviting to a ten-year truce and pledge not to attack thirty-one nations who were named.

States from her appropriate obligations. If she does not take people in, then let her power and beneficence go outward, for there is a due proportion between world contribution and self-welfare.

Nor should the debt to other peoples be forgotten, a debt arising out of their suffering at American hands in the past, and fully recorded by American historians. Whatever the righteousness and necessity of other peoples, they were forbidden colonization of Central and South America. Pressure, inspired revolutions, force, and despoilment of land and sovereignty were the lot of the Central American nations at the hands of the United States. Panama, Nicaragua, Colombia, Haiti, San Domingo were beset until American strategic and economic interests were satisfied. The Caribbean came under the American thumb. Texas and California were torn from Mexico, and that country, for its oil, reduced for decades to an appanage of American investors. More recently, the United States was uncompromising in securing its own will in the trusteeship of the Pacific Islands.

In the scales of world obligation it is not unreasonable to assay the gifts of civilization made by the old world to the new, gifts especially from the West. Law, government, parliamentary procedure, language, literature, philosophy, religion, science, educational method, and technology were priceless endowments. Dr. Vannevar Bush recently informed the United States Senate that America owed most of its *fundamental* science to foreign countries.¹¹ Some recent observers of Europe have noticed a sickening disparity between the resolution with which the American official authorities have taken from Germany a large group of scientists and industrial patents of all kinds, and the unmerciful lethargy with which government and people have rejected the plea for pity from the displaced persons, *all* of whom could be lodged in the United States and actually be lost to sight in its vastness.

It seemed to me a strange aberration when President Roosevelt chose to give nation-wide publicity to *I Am an American*, the eulogy of a Czech immigrant on the food, the work, the fishing, the car, the education for his daughter, as being the essence of Americanism. No single note is there heard of civic duty.¹²

Does not this suggest a considerable responsibility of the United

¹¹ Cf. *Hearings on Science Legislation*, S. 1297, U. S. Senate, Oct. 15, 1945, Part 2, p. 202.

¹² Cf. *New York Times Magazine*, May 18, 1941.

States for the peace and justice of the nations? It is intimated that some of the increment of determined monopoly and abundant endowment be returned. Is it a *civilization* that repudiates the claim?

If the general and special obligation is acknowledged it can be acquitted through (a) economic assistance and (b) the use of power to challenge evil, measured by those principles of democracy which the American people inherited, defended and perpetuated, and still rightly defend as the elementary basis of a good life.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

It cannot be maintained that to raise the standard of living throughout the world will infallibly secure peace. Wars do not arise from economic reasons alone. Nor is it possible to offer so much economic wealth that a peaceful yielding of independence and opinion would always follow everywhere. But, prudently, it might be possible to attach to the United States and democratic government, peoples who know that they are (a) free of foreign exploitation, (b) free from oppression by their own ruling classes who have inherited or seized power over them, and (c) if, year by year, they might anticipate some steady, if small, economic progress.

It is within the economic capacity of the United States, and it will be in the capacity of Great Britain and Western Europe, as well as the Soviet rulers, if they wish it, substantially to raise the standard of living of the backward peoples, but not all at once and not immediately. The range of need is far too great; the populations are too vast. The available and the foreseeable amount of labor, technology, and capital equipment is far too small for anything but modest beginnings and development.¹³ Between the United States, Great Britain, and the rest of Europe, something like 12 billion dollars a year could be applied to such works of development.¹⁴ With proper selection of projects and mass educa-

¹³ Cf. Clark, *Conditions of Economic Progress*, 1940; and Staley, *World Economic Development* (I.L.O., Montreal and Geneva, 1944).

¹⁴ Shortly after his return from Moscow, Mr. Stassen estimated that American economic aid abroad could and should be 10 per cent of annual national income. On June 5, 1947, Secretary Marshall proposed American aid to Europe, provided its nations agreed on a plan and to contribute to their own revival. He promised opposition to governments seeking to profit by perpetuating "human misery."

tion, this could be an important source of production, of full employment while the capital goods are being made in the lending countries, eventually creating customers for them. Above all, there would be hope and endeavor. The United Nations Economic and Social Council and the specialized agencies could assist this enterprise.¹⁵ The policy would be conditioned by the proper population policies.

The rejection of such policies, on the plea that Uncle Sam must not be a "sucker" or a Santa Claus, signifies only a heathen materialism, and would make it difficult for Americans who so plead, to assume any moral superiority over the objectives of the Soviet rulers. It is not possible for the United States to compete against Soviet promises: castles in the air have no ceiling. But sincere, if modest, economic advancement, accompanied by intelligent mass education, can easily defeat the grossly exaggerated subversive effect of "pie in the red sky." The leaders of the masses everywhere are prudent enough to know that they, also, can suffer from the Soviet's insincerity.

Such a policy of American economic assistance will find it indispensable to domesticate certain restive businessmen and tariff raisers, and eliminate the collusion of some employers and labor against lowering the barriers to trade. It will find it necessary to avoid using the loans as an interference with social control of the economy where that comes in the form of the *democratic* socialism of Western Europe. It may have to be tolerant toward "ingratitude." But the end is too important for these to be deterrents.

THE STATE OF MIND AND GOVERNMENT

Accompanying economic assistance, and as a paramount contribution to peace, the United States will exert power. This will mortify only those peoples with evil intentions. Her admonition cannot come early enough to those who might, like Hitler, who boasted of his providential somnambulism, slip step by step into irrevocable decisions with irremediable results for themselves and

¹⁵ See Finer, *The TVA: Lessons for International Application*, I.L.O., 1944; also, *The United Nations Economic and Social Council*, World Peace Foundation, 1946; and Staley, *World Economic Development*, I.L.O., 1943.

all mankind. The only self-restraint that need be exercised can be put in William MacNeile Dixon's words:

Yet it is possible through it all to accept Hegel's advice, "Be a person." Be a person and treat others as persons—if you must have a formula, there are not many better. That, or the English one, "Be a gentleman."¹⁶

In the present youthful stage of democratic government, it cannot be expected that every citizen shall comprehend, as fully as is desirable, the grounds and ends of a foreign policy which requires the United States to be the leader of an unspoken combination of like-minded nations until such time as full reliance can be placed in the United Nations. Strenuous efforts by the trusted leaders of the American people are necessary. Some events have given a fearful world the right to believe that Americans have, at last, seen the outlines of their duty. Among the signs and portents were: the unwisdom of the neutrality laws of the 1930's, the ineffectiveness of merely outlawing war, as in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or declaring that conquests would not be recognized; the inevitable entry into World War II and the masterly performance in its conduct; the resolutions of Congress promising continuous American participation in world affairs; the bipartisan leadership instituted by President Roosevelt; the development and ratification of the United Nations Charter; and the spirit and conduct of the Nuremberg Trials, with the purpose of creating new international law.

All these were favorable evidences of reliability. Yet, at the concrete stage of effectuating them, singular cause for dismay abruptly burst on the expectant world. It was as though the pledges had been regarded as enough in themselves, and that the price of peace were not the permanent, continuous, daily service in their fulfillment. One of the proposers of the famous H2B2 Resolution could not understand, on first hearing of it, the relationship between the World Bank idea and his resolution! When Mr. Truman's Greek policy was announced, politicians began the process of rereading the history of America in world affairs as though unconscious hitherto of the plight of Greece, Turkey, and Britain; as though time had no value, and as though Mr. Churchill had

¹⁶ *The Human Situation*, p. 298.

not fully and insistently informed the State Department in December, 1944, when the first crucial, and as it now appears, decisive measures were taken to avert a Communist seizure of power by force. The civic groups who had supported Dumbarton Oaks with every evidence of understanding and dedication, now talked of Greek policy as though they had never counted the long-term outcome of their attachment.

Few seemed to understand what they had accomplished; that the nations are much less than half in the United Nations and much more than a half out. They are united nations but not under a common government. For some purposes, then, action outside the Security Council was unavoidable. Did they not learn from their forums that the very disposition of the United Nations' voting power was a creature of the balance of power? If the attitude of the United States Senate had no impact on the peacemakers' minds, what of the practical reiteration of the Soviet's stringent idea of state sovereignty?

To avert the scourge of war and promote justice among the peoples, then, requires American attention to certain inadequacies.

American international duty can be fulfilled if her contribution is coherent, conscious, and constant: that is to say, if all the parts of her design, economic and political, assist each other's purpose; if the policy be fully comprehended in aim, spirit, and chain of consequences; and if there reign faithfulness, steadiness, unwavering aim, and loyalty in all eventualities. Britain gave something of these gifts to Europe and the United States from the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, to World War II. Can the United States assure them? When the United States' path is uncertain, all nations will severally try to reinsure themselves by the usual maneuvers of power politics, a procedure which will conduce to war. And the United States needs allies to limit and share the cost.

The American People

The criterion is the grave consequence of dereliction of duty for the American people themselves. Their educational opportunities are the broadest in the world, yet hitherto their responsibilities, even in domestic affairs, have not been revealed to them because the maxim, "Know thyself!" has been neglected. Chronology and

a multiplicity of facts are no substitute for world history and perspective. The tendency to parochialism has even received an impetus from research funds, and a misguided emphasis on knowing your city before you know your nation. The chapter on nationalism has shown why it can never be too early to learn about civilization at large. The recent trend to "general education" in the colleges offers some remedy, as does the perceptible impact of the war on high school students and veterans. The colleges hold the key to the development from the youth of today of the statesmen of a few years hence.

The mechanical and utilitarian aspects of American education, making strenuously for individual and national wealth, need counteraction if good world citizens are to be nurtured. Harrington said: "Education is the plastic art of government." A long road has yet to be traveled.

Where a further education is obtained from church or civic groups, a certain air of unreality usually obtains. For such groups are usually pacifist, either avowedly, or confusedly through misunderstanding of their own thoughts, knowledge of the world, or through a wish to escape from reality. It is of tremendous world importance that the American people wish so ardently to do what is "right." Yet many seem to anticipate that some mellifluous slogan and the gift of a few cows will charm all nations into the bosom of a single family. Too many fail to see that the problem is to secure a universal response to their own unilateral self-restraints, assuming the latter are fulfilled. Whenever action must be taken by the use of power, even if only financial aid, they are inclined to retreat. But such is not a reliable education for international duty.

What the American churches forget is that they live a highly sheltered life. Even when they are poor, they are very rich compared with most of their European and Eastern counterparts. Evil seems far distant from them. Hostile forces were long since defeated by the Republic's soldiers. Their condition blinds them to the forces that must be kept in awe if their divine services are to be continued. Hence, their teaching is not altogether equal to the grim task of this generation. It is even doubtful whether they know and tell the true story of the ascent to triumph of the Christian churches.

American education lulls its recipients. Its apparatus—books,

playgrounds, leisure activities—is incomparably rich. Its academic tests are not rigorous. Employment is ample and competition not crushing. It is, consequently, almost impossible to convey to American youth the bitterness of the struggle for existence of other peoples. However poor, the vast majority of Americans are content, happy, and complacent. Their wealth, accepted uncritically, makes it difficult for them to see the fate of other peoples, even if they stand on tiptoe to look over the soda counter. Prosperity persuades them that other peoples lack virtue and character if they do not own the machines that bring abundance. Special efforts of leadership and education are required to overcome this unjustified feeling of superiority lest it lead either to isolationism or lack of sensitiveness to the rights of other people.

Furthermore, America's geographic character requires the remedy of man-made plans, for the American people are dispersed over a truly enormous area, in many sparse as well as urban groupings. No community of this extent has ever before been democratically governed. Wrapped in their local affairs and occupations, without the crowding which knits mind to mind, the stimulus of discussion is lost, and they tend to become the passive and only half-listening recipients of scrappy and biased news from the press, the radio and the films, sensational, personal, and fleeting.¹⁷ The time for reflection is scant, the occasion flimsy, and the machinery for the nation-wide exchange of ideas ramshackle. As in the world, so in the wide American continent: news that concerns the whole society is not brought to bear on, and does not dwell with, each individual continuously and vividly enough; still less are discussion, cross-examination, and swift circulation thoroughly provided for. The incoming impression is swept away by its urgent successor long before it can affect the mind. The United States could use a UNESCO for itself alone.

The many forums and associations that interest themselves in peace, conduct research, and publish pamphlets, are a welcome promise of awakening responsibility. On the whole, they are a good influence. They usually have a deficiency which urgently requires repair—they tend to become panacea mongers. Their thoughts must usually end “on an optimistic note.” Peace seems to be just ’round the corner, if only the correct incantation could be

¹⁷ Cf. Annals of American Academy of Political Science: *The Press in the Contemporary Scene*, Jan. 1942; Llewellyn White, *The American Radio*, 1947.

found. It is as though the curse of Cain could be lifted from the brow of man by the smart discovery of the right combination. Dedicated to peace, their temper does not allow them to open the cupboard and show the skeleton. When "idealism" is the knowing purpose to do right, it cannot be lauded enough; but sentimentality is no help, for that is merely the good-natured fancy to do right, hardly knowing what it entails, and devoid of the effective fortitude to achieve it.

Immunity from the horrors of war in one's own home, horrors the European and Eastern peoples have seen, makes for a good-natured, optimistic, cushioned existence. The mood of substantial generosity is inconstant, and understandably occasional. A far heavier task is therefore laid on the American people: to understand far distant grimness from a snug niche. They must learn from the rumble of a distant drum. Few peoples have ever been asked to perform so difficult a deed. The brave men and women who wrought prodigies of heroism and administrative mastery in two world wars were still not numerous enough to carry home a compelling tale of a wild, wild world, and its drastic imperatives. Today Britain, desperate for men in production, nevertheless has established conscription, but not so the United States.¹⁸ Nor was the increase of professional forces in America easily attained; nor were the funds for the fulfillment of international pledges promptly provided.

Apart from two or three newspapers of national, but limited, circulation, few show steadiness and sagacity. The editorials rise and fall with the facile optimism or pessimism of the day, or between morning and afternoon. A frame of reference formed by history, cultivation, and reflection is missing. The purest personal prejudices often dominate the "slant" of the paper. In addition to the unexamined clichés of history—"chestnuts," "outworn Europe," "imperialism," "suckers," "tricky diplomacy," "red-baiters," "mediation," "it's none of our business"—there is that outnobbling of the noble by newspapers and magazines which advise no action unless it is so noble as to be utterly impossible. If only the perfect can do good, then good can never be done!

¹⁸ Compulsory military service was recommended by the President's Commission on Universal Military Training, June 1, 1947, "to safeguard the United States and to enable us to fulfill our responsibilities to the cause of world peace and the success of the United Nations."

The Politicians

It is not intended to assert that any people is, en masse, more competent to apprehend the conditions of peace, war, and justice, than the American. It is the American problem in itself that is relevant and material. Is the number of political leaders who are competent to repair the shortcomings of the masses adequate? The professional contribution of political leaders to the people is vision and constancy. From the leaders the maturing, but not yet fully equipped, people solicit the annunciation of principles and ends; prognostication of future events; diagnosis of the parts in the whole design of the near or distant objective; clarity regarding the efficacy of the means to the ends; equity to determine the proportionate burden each group should justly bear on the road to the goal.

If vision is the criterion, then, from time to time, America has been blessed with splendid leaders in world affairs, and sooner or later their insight has been accepted by the people. But "sooner or later" in an age of weapons of mass destruction is hardly a rock of salvation. Other peoples are repeatedly troubled by the unpredictability of American leadership. They suffer strong shocks from a partisanship that threatens to undermine policy by involved and inscrutable maneuvers. They recall the inordinately long months when the loan to Britain, in 1946, suffered obstruction, delays, and even serious doubt of being made. They observe that the Truman policy on Greece was challenged as a smart move to embarrass the Republicans. If partisanship were contained within the political parties, some bounds to confusion would spare other peoples' confusion and uncertainty. But every Congressman feels he may for a time, at any rate, pursue his private foreign policy in public and in Congress. Every crotchet, indiscretion, idiosyncrasy; every freakish bout of peevishness or rodomontade; every burst of spleen, has its vehement outlet to the confusion of America and the consternation of the rest of the world. So with Greek policy; so with policy toward the Soviet Union. So with Senator Vandenberg's interview in the *New York Herald Tribune* while he was a member of Mr. Byrnes's delegation to Paris in June, 1946—on his insistence on firmness with Russia. So with the economic aid program: suddenly there are warnings to retrench by Senator

Vandenberg and Mr. Hoover. But who, then, was speaking the American mind? Or consider Admiral Halsey's, "We will sail any damn place we choose!" Whose was the voice? Who was committed?

Another instance is American leadership on Palestine. Who could be sure at any point of time of the true mind of the leaders on this vital matter: President, State Department, members of the Congress? It was often rumored in Washington that while the President was declaring one thing, the State Department was declaring simultaneously a contradictory policy. No one has ever known who came first and at what accepted cost: Jews, Arabs, British, or American interests.

Beyond this, however, is the memory of errors costly beyond price to many of the suppliant peoples.

(1) They see America's defection from the League of Nations after so weighty a part in the initiation and drafting of the Covenant by America's Chief Executive. They review the consequences: the incapacity of Britain and France to bear the burden the Covenant imposed of sanctions against aggressors. They can still read the work of an American scholar whose horizon was too limited to see what the documents and experience demonstrate—that peace was lost by American defection.¹⁹

(2) They cannot obliterate the memory of the Senate's rejection before World War I, and since, of general arbitration treaties, and the Senate's persistent limitation of their universality and scope.²⁰ Membership of the World Court in 1946 was subjected to the reservation of "matters of domestic jurisdiction" in America's sole interpretation thereof, and this proviso was pressed by Senator Connally, America's delegate to the United Nations Charter Conference.

(3) They recall the refusal to cancel the First World War debts. The economic basis of the proposal envisaged correctly the welfare of all nations; but the debts were treated as private commercial debts between private persons, rather than as a contribution according to ability in a common enterprise benefiting all. France had literally been bled white.

(4) The flow of "hot money" to the German Reich was not hindered by public opinion or by the government; nor were the

¹⁹ Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940*, pp. 2, 3.

²⁰ Cf. Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community*.

cartel arrangements with some of Hitler's industries innocent of war preparations.

(5) The neutrality acts and the Johnson Act of the 1930's seemed to other peoples a rejection by America of the duty of solidarity in the battle against evil.

(6) It is always wondered whether the frantic following of certain absurdities will be repeated: such as Quincy Howe's thesis in *England Expects Every American to Do His Duty*, 1937; or Walter Millis's in *The Road to War*, 1935; or Gerald Nye's canard that wars are made by armaments profiteers. These sudden sweeps of passion produce bad dreams for peoples whose freedom has come to depend so largely on American judgment and calm purpose.

(7) The world was long confused by the ambiguous activities and assurances of the American leaders in the Sino-Japanese conflict. They gave the impression that the United States was ready to take sterner measures than Britain or France from the Manchuria incident onward. But American historians conclusively demonstrate that American policy never went beyond "approval" (if that) of League action, without practical assistance.²¹ For Britain alone, it might have meant sending more than half her fleet to the other end of the world.

(8) The slogan, "All aid short of war," meant death for millions of Europeans in the most hideous forms. The rest of the world might well have been enslaved, so slow was America in coming to the rescue in World War II. The years from 1939 to 1941 show American parties split wide open, the leaders fumbling, the rank and file off at personal tangents. Yet, it is difficult to impute the kind of blame—tergiversation, self-deception, lack of continuous candor—that some do to either Roosevelt or Willkie,²² for it was a very difficult matter to bring home to the American people, once the shooting had begun, the conviction of their duty. A democracy needs and craves leaders with ideals, vision and courage.

(9) Mr. Churchill's decisive and healthy action in Greece in December, 1944, was reviled by American political leaders; his policy excoriated in a public message by Mr. Stettinius, then newly installed as Secretary of State; a message hailed by the press and among the "foreign policy" groups. But Mr. Churchill was right,

²¹ Cf. The neat analysis by B. W. Wallace in *American Pol. Sci. Rev.*, Feb., 1945, "How the U.S.A. 'Led the League in 1931.'"

²² Professor Beard, *op. cit.*, is unfair to the task these men were responsible for performing.

as the State Department in March, 1947, was constrained to admit.

(10) A policy of "peoples speaking to peoples" is essential to support the pledges of international peace—but Congress in 1947 obstructs *The Voice of America*, slaps a tariff on wool and weakens the Reciprocal Trade Act.

The contribution, then, of historical perspective and sagacity that the masses must ask of their leaders in America, is uncertain and uneven. Where it is lacking there is no tonic to the fearful, nor warning to the tough. Destiny imposes the obligation, above all, to see clearly all round, for those who see clearly may walk straight.

Executive Incoherence

The rest of the world can only guess what America's foreign policy may be: coherence similar to that of the British executive does not exist. The President may speak, but foreigners will then attempt to discover whether what he says is in consonance with the State Department, the Senate, the House, the Press, and then with the congeries of associations who speak on foreign affairs. It is necessary to guess who is the confidential adviser of the President, for it almost certainly is not the men in the cabinet. The minds of men like Colonel House, Leahy, Hopkins, Cohen, and Dulles must be understood if foreign adjustment to probable American action is to be achieved. Nor is the State Department a constant unit; its most marked characteristic is flux. The Secretaries and the Under-Secretaries come and go so fast that even their names cease to be remembered in the course of weeks. The published reasons for their appointment or resignation offer little clue to the current of policy. Their relationship to Presidential thought is obscure. For long, Washington correspondents explained the disagreements and dislike between Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes; but, of a sudden, harmony was declared. Within a trice the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Wallace and the President perpetrated one of the most remarkable blunders (permission to make a speech on Soviet-American relations in September, 1946) in diplomatic history. It was obvious that they did not know what they had done.

Now it takes many years, perhaps twenty, fully to fathom the politics of any one foreign country sufficiently to appraise

its part in international relationships. Who stays so long in the State Department? How, for example, could it come about that at the Yalta Conference the President of the United States agreed to the Soviet figures of reparations, while the British did not?

Further, all must depend on the Senate, an uncertain, fluctuating, and inveterately partisan forum, which in the past has been too prone to mend its fences rather than its faith, and to speak for the record rather than to search its soul. Perhaps the peace of the world depends on whether this body can rise to greatness. It is not securely placed on the political level which *The Federalist* designed for it, where its objectives are "stability of character," to be "informed"; to observe "fidelity to the object of government."²³

Some illustration of executive incoherence in recent years is advisable to depict the heaviness of the burden thrown on the reliance of foreign nations on America's state of mind.

If, in the long run, the Morgenthau Plan for Germany was undesirable and could not be enforced, why was the Plan allowed to leak out, and with some semblance of official recognition?²⁴ It has confused action, assisted the Soviet Union to pose as the friend of Germany, shaken the faith of the German people in more reasonable plans of the United States, and fed anti-Semitism.

The brusqueness of the termination of Lend-Lease to Great Britain was unnecessary, disconcerting, productive of later economic and financial troubles, and even of abrupt decisions regarding Greece and Turkey. The blithe removals of ration controls immediately after victory over Japan, in entire disregard of prices and supplies for the rest of the world, reduced the value of American loans to foreign countries and heaped additional burdens on stricken economies whose workers were still not getting enough to eat. American purchasing power could outbuy short supplies in competition with the poorer peoples. Then the whole wage-price nexus was thoroughly examined by experts and the dangers of inflation clearly foretold. But instead of taking heed, many in high quarters persisted in bleating of the danger of "deflation." The difficulty this creates for international comradeship is that these selfish policies remind those abroad of the Coolidge

²³ No. LXII.

²⁴ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany Is Our Problem*.

attitude to the debts of the First World War. They seem to betoken lack of coherence and constancy.

Further, the problem of Germany seems not to have been confronted in a spirit of clarity and earnestness. American commanders, press correspondents, religious ministers, and private visitors have continually reported the extremely bad behavior of American troops. *Odit vitiae, odit homines*. If you hate vice, you hate men. Yet there is a season for virtue. Those who come as the messengers of the democratic faith to a country excessively ready to despise and reject it have obligations, and it is the supreme duty of their government to enforce them. The issue happens to be civilization: it may be lost for the want of a nail.

The failure to prevent the suicide of Goering or the sabotage of the Munich broadcasts to Russia could be regarded by too many open and secret enemies as the symbol and the fruit of infirmity of purpose. They could be regarded as a sign that America was not serious enough in Europe to be adamant in administration. Some day her enemies may fight again, perhaps successfully.

A long list could be made of disturbing indiscretions: divulgence of British presence in Iceland before the United States was in the war; a journalist's breach of faith revealing the end of the war with Germany, in spite of a clear pledge of confidence; open quarrels between the State Department and Ambassador Hurley in Chungking; the public brawls on Argentinian policy; the leakage of documents from the State Department. The complicated incoherence of policy, constitutional doctrine, and lack of unity between the President, State Department and supreme military chiefs revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation, cost many thousands of foreign as well as American lives.

The conclusion is unavoidable: the United States Constitution is part of the Constitution of the world, and *noblesse oblige*. The balance wheel of world peace is American policy and constancy.

For freedom-loving peoples the final, convincing test of truth or falsity of moral judgment, and therefore of Duty, "stern daughter of the voice of God," is willingness to fulfill all its consequential demands—all. Proof of the validity of a policy can only be approximate, never complete. But others will accept a leader's vision as true, if it is so true for him that he suffers even more than the loss of life for its establishment. The strength of Christ, of Socrates when he deliberately rejected the open

door to escape from the hemlock; St. Francis, Joan of Arc, Lincoln, Wilson, and of so many lesser lights among mankind, was not their eloquence, their logic, their promises of a cornucopia, but their constancy. The test of credibility, especially in the relations between nations, is the fullness and constancy of sacrifice in the support of justice and peace. If then, the United States will fulfill her high vocation and the ideals not seldom proclaimed on her behalf by her geniuses of vision—Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt—and cover one more frontier, the frontier of world disorder, then the inexorable road is the road of faithful and consistent action. Will this democracy do its duty at least as zealously as the Communist government does, but with mercy?

The Truman Message indicated the aim:

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members.

We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

A reformation, then, of the public mind and its agencies, the constitutional machinery, is needed at the points where deficiencies have been revealed. Implied also, are certain economic and social repairs, to which some attention must now be paid.

INDUSTRIAL PROSPERITY AND PEACE

America's destiny of world leadership will be the better mastered if she is wealthy, economically stable, and if her welfare is not frustrated by class and occupational grievances. A determined attack is overdue on depressions, social misery, and industrial disorder.

Depressions

For almost all other nations a depression in the United States is a major disaster that devastates their homes with hunger and sorrow. This is clear from the figures showing how their economies intertwine with that of the United States.²⁵ They must sell to so large and wealthy a customer to acquire the dollars with which they may buy raw materials, food, manufactures, and tools from America. The ratio of exports to the total national income of some countries is very high; for example: New Zealand, nearly 35 per cent; Canada, 23 per cent; Australia, 17 per cent; Sweden, 17 per cent; Japan, 14 per cent; France, 12 per cent; Italy, 11.5 per cent; Great Britain, nearly 11 per cent; Germany, nearly 7 per cent. Of all continental Europe's exports of merchandise (not including Soviet Russia), some 6 per cent was bought by the United States.²⁶ This is the difference between poverty, unemployment, and relative contentment. It can ill be lost. Further, another proportion of the fruit of the labor of other countries goes indirectly to the United States, since it constitutes an ingredient of the commodities made and exported to them by still other countries.²⁷ The world is intricately bound up in a world-wide network of trade,²⁸ and the United States, through her sales, investments and loans abroad, is the supreme creditor. Her uni-

²⁵ See p. 371, above.

²⁶ League of Nations, *The Network of World Trade*, table 38; 1942.

²⁷ Cf. *op. cit.*, *passim*.

²⁸ Cf. Finer, *United Nations Economic and Social Council*, 1946.

lateral establishment of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff, by excluding or obstructing imports from abroad, threw Europe into the final desperation of the Great Depression, in spite of the pleas of their governments.²⁹ The most magnificent economic boon that America can offer to other nations is to prevent or abate her own depressions, and to open the way for their goods.

Enough is known to stem heavy depression.³⁰ The whole apparatus of government, including public works, taxation policy, the manufacture of capital-export goods, subsidies to production of appropriate goods for poorer consumers—all these can contribute to the maintenance of full employment in the United States and stability abroad. It is not necessary to predict absolute success to suggest that the trial is desirable, as it is without doubt politically necessary at home. The Full Employment Act of 1946 recognizes the need and acknowledges the means. The Soviet rulers' not disinterested prediction of inevitable depression³¹—the last hope and talisman of their claim to economic superiority—links depression with capitalist military adventures to divert the mind of the masses from unemployment. This is the acme of malicious and envious nonsense, and it can be given the lie by American statecraft.

The initiative and energy and ability brought into the specialized agencies of the United Nations by the American representatives augur well for her fulfillment of her international economic responsibilities. I have personally witnessed the American effort. The leadership has been constant and effective. The testing time, however, is still to come; success depends upon the better organization of *political* leadership, and its growth in consciousness and wisdom. It is the leaders' special task to wean the American people from impatience of law and order, and to administer sedatives to the undoubted "boom-and-bust" spirit widely prevalent. And the "lobby" must be prevented from strangling such pillars as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, much as that falls short of a full free trade.

²⁹ Cf. League of Nations, *Commercial Policy in the Inter-War Period*, 1942. Beveridge, *Full Employment in a Free Society*, 1945; among others.

³⁰ Cf. League of Nations, *Commercial Policy in the Post-War World*, 1945;

³¹ Cf. Varga, *Two Systems*, 1939; as well as the continual Cassandra-notes of M. Tarle in the Soviet press. Cf. also *On the Teaching of Political Economy in the Soviet Union*, 1945; New York, International Publishers.

Social Improvement

The welfare of the American people must be bettered and tensions between employer and worker eased, if it is desired to attach all Americans to love of their country. Some qualities of the American economy are incomparable. These are the wide opportunities for economic advancement, the career open to the talented, the existing and rising standard of living, the fact that labor cannot be treated as a mere commodity. Yet one-third of the people is ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-fed, ill-educated, sick and ill-tended. Still monopolies and inequities exist in the conduct of production. The economic pride of America, so well justified, needs to be bettered by social adjustment. The policy is essential for humanity, for the increase of productive energies,³² and to lend concrete veracity to the democratic principle of equality. All signs point to substantial achievement in this field.

Industrial Peace

Neither workers nor employers are always in the right. What both must learn, if they are to fulfill their trust as Americans and as world citizens, is that both together are the managers of social possessions which, whoever owns the property therein, are society's instruments of production, the only gate of the people to a livelihood. They have a double duty: one to each other, and both together to utilize the instruments of production—the plant, the inventions, the processes, the tools—to the maximum that their energy, brains, organizing skill, and science permit. The competitive principle of enterprise allows freedom to the employers on the basis that they perform the social trust of the

³² Cf. Testimony of Dr. Vannevar Bush, and President James Conant of Harvard University on the loss of inventive talent through financial inability to get full training. U. S. Senate Hearings, S. 1297; 2, 199 ff.; and Conant, 5, 977 ff. Cf. also the recommendation of the President's Advisory Committee on universal military training:

"A strong united, healthy, and informed nation.—This is our number one security requirement. It is the bedrock on which all our military preparations depend. The vigor and vitality of our democracy, as expressed in improved health, education, productivity, and morale of the American people, are of paramount importance, not only for ourselves but also for millions subject to the deception of totalitarian philosophies abroad."

greatest production at the lowest cost for the consumer.⁸³ The workers' movement owes *its* value to the idea that it acts in trust for *all* workers and the public. Both sides in industry have from time to time sadly betrayed their social trust and reduced America's production below the level it is able to attain. Both sides have practiced monopolistic and tyrannical behavior and taken crushing advantage of the need of others—an advantage prohibited by the common Christian tenets they profess.

Unfortunately, today, the proper scale of wages and profits is submitted to the arbitrament of open war. No rule or obstacle stands in the way of a chain reaction of strike upon strike in successive occupations, each side trying to recoup the rise in prices produced by the concessions made to labor in the last round. It would seem from analysis of statistics over a long period, that once, and *if*, the organized and striking occupations have lost their gains to the occupations which buy less of the higher priced goods, all workers will derive little benefit from strikes. Where is the justice in this? And where can it end? The labor movement has produced no harmony of principle within its own ranks, except the American Federation of Labor's and Mr. J. L. Lewis's doctrine that they stand for free competitive enterprise "so long as labor gets its cut." What sort of civic morality or public trust is this? Full and free competition of labor and capital no longer prevail. Labor, for its part, adds to the difficulty with "slowdown" practices, restrictions on entering trades, and the "closed shop." The employers have brought labor's policy of "stand and deliver" upon themselves because they have practiced, and seem to believe in, the same ethics of "pull devil, pull baker." It is not a happy thought that the 14,000,000 organized workers can make the 30,000,000 unorganized pay part of their wages.

If the United States is to keep on an even industrial keel, and the division of the products of industry are to be made fairly between workers and employers, and among the various occupations, then we must adopt the Swedish and the Australian methods of self-discipline among the fully federated labor unions: the collective contract, the control of strikes by the federal council

⁸³ This is the theoretical justification of Hayek's *Road to Serfdom*; and Mises' *Bureaucracy*.

of all the workers for all industry, wage-fixing machinery under government protection, and compulsory arbitration. Not a shred of public reason exists for the jurisdictional strike. It is to be hoped that labor, which, above all, is the representative of democracy, will learn to restrain its appetites, so that its strikes will not destroy the welfare of the proletarians in other nations, as the shipping, rail, telephone, and automobile strikes helped to do. This is a duty owed to the workers of the world by American workers.

If the measure in which the tasks of controlling depressions, raising the standard of living, and making labor relations a province of law and order are met, so will American strength and faith be available to lead other peoples toward a world free from war. Does not such a destiny and such a policy offer significance to the lives of all who care to know the road to self-respect? Who deserves any respect if, when he knows better, he continues to live in what Plato called the City of Swine, and to practice what Carlyle called "the Pig-philosophy"?

VALE

It is not given to any man at this moment to say indubitably that the American people will master the spiritual comprehension of their world obligation, and bestow peace upon the world by the ingenious and compassionate exercise of their consolidated strength. Necessity, I believe, will teach America the way to help the world out of an interminable succession of wars or despotic rule.

How many nations have yearned for, but been denied, as high a moral opportunity as that which now lies before America! It is in her choice to return to the older civilization some of the cost of their spirit and blood, and to bestow the chalice of liberty on others. It was a friend of America's liberty who employed his magnanimous mind and golden tongue on her behalf, with an appeal which history, in urgent supplianee, now addresses to her. Edmund Burke promised, and rightly:

As long as you have the wisdom to keep the sovereign authority of this country as the sanctuary of liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith, wherever the chosen race and sons of England worship freedom, they will turn their faces toward you.

The more they multiply, the more friends you will have; the more ardently they love liberty, the more perfect will be their obedience. Slavery they can have anywhere. . . . But until you become lost to all feeling of your true interest and natural dignity, freedom they can have from none but you. This is the commodity of price of which you have the monopoly.

Surely this need not apply only to the sons of England, but to all people.

No objective test of truth in the highest social matters is available to man, nor is any single revelation of progress or duty so inherently valid for the millions upon millions of striving creatures that they can tacitly move as one to a foreordained end which all equally avow. It is the democratic way, and only the democratic way, that opens the road wide and far for the continuous experiment in living that may discover the fullness of happiness and the inspiration of acknowledged duty. On the democratic path, coercion of the individual by the government is the last reluctant remnant, for democracy cherishes individuality. There coercion is not, as in dictatorships, the first crude blow to defeat those who know and feel and long to be heard in this brief span given to them to nourish that particle of divinity with which the least has been endowed—that “one talent which is death to hide.”

Man needs the great society, yet he craves at the same time a guarantee for his individuality. He needs, then, a unifying faith which will keep men in easy relationship with each other; which casts out slavery and sustains social responsibility, but leaves the balance of the two at his disposal, free to evolve. The condition can be supported by a democratic government, and by no other. For it is the historically demonstrable nature of man that no single transcendent principle of the supreme good and truth exists that can carry to all of us an unchallengeable conviction founded on revelation or scientific proof. The good and the true inhere in all of us, and we come to their fuller recognition in ourselves and in others in the unfolding experience of society. No external pattern, objective and cosmic, is set above all. The pattern, if it becomes one, springs from the internal contributions we each make, even if passively. Thus, men are thrown back on their own resources. What, then, have they to discover? A way by which they may steadily, durably, tranquilly, and with the least coercion,

develop and externalize the truth in themselves, the truth of the spirit, of beauty, of economic desire and activity. At the same time they must offer, create, and defend the open way for others, because the truth is also inherent in others, and may be more significant when it finds expression. They must also defend it to assure the acceptance of their own truth. Only the democratic way fulfills these conditions of the dignity of man; this is the only Open Way. All other arguments for the values of democracy are important, but they are lesser arguments.

The more this creed is spread and maintained, the better the assurance of domestic and international peace and justice, the assurance that truth and the arts may flourish and mankind scale the heights which, with their infinite possibilities, have ever beckoned.

That they shall beckon and not mock, demands vital renewals of mind and institutions, of public spirit and education. Among the nations the United States is incomparably equipped to take up this challenge, for she has the power and the heritage. She looks down on forty centuries. If she fits herself betimes, the effort will be severe and the sacrifices costly. But how better can men spend their substance than to avert massacre and support reason? If she fails, her fate will be costly beyond measure, for in addition to substance and lives, chivalry and self-respect will also be lost.

The issue, then, is the democratic way for all—to hold open the road for it everywhere in its due season. The means are strength, preparedness, constancy, and the recognition of duty. The tactics are those of persuasion; but if failure threatens after the uttermost long-suffering, force must be used. The spirit animating the exertion of strength to the dedication of our purpose must be charity: charity for the weakness of our vision, the fragmentary nature of our truth, and the penitential feebleness of our flesh.

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